Short Note : These are Miscellaneous Petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issuing a suitable writ, order or direction to quash the notification No. Q/11-4.73-S- VII, published in the Extraordinary Gazettee dated 23rd February, 1973 and the Notification dated 8th March, 1973. 2. The Government of Madhya Pradesh through Revenue Department, published a Notification dated 20-2-1973 under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) regarding the above survey numbers which were to be acquired for utilising the land for public purpose. The public purpose mentioned is that this land will be used for market-yard for Mandi for Sheopur Kalan. It also gives to the officer mentioned in Column 5, power under section 4(2) of the Act. The Notification of acquisition which is also under section 17(1) of the Act, mentions that as it is a case of urgency, the provisions of section 5-A of the Act will not be applicable. The Notification is Annexure P\1. There is another Notification under section 6 of the Act which is dated 8-3-1973 and which is Ex.P/2. The second Notification gives the description of the land the area and the purpose shown in the Notification is to provide a separate market yard for Mandi for Sheopur Kalan. 3. In the petitions, the submissions of the petitioners are that they are Bhumiswamis of the above land and the Survey numbers are situated within the limits of Sheopur Municipality and as such they are not arable lands. To show that the lands are not arable, it is mentioned in the petition that the disputed lands are in the vicinity of a colony which is known as Chambal Colony. As to Survey No. 232, the grievance is that there is a pakka construction and is a mango grove as 50 mango trees are standing there. It was also urged that the urgency alleged by the State is not of such nature as to attract the provisions of section 17(1) of the Act and thereby disentitling the petitioners from filing their objections under section 5-A of the Act. It was also canvassed before us that section 17(1) of the Act is not applicable because the land is neither an "arable land"; nor a "waste land". It was also canvassed before us that section 17(1) of the Act is not applicable because the land is neither an "arable land"; nor a "waste land". The petitioners say that the cumulative effect of these objections is that Notifications (Ex.P/1 and P/2) are bad in law, and, therefore, they should be quashed. Held : First we will take the objection regarding arable land or waste land. The argument before us was that arable land is a land which is actually under cultivation and, therefore as the land is not actually under cultivation, the provisions of this section are not applicable. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State drew our attention to the amendment effected in section 17 of the Act. By this amendment, the words "waste or arable" are omitted and, therefore, because of this amendment, it is not necessary to see while applying section 17 of the Act whether the land is arable or waste land. But, this submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that this amendment is by C.P. and Berar Act No. 20 of 1949 which Act is called Central Provinces and 'Berar Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons (land Acquisition) Act, 1949 and it was made for a purpose of acquiring land for resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons. Therefore, this amendment will not be applicable to the acquisition proceedings before us. Needless to say that this land is not acquired for resettlement or rebabilitation of displaced persons. 4. The first thing in this case we have to see is that whether there is public purpose or not. Where certain lands are sought to be acquired and the public purpose indicated in the Notification is the development of an area for construction of court-yard for Mandi, then certainly, on the face of it, it is a public purpose. But it in itself does not call for an action barring exceptional circumstances as to make immediate possession without holding a summary enquiry under section 5-A of the Act imperative. In the return filed by the State, they have mentioned that the development programme for developing the Mandi is spread over a period of ten years and, therefore, certainly there was enough time to hear objections from the interested parties under S.5-A of the Act. In the return filed by the State, they have mentioned that the development programme for developing the Mandi is spread over a period of ten years and, therefore, certainly there was enough time to hear objections from the interested parties under S.5-A of the Act. Such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary enquiries under S.5-A of the Act to be completed without any impedement whatsoever to the execution of the scheme. Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency on the apparent facts of the case as to require elimination of the enquiry under section 5-A of the Act. Therefore, we hold that even though the acquisition is for a public purpose, certainly, we cannot see that the urgency was of such a nature as to require the elimination of the enquiry under section 5A of the Act. 5. Section 17(4) of the Act cannot be read in isolation from section 4(1) and section 5-A of the Act. The immediate purpose of a notification under section 4(1) of the Act is to enable those who may have any objections to make to lodge them for purpose of an enquiry under section 5-A of the Act. It is true that, although, only 30 days from the notification under section 4(1) are given for the filing of these objections under section 5-A of the Act, yet, sometimes the proceedings under section 5-A are unduly prolonged. But considering the nature of the objections which are capable of being successfully taken under section 5-A it is difficult to see why the summary enquiry should not be concluded quite expeditiously. The purpose of section 17(4) of the Act is, obviously. not hereby to confine action under it to waste an arable land but also to situations in which an inquiry under section 5-A will serve no useful purpose or, for some over-riding reading reason, it should be dispensed with. It is not the submission of the State the enquiry under section 5-A of the Act will not serve any purpose. It is also not submitted before us that the enquiry under section 5-A of the Act will take a long time. It is not the submission of the State the enquiry under section 5-A of the Act will not serve any purpose. It is also not submitted before us that the enquiry under section 5-A of the Act will take a long time. If the State would have allowed objections by the interested persons to be filed under section 5-A of the Act within thirty days of the Notification Ex.P/1 certainly by this time the objections would have decided. 6. It is not just the existence of an urgency, but the need to dispense with the enquiry under section 5-A which has to be considered and section 17(2) of the Act deals with a case in which an enquiry under section 5-A of the Act could not possibly serve any useful purpose. For example, sudden change of the course of a river would leave no option if essential communications have to be maintained. It results in more or less beyond human control. What land should be urgently taken possession of. Hence, it offers no difficulty in applying section 17(4) in public interest. 7. The next point to be considered under section 17 of the Act is whether the land is a waste land or arable land. Waste land or arable land has been expounded by the Supreme Court in Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P., AIR 1967 SC 1081 and in I.G. Joshi v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 870 . According to the decision in Raja Anand's (supra) case, 'arable land' is 'land' which is mainly used for ploughing and for raising crops, 'wasteland' means "land which is unfit for cultivation or habitation, desolate and barren land with little or no vegetation thereon." In the case of I.G. Joshi (supra), it has been held that "by arable land is meant not only land capable of cultivation but also actually cultivated." In the case of Raja Anand (supra), it has also been held that the question of determination of character of land is a preliminary finding of fact on which depends the jurisdiction of the State Government to Act under section 17(1) and section 17(4) of the Act and, therefore, the High Court is entitled in a proceeding of writ of certiorary to determine whether or not the finding of the State Government is correct. We are supported in this proposition by a judgment of this Court in Jagannath Prasad v. State of M.P., 1969 JLJ 267 . 8. In the present case, there is no dispute that the petitioners say that they are Bhumiswamis of the land. They also pay land revenue to the Government and they are entered as Bhumiswamis in revenue papers. In the Misc. Petition No. 117 of 1973, the sale deeds produced also go to show that the land is an agricultural land. Therefore, we find no difficulty in holding that the land is an arable land. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that section 17(1) of the Act is not applicable because they are not arable lands cannot be accepted. But, as we have held that according to section 17 of the Act, no urgency is made out, naturally, the provisions of section 5-A of the Act cannot be dispensed with. Therefore, the mention in the Notification that section 5-A of the Act will not be applicable to the acquisition proceedings will have to be struck down. 9. The other consequence also will be that as under section 6 of the Act the appropriate Government will have to be satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under section 5-A sub-section (2) that the land is needed for a public purpose, then a declaration will have to be made under section 6 of the Act, we will have to strike down Annexure P/2 and we do so. AIR 1967 SC 1081 , AIR 1968 SC 870 , AIR 1977 SC 183 and 1969 JLJ 267 relied on. Petitions partly allowed.