JUDGMENT Satish Chandra C.J. - On 3rd July, 1971, the Governor of this State promulgated the U. P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Ordinance No. 13 of 1971 seeking to acquire the sugar undertakings of 12 Sugar Mills. Soon after the sugar mills filed the present writ petitions to question the constitutional validity of this Ordinance. 2. On 27th August, 1971, the State Legislature enacted the U. P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971. The Act replaced the Ordinance. The writ petitions were amended to challenge the validity of this Act. 3. For the petitioners the validity of the Act has been questioned on the following grounds: (1) The State Legislature had no legislative competence to enact it. (2) The Act violated Art. 31 of the Constitution, because the acquisition was not for a public purpose and the compensation proposed in the Act was illusory. (3) The Act was in breach of Arts. 19 (1) (f) and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. (4) The Act infringed the guarantee of equality enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. 1. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE 4. According to the preamble the Act provides, in the interest of general public, for the acquisition and transfer of certain sugar undertakings. As defined by S. 2, clause (h), a "scheduled undertaking means an undertaking engaged in the manufacture or production of sugar by means of vacuum pans and with the aid of mechanical power in a factory specified in the Schedule, and comprises all plant, machinery, equipment, workshop, laboratory, locomotives, vehicles, railway sidings, dispensary, hospital, all lands and buildings occupied for the purposes of that factory, quarries tools, spare parts and stores, sugarcane, sugar in the process of manufacture or production and stocks of sugar, as also all books of account, registers and other documents pertaining to that factory. It does not, however, include cash in hand, cash in bank, advances towards any income or other tax, investments and book debts, or rights, liabilities and obligations respecting any other contract. 5. Under Section 3 of the Act, however, every scheduled undertaking shall stand, and be deemed to have stood, transferred to, and vest in, the State Sugar Corporation free from any debt, mortgage etc. 6. 5. Under Section 3 of the Act, however, every scheduled undertaking shall stand, and be deemed to have stood, transferred to, and vest in, the State Sugar Corporation free from any debt, mortgage etc. 6. Section 4 provides that on and from the appointed day every appointment of Receiver, lease or other arrangement or attachment, injunction or any order of the court restraining or restricting the use of any scheduled undertaking shall cease to have effect. 7. Section 5 makes it obligatory for every person in possession, custody or control of the undertaking to deliver its possession to the Corporation: 8. Section 7 onwards lays down the procedure for determination and payment of compensation. The Act, by Section 22, repeals the ordinance. 9. The Corporation to whom an undertaking is transferred is the U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited, a Government Company within meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (vide S. 2 (c) of the Act). 10. It is apparent that the Act seeks to transfer ownership of the sugar undertaking, namely, the entire apparatus used for the production or manufacture of sugar. It does not, however, seek to take over the management or the business of the sugar mill. The effect of the operation of the Act, however, is that the Company owning the undertaking was deprived of the means of carrying on the business of manufacture of sugar through the acquired undertaking. 11. The twelve sugar undertakings, which are the subject-matter of the Act, were sick mills. They had, according to the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act, incurred heavy losses and had created serious problems for the cane growers and labour which had created an adverse impact on the general economy of the local areas. It was thought advisable to take immediate steps to acquire with a view to renovating and rehabilitating them, for payment of the dues of the cane growers and labourers and of the Government and to prepare the mills for crushing before the next season. 12. On behalf of the State it was urged that this Act has been enacted under Entry 42 of List III to the Seventh Schedule which deals with "Acquisition and Requisitioning of Property". It was stated that the Act does nothing except to transfer the ownership of the sugar undertaking from the erstwhile mills to the State Sugar Corporation. 12. On behalf of the State it was urged that this Act has been enacted under Entry 42 of List III to the Seventh Schedule which deals with "Acquisition and Requisitioning of Property". It was stated that the Act does nothing except to transfer the ownership of the sugar undertaking from the erstwhile mills to the State Sugar Corporation. It envisages payment of compensation for the acquisition. 13. The petitioners counsel countered this by submitting that in its true nature and character the Act dealt with sugar industry which was a subject enumerated in Entry 24 of the State List, namely, "Industry subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I". The field or the head "Industries" was subject to, inter alia, Entry 52 of List I, which provided "Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law, to be expedient in the public interest." 14. Under this Entry the Parliament had enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, No. 65 of 1951. In Section 2 of the said Act the Parliament made the requisite declaration: "It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule." 15. Item 25 of the First Schedule mentions "sugar". It was submitted for the petitioners that the sugar industry being subject to law made by Parliament was outside the purview of the legislative competence of the State Legislature because the control of sugar industry was taken over by Parliament under the Act No. 65 of 1951. 