JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal by the Eastern Railway administration. The plaintiff-respondent claimed a declaration to the effect that the notice dated 27th June, 1969 dismissing him from service was illegal, invalid, inoperative and unconstitutional and that the plaintiff respondent continues in employment and is entitled to all the benefits and privileges of the post of fireman. The trial court decreed the suit declaring the notice dated 27th June, 1969 dismissing the plaintiff respondent from service as illegal, inoperative and ineffective, the lower appellate court has confirmed the decree. 2. According to the plaintiff-respondent he joined railway service some 18 years before the suit. On 28th May, 1964 he was posted as fireman at Moghalsarai and "was booked on duty along with Kharpat, driver, and P. S. Lal Srivastava, second fireman." The same day coal was "fraudulently" removed from Pusauli Railway Station "by somebody posing himself as Shambhu Tewari before the Chaukidar." Shri A. K. Chatterjee, J. F. I. Moghalsarai, Deputy Loco Foreman Moghalsarai and Shri H.G. Goswami, Station Master were suspected but on investigation, the police could not make out any case against them. Thereupon, Shri B. N. Tiwari, Assistant Station Master Pusauli, alleged to bear a grudge against the plaintiff-respondent, gave it out that it was the plaintiff who had posed as Shambhu Tiwari, but the police did not find the plaintiff guilty and submitted a final report. A charge sheet was thereafter issued on 6th Feb. 1967 by the Railway Administration in respect of the very same matter. An enquiry was thereafter conducted by the disciplinary authority. The only witness who appeared against the plaintiff before the Enquiry officer was the said Assistant Station Master Shri B. N. Tiwari. The Chawkidar was not examined although the plaintiff requested the Enquiry Officer to examine him. The plaintiff-respondent has then proceeded to attack the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as "illegal, unwarranted by facts and record and based on surmises and conjectures and in utter breach of the statutory rules and against the principles of natural justice". It is then pleaded by the plaintiff that a show cause notice dated 11th April, 1969 was issued to him on the basis of the Enquiry Officer's findings. It is then pleaded by the plaintiff that a show cause notice dated 11th April, 1969 was issued to him on the basis of the Enquiry Officer's findings. The plaintiff submitted a reply, but according to him no consideration was given to it and a notice dated 27th June, 1969 was issued dismissing him from service. It has then been pleaded that the said notice was illegal, ultra vires the Constitution, unwarranted by fact, perverse and against the principles 1979 Lab. I. C./85 XI pies of natural justice on grounds (a) to (g) that are specified thereunder in paragraph 9 of the plaint. 3. The defendant Railway Administration denied the plaint allegations and pleaded that the suit was filed on wrong and incorrect allegations and was not maintainable. It was asserted that the plaintiff was appointed in service on 14th August, 1949 and was removed from service on 27th June, 1969. Apart from the final punishment of dismissal from service, he had been punished twice before by stoppage of his annual increment, on the first occasion for not being found present when called for duty on 6th Feb. 1960 and on the second occasion for refusing the call when required on duty on 31st August 1960. Finally the plaintiff was removed from service with effect from afternoon on 27th June, 1969 for posing as Shambhu Tiwari before the Chowkidar and the Mate of Permanent Way Inspector/ Karamnasa at Pusauli Station, and representing himself as the Coal Contractor sent by the Loco Foreman, Mughalsarai and taking away the coal from the custody of the Permanent Way Inspector Karamnasa at Pusauli Station. With regard to his punishment it was pleaded by the defendant Railway Administration that on 28th May, 1964 the plaintiff's Headquarter was at Mughalsarai; that he was booked up to six hours on that day, to work T.P. 8, along with Kharpat driver and Sri P. S. Lal Srivastava, 2nd Fireman; that he was on rest from six hours that day, that the base of T.P. 8 (DMT) was changed from Pusauli to Dehri-on-Sone. In the morning of 28th May, 1964, Ramandan Chowkidar saw that the coal was being loaded on a truck by some unknown persons and on interrogation, the person removing the coal, gave out his name as Shambhu Tiwari and represented that he was the owner of the truck and the coal contractor. In the morning of 28th May, 1964, Ramandan Chowkidar saw that the coal was being loaded on a truck by some unknown persons and on interrogation, the person removing the coal, gave out his name as Shambhu Tiwari and represented that he was the owner of the truck and the coal contractor. It was found on enquiry that it was the plaintiff who had posed as Shambhu Tiwari. Enquiries were made and disciplinary action was taken against Shri A. K. Chatterjee, JFI and Shri H. G. Goswami, Station Master also, that there was no enmity between the plaintiff and Shri B. N. Tiwari, and that the defendant Railway Administration had no knowledge of the same. With regard to the enquiry. in the disciplinary proceedings it