JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This is plaintiffs appeal arising from a suit for recovery of possession of shop and for recovery of the sum of Rs. 280/- on account of damages for use and occupation of the shop and for Rs. 370.90 on account of arrears of profits of partnership. The suit has been dismissed by the learned court below. 2. Admittedly Kalyan Chand, respondent No. 2, was the owner of the shop in dispute. On 17-10-1961 a document was executed between Kalyan Chand, respondent No. 2 and Sita Ram Gupta respondent No. 1. This document is Ext. 22 on record of the Court below and has been described as a deed of partnership. Cn 21-7-1971 Kalyan Chand, respondent No. 2, executed a deed of sale in favour of the appellant. Through this deed he transferred the property of which the shop in suit forms part in favour of the appellant. Along with the property he also transferred the sum of Rs. 1548.71 which according to Kalyan Chand had accrued due to him from respondent No. 1 by way of profits of the partnership created under Ext. 22. After executing the sale deed in favour of the appellant respondent No. 2 issued notice to-respondent No. 1 on 26-7-1971 requiring him to vacate the shop. Before execution, of the sale deed Kalyan Chand had issued notice to respondent No.1 on 27-10-1970 purporting to dissolve the partnership Another notice was issued by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 1 on 2-8-1971 requiring him to pay the arrears of profits. Through this notice respondent No. 1 was also intimated of' the sale of the shop in favour of the appellant and required him to vacate the-shop and hand over possession to the appellant. Respondent No. 1 did not comply with this notice and thereafter the appellant filed a suit which has given rise to the present appeal. 3. The appellants case before the court below was that the transaction evidenced by Ext. 22 was a transaction of partnership between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 and that by virtue-of the sale deed executed in her favour by respondent No. 2 she had become entitled to possession of the shop. Her further case was that Ext. 22 at the most, created licence in favour of respondent No. 1 and the transaction was not one-of tenancy. Her further case was that Ext. 22 at the most, created licence in favour of respondent No. 1 and the transaction was not one-of tenancy. It was also pleaded that the shop in question had been newly constructed and was exempt from the operation of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. 4. The above suit had initially been-, filed only against Sita Ram Gupta. Kalyan Chand, appellants transferor was impleaded subsequently. In his written, statement Kalyan Chand supported the case of the appellant. The case in the-court below was contested by respondent No. 1 alone. His case was that the shop-in question was an old construction and was governed by the provisions of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act No. 3 of 1947. His further case was that the transaction evidenced by Ex. 22 was actually transaction of lease and it was given the cloak of a partnership in order to circumvent the provisions of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. According to respondent No. 1 none of the grounds prescribed under Section 3 of the-Act was present which entitled the appellant to claim his ejectment from the-shop in dispute. According to him he-could not be evicted from the shop in, dispute unless one of the conditions prescribed under Section 3 of the Act existed. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the learned court below framed the relevant issues. The learned court below came to the conclusion that the building of which the shop in dispute formed part had been constructed prior to the year 1951 and was subject to the provisions of U. P. Act 3 of 1947. He further found that the partnership was merely a cloak for the tenancy which was actually created in favour of respondent No. 1, by respondent No. 2 through Ex. 22. In respect of the arrears of profits due under Ex. 22 to respondent No. 2 which had been transferred by him in favour of appellant, the learned court below found that the same stood paid off. After finding that the respondent No. 1 was actually a tenant of the accommodation in dispute, the learned court below found that since he had protection of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 he could not be evicted from the shop in dispute. After finding that the respondent No. 1 was actually a tenant of the accommodation in dispute, the learned court below found that since he had protection of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 he could not be evicted from the shop in dispute. With these findings it, as mentioned above, dismissed the suit. 6. In this appeal the learned counsel for the appellant Sri S. D. Misra, argued, that the learned court below was in error in holding that Ext. 22 evidenced transaction of lease and not one of partnership. According to the learned counsel the said document clearly indicated that respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 desired to carry on business in partnership. This argument was countered by Sri Z. Jilani who urged that although Ex. 22 was described as a deed of partnership it actually was a transaction of lease which had been given the cloak of partnership in order to circumvent the provisions of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. The learned counsel urged that Ext. 22 itself indicated that the necessary elements of partnership were entirely absent from the transaction. The