16. It is obvious that the control of sugar industry having been taken over by law made by Parliament, that subject-matter was outside the purview of State legislative competence. 17. The question arises what does the term "Control of Sugar Industry" connote. Does it include the subject of acquisition of property spoken of by Entry 42 of the Concurrent List ? 18. The term 'Industry as used in Entry 52 of List I came up for consideration in Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 676 . The Supreme Court observed that industry comprises raw material, which is covered by Entry 27 of List II and process of production or manufacture, an aspect dealt with by Entry 52 of List I and Entry 24 of List II. Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 676 . The Supreme Court observed that industry comprises raw material, which is covered by Entry 27 of List II and process of production or manufacture, an aspect dealt with by Entry 52 of List I and Entry 24 of List II. It also includes distribution of goods produced or manufactured, a subject dealt with by Entry 27 of List II and Entry 33 of List III vide para 24. 19. It is thus apparent that the term "Industry" used in Entry 52 of List I refers to only the process of production or manufacture. It does not deal with other components or aspects of the industry. The legislative power to make a law in respect of acquisition of property under Entry 42 of List III prima facie appears to be outside the purview of the term "Industry" as used in Entry 52 aforesaid. 20. The decision of the Supreme Court in Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1972 SC 2301 illustrates this. The Kanan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971, provided for requisition of lands in relation to tea plantation. This Act was challenged. The tea industry was a controlled industry under Entry 52 of List I. It was argued that the Act of 1971 infringed upon the field of Entry 52 of List I. because it was impossible to run an efficient plantation without sufficient land, and the Act by providing for taking over of possession of lands of tea estates interfered with the proper working of the tea industry. The Supreme Court repelled this submission. It held that the State has legislative competence to legislate under Entry 18 of List II and Entry 42 of List III. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under Entry 52 of List I. Effect is not the same thing as subject-matter. If a State Act, otherwise valid, has effect on a matter in List I, it does not cease to be a legislation with respect to an entry of List II or List III. The object of Sections 4 and 5 seems to be to enable the State to acquire all the lands which do not fall within the categories (a), (b) and (c) of Section 4 (1). The object of Sections 4 and 5 seems to be to enable the State to acquire all the lands which do not fall within the categories (a), (b) and (c) of Section 4 (1). These provisions are really incidental to the power of acquisition. 21. Prima facie the topic of acquisition of property does not relate to control of an industry. 22. In P.C. Chatterjee v. State of Assam, AIR 1962 SC 167 the validity of Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, was challenged inter alia on the ground that it provided for requisition and acquisition of tea estates which was a matter for exclusive control under Entry 52 of List I, because Parliament had enacted the Tea Act of 1953 under Entry 52 of List I. The Supreme Court held that the Act of the Assam Legislature in a sense provided only for requisition or acquisition of lands in public interest. It had nothing to do with tea industry. The Tea Act of 1953 was enacted to control the tea industry, by providing for matters relating to cultivation, export and levy of customs duty on tea. In this case it was not even whispered that control of industry includes within it the concept of acquisition of property. 23. Gold industry was one of the industries mentioned in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. In Fatechand Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1825 the Supreme Court held that the effect of Entry 52, List I, is not that other Entries in the State List become impotent even regarding gold. The State Legislature can make laws regarding money-lending even where gold is involved under Entry 30, List II, even as it can regulate gambling in gold under Entry 34, impose sales tax on gold sales under Entry 54, regulate by municipal laws under Entry 5 and by trade restrictions under Entry 26. The core of the matter was where under its power Parliament has made a law which overrides an Entry in the State List, that area is abstracted from the State List. Nothing more. 24. A somewhat similar situation arose in the State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 215 . The Road Transport Corporations Act provided for acquisition of contract carriages running on inter-State routes. It was held that that was not a legislation on the subject of inter-State trade and commerce. Nothing more. 24. A somewhat similar situation arose in the State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 215 . The Road Transport Corporations Act provided for acquisition of contract carriages running on inter-State routes. It was held that that was not a legislation on the subject of inter-State trade and commerce. In pith and substance it was an Act for acquisition of contract carriages. The incidental encroachment on the field of inter-State trade and commerce cannot invalidate the Act. Entry 42 of List III gives power in relation to acquisition of property. 