was stated that on going through SP/SPE's report the disciplinary authority found the plaintiff responsible and accordingly issued a charge-sheet dated 6th Feb. 1967, against the plaintiff; that 8 persons were examined and cross-examined in the enquiry. All reasonable facilities were given and the plaintiff's allegations to the contrary were wholly wrong and unfounded; that the statement of Kharpat driver and other witnesses before the Enquiry Officer fully proved the plaintiff's guilt and it is wrong to say that the plaintiff did not commit any offence; that the Chowkidar Ramnandan of Gang No. 1 under Permanent Way Inspector, Karamnasa, did not turn up as a witness but his mate Ram Lakhan under Permanent Way Inspector, Karamnasa attended the enquiry and was examined; that copies of the oral evidence recorded in the enquiry were made available to the plaintiff and the documents relied upon were inspected by the plaintiff on 1st April, 1967 in the office of SP/ SPE/Patna, and on 28th April, 1967 in the office of the Divisional Superintendent, Danapur. The defendant Railway Administration then relied on a statement made by the plaintiff on 19th Dec., 1968 before the Enquiry Officer, the statement as recorded by the Enquiry Officer being: "The enquiry was concluded at this stage and Sri Chandrama Tewari was asked if you had any written or oral submission to make in respect of the evidence recorded during the enquiry. Sri Tewari stated that he would submit a written defence note by 30-12-1968". Sri Tewari stated that he would submit a written defence note by 30-12-1968". It is then alleged that the plaintiff failed to submit his "defence note" to the Enquiry Officer till 29th Jan., 1969 whereupon the Enquiry Officer recorded his findings on the evidence adduced during the enquiry. It was added that as a result of the enquiries against Sri A. K. Chatterjee and Sri H. G. Goswami, the pay of Sri H. G. Goswami, Station Master, Pusauli was reduced by two stages for a period of two years as "penalty for not taking positive action in stopping removal of the coal with the result that the coal was removed to some unknown destination and it never reached the Pump House, Pusauli and the Railway was thus put to a loss of considerable amount." The pleas of under-valuation, insufficiency of court-fees, bar of Ss. 34 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, non-maintainability of the suit and invalidity of the notice under S. 80 of the Civil P. C. were also raised. 4. The trial court framed the following six issues, namely: 1. Whether the order No. CS/DNR/ SPE/16/65, dated 27-6-69 is illegal, null and void for the reasons alleged in para 9 of the plaint? 2. Whether the suit is under-valued and the court-fee paid is insufficient? 3. Whether the suit is barred u/ss-34 & 41 of the Specific Relief Act? 4. Whether the notice u/s 80 C.P.C. is invalid as alleged in para 29 of W.S.?' 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable? 6. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? Issue No. 2 was decided earlier as a. preliminary issue in the plaintiff's favour. On Issue No. 1, the trial court held that the order dated 27th June 1969 is illegal, null and void and cannot be sustained in law. Issue No. 31 was decided in the negative as the-defendant's counsel did not advance any arguments thereon. Issues Nos. 4 and 5 were also decided in the negative and on Issue No. 6 the plaintiff was held entitled to the relief claim- ed. 5. On appeal before the lower appellate court, it did not specifically formulate the point or points which arose for its determination. Issues Nos. 4 and 5 were also decided in the negative and on Issue No. 6 the plaintiff was held entitled to the relief claim- ed. 5. On appeal before the lower appellate court, it did not specifically formulate the point or points which arose for its determination. It noticed that the order of dismissal was challenged on three grounds; (i) that the copies of the relevant documents were not furnished to the plaintiff and thereby prejudice was caused to him: (ii) that proper procedure was not adopted at the departmental enquiry and principles of natural justice were violated; and (iii) that it was a case of no evidence and yet the Enquiry Officer chose to hold the plaintiff to be guilty of theft and this was a perverse finding which could not stand scrutiny. In elaborating the first point, the lower appellate court noticed that the plaintiff's contention was that paper No. 5 mentioned on page 4 of the charge-sheet was neither shown nor a copy thereof was given to him and that the disciplinary authority had considered and relied upon the report H of the S. P. Establishment for holding against the plaintiff. The lower appellate court observed that copies of "both these documents" were never given to the plaintiff. According to the lower appellate court), the contention of the defendant Railway Administration that it was not bound to give such copies was untenable as it was opposed to the principles of natural justice. The lower appellate court proceeded to observe that the learned Munsiff was right in observing that the plaintiff had been prejudiced by the said lapse on the part of the defendant Railway Administration. Explaining its view, the lower appellate court observed that Ext. A-2 itself showed that the