JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - This is a defendants appeal against the judgment and decree-dated 22-9-1969 passed by II Temporary Civil Judge, Banda in civil appeal No. 28 of 1967 judgment and decree dated 12-1-1967 passed by Additional Munsif, Banda, in Original Suit No. 41 of 1965. 2. The matter involved is of a petty; nature. In the commissioners map 10 Kha the disputed door of the appellants house has been shown by letter "R". There is a Parchhati to the north of this door. To the north and east of this Parchhati, there is Sehan land of the respondents. To the north-east of the Sehan land there is house of the respondents. All this property' has been shown by red lines. The house property of the appellants has been, shown by blue lines. The case of the respondent was that their parchhati exists since a long time and that the appellants had opened a new door "R" in their wall with the intention of passing through their parchhati and Sehan Land. Therefore, the respondents claimed mandatory as well as preventive injunctions. A commission was issued ex parte on the 3rd day of the filing of the suit. The appellants case was that their door "R" exists since a long time and that the respondents had forcibly made Parchhati a few months before the filing of the suit. The suit was filed on 31st Jan., 1965. Parties led oral evidence in the case. The respondents also examined the Vakil Commissioner who visited the spot on 2-2-1965. On an appraisal of the evidence of the parties witnesses including the statement on oath of the commissioner, both the courts below found that the case of the respondents was true, and the case of the appellants was not true. Therefore, the reliefs claimed by the respondents were allowed. 3. The learned counsel for the appellants raised only two legal points. (1) The report of the commissioner and the statement of the commissioner should not have been relied upon by the courts below in view of the provisions of O. 26, Rr. 10 (2) and 18. Reliance was placed on the case of Seetharamappa v. Pcdda Appaiah, AIR 1962 Andh Pra 84. 4. Order 26, C. P. C. lays down for what purposes a commission can be issued by a Court, Rr. 9 and 10 relate to commissions for local investigation. 10 (2) and 18. Reliance was placed on the case of Seetharamappa v. Pcdda Appaiah, AIR 1962 Andh Pra 84. 4. Order 26, C. P. C. lays down for what purposes a commission can be issued by a Court, Rr. 9 and 10 relate to commissions for local investigation. R. 9 lays down that in any suit in which the Court deems a local investigation to be requisite or proper for the purpose of elucidating any matter in dispute, or. of ascertaining the market-value of the property, or the amount of any mesne profits or damages or annual net profits, the Court may issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit directing him to make such investigation and to report thereon to the Court. R. 10 (1) then provides that the commissioner, after such local inspection as he deems necessary and after reducing to writing the evidence taken by him shall return such evidence, together with his report in writing signed by him to the Court. Sub-rule (2) of this rule lays down that the report of the commissioner and the evidence taken by him shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record, but the Court, or, with the permission of the 'Court, any of the parties to the suit may examine the commissioner personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation. 5. It shall be .noticed that these rules do not lay clown at what stage a Court, can issue a commission. It follows from this that a Court can issue commission immediately after the filing of a suit without waiting for the appearance of the defendant in the case. 6. Rr. 15 to 18 are lays down that where a commission is issued under this order, the Court shall direct that the parties to the suit shall appear before the commissioner in person or by their agents or pleaders. Subrule (2) of this rule further lays down that where all or any of the parties do not so appear, the commissioner may proceed in their absence. 7. In the case of Pedda Seetharamappa (cited above) an ex parte commission was issued and the commissioner was also examined in the case. Subrule (2) of this rule further lays down that where all or any of the parties do not so appear, the commissioner may proceed in their absence. 