25. Coal was specified in Item 3 of First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The control of Coal Industry hence became subject to exclusive legislation of Parliament. Yet the Parliament enacted the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, for acquiring coal bearing areas vesting in the State of West Bengal. This Act was challenged, but the challenge was repelled by the Supreme Court in the State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 . It was held that Parliament has legislative competence to enact a law for compulsory acquisition by the Union of land and other properties vesting in, or owned by, the State. That apart, this parliamentary exercise shows that acquisition of property was not within the ambit of control of industry. This is why to gain power to acquire lands bearing coal, a separate Act, in exercise of the power conferred under Entry 42 of List III was necessary. The field of acquisition of property does not become occupied merely because a declaration is made under Entry 52 of List I. This was held by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Chanan Mal, AIR 1976 SC 1654 . In this case the Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973, was challenged. It was submitted that the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, covered the subject of acquisition of minerals, and so the State Legislature of Haryana have no competence to provide for acquisition of minerals. The Supreme Court repelled the submission. It observed that it is difficult to see how the field of acquisition could become occupied by a Central Act even before Parliament legislates to acquire land in a State. The Supreme Court repelled the submission. It observed that it is difficult to see how the field of acquisition could become occupied by a Central Act even before Parliament legislates to acquire land in a State. The Court referred to the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India (supra), and held that until Parliament has so legislated about acquisition as was done in that case, the field of acquisition is free for State legislation under Entry 42 of List III. It shows that even though by law control of an industry is taken over by Parliament, the field of acquisition of property, even though relating to the property used by such industry, is still open for legislation. 26. The term "control" has been defined in Websters New International Dictionary, Vol. I, page 580, to mean "to exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate" Its synonyms are restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct, check, subdue. 27. In Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth, (1948) 76 CLR 1, Dixon, J. (page 385) observed that "control" was an unfortunate word of such wide and ambiguous import that it has been taken to mean something weaker than restraint, something equivalent to regulation. 28. In Mst. Bhagwati Devi v. Sardar Balwant Singh, 1955 All LJ 1 a Full Bench of our Court explained the significance of the word "regulation" as occurring in Entry 2 of List I of the 7th Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, as not including the right to requisition or acquisition. It was held that regulation only means that the rights of the owner or the person entitled to possession are restricted and controlled by the requisite authority, the State Government neither acquiring possession nor the right to possession. 29. It is thus evident that the term ."control" does not include the concept of | acquisition of property within its ambit, i howsoever wide that may be. 30. Further, the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, as it stood on 3rd July, 1971, when the Ordinance was promulgated, did not provide for acquisition of the sugar undertakings. It laid down various methods of regulation and control, including appointment of an Authorised Controller in suitable cases. 31. 30. Further, the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, as it stood on 3rd July, 1971, when the Ordinance was promulgated, did not provide for acquisition of the sugar undertakings. It laid down various methods of regulation and control, including appointment of an Authorised Controller in suitable cases. 31. We are not at all satisfied that the operation of the impugned State Act would make the working of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act in matter of control of sugar industry in any manner unworkable or difficult. The control envisaged in the said Act would continue to effectively operate irrespective of whether the sugar undertaking is owned by a private company or the State Sugar Corporation. 32. Unlike Entry 24 of List II, which is subject to Entry 52 of List I, Entry 42 of List III is not subject to any such limitation or restriction. The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, which came into force on 1st Nov., 1956, repealed the pre-existing Entries 33 of List I and 36 and 42 of List II, which dealt with acquisition and requisition of property, and enacted Entry 42 in List III in the present form. Article 298 of the Constitution was also substituted. Since then the purpose of the Union or the State is not at all linked with the power to acquire property. That phrase as occurring in the original entries was repealed. Entry 42 of List III cannot be subjugated to any particular entry of List I or List II on such repealed grounds. 33. For the petitioners apprehensions were expressed that in this view the State can acquire properties belonging to the Union, like railways etc. 34. Apprehensions of abuse of power cannot deny its existence. Furthermore, the chances of abuse are nil, because Art. 31 (3) lays down a safeguard against such abuse by providing for Presidential assent to a State law for acquisition of property. 