said paper No. 5 was not given to the plaintiff. The Disciplinary Authority was found to have placed reliance on the report of the S. P. Establishment; that the plaintiff had absolutely no opportunity to show that the report was not admissible against him and that it was wrong. This according to the lower appellate court amounted to a "clear violation of Rule 9 sub-rule (4) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeals) Rules, 1968." The substance of the rules has thereafter been quoted by the lower appellate court. This according to the lower appellate court amounted to a "clear violation of Rule 9 sub-rule (4) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeals) Rules, 1968." The substance of the rules has thereafter been quoted by the lower appellate court. It requires the Disciplinary Authority to deliver to the railway servant a copy of the articles of charges, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained. According to the lower appellate court the decision in Abdul Aziz Khan v. Union of India (1973 Lab IC 1267) (All) "also helps the plaintiff." The lower appellate court also found the enquiry proceedings to be vitiated inasmuch as the Enquiry Officer did not allow any cross-examination of Sri K. P. Sinha who had held the test identification and further inasmuch as the Enquiry Officer refused to recall Sri. B. N. Tewari for cross-examination along with the Station Diary. According to the lower appellate court this amounted to a clear violation of the principles of natural justice and vitiated the enquiry. The lower appellate court' has thereafter observed that the case also appears to be one of "no evidence" and that the finding of the Enquiry Officer could not be sustained for being perverse and arbitrary. According to the lower appellate court the record showed that of the two persons Ram Lakhan Mate and Ramnandan Chowkidar before whom the coal is said to have been stolen, Ram Lakhan Mate said nothing against the plaintiff and Ramnandan Chowkidar was not examined at all and that instead of passing its finding on direct evidence, the Enquiry Officer has chosen to rely on the solitary testimony of Sri B. N. Tewari, Assistant Station Master, Pusauli, and that even he failed to state in so many words that it was the plaintiff who had posed himself to be Shambhu Tewari and had removed the coal. It was then said that Shri B. N. Tewari's replies to certain questions in the course of his cross-examination "indicate that Sri Tewari was ill-disposed towards the plaintiff" and that he had tried to state that the plaintiff was the person who committed the theft. It was then said that Shri B. N. Tewari's replies to certain questions in the course of his cross-examination "indicate that Sri Tewari was ill-disposed towards the plaintiff" and that he had tried to state that the plaintiff was the person who committed the theft. The lower appellate court then commented that Sri K. P. Sinha, who had conducted the identification proceedings was not offered for cross-examination and that otherwise too the evidence of identification could not have been accepted inasmuch as Sri B. N. Tewari's statement indicates that "he knew or in all probability knew" the plaintiff from before. According to the lower appellate court no reliance could therefore, be placed on the testimony of Sri B. N. Tewari. The lower appellate court then proceeded to observe that one Hira Lal, who is said to have stated at a later stage that it was the plaintiff who was responsible for the theft, was not examined in the course of the departmental enquiry. According to the lower appellate court, the finding of the Enquiry Officer was "rather perverse". 6. Mr. D. Sanyal, learned counsel for the appellant Railway Administration urged before me at the very outset that a suit challenging the validity of an order of dismissal against the Government servant cannot be treated as an appeal from the findings recorded by an Enquiry Officer in departmental proceedings or from the order of punishment inflicted by the appointing authority. In support he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in R. C. Sharma v. Union of India (1976 Lab IC 1333; AIR 197S SC 2037). The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel was that the two courts below have exceeded the jurisdiction vested in the civil courts while trying a civil suit inasmuch as all that could be done was to see whether the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice in the present case was such as to vitiate the findings of the Enquiry Officer or the punishment inflicted by the appointing authority, such as to render them wholly null and void. A civil court can only see whether the impugned order of punishment is a nullity and to declare it to be so. A civil court can only see whether the impugned order of punishment is a nullity and to declare it to be so. It cannot say that a particular finding or the resultant order of punishment is erroneous in law, much less say that it is erroneous on the facts or that it was improper or harsh. The scope of the enquiry before the civil court on a suit of the nature giving rise to the present second appeal is limited to the question whether the authority who passed the order had the jurisdiction to do so and whether in doing so it did not do something which was