learned counsel urged that in order to term a relationship a partnership the following three conditions must exist: - (1) There must be an agreement entered into by all the persons concerned; (2) The agreement must be to share the profits of a business; and (3) The business must be carried on by all or any of the persons concerned, acting for all. 7. The learned counsel urged that in order to determine whether a group of persons constituted a partnership regard has to be had to the real relation between the parties as shown by all relevant facts taken together. In making this submission the learned counsel placed reliance upon Section 6 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 which provides as follows: - "6. Mode of Determining Existence of Partnership; - In determining whether a group of' persons is or is not a firm, or whether a person is or is not a partner in a firm, regard shall be had to the real relation between the parties as shown by all relevant facts taken together." 8. Sri Jilani next placed before mettle definition of the term partnership as given in Section 4 of the Act. Sri Jilani next placed before mettle definition of the term partnership as given in Section 4 of the Act. The said definition runs as follows: - " 'Partnership is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all ............." It is on the basis of the above definition that the learned counsel urged that the transaction must have the three elements mentioned above in order to have the character of partnership. In support of his contention the learned counsel cited AIR 1959 Mad 379 (Mohd. Musa Sahib v. N. K. Mohammed Ghouse Sahib); AIR 1959 SC 719 (M. P. Davis v. Commr. of Agricultural Income-tax); AIR 1963 SC 1737 (Champaran Cane Concern v. State of Bihar), and AIR 1973 Cal 193 (Murlidhar Haspuria v. Bansidhar Halwai). 9. In Para 8 of the Judgment m Champaran Cane Concerns case their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows: - "....... In Lindley on Partnership (Twelfth Edition page 57) the main difference between co-ownership and copartnership have been compared. One of the principal differences is that co-ownership is not necessarily the result of agreement whereas partnership is .................. The second difference is that co-ownership does not necessarily involve community of profit or of loss, but partnership does ............. A third difference is that one co-owner can without the consent of the other, transfer his interest etc. to a stranger. A partner cannot do this .........." 10. In Munna Lal v. Ram Harakh. (Second Appeal No. 216 of 1974 decided on 12-4-1978 (All) by brother U. C. Srivastava, J.) the same three elements were reiterated. In the said case it was observed as follows : - "Thus there must be three elements-present before any relation which may be termed partnership comes into existence. (1) There must be an agreement entered into by all the persons concerned; (2) The agreement must be to share the profits of a business; and (3) The business must be carried on by all or any of the persons concerned, acting for all." 11. In view of the above legal position I have now to see whether Ex. 22 taken as a whole evidences the intention of the parties to constitute a partnership or to create the relationship of landlord and tenant. The material terms of Ex. 22 are as follows: - 1. In view of the above legal position I have now to see whether Ex. 22 taken as a whole evidences the intention of the parties to constitute a partnership or to create the relationship of landlord and tenant. The material terms of Ex. 22 are as follows: - 1. The entire investment in the partnership will be of respondent No. 1 with which respondent No. 2 will have no concern. Respondent No. 2 has balance goods worth Rs. 400/- which are invested. 2. The accounts of the partnership and the lock and key of the shop will remain with respondent No. 1. 3. In order to avoid accounting, the profit of respondent No. 2 has been fixed at Rs. 300/- per annum. Respondent No. 2 will receive profits every three months in advance. 4. Partnership business shall be carried on in the name of respondent No. 1 and on his licence. The responsibility for .all receipts and payments in respect of the partnership business shall be upon respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 will have no right to borrow or take goods on credit on behalf of the partnership. Respondent No. 1 will not be bound by any such transaction. Similarly if respondent No. 1 will obtain investment of any money in partnership from anybody, the liability for its repayment will be upon him; respondent No. 2 will not be responsible. 5. The period of partnership shall be at least nine years. During this period respondent No. 2 or his legal representatives will not be entitled to dissolve the partnership. Of course, if respondent No. 1 so desires, he can dissolve the partnership by giving 3 months notice to respondent No. 2 and he can vacate the shop by removing his entire goods. 6. If after the expiry of the period of partnership, respondent No. 2 desires to dissolve the partnership, he can do so by giving one years notice to respondent No. 1 so that the latter may make his own arrangements and remove his goods and till then respondent No. 2 will be entitled to receive the profits. 7. If both the parties desire to continue business in partnership after the expiry of 9 years, they can do so on the same terms. 8. That the accounting period will be from 1st April to 31st March. The accounting for that year shall be done on 31-3-1972. 