35. For the petitioner reference was made to Section 20 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, where under it has been provided that after the commencement of this Act it shall not be competent for any State Government or local authority to take over the management or control of any industrial undertaking under any law for the time being in force which authorises any such Government or local authority so to do. 36. The impugned Act acquires sugar undertakings. 36. The impugned Act acquires sugar undertakings. It does not take over their management or control. As already seen, control or regulation is a legislative topic, distinct from acquisition. 37. For the petitioners reliance was placed upon the following observations in State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 (supra) "Power to legislate for regulation and development of mines and minerals under the control of the Union, would by necessary implication include the power to acquire mines and minerals." 38. This observation was in connection with the question whether the Union Government can acquire property vesting in the State. This observation was immediately followed by the following sentence: "Power to legislate for acquisition of property vested in the State cannot therefore be denied to the Parliament if it be exercised consistently with the protection afforded by Article 31." 39. In para 67 of the same judgment it was held that Art. 31 (2) imposes restrictions on the exercise of legislative power under Entry 42 of List III. 40. It is thus evident that the power to acquire property flows from Art. 31 read with Entry 42. The quoted observation cannot mean that without the aid of Entry 42 of List III the power of regulation would include the power to acquire. The two enactments, namely, the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, and the impugned Acquisition Act are not in conflict. They operate in different fields. No question of repugnancy arises. The Acquisition Act purports to transfer the ownership of the sugar undertakings on the appointed date. The introduction of Chapters 3-AA, 3-AB and 3-AG in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act subsequent to the coming into force of the impugned Act is hence of no material relevance. 41. We are hence satisfied that the I State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Acquisition Act. (2) VIOLATION OF ART. 31 OF THE CONSTITUTION 42. The impugned Act came into force in August, 1971. At that time Art. 31 of the Constitution had not been amended by the Constitution (Twenty fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, because that Amendment Act came into force on 20th April, 1972. 43. (2) VIOLATION OF ART. 31 OF THE CONSTITUTION 42. The impugned Act came into force in August, 1971. At that time Art. 31 of the Constitution had not been amended by the Constitution (Twenty fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, because that Amendment Act came into force on 20th April, 1972. 43. For the petitioners it was submitted that the word "compensation" occurring in Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution was interpreted by the Supreme Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 to mean just equivalent to the market value of the acquired property. The impugned Acquisition Act does not award just equivalent to the market value of the acquired property. It was hence violative of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. 44. The submission is not correct. 45. In Oriental Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1979 SC 248 the question of compensation in accordance with Art. 31 (2) as it stood after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act and be- fore the Constitution (Twenty fifth Amendment) Act came up for consideration. While referring to Coopers case the Supreme Court held (para 17): "It is worthy of notice that Shah, J. very carefully refrained, throughout the discussion, from using, the expression 'just compensation or 'just equivalent nor did he draw inspiration from any American or Australian cases. Realising the implication of the use of adjectives like 'just or 'fair, he was content to use the expression 'compensation and to say that the principle specified must be relevant for determination of compensation." 46. It is not in dispute that after the Fourth Amendment in 1956 the adequacy of compensation was not justiciable if the Legislature fixes the amount of compensation or lays down principles for determining it. The legislative exercise can be struck down only if it is established that the compensation was wholly illusory. Even in the case of Vajravelu Mudaliar v. The Special Deputy Collector, AIR 1965 SC 1017 it was observed that the law may also prescribe compensation which is illusory: it may provide for the acquisition of a property worth lakhs of rupees for a paltry sum of Rs. 100/-. The question in that context does not relate to the adequacy of the compensation, for it is no compensation at all. 47. According to the State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 215 , Chandrachud, Js. 100/-. The question in that context does not relate to the adequacy of the compensation, for it is no compensation at all. 47. According to the State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 215 , Chandrachud, Js. opinion on the question of compensation in Keshavananda Bharatis case ( AIR 1973 SC 1461 at p. 2051) was decisive. The learned Judge observed: " though it is not open to the Court to question a law under Art. 31 (2) on the ground that the amount fixed or determined is not adequate. Courts would have the power to question such a law if the amount fixed thereunder is illusory; if the principles, if any are stated, for determining the amount are wholly irrelevant for fixation of the amount.......... .......... if the fixation of an amount is shown to depend upon principles bearing on social good it may not be possible to say that the principles are irrelevant." 48. In Ranganatha Reddys case (supra) it was observed (para 79); "The result is the quantum of the amount or the reasonableness of the principles are out of bounds for the Court." 