procedurally ultra vires. For instance, if an order of dismissal is alleged to have been passed by an authority subordinate to that by which the Government servant was appointed, the civil court may certainly say that the order is void for being ultra vires and unconstitutional. Similarly if a Government servant is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank without affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him, and before the amendment of the Constitution by 42nd Amendment, without being given a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the proposed penalty, a civil court may declare the order of punishment a nullity on the ground that it was procedurally ultra vires the disciplinary authority. The allegation that the plaintiff respondent was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him or that the enquiry was vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice falls in the second category of procedural ultra vires, and a civil court may certainly adjudicate upon the same. But in doing so it can go no further and cannot arrogate to itself the appellate or the revisional jurisdiction of the authorities vested with such jurisdiction, or even the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts on a petition for a writ or order in the nature of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution. As observed by the Supreme Court in R. C. Sharma's case, "a question which could affect the jurisdiction in a civil suit has to be of such a nature that it goes to the root of the jurisdiction and the conduct of the departmental trial and vitiates the result". 7. As observed by the Supreme Court in R. C. Sharma's case, "a question which could affect the jurisdiction in a civil suit has to be of such a nature that it goes to the root of the jurisdiction and the conduct of the departmental trial and vitiates the result". 7. The questions whether a Government servant was afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him or whether the disciplinary authority violated the principles of natural justice in arriving at its findings and conclusion on which the punishment is based, are in a sense questions of fact. But whether the opportunity given was reasonable or in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the rules and whether the fault complained of against the disciplinary authority was such as to amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice and in either case whether the defect complained of was such as to vitiate the whole enquiry and the punishment meted out as a result thereof are undoubtedly questions of law. The plethora of cases on this subject show that the question is not only a question of law but a substantial question. The fact that different Courts have taken different views which are not easily reconcilable on a similar state of facts only accentuates the difficulty in resolving the question. 8. The approach of the two courts below to the principal question whether the disciplinary proceedings in the present case were vitiated by procedural ultra vires, did not follow the law limiting the jurisdiction of civil courts in these matters. For instance, while citing clause (4) of rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 and holding that it was imperative on the disciplinary authority to supply copies of all the documents which are proposed to be relied upon to prove the charge against the delinquent employee, the trial court lost sight of the fact that all that rule requires is the supply of a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and then if the railway servant so requires, to give him an opportunity to inspect those documents for preparation of his defence. The trial court wrongly assumed that the disciplinary authority did not comply with this rule. The trial court wrongly assumed that the disciplinary authority did not comply with this rule. The reliance placed by the trial court on the case of Abdul Aziz Khan v. Union of India, (1973 Lab IC 12G7) (All.), in this context was misplaced. Rule 9 (4) does not require that the disciplinary authority must before calling upon the railway servant charged of misconduct or misbehaviour to submit his statement in defence, supply him copies of the documents or the statement of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained. The question in that case was whether the refusal of the Enquiry Officer to permit the examination of certain witnesses asked for by the railway servant was such as to have vitiated the enquiry and it was in this context that Hon'ble K. B. Asthana, J. as he then was observed that; "It is always open to a dismissed Government servant to question the legality and propriety of the order passed by the enquiring authority in a departmental trial on the grounds of refusal to examine witnesses nominated by him and refusal to supply copies of material documents and other evidence forming the basis of the charge and that the learned Judge of the lower appellate court fell into a legal error in holding that the civil court could not be invited by the plaintiff to question the legality and propriety of the order of the Enquiry Committee refusing to examine witnesses nominated by the plaintiff". The question which arose in that case was, in the words of the learned Judge himself, "whether