7. In the case of Pedda Seetharamappa (cited above) an ex parte commission was issued and the commissioner was also examined in the case. It was held that the Court could issue an ex parte commission. Then it was held that R. 19 laid down that after the issue of commission the Court should direct the parties to appear before the commission. The court had not passed a direction as required by R. 18. It was, therefore, held that no reliance could be placed on the report of the commissioner nor any reliance could be placed on the statement of the commissioner. The learned counsel for the appellants relies on this part of the decision with due respect, I am not in agreement with this view. Its first reason is that a court can issue a commission ex parte without waiting for the appearance of the defendant before it. As the commission can be issued without waiting for the appearance of the defendant and even immediately after the filing of the suit, there is no question of the court directing the parties to appear before the commission because on the date of the order issuing commission or immediately thereafter the defendant is not before the court. In order to implement the intention of R. 18 the court will have to issue notice or a direction in writing to the defendant to appear before the commission. This will take sufficient time. There can be cases in which the direction may not reach the defendant even for months. If R. 18 is strictly complied (with) then the commissioner would not be able to execute the commission soon after obtaining the writ from the court. It would thus lead to a negation of the right of the plaintiff to get a commission issued immediately after the filing of the suit. It will further be seen that if the parties do not appear, the commissioner can proceed to execute the commission in their absence as is clearly laid down in sub-rule (2) of R. 18. 8. It would thus lead to a negation of the right of the plaintiff to get a commission issued immediately after the filing of the suit. It will further be seen that if the parties do not appear, the commissioner can proceed to execute the commission in their absence as is clearly laid down in sub-rule (2) of R. 18. 8. From what has been discussed above, it is not correct to say that as the court did not make compliance of the provisions of R. 18 (1), the report and the statement of the commissioner cannot be read in evidence. Besides, no party can be made to suffer for the omission of the court. It shall also be kept in view that there is no rule in the Code providing that if the court did not issue direction as required by R. 18 (1) the commissioner's report would be inadmissible and would be of no help or value. The specific provision in R. 10 (2) is that the report of the commissioner shall be evidence in the suit. Furthermore the court can examine the commissioner on the request of any party to the suit as has been clearly laid down in R. 10 (2). 9. The position that follows is that the view taken in the above cited case is not practical and the appellants cannot be given any advantage of it. In the present case the respondents had examined the commissioner and the appellants got full opportunity to cross-examine him. Thus it cannot be said that the appellants were in any way prejudiced in the trial of the suit. 10. For the foregoing reasons, there is no force in the contention of the appellants counsel. (2) Every person has a right to open a door in his wall and, therefore, in the present case mandatory injunction should not have been issued directing the appellants to close the door "R". Ordinarily every person has a right to open a door in his wall, but this absolute right is subject to certain limitations. Therefore, each case has to be considered on its own merits. Relief of injunction is discretionary. In exceptional cases the courts can issue mandatory injunction (vide Section 89 Specific Relief Act). Ordinarily every person has a right to open a door in his wall, but this absolute right is subject to certain limitations. Therefore, each case has to be considered on its own merits. Relief of injunction is discretionary. In exceptional cases the courts can issue mandatory injunction (vide Section 89 Specific Relief Act). This section lays down that when, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of requisite acts. The appellants counsel has placed reliance on the case of Kashi Nath v. Ram Jiwan, AIR 1933 Lah 847. In this case the plaintiff was owner of an open piece of land. The defendants had opened a door and some windows in their own wall adjoining the open land of the plaintiff. It was observed, "It is conceded that every owner has got the right to open apertures in his own wall and unless by doing so he invades the privacy or any other pre-existing and well-established right vested in his neighbour, the latter cannot force him to close tire apertures". 11. There is no dispute to the above-observations. These observations are not. applicable to the present case. In the present case Parchhati of the respondent was in existence since a long time. The wall of the appellants house was to the-south of the respondents Parchhati. The respondents were using this parchhati for-keeping their cattle etc. In this circumstance, the appellants had absolutely no right to open any door into or towards the Parchhati of the respondents. The opening of the door infringed the right of the. respondents to use the Parchhati in any manner they liked. In cases of the present nature there is prima facie an obligation upon the neighbour not to open apertures towards the property of the adjoining neighbour. Therefore, this case-squarely falls under Section 39 of the Specific-Relief Act and the case of Kashi Natta (cited above) is of no avail to the appellants. si 12. For The findings arrived at above, there is no substance in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.