49. It is thus apparent that where the Legislature fixes the amount of compensation the only ground on which it can be assailed is that the amount is illusory or that the principles, if any laid down in the Statute, are wholly irrelevant for fixation of the amount. 50. Section 7 of the Act deals with determination and mode of payment of compensation. Sub-section (1} provides for payment of compensation for sugar stocks at the ex-factory market price prevailing immediately before the appointed date. It is to be paid in cash as and when the stocks are disposed of. 51. For stocks of molasses compensation value is calculated at the price prevailing immediately before the appointed day, as fixed under the Uttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964. 52. Compensation for stocks of sugarcane was the actual cost of their purchase as may be agreed upon between the State Government and the person interested and failing such agreement, as may be determined by the prescribed authority. 53. Under sub-section (4) the State Government is to pay compensation for sugar in the process of production or any bagasse of press-mud according to its market value, as may be agreed upon, or as may be determined by the prescribed authority. 54. 53. Under sub-section (4) the State Government is to pay compensation for sugar in the process of production or any bagasse of press-mud according to its market value, as may be agreed upon, or as may be determined by the prescribed authority. 54. In addition to these amounts, compensation is payable for the scheduled undertaking specified in Column 2 of the Schedule and amount specified against it in Column 3 thereof, by depositing the amount with the prescribed authority in accordance with sub-secs. (6) and (9), and the same shall be paid to the person entitled thereto. Under subsection (10) the deposit in respect of compensation is to be made not later than six months from the date on which possession is taken. Under subsection (11) interest at the rate of 5| per cent is payable from the date of possession to the date of deposit. 55. The Schedule is as follows: Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Serial No. Name in which the factory is registered with the Chief Inspector of of Factories, Uttar Pradesh and its address. (Note: Where the factory is registered in the name of the company or firm owning or holding the factory on lease, the name as registered is specified in this column, but such specification shall not be construed to mean thar it is that company or firm that is being acquired by virtue of S. 3.) Amount compensation (in rupees) *1. Ramchand and Sons Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Bara Banki Twenty.five Lakhs (Rs. 25,00,000). 2. Burhwal Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., Burhwal, district Bara Banki Twenty-four Lakhs (24,00,000) 3. B. B. Lachmandas Sugar and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Jerwal Road, district Bahraich Ten Lakhs (Rs. 10,00,000. 4. Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Ramkoka, district Deoria Eleven Lakhs (Rs. 11,00,000). 5. Vishnu Pratap Sugar Mills Ltd., also described as Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (Pvt.) Ltd. Khadda, district Deoria Eight Lakhs (Rs. 8,00,000). 6. Diwan Sugar Mills, also described as Diwan Sugar and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Sakhoti Tanda, district, Meerut (Note : The lessee of this factory is Diwan Sugar and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd ) Twelve Lakhs (Rs. 12,00,000). 7. Ram Luxman Sugar Mills, Mohiuddinpur district Meerut Thirteen Lakhs and Fifty Thousand (Rs. 13,50,000) 8. Raza Buland Sugar Company Ltd., Rampur One Crore, Eighteen Lakhs (Rs. 1,18,00.000). 9. Kundan Sugar Mills, district Moradabad Forty-two Lakhs (Rs. 42,00,000). 10. 12,00,000). 7. Ram Luxman Sugar Mills, Mohiuddinpur district Meerut Thirteen Lakhs and Fifty Thousand (Rs. 13,50,000) 8. Raza Buland Sugar Company Ltd., Rampur One Crore, Eighteen Lakhs (Rs. 1,18,00.000). 9. Kundan Sugar Mills, district Moradabad Forty-two Lakhs (Rs. 42,00,000). 10. Shiv Prasad Banarasi Das Sugar Mills, Bijnor Twenty-one Lakhs (Rs. 21,00,000) 11. Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshmiganj district Deoria Twenty Lakhs (Rs. 20,00,000). 12. Kamlapat Motilal Bhatni Sugar Mills Ltd., Branch Bhatni, also described as Kamlapat Motilal Bhatni (Sugar Mills) Branch Bhatni, district Deoria Twenty-two Lakhs (Rs. 22,00,000). 56. The compensation payable for the sugar molasses, bagasse etc. is the market value. No exception has been taken to it. The quantum of compensation fixed by the Legislature in the Schedule (or each undertaking had been the subject of good deal of debate before us. From the arguments it appears that though the principles upon which the amount was fixed by the Legislature had not been stated in the Ordinance or the Act, the Legislature took into account inter alia the written down value or the depreciated value of the undertaking. Even so it cannot be said that the principles were wholly irrelevant. 57. In Union of India v. The Metal Corpn. of India Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 637 principles for determination of compensation were laid down. Valuation of Plant, machinery or other equipment which had not been used and was in good condition was to be done at the actual cost incurred by the Corporation is acquiring them. The valuation of any other plant, machinery, or equipment was to be determined in accordance with their written down value determined in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 58. In the Metal Corporations case (supra) the Supreme Court held that the principles were not relevant. This view was specifically overruled in the State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, AIR 1969 SC 634 . The Court held that the principle for determining compensation in respect of used machinery, namely, the written down value, was not irrelevant to the determination of compensation and the compensation is not illusory. 