ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. The notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act was issued to Balwant Singh, who is the petitioner No. 1 before me. He filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority. Thereafter, an appeal was filed and the same was heard and decided by the District Judge, Lalitpur by his judgment dated 5th February, 1977, a true copy whereof is Annexure 7 to the petition. The appeal was dismissed. Now the petitioners have come up before me in the instant writ petition and in support thereof, I have heard Dr. Dwivedi. learned counsel for the petitioners and in opposition the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. 3. It may be stated that the petitioner No. 2, Smt. Badi Dulaiya is the mother of the petitioner No. 1. The first contention, which was raised, related to the right of the petitioner No. 2 in certain land which before the abolition of Zamindari was found to be Seer and Khudkasht and which subsequent to such vesting came to be recorded as the Bhumidhari in the name of the petitioner No. 1 alone. It is contended that the father of the petitioner No. 1 and husband of petitioner No. 2, Mahip Singh, died in the year 1943 and he left behind the two petitioners to inherit the property. In this connection the attention was drawn to the provisions of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 under which the widow had the same interest in the joint family property as tho deceased husband had and in the self acquired property the widow had the same share as the son. Accordingly, it is contended that when such seer and khudkasht land came to be recorded as Bhumidhari in the name of the petitioner No. 1, such recording was in a re- presentative capacity and the petitioner No. 2 also had half share in such Bhumidhari land. Section 3 of the said Act lays down as under: - "3. Accordingly, it is contended that when such seer and khudkasht land came to be recorded as Bhumidhari in the name of the petitioner No. 1, such recording was in a re- presentative capacity and the petitioner No. 2 also had half share in such Bhumidhari land. Section 3 of the said Act lays down as under: - "3. (1) When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu Law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow (c), or if there is more than one widow all his widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son: Provided that the widow of a predeceased son (cl) shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a sons son if there is surviving a son or sons of such predeceased son: Provided further that the same provision shall apply mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son. (2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga School or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest on a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had (3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner (4) The provisions of the section shall not apply to an estate which by a customary or other rule of succession or by the terms of the grant applicable thereto descends on a single heir or to any property to which the Indian Succession Act, 1925, applies." Therefore, there can be little doubt that under the said provision the petitioner No. 2, had half share along with her son the petitioner No. 1, when in 1948 Mahip Singh died. It is wholly immaterial that the name of the petitioner No. 1 alone came to be recorded in the revenue papers because as laid down in Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai Ram ( AIR 1973 SC 893 ), such recording has to be held to be on behalf of all the co-owners. The possession of the petitioner No. 1 was constructively on behalf of the petitioner No. 2 also. The learned Standing Counsel sought to contend that as the widow had only a limited interest under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, therefore, after the abolition of Zamindari she could become Bhumidhar of only the limited life interest and not a full-fledged Bhumidhar. This contention stands rejected in view of the Supreme Court pronouncement in Ramii Dixit v. Bhirgunath ( AIR 1968 SC 1058 ). Under the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 her interest was not a life interest but a full-fledged interest. 4. I have not been satisfied that really there was any ouster of the petitioner No. 2 from the land in dispute. The mere fact that in some sale-deed the petitioner No. 1 claimed to be the full owner and sold the land with him and such recital will not prove a case of ouster. Accordingly, in my view, the first contention of Dr. Dwivedi, has to be accepted. 5. Learned counsel next contended chat certain plots, which should have been treated as unirrigated, were treated as irrigated. In my opinion as the authorities below did not have the benefit of having the guidance which was subsequently given in Jaswant Singh v. State (1978 All WC 577) of this Court, therefore, the treatment of the said controversy in the verdict of the authorities below is not in accordance with Section 4-A of the Act. 6. It was next contended that the transfers which were effected after 24th January, 1971 should have been accepted. In my opinion this contention is not tenable. The authorities below have concurrently held against the petitioners and undoubtedly the burden was upon the tenure-holder to prove the good faith and adequacy of the consideration. It is obvious that the authorities below were not satisfied on the points. 7. The learned counsel next con- tended that the number of the members of the family was not properly found. The authorities below have concurrently held against the petitioners and undoubtedly the burden was upon the tenure-holder to prove the good faith and adequacy of the consideration. It is obvious that the authorities below were not satisfied on the points. 7. The learned counsel next con- tended that the number of the members of the family was not properly found. Again this is a pure funding of fact and the finding about the date of birth of the daughter cannot be interfered with in these proceedings. 8. Lastly, it was contended that some land was covered by a cremation ground but the authorities below have, given a concurrent finding against the petitioners. No interference can be made in such finding of fact. 9. This petition accordingly, is allowed and the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 31-8-1976 and the judgment of the appellate court dated 5-2-1977 are hereby quashed in so far as the aforesaid two controversies are concerned; namely, in respect of the land, which was formerly Seer and Khudkasht before the abolition of Zamindari and in respect of the plots, which have been treated as irrigated by the authorities below. The case is remanded to the Prescribed Authority with a direction that the parties shall be allowed to lead additional evidence on the said two controversies. The petitioner will adduce the evidence to substantiate his contention that certain land was Seer and Khudkasht in the hands of the father of the petitioner No. 1 before the abolition of Zamindari. The parties shall also lead evidence on the question of plots, which have been treated to be irrigated by the authorities below. Such evidence shall be led in the light of the law laid down in Jaswant Singhs case (supra) and thereafter the Prescribed Authorities shall deal with each such plot and state how both the requirements mentioned in any of the three categories of a Section 4-A of the Act stand satisfied or do not stand satisfied and thereafter a particular plot shall be held to be irrigated or unirrigated, in the light of the law laid down in the said Jaswant Singhs case. In the land which is found to have been Seer and Khudkasht before the abolition of Zamindari, the petitioner No. 2 shall be deemed to have half share and the same shall be excluded from the holding of the petitioner No. 1. In the land which is found to have been Seer and Khudkasht before the abolition of Zamindari, the petitioner No. 2 shall be deemed to have half share and the same shall be excluded from the holding of the petitioner No. 1. The surplus land shall be redetermined thereafter. It is made clear that no other controversy shall be allowed to be raised before the Prescribed Authority or before the appellate court in case an appeal is filed against the fresh decision of the Prescribed Authority. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.