JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - Main question arising in this appeal is whether the contract entered into by the parties was a forward contract as defined in the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, hereinafter called the Act. 2. Section 17 of the Act prohibits forward contracts in certain cases. This section lays down that the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare that no person shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any forward contract for the sale or purchase of any goods or class of goods specified in the notification. Sub-section (2) of this section further lays down that all forward contracts in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) entered into after the date of publication of the notification thereunder shall be illegal. 3. Term 'forward contract has been defined in Section 2 (c) as 'means a contract for the delivery of goods at a future date and which is not a ready delivery contract. There are two essentials of this definition, (1) contract for the delivery of goods at a future date and (2) which is not a ready delivery contract. Expression ready delivery contract has been defined in clause (i) of Sec. 2 of the Act in the following words: "Ready delivery contract means a contract which provides for the delivery of goods and the payment of a price therefor either immediately or within such period not exceeding 11 days after the date of contract the period under such contract not being capable of extension by the mutual consent of the parties thereto or otherwise." There is one exception to the prohibition contained in Section 17. That exception is to be found in Section 18 of the Act. The exception is that the provisions of Section 17 shall not apply to non-transferable specific delivery contracts for the sale or purchase of any goods. 4. Turning to the facts of the case we find that undisputedly there took place a contract between the parties on 7-4-1964 in respect of 1188 tins of mustard oil. The plaintiff appellant is a partnership firm doing business at Hathras. This firm is of Pakka Arhat. The defendant respondent is a Mill manufacturing oil, dal etc. at Hathras. 4. Turning to the facts of the case we find that undisputedly there took place a contract between the parties on 7-4-1964 in respect of 1188 tins of mustard oil. The plaintiff appellant is a partnership firm doing business at Hathras. This firm is of Pakka Arhat. The defendant respondent is a Mill manufacturing oil, dal etc. at Hathras. The appellant filed suit with the allegations that it had purchased for its constituents 1188 tins of mustard oil with the condition that the respondent would place the indent for two wagons of 594 tins each on the same day or at the earliest, one for Alipurduar and the other for Cooch Behar and that as soon as the wagons would be placed on rail by the railway authorities, the goods would be despatched to the said places, the appellant further alleged that the respondent placed indent for one wagon to Alipurduar and did not place any indent with the Railways for a wagon for Cooch Behar. It was then alleged that the Railway Administration supplied the wagon for Alipurduar on 21-4-1964 and that the respondent did not load the wagon. In this way breach of contract on the part of the respondent was alleged in the plaint and on its basis suit for damages was filed. 5. In its written statement the respondent contended that it was under no liability to put indents for the wagons for the stations in question, it was simply a matter of courtesy that on the appellants request it put an indent for one wagon only for Alipurduar, that the contract in question was made on the terms that the plaintiff would have to take delivery within 10 days by sending empty tins and having the oil filled in the said tins within 10 days of the contract and get the same despatched against payment of value to the railway station, if wagons were allotted by that time, otherwise to get them transported to its own godowns, that the appellant failed to send any tins for taking delivery as agreed and to pay its value as agreed and as such it itself committed breach of the contract. The respondent further contended that the breach of contract took place on 17-4-1964 on the appellants default. The respondent further contended that the breach of contract took place on 17-4-1964 on the appellants default. The respondent then contended that it was a case of forward contract not enforceable at law and was barred by provisions of Section 230 of the Indian Contract Act. The respondent also contended that the contract was in violation of the. provisions of the Standard Weights and Measures Act and as such not enforceable at law. 6. The trial court (Civil Judge, Aligarh) found in favour of the appellant and decreed the suit for recovery of Rupees 5475.35 against the defendant respondent. On appeal by the respondent, by order dated 9-8-1968, the Additional District Judge, Aligarh, set aside the decree of the trial Judge and dismissed the suit. The Additional District Judge concluded that the contract was a forward contract as defined in the Act and that the plaintiffs appellants were not entitled to the benefit of exception contained in Section 18. 7. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length and the record has been examined with their assistance. A perusal of the judgment of the Additional District Judge shows that he has taken into consideration the plaint allegations, the oral evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses and has not at all taken into consideration the allegation contained in the written statement and the statement made on behalf of the defendant respondent. 