the reasons which led the Enquiry Committee to refuse examination of the witnesses nominated by the plaintiff were justified and the plaintiff cannot, therefore, complain of denial of reasonable opportunity." The Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 do not require the supply of copies of the documents and statement of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained, before requiring a railway servant to submit his statement of defence. It cannot, therefore, be said that the disciplinary authority commits any illegality if it refuses to supply copies of any such documents or a statement of witnesses at the stage before the railway servant submits his written statement of defence. It cannot, therefore, be said that the disciplinary authority commits any illegality if it refuses to supply copies of any such documents or a statement of witnesses at the stage before the railway servant submits his written statement of defence. All that the rule requires is that the list of such documents and witnesses should be given along with the copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour, and the railway servant should be allowed to inspect such of the documents (included in the list) as he wants. On the other hand the case which Hon'ble K. B. Asthana, J., had most probably in mind, when he made those observations was of the stage during the enquiry when those documents are actually relied upon and those witnesses are actually examined. There may be cases where a refusal to supply copy of a document or the statement of a witness already examined seriously prejudices the railway servant in defending himself, either by rebutting or explaining the documents or the evidence given by the witnesses or by effectively cross-examining the witnesses, such (as) to lead to the inference that the railway servant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard and that, therefore, the enquiry was vitiated by procedural ultra vires. But such an inference can be drawn only if the facts of the case warrant the finding that the railway servant was prejudiced by such refusal to furnish copies of the documents or the statement of witnesses to him. It cannot be the law that every refusal to supply copy of every document or every statement of a witness in a departmental proceeding must necessarily vitiate the enquiry, such as to be sufficient to justify a declaration that the findings recorded on the result of the enquiry and the punishment based thereon are wholly null and void. It cannot be the law that every refusal to supply copy of every document or every statement of a witness in a departmental proceeding must necessarily vitiate the enquiry, such as to be sufficient to justify a declaration that the findings recorded on the result of the enquiry and the punishment based thereon are wholly null and void. Each case must be examined on its own facts in order to see whether the refusal to supply copies of the documents and of the statement of the witnesses was in the circumstance of that case so prejudicial to the Government servant as to justify a finding that the refusal was procedurally ultra vires the disciplinary authority and, therefore, vitiated the enquiry, and its result such as to render it a nullity and, therefore, make it competent for the civil court to declare the same to be null and void. 9. The trial court has then proceeded to comment on the fact that the Chowkidar Ramnandan who was one of the two witnesses of the removal of the coal by the plaintiff which was the very basis of the charge, was not examined by the Enquiry Officer. It does not appear that the plaintiff ever asked for the examination of the Chowkidar as his witness, or that the Enquiry Officer Refused to summon the witnesses even on being asked so to do by the plaintiff and that the non-examination of the Chowkidar prejudiced the plaintiff in the enquiry. As to prejudice, even the mate who was examined as one of the witnesses of the removal of the coal, did not identify the plaintiff as the man who had removed the coal and represented himself to be the coal contractor Shambhu Tewari. It cannot, therefore, be said that the non-production of the Chowkidar Ramnandan as a witness prejudiced the plaintiff in the enquiry. The findings of the Enquiry Officer referred to the statement of only those witnesses who were examined. have gone through the entire reasons given by the Enquiry Officer for his findings and the record of the proceedings taken by him, including the statement of the witnesses examined. The only witnesses whose examination was asked for by the plaintiff were Kharpat Driver and P. S. Srivastava, the Second Fireman, and both these witnesses were in fact examined by the Enquiry Officer. The only witnesses whose examination was asked for by the plaintiff were Kharpat Driver and P. S. Srivastava, the Second Fireman, and both these witnesses were in fact examined by the Enquiry Officer. It also appears that Ram Nandan Chowkidar had actually been summoned to attend at the enquiry but he failed to turn up as per Enquiry Officer's record of proceedings dated 28th October, 1968. It is not possible to say that the plaintiff was in any manner prejudiced by the non-examination of the Chowkidar by the Enquiry Officer as a witness before him. The trial court did not advert