JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for redemption of a mortgage. 2. The deed of mortgage was executed on 21st January, 1924. The mortgage was unsfructuary. The amount secured was Rs. 200 and the period for payment was one 3 year. The usufruct was to be set off against the interest. The original mortgagee was Sheikh Mohammed Husain. He transferred his mortgagee right by a deed dated 2nd February, 1953 to the defendant. The deed, Ext. 3 described the property sold as- ( gd eqjrguh ckcr jgsuukek n[kyh eD[kkZ 21 tuojh lu~ 24 bZ0 ftldh jftLV~h cgh ua0 1 ft0 469 ds nQk 384 bZ0 cnQ~rj lc&jftLV~kj lkgsc cjsyh esa gqbZ gSA bdjkjh gkfQt mej vgen [kka oYn gkth eksgEen tkQj [kka dkSe iBuk lkfdu cjsyh eq0 t[khjk ekSlwek o ;kdruh eueqfdj ftlesa eq>dks ,d gCck olwy ugha gqvk gS vkSj 'k; ejguk cgkyr ekStwnk esa eugfn gks pqdh gS ftlesa ftudh nhokjkjkr ekStwn gS lkFk lc gnwn o gdwd ejkfQd nk[kyh o [kfjth dkfct ,ot eqcfyx 200 nks lkS :i;k ls cnLr lqYrku vgen------------------drbZ csap Mkyk----- ) 3. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation, inasmuch as the aforesaid recital in the deed of assignment of the mortgagee rights did not give a fresh start to limitation prescribed by Art. 61 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 4. The principal question arising for determination in this second appeal is whether the said view of the lower appellate court is correct in law. The suit was filed on 7th August, 1972. Clause (a) of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes for a suit by a mortgagor to redeem or to recover possession of the immoveable property mortgaged, the limitation of 30 years from the date when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues. On the facts stated, the right to redeem or recover possession accrued on the expiry of one year from the date of the mortgage, that is, on 21st January, 1925. 30 years therefrom expired on 21st January, 1955, when Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was in force. On the facts stated, the right to redeem or recover possession accrued on the expiry of one year from the date of the mortgage, that is, on 21st January, 1925. 30 years therefrom expired on 21st January, 1955, when Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was in force. Art. 148 of the Schedule to that Act prescribed the limitation of 60 years for a suit by the mortgagor for redemption of a mortgage or to recover possession of immoveable property mortgaged. The limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 was thus shorter than that prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 had not expired when the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force on 1st January, 1964, rather it was due to expire on 21st January, 1985. In such a situation the suit could have been instituted, according to clause (a) of Section 30 of the Limitation Act, 1963 within 7 years ' from 1st January, 1964, that is up to 1st January, 1971, but the suit was instituted, as noticed above, on 7th August, 1972, but the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the proviso to that clause of Section 30 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which runs as follows: "Provided that if in respect of any such suit, the said period of seven years expires earlier than the period of limitation prescribed therefor under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and the said period of seven years together with so much of the period of limitation in respect of such suit under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, as has already expired before the commencement of this Act is shorter than the period prescribed for such suit under this Act, then, the suit may be instituted within the period of limitation prescribed under this Act." The argument runs thus. The period of limitation for the suit prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was undoubtedly due to expire more than seven years after the commencement of the Limitation Act, 1963, but it was not due to expire on 21st January, 1985 inasmuch as a fresh start of limitation was given by the acknowledgment in writing of the liability to redemption under the mortgage deed dated 21st January, 1924, by the acknowledgement in writing made on 2nd February, 1953 by the mortgagee in favour of the defendant-That being so, the limitation of 30 years prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be computed from 2nd February, 1953 and not from 21st January, 1925. According to the judgment of the lower appellate court no authority was cited before it, and hence it came to a conclusion, unfavourable to the plaintiff, on an interpretation of Article 61 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes the date, when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues as the starting point of limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the lower appellate court lost sight of the provisions of Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. According to subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed." 5. Learned counsel contended that the defendant claimed his title to the property in suit from the mortgagee, and the mortgagee had by the above quoted recital in the deed of assignment dated 2nd February, 1953 acknowledged in writing signed by him the mortgagors right to redeem the property and the corresponding liability of redemption of the property. He contended that the limitation had, therefore to be computed from 2nd February, 1953. He contended that the limitation had, therefore to be computed from 2nd February, 1953. Sec. 18 