59. This view has nowhere been overruled in Coopers case ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ). The Court held that the principle for determining compensation in respect of used machinery, namely, the written down value, was not irrelevant to the determination of compensation and the compensation is not illusory. 59. This view has nowhere been overruled in Coopers case ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ). On the contrary, Coopers case also emphasises that there can be more than one principle for determining compensation for a particular kind of property, and if the Legislature has chosen one, it cannot be struck down on the ground that some other principle was better. 60. In Oriental Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1979 SC 248 (supra) it was held (vide para 20) that property like plant etc. may have to be valued on the basis of original-cost, cost of reproduction, allowance for depreciation etc. It is apparent that the principle of written down value or depreciated cost is relevant to determination of compensation for used machinery or equipment. In the present cases the petitioners have not indicated the exact age of the undertakings. But it is apparent that they are very very old. According to the learned Advocate-General they have virtually outlived their lives. 61. The petitioners have not brought to our notice any material to sustain the submission that the compensation is wholly illusory. 62. It was submitted that no compensation has been paid for the goodwill of the undertaking. 63. An undertaking which is running into losses year after year hardly has any goodwill. In the next place, the undertaking alone has been acquired. The sugar mills management of business has not been touched. The company, its shares, its managerial set up remains intact. It is not a case of acquisition of a running business as a going concern. No question of payment of compensation for goodwill hence arises. 64. We are unable to hold that the Act contravenes the provisions relating tc compensation under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. 65. It was then submitted that there was no public purpose behind the acquisition. 66. In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 215 (supra) it has been held that it is settled law that a law providing for acquisition of property, must be for a public purpose. This is a justiciable issue. But the decision in that regard is not to be given by any detailed enquiry or investigation of facts. 66. In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 215 (supra) it has been held that it is settled law that a law providing for acquisition of property, must be for a public purpose. This is a justiciable issue. But the decision in that regard is not to be given by any detailed enquiry or investigation of facts. The intention of the Legislature has to be gathered mainly from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act and its Preamble. The matter has to be examined with reference to the various provisions of the Act, its context and set up, the purpose of acquisition has to be culled out therefrom and then it has to be judged whether the acquisition is for a public purpose within the meaning of Art. 31 (2). It was also held that merely because the acquired property is transferred to a State Corporation, it cannot be challenged as being not for a public purpose. The term "public purpose" was held to have a wide and comprehensive significance. The expression has to be liberally construed, and legislative judgment in this behalf deserves due weight. 67. The Preamble of the Act stated that it was an Act to provide, in the interests of the general public, for the acquisition and transfer of certain sugar undertakings, and for matters connected therewith or incidental there to. 68. The Statement of Objects and Reasons stated: "The owners of certain sugar mills of the State or their lessees had created serious problems for the cane-growers and labour which created an adverse impact on the general economy of the areas, where those mills were situate. The only solution of these problems was for the State Government to take immediate steps to acquire with a view to renovating and rehabilitating those mills or carry out improvement therein. 2. Accordingly, a legislation was prepared to acquire such mills, which provided for acquisition of properties and assets pertaining to those mills and for payment of compensation for the same and for the replacement of the dues of cane-growers, labourers and of the Government out of the amount of compensation and for other connected and incidental matters. 3. 2. Accordingly, a legislation was prepared to acquire such mills, which provided for acquisition of properties and assets pertaining to those mills and for payment of compensation for the same and for the replacement of the dues of cane-growers, labourers and of the Government out of the amount of compensation and for other connected and incidental matters. 3. To prepare the mills for crushing before the next crushing season, the usual annual repairs (which are carried out during the off-season) had to be carried out well in time, and since the time available was short, immediate action was called for ...................... 4. The State Government have since decided that the dues of cane-growers and labourers should be given higher priority than the State Governments taxes and other unsecured dues." 69. The stated purpose was to ameliorate the adverse economic conditions created by these sick mills, and to resolve the serious problems caused by the non-payment of the dues of cane-growers and labourers. Another object was to renovate and rehabilitate these sick mills, so that they may work efficiently. These objects were for the public good. The Act sought to achieve social betterment. The acquisition was for a public purpose. There is nothing in the provisions of the Act to contradict the aforesaid purposes of acquisition. The ground of attack based on Article 31, therefore, fails. (3) Article 19 of the Constitution: 70. The submission that the Act violates Art. 19 (1) (f) and (g) is misconceived. 