8. We should first state what a contract is. Section 2 (g) of the Indian Contract Act lays down that an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. Section 2 (e) says that every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other is an agreement. Then clause (b) of Section 2 says that when the person to whom proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted and that a proposal when accepted becomes a promise. It means that a person makes an offer or proposal, that when the offer or proposal is accepted by the other, a promise comes into existence. Every promise amounts to an agreement. An agreement which can be legally enforced is a contract. In the instant case the contract between the parties is not in writing. Therefore, its terms will have to be inferred or gathered from the pleadings and, if necessary, from the statements made on behalf of the parties. Every promise amounts to an agreement. An agreement which can be legally enforced is a contract. In the instant case the contract between the parties is not in writing. Therefore, its terms will have to be inferred or gathered from the pleadings and, if necessary, from the statements made on behalf of the parties. It shall be borne in mind that if the contract provides for delivery of goods on payment of price within a period exceeding 11 days, then it would be a forward contract as appears from the definition of the terms 'forward contract and 'ready delivery contract mentioned above. Ordinarily the payment of price and delivery of goods should take place simultaneously unless otherwise agreed (vide Section 32 of the Sale of Goods Act). In para 3 of the plaint, the appellant alleged that it had purchased the tins of mustard oil from the respondent on the condition that the respondent would, place the indent for two wagons on the same day or at the earliest. No doubt it was further added that as soon as the wagons would be placed on rail by the railway authorities, the goods would be despatched. We shall indicate presently as to why the latter portion was added in para 3 of the plaint. Suffice it to say at this stage that the parties were not aware in how much time the wagons would be made available by the railway authorities. Therefore, the appellant alleged in the plaint that as soon as the railway authorities provided the wagons, the respondents would load them. In view of this, the only relevant portion of para 3 of the plaint is that the condition was that the respondents would place the indent for two wagons on the same day or at the earliest. It means that the delivery was to be made by the respondents either on the same day or so soon thereafter. By these words it cannot be inferred that the delivery was to be made after 11 days. 9. The respondents in para 12 of the written statement clearly contented that the contract in question was on the condition that the appellant would have to take delivery within 10 days by sending empty tins and having oil filled therein within 10 days of the contract and get the same despatched against payment of value to the railway station. 9. The respondents in para 12 of the written statement clearly contented that the contract in question was on the condition that the appellant would have to take delivery within 10 days by sending empty tins and having oil filled therein within 10 days of the contract and get the same despatched against payment of value to the railway station. Thus the crux of the contract according to the respondent was that delivery and payment should be made within 10 days of the contract. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the delivery and payment of the price was to take place after 11 days. The respondent was also not sure in how much time the wagons would be made available by the railway authorities. Therefore, they added the words "if wagons were allotted by that time" otherwise it would be the duty of the appellant to get the tins transported to its own godowns. It means that the duration of 10 days was the limit within which the contract was to be performed by the parties. If the pleadings of the parties alone are taken into consideration there is no room for doubt that payment and delivery were not to be made after 11 days. That being the position on the case put forward by the parties, the notion of forward contract given in Section 2 (c) of the Act was completely excluded. More appropriately speaking it was no partys case that the delivery would be effected more than 11 days after the contract. 10. In his statement under Order X, Rule 2, C.P.C. the learned counsel for the appellant stated that the contract was oral, that the goods were to be despatched as soon as wagons were available, that it was the duty of the defendant to indent for the wagon. Then he denied the contentions of the written statement by saying that there was no such condition that the appellant should supply empty tins and take delivery within 10 days, that there was no such condition that the appellant was to take delivery within 10 days against payment and that there was no agreement for payment of price in any particular manner. 11. In his statement under Order X, Rule 2, the respondents counsel reiterated the contentions of the written statement. 11. In his statement under Order X, Rule 2, the respondents counsel reiterated the contentions of the written statement. He stated that the contract was oral, that it was agreed that the appellant would supply empty tins within 10 days and take delivery against payment, that it was the duty of the appellant to supply the wagon but at the request of the appellant, the respondent, placed indent for a wagon for Alipurduar, that the wagon, was made available on 21-4-1964, that as it was not made available within time, indent was cancelled and that the defendant treated the contract cancelled on 17-4-1964. It means that the respondent treated the contract cancelled within 11 days. 12. Vijai Singh, P.W. 1 stated that in respect of delivery, it was settled that it would be effected when the wagon would be available, that then the respondent would load the wagons and hand over R/R to the appellant, that it was wrong to say that it was settled that the delivery would be taken within 10 days, that the wagons were ordinarily provided by the railway authorities within 15-16 days, that no particular time limit for delivery was settled between the parties, that it was settled that as soon as the wagons were available, they would be loaded and R/R would be handed over. Gopal Prasad, P.W. 2 stated that it was settled that the delivery would be taken within 10 days, that payment would be made prior to the delivery, that the appellant was informed on telephone several times to take delivery, that the breach of contract took place on 17-4-1964, that it was not certain when the railway authorities would supply the wagons, that sometimes the wagons were supplied within a day and that sometimes the wagons were not made available even within months and that ordinarily the wagons used to be made available within 2 or 3 days. Ram Gopal, D.W. 2, stated that in his presence the parties agreed to effect delivery within 8-10 days. 13. The position that follows from the above is that according to the allegations of the plaint, the delivery was to be effected on the date of the contract or at the earliest and according to the own admissions of the respondent, the delivery and payment of price were to be made within 10 days of the contract. 13. The position that follows from the above is that according to the allegations of the plaint, the delivery was to be effected on the date of the contract or at the earliest and according to the own admissions of the respondent, the delivery and payment of price were to be made within 10 days of the contract. A party can safely rely on an admission made by the opposite party. That is the best evidence available to him. In the instant case looking to the entire material on record, it is difficult to hold that delivery of the goods and payment of price were to be made beyond 11 days.; Therefore, it is not a case of forward contract as defined in Section 2 (c) of the Act. The Additional District Judge fell into error in law in completely ignoring the allegations and the evidence of the respondent and in not arriving at the correct terms of the contract by looking to the pleading of the parties and the evidence. This legal error has gone to the root of the case and caused injustice. As the respondent itself indicated by its pleadings that the delivery of goods and payment were to be made within 10 days, there was no question to find that the contract was of a forward nature as envisaged by the Act. Mere despatch of goods beyond 11 days of the contract in view of the prevailing uncertainties relating to the availability of the wagons, would not make the contract a forward one. In the case of Govindji Jay at and Co. v. Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., AIR 1968 Ker 310 it was observed (at p. 313): "In Ex. A-8 delivery is ready, and despatch is subject to rail/sea transport available. On the basis of the aforesaid definitions and the clause relating to delivery in Ex. AB, the counsel for the appellant argues that the contract is a forward contract. His argument is that a ready delivery contract is one which provides for the delivery of the goods either immediately or within a period which does not exceed 11 days; since the despatch in the present case is subject to availability of transport, the argument proceeds, delivery is not within 11 days as contemplated by Section 2 (i). His argument is that a ready delivery contract is one which provides for the delivery of the goods either immediately or within a period which does not exceed 11 days; since the despatch in the present case is subject to availability of transport, the argument proceeds, delivery is not within 11 days as contemplated by Section 2 (i). We are afraid this argument has no substance, because delivery in the present case is ready, and merely because despatch of the goods is subject to availability of transport, the contract does not become any the less a ready delivery contract." In view of the above the contract in question was not forbidden by the Act and as such it was enforceable at law. It is unnecessary to find whether the contract was saved by the exception contained in Section 18. 14. The trial Judge found that the respondent had committed breach of contract. It is obvious that when the wagons were available, the goods were not loaded by the respondent. The Additional District Judge has not found that the breach of contract was made by the appellant. On the other hand he has observed that as the respondent failed to supply the goods, it had committed breach of the contract. 15. For what has been said above, the decree of the Additional District Judge cannot be maintained and the decree passed by the trial Judge has to be restored. 16. The appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 9-8-1968 passed by the Additional District Judge, Aligarh, are set aside and the decree dated 12-10-1965 passed by the Civil Judge, Aligarh, is restored. The appellant will get costs of this court as well as of the lower appellate court from the respondent.