Short Note : 1. The main contention raised in both the revision applications is that Leelabai had entered into a compromise with her husband Bhagirath and had received a sum of Rs. 3000/- in lieu of maintenance from him. She was not entitled to enforce the order of maintenance passed in her favour. It is further contended that after the compromise, Leelabai had started living with her husband Bhagirath and had actually lived for two years. In these circumstances even if she had sub-squinty voluntarily left her husband after living with him for two years, the said order of maintenance was not enforceable. On behalf of the non-applicant Leelabai, it was contended that the view taken by the impugned order by the Additional Sessions Judge was fully justified and no valid grounds have been made out for exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court. Held: According to the provisions of sections 125, 126, 127 and 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 an order for maintenance once passed remains enforceable except under certain circumstances. According to sub-section (4) and (5) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an order of maintenance cannot be passed in favour of a wife if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband. or if they are living separately by mutual consent. This sub-section. therefore. contemplates a stage before an order of maintenance is passed in favour of wife. Evidently, therefore, the appellant Bhagirath cannot rely Upon the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 125 of the Code for the cancellation of the order made against him. Sub-section (5) of section 125 refers to such cases where in the event of the wife being found to be living in adultery or the wife refusing to live with her husband without sufficient reason or the wife living separately by mutual consent the Magistrate is empowered to cancel the order Section 127 Criminal Procedure Code speaks of the powers of a Magistrate to make such alteration in the allowance as he may think fit in the circumstance mentioned in sub-sections (2) and (3) of that section. The question, therefore, is as to whether the applicant Bhagirath. The question, therefore, is as to whether the applicant Bhagirath. has made out a case for the cancellation of an order either under sub-section (5) of section 125 of the Code or under any of the provisions of section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The applicant does not contend that h is wife Leelabai is living in adultery. His contention is that because of a Panchayat convened by the village people there was a compromise between his father and his father-in-law-father of his wife Leelabai that a sum of Rs. 3000/- was paid in lieu of arrears of maintenance and Leelabai agreed to live with him. Further, according to him. after Jiving for two years with him, she left him of her own accord. As there is no allegation of adultery, there is no question of maintenance order being cancelled by the Magistrate on this ground. The other ground available to the applicant for the cancellation of the order under sub-section (5) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was refuse al on the part of the non-applicant Leelabai to live with him without any sufficient reason. It is in the evidence of the applicant Bhagirath himself that he has married again and has a child also by the second marriage, For this second marriage, he was prosecuted also. According to the explanation to the second proviso under sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps some one it has to be considered to be a just ground for the wife's refusal to live with him. As stated the applicant Bhagirath has admitted in his statement in para 3 that one Sugnabai is living with him as his keep and by her a daughter has also been born. When that is so, refusal on the part of Leelabai to continue to live with her husband Bhagirath will be just ground for her refusal. The applicant cannot in these circumstances contend that the wife has refused to live with him without any sufficient reason. 3. The third ground available to the applicant for the cancellation of the order under sub-section (5) of section 125 was of separate living by mutual consent. The applicant has neither alleged nor proved that Leelabai is living separately from him by mutual consent. 3. The third ground available to the applicant for the cancellation of the order under sub-section (5) of section 125 was of separate living by mutual consent. The applicant has neither alleged nor proved that Leelabai is living separately from him by mutual consent. On the contrary his allegation is that she had left him without his consent. In these circumstances the order of maintenance cannot be cancelled under sub-section (5) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. The next ground urged by the applicant is that under clause (c) of subsection (3) of section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Leelabai had surrendered voluntarily rights to maintenance and on that ground the order of maintenance has ceased to be enforceable. This contention. in my opinion, is based on a misreading of the aforesaid provisions of section 127 The aforesaid provisions of section 127 apply to such cases only where a woman that is the wife in this case had obtained a divorce from her husband and had also voluntarily surrendered her rights to maintenance after her divorce. Thus in these circumstances only the Magistrate is empowered to cancel the order from the date of the divorce and surrender all the rights. In this case it is not even alleged by the applicant that Leelabai has obtained, a divorce from him. Without a divorce, according to law the provisions or clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 127 cannot apply. The applicant in these circumstances cannot rely upon the aforesaid provisions, even if it be assumed that by receiving a payment of Rs. 3000/- his wife had surrendered her rights to the maintenance awarded to her in the original case. 5. It was also urged that since the father of tile applicant had paid Rs. 3000/- as per resolution arrived at in the village Panchayat to Ranchhod (A.W.8) the order of maintenance was not enforceable. Ranachod (A.W. 8.) in his statement has stated that the applicant Bhagirath's father Puna (P.W.5) had as per resolution of the village Panchayat paid Rs. 3000/- which he in his own turn had paid to Girdhari, father of Leelabai. Girdhari (N.A.W.2) has denied receiving this amount from Ranchhod. There is admittedly no acknowledgment from Girdhari about the receipt of this payment. 3000/- which he in his own turn had paid to Girdhari, father of Leelabai. Girdhari (N.A.W.2) has denied receiving this amount from Ranchhod. There is admittedly no acknowledgment from Girdhari about the receipt of this payment. In any event it is clear that neither in the village Panchayat Leelabai was present and a party to the alleged compromise between the father of the applicant and her father nor is there any evidence to show that the said amount of Rs. 3000/- was paid to Leelabai in pursuance of the Panchayat resolution. If the applicant's father had paid either Rs. 3000/- or any other amount to the father of Leelabai, Girdhari (N.A.W, 2) then such payment cannot be said to be a payment to Leelabai of the maintenance amount payable to Leelabai. In these circumstances even if as deposed to by the witnesses of the applicant Bhagirath. any amount of Rs. 3000/- was paid by the applicant's father to Ranchhod (A.W.8). the said payment cannot be treated as payment to Leelabai. Revision dismissed.