71. Sub-clause (f) is subject to Cl. (5) of Article 19, under which reasonable restriction can be imposed upon the right to hold property. In Coopers case ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ) it was held (at page-596): "Where the law provides for compulsory acquisition of property for a public purpose it may be presumed that the acquisition or the law relating thereto imposes a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. If there is no public purpose to sustain compulsory acquisition, the law violates Art. 31 (2). If the acquisition is for a public purpose, substantive reasonableness of the restriction which includes deprivation may, unless otherwise established, be presumed, but enquiry into reasonableness of the procedural provisions will not be excluded." 72. We have already held that the Act was for compulsory acquisition for a public purpose. Substantive reasonableness can hence be presumed. If the acquisition is for a public purpose, substantive reasonableness of the restriction which includes deprivation may, unless otherwise established, be presumed, but enquiry into reasonableness of the procedural provisions will not be excluded." 72. We have already held that the Act was for compulsory acquisition for a public purpose. Substantive reasonableness can hence be presumed. The petitioners have not been able to establish anything to rebut this presumption. 73. We did not hear any argument on procedural unreasonableness, obviously because the Act does not provide for determination of compensation on given principles. The Legislature itself fixed the amount of compensation. 74. So far as Cl. (g) is concerned, the Act does not deprive the petitioners of the right to carry on business. The Com-; pany or its shares are left intact. Thej licence of the Company to carry on busi-i ness of sugar manufacture has also not been touched. The Company is free to, carry on its business by establishing another undertaking or otherwise. Cl. (g)! hence does not come into the picture. (4) Article 14 of the Constitution: 75. Under this head it was argued that the Legislature has arbitrarily picked up twelve mills for being axedi under the impugned Act. Many other mills similarly situate were left out. The Legislature has in the impugned legislation acted with an evil eye and an unequal hand. Hence the infringement of the guarantee of equality under Art. 14 of the Constitution. 76. It is well settled that Art. 14 forbids hostile class legislation. It permits reasonable classification: see R.K. Dalmia v. Sri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 . 77. In Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771 it was observed that the Legislature is in the best position to understand and appreciate needs of the people as enjoined by the Constitution to bring about social reforms for the upliftment of the backward and the weaker sections of the society and for the improvement of the lot of poor people. It was further observed that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus to prove its invalidity lies on the party which assails the same. 78. In reply to the charge of discrimination the respondents have stated as follows in para. 16 of the counter affidavit: "16. It was further observed that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus to prove its invalidity lies on the party which assails the same. 78. In reply to the charge of discrimination the respondents have stated as follows in para. 16 of the counter affidavit: "16. That in reply to the allegation of the petitioner that the Act violates Article 14 of the Constitution contained in paragraphs Nos. 11, 12, 13, 26 (m) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) of the writ petition it is stated as below: (a) That the allegation that there is no rational differentia between the undertakings that have been acquired and those that have been left out is again a wrong assertion. The State Legislature while exercising the legislative powers were fully competent to recognise degrees of harm and to confine the legislation to those cases where need was deemed to be the clearest. The facts brought out in the foregoing paragraphs are quite eloquent proof of the necessity for acquiring the petitioners undertaking in the public interest. The various factors, namely, mismanagement as reflected in persistent default in payment of the cane growers dues and public demands and inefficiency in the maintenance of plant and machinery, which impelled the State Government to choose the petitioners undertaking for acquisition, have already been set out in the foregoing paragraphs. (b) That it is further stated that the State Government on a close review of the performances of the undertaking generally and in particular for the period 1965-66 to 1969-70 and in 1970-71 tried to ascertain as to which of these had been mismanaged over long periods or had persistently defaulted in payment of cane price, purchase tax and other dues. One of the indices considered for this purpose was whether the undertakings have had to be put under the charge of authorised controllers under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act or of Receivers appointed by the Civil Courts or by the Collectors for recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue. The position as to payment of dues was closely scrutinised from several angles. The position as to payment of dues was closely scrutinised from several angles. It was seen as to which of these undertakings had paid cane price below the average