to these aspects at all and I am of the opinion that its finding on issue no. 1 is, therefore, vitiated in law. 10. The findings arrived at by the lower appellate court and the reasons given by it for the same have already been adverted to in some detail in the earlier part of this judgment. The plaintiff's complaint was that the inspection of paper no. 5 mentioned on page 4 of the charge-sheet was not allowed to him nor was a copy thereof given and further that the disciplinary authority considered and relied upon the report of the Special Police Establishment, which was also not shown to him nor was its copy given. The reasons for his findings given by the Enquiry Officer do not show that any reliance was placed by him on the report of the Special Police Establishment. He only relied on what A. C. Das, the Investigating Officer of the Special Police Establishment, stated before him as witnesses in the course of the disciplinary enquiry. Moreover, it appears that the Special Police Establishment did not proceed with the case, and accordingly the report of the Special Police Establishment, if any, could have only been to the effect that no case was made out against the plaintiff or that the evidence found by the police on investigation was not sufficient to warrant the plaintiff's prosecution. I do not see how the withholding of a copy of the report of the Special Police Establishment, if the same was withheld by the disciplinary authority could have in any manner prejudiced the plaintiff in answering the charge before the disciplinary authority. I do not see how the withholding of a copy of the report of the Special Police Establishment, if the same was withheld by the disciplinary authority could have in any manner prejudiced the plaintiff in answering the charge before the disciplinary authority. As to paper No. 5 mentioned on page 4 of the charge-sheet, the judgment of the lower appellate court does not show as to how the failure of the disciplinary authority in making it available for investigation prejudiced the plaintiff. Mr. D. Sanyal, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant Railway Administration stated before me that all that the document showed was that the base of T.P. 8 (DMT) was changed from Pusauli to Dehri-on-Sone. That this was so is clear from the first paragraph of the reasons for the findings given by the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry proceedings show that it was the plaintiff's own case that the base of T.P. 8 (DMT) was changed from Pusauli to Dehri-on-Sone on the date on which the coal is alleged to have been removed. The existence of 28 tons of coal at Pusauli Station which is said to have become surplus on account of the change of the base of T.P. 8 (DMT) from Pusauli to Dehri-on-Sone, was not challenged. Indeed on the evidence led before the Enquiry Officer, the fraudulent removal of the coal from Pusauli Railway Station on 28th May, 1964 was admitted on all hands and was amply proved. The dispute was about the person who removed the coal. It cannot, therefore, be said that the failure of the disciplinary authority to provide the plaintiff an opportunity to inspect paper No. 5 mentioned on page 4 of the charge-sheet prejudiced the plaintiff in any manner whatsoever in putting up his defence. Indeed Mr. Sanyal learned counsel for the appellant Railway Administration was ready with a copy of the document, but I declined his request for entertaining it is additional evidence in second appeal. The lower appellate court has not given any ground or reason for holding that the failure of the disciplinary authority to provide the plaintiff an opportunity to inspect the said document prejudiced the plaintiff in his defence and, therefore, vitiated the enquiry. The lower appellate court has not given any ground or reason for holding that the failure of the disciplinary authority to provide the plaintiff an opportunity to inspect the said document prejudiced the plaintiff in his defence and, therefore, vitiated the enquiry. The breach of Rule 9 (4) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1948 in this matter seems to have been only technical, for the plaintiff does not appear to have insisted on seeing the document before submitting his statement of defence in reply to the charge-sheet, or at any .stage of the enquiry thereafter. 11. The observation of the lower appellate court that the Enquiry Officer did not allow any cross-examination of Sri K. P. Sinha, is also not justified. The so-called helper whom the plaintiff had nominated failed to turn up in time on the date when Sri K. P. Sinha was examined. The plaintiff was specifically asked by the Enquiry Officer whether he would like to put any question to the witness on which the plaintiff replied that he would not do so in the absence of his helper, and by the time the helper arrived, the witness seems to have left and the examination of another witness Ram Lakhan Mate was continued. After the close of the examination of Ram Lakhan Mate, the plaintiff or his helper did not ask for recalling the witness Sri K. P. Sinha. All that they asked for was to recall Sri B. N. Tewari for cross-examination. That request was refused and I think rightly so. The inference drawn by the lower appellate court that the principles of natural justice were violated by the Enquiry Officer by such conduct of the enquiry proceeding is in my opinion unwarranted. 