7. If both the parties desire to continue business in partnership after the expiry of 9 years, they can do so on the same terms. 8. That the accounting period will be from 1st April to 31st March. The accounting for that year shall be done on 31-3-1972. The partnership business shall commence on 20-10-1961. 9. On the expiry of the period of partnership or sooner determination thereof at the instance of respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 will get back possession of the shop. (The actual words used in the deed which is in Hindi are - "Dookan par qubza Paksh No. 2 ko wapis mill Javega"). 10. The partnership business shall be carried on in the lower portion of the shop and the upper portion of the shop will remain in the possession of respondent No. 2 who will be entitled also to let out the same. 11. The respondent No. 1 will not be entitled to let out the shop to anyone. Of course, he may take work from his real brothers etc. in respect of the partnership business, but this will not create tenancy rights in favour of such person. 12. Respondent No. 1 shall be liable to pay Government taxes in respect of the partnership business. Respondent No. 1 will be entitled to make payments of profits to respondent No. 2 out of the profits of the business. 13. Partnership accounts shall be maintained by respondent No. 1. Losses shall be borne by respondent No. 1 only and respondent No. 2 shall have no concern therewith. 14. The electric connection in the shop is in the name of respondent No. 2 and the same shall remain so, but the electric charges shall be paid by respondent No. 1. The present electric fitting is the property of respondent No. 2. If respondent No. 1 wants to add to that fitting he can do so. If there be electric fitting on the upper storey, respondent No. 2 will get sub-meter installed and he will pay charges for the electricity consumed on the upper storey. 15. Respondent No. 1 will not make any alteration in the building of the shop without obtaining permission from respondent No. 2. Annual whitewashing will be done by respondent No. 2. 12. Ext. 22 contains internal evidence of its true character. 15. Respondent No. 1 will not make any alteration in the building of the shop without obtaining permission from respondent No. 2. Annual whitewashing will be done by respondent No. 2. 12. Ext. 22 contains internal evidence of its true character. Out of the three elements of partnership mentioned above only one is present namely, the first element which requires an agreement to be entered into by all persons concerned. The other two elements are completely lacking. Neither there is sharing of profits of the business, for the business is carried, on by respondent No. 1 acting for respondent No. 2 also: in other words the element of agency is also absent. So far as sharing of profits is concerned, respondent No. 2 gets the fixed sum of Rs. 800/- per annum. The total amount is split up and payments are made every third month. (clause 3 of Ex. 22). The third monthly payment has to be made in advance. Profits will be earned only-after business has actually been carried on. If respondent No. 1 is required to pay in advance he will have to pay out of his own pocket and not out of the profits of the firm. Thus the sum of Rs. 800/-does not represent the share of respondent No. 2 in the profits of the business. The stipulation regarding payment of the sum of Rs. 800/- by' respondent No. 1 to respondent No. 2 does not, therefore, amount to sharing of profits of the business between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. Under para 12 of the deed respondent No. 1 is "entitled" to pay respondent No. 2's share of profits out of the profits of the business. This is entitlement and not bounden duty. 13. Under paragraph 4 of the deed the business is to be carried on in the name of respondent No. 1. Under para 1 the entire investment has to be made by respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 will have no concern with this investment. Once an investment has been made in the partnership that investment should enure for the benefit of the partnership. The so-called partnership comprises of only two partners. When one of the partners has been excluded from having any concern with the investment made by the other, that investment remains the asset of that other and does not become partnership property. Once an investment has been made in the partnership that investment should enure for the benefit of the partnership. The so-called partnership comprises of only two partners. When one of the partners has been excluded from having any concern with the investment made by the other, that investment remains the asset of that other and does not become partnership property. When that other deals with such investment he deals with his own assets and not with partnership assets. Thus, while dealing with investment made by him respondent No. 1 does not act for respondent No. 2 but acts for himself alone. Although para 1 of the deed says that goods worth Rs. 400/- constitute respondent No. 2s investment in the partnership, the deed does not contain any clause as to how, on dissolution this investment will be dealt with. On dissolution of partnership all that is required to be done is that respondent No. 1 has to vacate the shop. There is no provision for payment of any money or compensation to respondent No. 2 in respect of his investment of goods worth Rs. 400/-. Under para 2 the lock and key of the shop remain -with respondent No. 1 who is also enjoined to keep the partnership accounts. No right has been reserved in favour of respondent No. 2 to inspect the accounts or even the shop. The purpose of keeping the accounts is not at all understandable in a situation like the one contemplated by the deed in dispute. In fact the various paragraphs of the deed show that after delivering possession of the shop to respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 completely disappears from the scene so far as the business is concerned. He comes on the scene only to receive his so-called profits and possession of the shop on dissolution of the alleged partnership. Thus respondent No. 1, so far as the business in question is concerned, acts for himself alone and not for respondent No. 2. 14. In view of the above I am of the opinion that Ext. 22 does not evidence a transaction of partnership between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. 15. I shall now take up the case set up on behalf of respondent No. 1 that Ext. 22 evidences a transaction of lease. 14. In view of the above I am of the opinion that Ext. 22 does not evidence a transaction of partnership between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. 15. I shall now take up the case set up on behalf of respondent No. 1 that Ext. 22 evidences a transaction of lease. It has been urged by Sri S. D. Misra, learned counsel for the appellant that even if Ext. 22 was not treated as creating partnership between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 it, at the most, created licence in favour of respondent No. 1 to enjoy the shop. The argument of the learned counsel was that the filing of the suit itself amounted to termination of the licence. Prior to the filing of the suit notices had been issued to respondent No. 1 requiring him to vacate the shop and that also amounted to termination of the licence. In view of the arguments advanced by Sri Misra and Sri Jilani, the question for determination is whether Ext. 22 creates a transaction of lease or a transaction of licence. In the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor ( AIR 1959 SC 1262 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down propositions for distinguishing a lease from a licence. At page 1269 their Lordships observed as follows: - "...... The following propositions may, therefore, be taken as well established: (1) To ascertain whether a document creates licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real test is the intention of the parties - whether they intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence; and (4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, 'prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease .........." 16. The above propositions were reiterated by' their Lordships in the case of Lakhi Ram Ram Das, Bombay v. Vidyat Cable & Rubber Industry, Bombay (1969 UJ (SC) 745). 17. The above propositions were reiterated by' their Lordships in the case of Lakhi Ram Ram Das, Bombay v. Vidyat Cable & Rubber Industry, Bombay (1969 UJ (SC) 745). 17. In view of the dictum laid down fey their Lordships of the Supreme Court one of the questions to be determined in this case is whether under Ext. 22 respondent No. 2 gave exclusive possession to respondent No. 1. Paras 2, 5, 6, 9, 14 and 15 leave no manner of doubt that exclusive possession of the shop was given by' respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 1. In para 2 the lock and key of the shop remains with respondent No. 1. Under para 5 respondent No. 1 is given the right to dissolve the partnership by giving 3 months notice to respondent No. 2. After dissolving the partnership in this manner, under the same clause he is required to vacate the shop by removing his' entire goods. The use of the words "his entire goods" is significant. These words indicate that the goods in the shop at the time of vacation are of respondent No. 1 alone and respondent No. 2 had no interest in the said goods. Similar provision is made in paragraph 6 where-under respondent No. 1 is required to make his own arrangement and remove his goods. Under para 9 it is provided that cn dissolution of the partnership respondent No. 2 will get back possession of the shop. The question of getting back possession of the shop arises only when respondent No. 2 is not in possession at all. The covenants in paras 14 and 15 are typical of covenants of a lease deed and rarely' occur in a deed of partnership. In Lakhi Rams case (supra) their Lordships observed in respect of a clause providing - "The licensee shall be responsible for effecting necessary repairs to the shed or the premises at his own costs", that the same showed an intention to create lease rather than licence. Second part of Para 15 is akin to the clause which their Lordships were interpreting. While dealing with the question as to whether ;Ext. 22 created partnership, I have observed that after delivery of possession of the shop to respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 has reserved with himself only two rights; firstly, to get a periodical payment totalling Rs. Second part of Para 15 is akin to the clause which their Lordships were interpreting. While dealing with the question as to whether ;Ext. 22 created partnership, I have observed that after delivery of possession of the shop to respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 has reserved with himself only two rights; firstly, to get a periodical payment totalling Rs. 800 per annum and secondly, the right to get back possession over the shop on dissolution of the alleged partnership. The sum of Rs. 800 represents nothing but rent. The transaction in question creates interest in the property in favour of respondent No. 1. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that Ext. 22, the so-called deed of; partnership, creates relationship of land-: lord and tenant between respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 1. 18. The above conclusion is proved from respondent No. 2s subsequent conduct also. On 24-10-1967 respondent No. 2; wrote a letter to the Profession Tax Officer, Gonda. In this letter he stated that previously he had been carrying on business in cloth and that in the year 1961 he discontinued that business and let out the shop to Sita Ram Gupta respondent No. 1 at the annual rent of Rs. 800. This letter contains clear admission of respondent No. 2 that respondent No. 1 had been inducted into the shop in dispute as a tenant. Respondent No. 2 tried to explain, this admission by saying that it related to another shop of his. This explanation is obviously false inasmuch as in his affidavit dated 9-6-1959 filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, a copy of which is on record, he stated that he did not have any other shop. 19. Sri S. D. Misra, learned counsel for the appellant, then urged that the contract of tenancy alleged by respondent No. 1 was hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act inasmuch as the same had been entered into without allotment order having-been made in favour of respondent No. 1 by the District Magistrate as required' under Section 7 of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. In support of this plea he placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Abdul Hameed v. Mohd. Ishaq ( AIR 1975 All 166 ). In support of this plea he placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Abdul Hameed v. Mohd. Ishaq ( AIR 1975 All 166 ). In an earlier case a Full Bench of three Judges of this court had held that the contract of tenancy entered into without allotment order was not void. The decision of this Full Bench was given in the case of Udhoo Dass v. Prem Prakash ( AIR 1964 All 1 : 1963 All LJ 406). A learned Judge of this court doubted the correctness of the Full Bench decision in Udhoo Dasss case whereupon a Full Bench of five-Judges was constituted to decide the case of Abdul Hameed v. Mohd. Ishaq. The Full Bench which decided the case-of Abdul Hameed v. Mohd. Ishaq was of the view that Udhoo Dasss case was not correctly decided. Accordingly by the judgment given in Abdul Hameeds case the judgment given in Udhoo Dasss case was overruled. However, in Abdul Hameeds case a significant observation has been made, in para 15 of the judgment to the effect that a void agreement can be disregarded by a third party. Be that as it may, the question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Murlidhar Agrawal v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ) and their Lordships approved of the law which had been laid down in the case of Udhoo Dass. In Para 16 of the judgment their Lordships observed as follows: - "In Udhoo Das v. Prem Prakash, 1963 All LJ 406 : ( AIR 1964 All 1 ) (FB) a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court took the view that a lease made in violation of the provisions of Section 7 (2) would be valid between the parties and would create the relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it might not bind the authorities concerned. In the light of this ruling the correctness of which we see no reason to doubt - we think that the respondent was a tenant......." 20. In view of the above observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court the Full Bench decision in Abdul Hameeds case stands overruled and the law laid down by this court in Udhoo Dasss case is revived. 21. In view of the above observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court the Full Bench decision in Abdul Hameeds case stands overruled and the law laid down by this court in Udhoo Dasss case is revived. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon another decision rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Khanna v. Addl. Dist. Magistrate, Kanpur ( AIR 1975 SC 1525 ). In this case a shop which was in the occupation of a tenant was about to fall vacant. The landlord of the shop applied for its release in his favour. Certain persons applied for allotment thereof in their favour. The landlords application for release was rejected and an order of allotment was made in favour of one of the applicants. In the meantime, the tenant who was about to vacate actually vacated the premises and handed over possession to the landlord. The allottee moved an application under Section 7-A of the Act for being put in possession of the shop. This application was allowed ex parte. Before the allottee had filed application under Section 7-A of the Act the landlord filed civil suit challenging the allotment order. In this suit the allottee alone had been impleaded as a defendant. A decree for permanent injunction was prayed for and an application for interim injunction was also made which was granted. On 11-10-1962 the suit ended in compromise. By this compromise the allottee admitted that allotment order was invalid and recognised that the possession of the landlord over the shop was valid. After the compromise decree had been passed the landlord moved an application for setting aside the order which had been passed for delivery of possession to the allottee on latters application under Section 7-A. The Rent Controller refused to review the order and dismissed the application. Thereupon the landlord preferred writ petition in this court to challenge the order of allotment and the order for delivery of possession to the allottee. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this court and the special appeal also met the same fate. Thereupon the landlord preferred appeal before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It was on these facts that their Lordships did not give effect to the agreement which had been entered into between the landlord and the allottee. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this court and the special appeal also met the same fate. Thereupon the landlord preferred appeal before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It was on these facts that their Lordships did not give effect to the agreement which had been entered into between the landlord and the allottee. The pith and substance of this judgment is that and agreement entered into between private individuals which has the effect of nullifying the provisions of the Act would not be binding upon the authorities constituted under the Act. In the present case no such situation arises. Of course if the District Magistrate had, in spite of the agreement entered into between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2, allotted the accommodation in favour of a stranger, the District Magistrate could very well say that the agreement was in violation of the provisions contained in Section 7 of the Act and, therefore, he was not bound thereby. This judgment has, therefore, no application to the facts of the present case. 22. Sri Misra further relied upon the decision in Smt. Nai Babu v. Lala Ramnarayan ( (1978) 1 SCC 58 ). In this case a decree for ejectment was passed in favour of the landlord on the basis of a compromise although the grounds on which the landlord could seek ejectment of tenant under law did not exist. When tins compromise was sought to be executed, the tenant raised the plea that the decree was inexecutable. The tenants plea was upheld by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In para 9 of the judgment their Lordships observed as follows: - "It is well-settled that where the Rent Control and Restrictions Acts are in operation, a landlord cannot obtain eviction of the tenant unless he can satisfy the requirements of the provisions in those Acts. The general law of landlord and tenant to that extent will give way to the special Act in that behalf. The general law of landlord and tenant to that extent will give way to the special Act in that behalf. It is also well-settled that if the court does not find the permissible grounds for eviction disclosed in the pleadings and other materials on the record, no consent or compromise will give jurisdiction to the court to pass a valid decree of eviction." The above observation is obviously based on the dictum which had been laid by their Lordships in the case of Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U. P. (supra); in para 27 at p. 1929 their Lordships observed as follows: - "There can be no doubt about the policy of the law, namely, the protection of a weaker class in the community from harassment of frivolous suits. But the question is, is there a public policy behind it which precludes a tenant from waiving it?" Then in para 33 at page 1930 their Lordships observed as follows: - "We think that Section 3 is based on public policy. As we said, it is intended to protect a weaker section of the community with a view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general by creating equality of bargaining power. Although the section is primarily intended for the protection of tenants only, that protection is based on public policy. The respondent could not have waived the benefit of the provision." 23. In view of the above propositions laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court I have to consider whether public interest would be advanced by enforcing the agreement evidenced by Ex. 22 or it will be advanced by ignoring it. In case Ex. 22 is treated as invalid document, the tenant who belongs to the weaker section of the society will be put to disadvantage and landlord who was in a better bargaining position would derive advantage. This would, therefore, lead to the defeat of the public policy implicit in the Act. I therefore hold that Ex. 22 created a valid lease between respondent No. 2 and respondent No.l. By virtue of the sale deed executed by respondent No. 2 in favour of the appellant, the latter has become landlord of the shop entitled to receive rent from respondent No. 1. I therefore hold that Ex. 22 created a valid lease between respondent No. 2 and respondent No.l. By virtue of the sale deed executed by respondent No. 2 in favour of the appellant, the latter has become landlord of the shop entitled to receive rent from respondent No. 1. It has already been found by the learned court below that the building in question was constructed prior to 1951 and the same was subject to the provisions of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947. This finding was not challenged before me nor it could be. The suit was filed in the year 1971 when U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 was in operation. None of the grounds prescribed under Section 3 of the Act existed, entitling the appellant to claim ejectment. Now respondent No. 1 has the protection of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which was , enforced during the pendency of the suit, replacing U. P. Act No. III of 1947. The grounds which entitle a landlord to claim ejectment of tenant under the Act of 1972 also do not exist. The appellant cannot therefore evict respondent No. 1 and get possess of the shop. 24. No others point was urged before me. 25. The appeal has no force, and is hereby dismissed with costs to respondent No. 1.