payment for the whole of the sugar industry in the State in the particular year and as to what per centage of cane price due in a particular year was left unpaid. As to purchase tax, it was examined as to which of these factories had paid less than 40%. of the tax due in a majority of 5 years and it was found that in the case of some the payment was less than 25% in some year and with regard to some the payment in some of the years was found nil. The total amount of dues outstanding, the length of the period for which they had remained unpaid, or, in other words, the duration thereof and the readiness of the parties and efforts made by them to clear off the dues was also taken into account. Of the factories thus tentatively selected, the condition of plants and machinery was also checked up and the effort made by them, if any, to improve the management and condition of the plant and machinery was taken into consideration as well. The actual production was found in the ease of some to have not reached the capacity of plants and machinery, and moreover, out of these 12 as many as 10 were found to have incurred, on an average, loss during the five years up to 1968-69. On the selection that thus came to be made, two groups as below were formed: GROUP I 1. Ramchand & Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., Barabanki. 11/ 2. Burhwal Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., Burhwal, Distt. Barabanki. 3. R. B. Lachmandas Sugar and General Mills (P) Ltd., Jarwal Road, district Bahraich. H 4. Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Ramkola, District Deoria. 5. Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P) Ltd., Khandda, District Deoria. 6. Kamlapat Motilal Bhatni (Sugar Mills) Branch, Bhatni, District Deoria. 7. Ram Laxman Sugar Mills, Mohiddinpur, District Meerut. 8. Diwan Sugar and. General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Sakhotitanda, District Meerut. GROUP II 1. Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur. 2. Kundan Sugar Mills, Amroha, Disr trict Moradabad. 3. Shiv Prasad Bansarji Dass Sugar Mills, Bijnor. s 4. Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshmiganj, district Deoria. 7. Ram Laxman Sugar Mills, Mohiddinpur, District Meerut. 8. Diwan Sugar and. General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Sakhotitanda, District Meerut. GROUP II 1. Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur. 2. Kundan Sugar Mills, Amroha, Disr trict Moradabad. 3. Shiv Prasad Bansarji Dass Sugar Mills, Bijnor. s 4. Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshmiganj, district Deoria. "The factories constituted in the first group were found on the scrutiny thus made to be the worst defaulters which suffered from mismanagement, improper maintenance of plant and machinery or persistent default in payment of dues to the largest extent. The difference in overall position between those in this group and Group No. 2 was of degree only, since those in Group 2 were defaulters and mismanaged, besides being inefficient. The picture that has thus emerged was based on a consideration made cumulatively of the relevant indicia indicated in the above and not on the exclusion of one to the other. The factories which did not come up to the strict standard categories for the selection made of those in groups I and II and in the case of which the need for State intervention did not appear to be so immediate were left out. (c) The remedy available to the Central Government to appoint authorised controllers under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 was not very effective. In any case, it is no substitute for transference of the unit to public ownership. When the State takes over a unit for merely substituting its management for a limited period it cannot in the very nature of things, make long term investments. That may be possible only when the ownership vests in the State. The States own resources, however, though far superior to those of private mill owners, are not entirely unlimited. The State has to take an overall view of its requirements and commitments in different fields. Not merely financial resources but even availability of suitable management personnel is limited, though the position need not be static. Accordingly the State had to intervene up to the limits of its presently available resources at this stage. It had to make a selection in order to choose the worst cases which it was in a position to tackle for the present." 79. The petitioners have not been able to dislodge these assertions. Accordingly the State had to intervene up to the limits of its presently available resources at this stage. It had to make a selection in order to choose the worst cases which it was in a position to tackle for the present." 79. The petitioners have not been able to dislodge these assertions. The facts averred by the respondents clearly show that the petitioners were chosen on the basis of intelligible differentia, which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. 80. The charge that several other mills similarly situate as the petitioners were left out is sufficiently answered by Cl. (c) of para. 16 of the counter affidavit mentioned above. 81. In the present cases the selection was made by the legislature itself and not by any executive official. There is a presumption that the Legislature acts with reasonableness in the light of comparative need and also in the light of its own resources. 82. We are hence not satisfied that the Act violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. 83. It was faintly urged that the Ordinance was invalid, because it did not receive the Presidential assent. 84. It is not disputed that the Act which replaced the Ordinance did receive the Presidential assent. The Act replaced the Ordinance. Since the Act is valid, it is unnecessary to prove further into the validity of the Ordinance. 85. The various points urged in su