12. The lower appellate court has then proceeded, to hold that the findings of the Enquiry Officer could not the sustained on the ground that it is perverse and arbitrary. The lower appellate court clearly exceeded the jurisdiction vested in a civil court in holding so. The finding of the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be based on no evidence and it cannot be said to be such as could not be arrived at by any reasonable person on the material before him. The lower appellate court clearly exceeded the jurisdiction vested in a civil court in holding so. The finding of the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be based on no evidence and it cannot be said to be such as could not be arrived at by any reasonable person on the material before him. It was not open to the lower appellate court to have appraised the evidence before the Enquiry Officer and on coming to an inference different from that arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, to have labelled his findings as perverse and arbitrary. Even if it were open to go into such a question in a suit filed in a civil court, having read the evidence and the reasons for the finding arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, it cannot be said that the finding is based on no evidence or that it is in any manner vitiated in law. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the findings of the two courts below that the plaintiff-respondent had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing and that the enquiry was vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice, are findings of fact and this court cannot therefore, take a contrary view in second appeal. It is unnecessary to go into this question for the limits of the jurisdiction of this Court in second appeal are well settled and in the foregoing discussion of the findings arrived at by the two courts below I have in giving my reasons for differing with them also indicated the nature of the errors committed by the two courts below which justifies interference by this Court in this second appeal. 14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent cited certain cases in support of the judgment under appeal. The case of Abdul Aziz Khan v. Union of India (1973 Lab IC 1267) (All) which was referred to by the trial court has already been discussed above. The next case cited by him was that of Union of India v. Pauhari Saran Misra (1973 Lab IC 1331) (All). That case is distinguishable inasmuch as the order of the appellate authority is not in question in the present case, nor does the order of the punishing authority show that he had not applied his mind to the material on the record. That case is distinguishable inasmuch as the order of the appellate authority is not in question in the present case, nor does the order of the punishing authority show that he had not applied his mind to the material on the record. Moreover, the only point raised in the present case was the alleged denial of a reasonable opportunity of hearing against the charge and it was not even pleaded that the order of the punishing authority did not show that it had applied its mind to the material on the record. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India ( AIR 1958 SC 300 ) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan ( AIR 1961 SC 1623 ) only defined the meaning of reasonable opportunity to defend at the stage of departmental enquiry, and the principles of natural justice, and that denial of opportunity to public servant to cross-examine witnesses who give evidence, or not furnishing copies of the documents to which the public servant is entitled, amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. The principles laid down by these cases are well settled and as found above, it cannot be said in the present case that the disciplinary authority did not afford the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity of hearing or of cross-examining the witnesses in the course of the disciplinary enquiry or violated the principles of natural justice in any other manner. The case of Bhagaban Chandra Majumdar v. District Magistrate and Collector of Tripura (1968 Lab IC 1268) (Tripura) formulates certain tests to be applied for finding out whether a departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and whether the delinquent was afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing. I have applied all those tests and found that the departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and that the plaintiff was afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing. In the State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram ( AIR 1974 SC 2335 ), the Supreme Court laid it down that it is unjust and unfair to deny the Government servant copies of statements of witnesses examined during investigation and produced at the inquiry in support of the charges levelled against him. The plaintiff did not make any such complaint in the present case. 15. The plaintiff did not make any such complaint in the present case. 15. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgments and decrees of the two courts below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout.