JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - This is a decree-holders appeal against the judgment and decree dated 24-9-1969, passed by Additional Civil Judge, Jhansi, in Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1969. 2. Facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal are these: The appellant filed suit for recovery of Rs. 1700.00 on the basis of a pronote and a receipt. The respondent is an employee of the railway department. A compromise was entered into between the parties in the original suit. The terms of the compromise are as follows: - (1) Plaintiffs suit for Rs. 1700.00 with full costs and Rs. 6.75 as costs of notice be decreed. (2) If the respondent paid Rs. 230/-in monthly instalments of Rs. 10/- each besides the entire costs of the suit and Rs. 6.75 as costs of notice, the entire decretal amount would be deemed satisfied. (3) The first instalment would be payable on 1-2-1967 and future instalments would be payable on the first of each month. (4) In default of payment of any instalment, the entire sum of Rupees 1700.00 and costs would be liable to be recovered. The decree-holder could get deducted Rs. 35/- out of his pay for which the respondent would have no objection. (5) pendente lite and future interest @ 6% p. a. would be payable. 3. The respondent paid only one instalment of Rs. 10/-. He did not pay any other instalment. The decree-holder put the decree into execution and desired attachment of Rs. 35.00 p. m. from the salary of the respondent. The respondent filed objection under Section 47 that no part of his salary was liable to be attached as it was immune from attachment under Section 60 (1) (i), Civil P. C. This objection found favour with both the courts below. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the terms of the compromise between the parties, the respondent was estopped from claiming immunity from attachment of his salary to the extent of Rs. 35/- under Section 60 (1) (i) and that the respondent would be deemed to have waived his right to object under the said provision. 5. Reliance has been placed on the case of Jai Jai Ram v. Smt. Laxmi Devi, 1963 All LJ 832. In this case the appellant was an agriculturist. He was in occupation of the house attached in execution of the decree. 5. Reliance has been placed on the case of Jai Jai Ram v. Smt. Laxmi Devi, 1963 All LJ 832. In this case the appellant was an agriculturist. He was in occupation of the house attached in execution of the decree. The respondent wanted to realise his decree by attachment or sale of the house. The appellant filed objection under Section 47 read with Section 60 (1) (c) of the Civil P. C. A compromise was arrived at between the parties that the appellant could satisfy the decree in Annual instalments of Rs. 200.00, that if he failed to pay any instalment, the entire decretal amount would become recoverable in one instalment and the house in question and said attached property could be auctioned and the appellant's objection under Section 60 would be deemed to have been rejected and it would not be open to him to file another objection. The appellant did not satisfy the decree in terms of the compromise. The respondent then sought further execution i.e. sale of the attached house. The appellant filed objection that as he was an agriculturist and occupying the house, his house was immune from attachment and sale under Section 60 (1) (c). His objection was not accepted for the following reasons. (1) The doctrine of res judicata was applicable to execution proceedings. (2) The provision under Section 60 (1) (c) is for the individual benefit of an agriculturist. It was and is not based on any public policy. (3) The law does not prohibit transfer of a house belonging to and occupied by an agriculturist and an agriculturist can mortgage, sell or give away his house. In these circumstances, a judgment-debtor can waive the benefit of the exemption, granted by Section 60 (1) (c). 6. In thus case it was further observed that any agreement which tended to be injurious to the public or against public good is void as being contrary to public policy. 7. The provisions of Section 60 (1) (c) and Section 60 (1) (i) may be examined. Section 60 (1) indicates the property which was liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree. There is a proviso to this general rule which says that the following particulars shall not be liable to such attachment or sale: (c) Houses and other buildings belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him. Section 60 (1) indicates the property which was liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree. There is a proviso to this general rule which says that the following particulars shall not be liable to such attachment or sale: (c) Houses and other buildings belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him. (i) salary to the extent of the first two hundred rupees and one half of the remainder. 8. It will be noticed that clause (c) is qualified. There are two qualifications, (1) the house must belong to an agriculturist and (2) it must be in his occupation. As soon as an execution application for attachment of a house is moved by a decree-holder, the court cannot presume that it belongs to an agriculturist and is in his occupation. There can be cases where agriculturist may be owning more than one house. Therefore, in such a case the judgment debtor has to come forward and prove that he is an agriculturist and is in occupation of the house attached or sought to be attached. It is the pleasure of the judgment-debtor to come forward and to make such objection. He may not at all come up and file an objection under this provision. 9. The position of clause (1) is entirely different. There is no qualification in this clause. The Code clearly lays down that the salary to the extent of first Rs. 200/- and one half of the remainder shall not be liable to attachment. In case an executing court issues an order of attachment, it will have to satisfy itself first that the limit goes beyond the one laid down in clause (i). If the decree-holder himself is not able to show that the salary of of the judgment-debtor is not more than the limit, no executing court will have power to issue an order of attachment. In the case of salary, ordinarily the attachment order is sent to the head of the office for deducting the amount. The head of the office can also report to the court that the salary of the judgment-debtor is not such as may be attached and sent to the court. It will thus be seen that clause (i) is wholly unqualified and places a restriction on the power of the executing court. Such a power (sic) is not placed by clause (c). 10. It will thus be seen that clause (i) is wholly unqualified and places a restriction on the power of the executing court. Such a power (sic) is not placed by clause (c). 10. Clause (i) is based on public policy. That policy is that the judgment-debtor should get sufficient salary for his maintenance and the maintenance of his family. There is no public policy behind clause (c). 11. It will further be noticed that the decree-holders suit was for recovery of Rs. 1700/-. The first paragraph of the compromise says that the suit would be decreed in toto. In paras 2 and 3 a concession has been shown to the judgment-debtor. If the judgment-debtor had availed of this concession he would have paid lesser amount towards the full satisfaction of the decree. Paragraph 4 contains the default clause. The first part of this paragraph says that if any instalment is not paid, then the entire decretal amount would be recoverable immediately. So far the compromise is all right looking to the nature of the relief claimed in the suit. 12. The second part of paragraph 4 provided that the decree-holder would have a right to get Rs. 35/- deducted out of the judgment-debtor's pay. This part of the compromise as it is against the provisions of Section 60 (1) (i) is against the public policy behind the statutory provision. Therefore it is void. There is no mention in the compromise that the pay of the respondent was more than 270/- Had it been noted in the compromise that the pay of the respondent was less than Rs. 270/-, the court could not have accepted this part of the compromise. 13. The result of what has been discussed above is that the letter part of the compromise in the instant case is void and it is contrary to public policy and cannot be enforced by execution. 14. The case of Jai Jai Ram does not at all help the appellant. On the other hand the principles laid down the in the said case go against the appellant. 15. In view of the above there is no force in the contention of the appellant's counsel and the appeal is without merit. Appeal is dismissed. Costs on parties.