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is in identical terms and, therefore, whether limitation has to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, or in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation had to be computed in this case from 2nd February, 1953'. This being so the limitation of 30 years prescribed by Article 61 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was due to expire on 2nd February, 1983 and the suit filed on 7th August, 1972 was well within time. Learned counsel for the respondent was unable to show that this was not so. 6. However, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the property in suit was not, correctly described in the plaint and on this point he invited my attention to issues Nos. 7 and -8 which were to the effect whether the defendant is the owner of the adjoining house and if so whether its area had been included in the property in dispute as alleged, and whether the property in dispute is 293 square yards. These issues appear to have been raised on account of the addition of the words 'with land underneath measuring 293 sq. yards in the description of the house at the foot of the plaint by an amendment thereof. The trial court found that from a perusal of Ext. 4, which is the map of the Municipal Board Bareilly, it is clear that the disputed property is 293 sq. yards and that there was no evidence from the side of the defendant to rebut the same. The trial court further found that the defendant was the owner of the adjoining house and no encroachment had been made over the property in suit, the area of which was 293 sq. yards. yards and that there was no evidence from the side of the defendant to rebut the same. The trial court further found that the defendant was the owner of the adjoining house and no encroachment had been made over the property in suit, the area of which was 293 sq. yards. This finding of the trial court was not approved of by the lower appellate court, but it did not give a positive finding of its own except for observing that there is no specific mention of area of the mortgaged property in the deed of mortgage wherein it was identified only by the boundaries and that the plaintiff had specified the area of the mortgaged property only by way of an amendment of the plaint and should have, therefore, applied for the issue of a commission with the direction that the Amin will locate the land in dispute with the help of the boundaries as given in the mortgage deed etc. The lower appellate court observed that although a Commission had been issued by the trial court and the Amins map and the report were on the record, but the same were not considered at the trial stage and that on the contrary help was sought from a map maintained by the Municipal Board. The Amins report and map were also criticised by the lower appellate court and it has observed that under the circumstance a fresh commission ought to have been issued in order to arrive at a 'plausible conclusion. In his original written statement the defendant did not dispute the identity of the mortgaged property. It was only after the amendment that he pleaded in his additional written statement that the measurement of the property in suit was not 293 sq. yards and that the defendant who is the owner of the adjoining house to the north had raised a wall east-west between the properties including a strip of land 7 yards wide east-west out of the purchased property in the southern property in suit to afford sufficient accommodation to his tobacco business carried on in the southern property in suit and built his residential house on the remaining land purchased by him towards north of the property in suit. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was not justified in fixing the wall raised by the defendant as the northern boundary of the property in suit. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was not justified in fixing the wall raised by the defendant as the northern boundary of the property in suit. It is not possible for this court sitting on second appeal, to determine this controversy one way or the other, and in view of the conclusion reached by me that the suit was not barred by limitation, it appears necessary to determine the exact area of the land which was the subject-matter of the mortgage and for that purpose, to remand the appeal to the District Court of Bareilly with the direction that after determining the exact area of the land covered by the mortgage, on the basis of the evidence already on the record or on such additional evidence as the District Court may in its discretion think it fit to admit, including the issue of a fresh survey commission, for fixing the boundaries of the mortgaged property. The suit for redemption shall then be decreed with costs throughout requiring the plaintiff to pay the mortgage money within 30 days of the passing of the decree and requiring the defendant within 7 days of such payment to transfer the deeds and the possession over the mortgaged property, to be specified on the basis of the determination of its area and boundaries to be made by the lower appellate court. It shall, however, be open to the court of the District Judge, Bareilly to either hear the appeal itself or to assign it for hearing to any other court of competent jurisdiction. 7. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside. The appeal being Civil Appeal No. 174 of 1975 is remanded to the District Court, Bareilly, for determination of the area and boundaries of the mortgaged property and decreeing the suit for redemption with costs throughout in the light of the directions given in this judgment.