JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The prayer in these two connected writ petitions is for quashing of a notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) dated 19th April, 1975, and another notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 27th March, 1977, whereby some land belonging to the petitioners of these two writ petitions was sought to be acquired. During the course of arguments, however, the validity of the notification under Section 6 dated 27th March, 1977, alone was questioned. The main argument advanced by counsel for the petitioners is that the acquisition was for Kashi Vidyapith, University Varanasi, respondent No. 3, which was a company and since the requirements of part VII of the Act had not been complied with, the notification under Section 6 was bad. Faced with the situation that the notification under Section 6 mentioned that the land of the petitioners was sought to be acquired for public purpose and not for a company it was urged by counsel for the petitioners that since no part of the compensation was stated to be paid by the Government from the public revenue the use of the words 'public purpose in the notification as the purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired was a colourable exercise of power and since there was no compliance with the second proviso to Sec. ,6 (1) of the Act the notification under Section 6 was in any case liable to be quashed. 2. Having heard counsel for the petitioners, the counsel for respondent No. 3 as also the Chief Standing Counsel, we are of opinion that the impugned notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 27th March, 1977, cannot be sustained. There was some controversy on the question as to whether Kashi Vidyapith, for which the acquisition was being made, was a company or not, but in our opinion on the facts of the instant case it is not necessary to go into that question. We may point out that Kashi Vidyapith became a university with effect from 15th January, 1974, in pursuance of a notification issued by the State Government under sub-section (2) of Sec. 4 of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973. The notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued after 15th January, 1974, when Kashi Vidyapith had already become a university. The notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued after 15th January, 1974, when Kashi Vidyapith had already become a university. The notification under Section 6 states that the land of the petitioners was sought to be acquired for public purpose, viz., for extension of the campus and construction of building and residential quarters of Kashi Vidyapith. In Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1961 SC 343 ) it has been held that the essential condition for acquisition for a public purpose is that the cost of the acquisition should be borne, wholly or in part, out of public funds. Hence an acquisition for a Company may also be made for a public purpose within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. In such a case, it is not necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by Part VII, If, on the other hand, the acquisition for a company is to be made at the cost entirely of the company itself, such an acquisition comes under the provisions of Part VII, As such even if the submission made by counsel for the petitioners that Kashi Vidyapith was a company may be accepted for the sake of arguments the notification under Section 6 would not be bad when it seeks to acquire the petitioners land for public purpose. In that event it will not be necessary to conform with the requirements of Part VII of the Act. However, if it is not established that any part of the compensation was to be paid out oi public funds the notification would certainly be bad inasmuch as it did not meet the requirements of the second proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. In that event the mere use of the expression 'public purpose in the notification under Section 6 would not be of any consequence and the issue of the notification would be deemed to be a colourable exercise of power, having been 'made in fraud of the Act. (see State of W. B. v. P. N. Talukdar, AIR 1965 SC 646 ). 3. The short question which comes up for consideration is whether any part of the compensation, is to be paid out of public funds. (see State of W. B. v. P. N. Talukdar, AIR 1965 SC 646 ). 3. The short question which comes up for consideration is whether any part of the compensation, is to be paid out of public funds. There is nothing on the record which may indicate the intention of the State Government that an.y part of the compensation was to be paid out of public funds. What was urged by counsel for the respondents, however, was that the Kashi Vidyapith had in pursuance of some earlier proceedings for acquisition made two deposits - one on 20th April, 1971, and the other on 15th February, 1972, to meet the cost of acquisition and the amounts so deposited could be termed as 'public revenues and since the cost of acquisition was to be paid out of that amount it was apparently a case in which the compensation was to be paid out of public funds. In the alternative it was urged that Kashi Vidyapith was a local authority and since the second proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act contemplated payment of compensation out of some fund controlled or managed by a local authority its requirements were fulfilled. 4. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by counsel for the respondents we find ourselves unable to agree with them. So far as the submission that the deposits made by Kashi Vidyapith on 20th April, 1971, and 15th February, 1972, may be treated as public revenue is concerned, reliance has been placed on the dissenting judgment of Mr. Justice Goswami in C. K. Sharmah v. D. C., Nowgong (AIR 1971 Assam & Naga 1) (FB). We find it unnecessary to go in, detail with the reasonings of that judgment for in the instant case at the point of time when the two deposits were made on 20th April, 1971, and 15th February, 1972, Kashi Vidyapith had not become a university but was only a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The amounts were deposited by Kashi Vidyapith in that capacity. Even in the report made under Section 5-A of the Act, a copy whereof has been filed along with the writ petition, a recommendation was made that the proceedings under Sections 41 and 42 of the Act may be taken. The amounts were deposited by Kashi Vidyapith in that capacity. Even in the report made under Section 5-A of the Act, a copy whereof has been filed along with the writ petition, a recommendation was made that the proceedings under Sections 41 and 42 of the Act may be taken. It is not the case of the Kashi Vidyapith that the deposits made by it have become Government property and that it has no interest left in the said deposits even if the land acquisition proceedings are dropped. In our opinion, in these circumstances it cannot be said that the deposits made by Kashi Vidyapith, as aforesaid, could be termed as 'public revenues as contemplated by the second proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. 5. Coming to the second submission made by counsel for the respondents it will be seen that the term 'local authority has not been defined in the Act. It however stands defined in. Section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as follows: - " local authority shall mean a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund;" In Valjibhai v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1963 SC 1890 ) it was held that even though General Clauses Act was enacted later in point of time than the Land Acquisition Act, the definition given in Section 3 (31) will hold good for construing the expression 'local authority occurring in the Land Acquisition Act. 6. In order to construe the term 'local authority used in the second proviso to Section 6 of the Act we can, therefore, legitimately take the aid of the definition of the said term as contained in the General Clauses Act. Emphasis was placed by counsel for the respondents on the words 'other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of- a municipal or local fund. Emphasis was placed by counsel for the respondents on the words 'other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of- a municipal or local fund. With reference to the definition of the term 'local fund in the U. P. General Clauses Act and in the U. P. Financial Handbook as also with reference to certain provisions of the U. P. State Universities Act in pursuance of which the State Government exercises control over the universities in numerous ways, it was urged that Kashi Vidyapith being a university over which the State Government exercises control would be an authority dealing with local fund and hence a local authority. In our opinion it is not possible to subscribe to this view. The words 'other authority in the definition of the term 'local authority in Section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act occur after the words 'shall mean a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or. It is a settled principle of law that 'words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those defined. This is the true scope of the rule of ejusdem generis, (see Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1955 SC 504 )). The term 'other authority used in Section 3 (31) aforesaid will have, therefore, to be read ejusdem generis to 'a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners. Construed that way there seems to be no doubt that Kashi Vidyapith University cannot come within the term 'other authority, it being not an authority of the nature of a municipal committee, district board or body of port commissioners. The same principle of ejusdem generis will apply even in regard to the term 'local occurring after the word 'or and before the word 'fund in, the definition of the term 'local authority. As such 'local fund would mean such fund which is analogous to a municipal fund. For this reason by taking aid of the definition of the term 'local fund either in the U. P. General Clauses Act or in the U. P. Financial Handbook, it is not possible to hold that Kashi Vidyapith University, respondent No. 3 is a 'local authority within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. 7. 7. In the result both the writ petitions succeed and are allowed with costs and the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 27th March, 1977, in so far as it relates to the plots of the petitioners in these two writ petitions, is quashed.