JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - This is a defendants appeal arising under the circumstances mentioned hereinafter. 2. The dispute relates to 4 plots of village Suichak and 2 plots of village Hirdaipur in district Varanasi. It is undisputed that there is grove in all these plots which adjoin each other. For the purpose of this appeal it is also undisputed that Bechu Lal, ancestor of the respondents was tenant of these plots. About 30 years before the filing of the present suit in tire year 1960, he had planted grove in the plots. In this way Bechu Lal was grove-holder under Section 196 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. At the instance of the appellant Raja there took place proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. between the parties. In these proceedings a compromise was arrived at on 21-10-1954, Ex. 8. The terms of this compromise are: (1) The respondents are and would remain the tenants of the disputed property. (2) The appellant would look after the trees. In case he committed any default in the supervision of the trees, the respondents would be entitled to lake possession immediately. (3) The appellant is and would remain the owner of the fruits of the trees. He would pluck the fruits and sell them. He will pay Rs. 300.00 p.a. to the respondents and obtain a receipt therefor. Every year he will further give 600 mangoes and one maund and 10 seers Kathal to-the respondents. (4) In case the appellant committed default in paying Rs. 300.00 or mangoes or Kathals, the respondents would be entitled to take possession of the suit property. The appellant and his heirs would have no right to interfere. (5) So long as the appellant continued to pay Rs. 300.00 the respondents will have no right to take possession or to settle the property with anybody-else. (6) A sum of Rs. 160.00 is outstanding in favour of Satya Narain, the appellant will pay him at the time of the season of the fruits. (7) The parties shall bear their own costs. 3. At the end of the compromise the number of the disputed plots are given. 4. On 21-10-1954 the Magistrate passed order, "The case is decided in terms of the compromise. The attachment is lifted in favour of the first party" (i.e. Raja appellant). (7) The parties shall bear their own costs. 3. At the end of the compromise the number of the disputed plots are given. 4. On 21-10-1954 the Magistrate passed order, "The case is decided in terms of the compromise. The attachment is lifted in favour of the first party" (i.e. Raja appellant). On 18-5-1960 the respondents filed suit to enforce the terms of the above compromise with the allegations that he had not paid Rs. 300.00 as agreed, that he had not given mangoes and kathal in all worth Rs. 140 that he had taken away illegally some branches of the trees and some timber in all worth Rupees 600.00 that he did not pay the sums despite notice. The respondents claimed the above sums and ejectment of the appellant from the plots. 5-6. The appellant contested the suit on the grounds he was sub-tenant of the plots from the times of Bachu Lal, ancestor of the respondents, that his thumb mark on the compromise was taken under pressure and undue influence, that he was not liable to be ejected, that he was always ready to pay Rs. 300.00 for the year 1959, that he had given mangoes and kathals to the respondents and that he had not taken away any branches or timber from the grove in suit. 7. Parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The Munsif Havali. Varanasi, who tried the suit held that under the terms of the compromise, Ex. 8, the appellant was a licensee and liable to be ejected for the breach of the terms of the licence, that the revenue records indicated that the appellant was a sub- tenant since 1342-43 F. that this status of the appellant did not continue after the compromise because there took place surrender or extinction of tenancy rights by implication, that the appellant had not cut or taken away any timber, that he had already given mangoes and Kathals, that the respondents were therefore entitled to get Rs. 300.00 only. The trial court, therefore, decreed the respondents suit for possession and for recovery of Rs. 300.00. This decree has been confirmed in appeal on 11-2-1966 by IIIrd Additional Civil Judge in Civil Appeal No. 84 of 1963. The Additional Civil Judge in (appeal) has taken the same view as the trial court. 8. 300.00 only. The trial court, therefore, decreed the respondents suit for possession and for recovery of Rs. 300.00. This decree has been confirmed in appeal on 11-2-1966 by IIIrd Additional Civil Judge in Civil Appeal No. 84 of 1963. The Additional Civil Judge in (appeal) has taken the same view as the trial court. 8. Both the courts below did not accept the contention of the appellant that he had thumb marked on the compromise under pressure or undue influence. The learned counsel for the appellant has not assailed this finding. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was sub-tenant of the plots, that on coming into force of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act, he became asami, that he had not surrendered his rights in the plots as an asami, that the respondents had based their case on the basis of the compromise that the respondents did not come up with the allegation that the appellant had surrendered his asami rights either expressly or by compromise in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. that therefore, the courts below were not justified in making out a case for the respondents which was not pleaded, nor any issue framed, that the appellant was not liable to be ejected on the allegations made in the plaint, that the compromise was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration and that the respondents were not entitled to get any relief. 10. Firstly, it is to be seen whether the appellant had become asami of the suit plots. The trial court clearly recorded a finding that the revenue records indicated that the appellant was a sub-tenant since 1342-43 F. The lower appellate court found that the appellant was sub-tenant of the plots of village Suichak from the year 1343 F. corresponding to 1935-36, that he was subtenant of the plots of village Hirdaipur from the year 1341 F. corresponding to 1933-34. The respondents did not at all state in the plaint that the appellant was sub-tenant of the plots or grove from about the year 1934. Rama Shanker son of Bechu Lal, who was examined on behalf of the respondents as P.W. 1, went to the extent of saying that the appellant had no concern with the grove in suit earlier than one year before the criminal case under Section 145 Cr. Rama Shanker son of Bechu Lal, who was examined on behalf of the respondents as P.W. 1, went to the extent of saying that the appellant had no concern with the grove in suit earlier than one year before the criminal case under Section 145 Cr. P. C. This statement is wholly false in view of the entries recorded in the village papers. Not only this the appellant proved a receipt Ex. A-16, issued by Bechu Lal for the year 1352 F. In this way it is proved by overwhelming evidence that the appellant was subtenant of the suit plots from about the year 1934. 11. It has been stated above that Bechu Lal was tenant of the plots, that he had planted grove in these plots and that as such he became grove holder under Section 196 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. As a grove-holder Bechu Lal could sub-let the grove land under Section 197 (d) of the Agra Tenancy Act. 12. A sub-tenant of a grove holder becomes a non-occupancy tenant under the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 (vide Section 31). After the coming into force of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act subtenants of grove lands became asamis under Section 21. This position has not been disputed by the respondents counsel. The courts below did not take into consideration these statutory provisions. 13. It is, therefore, obvious that as an asami, the appellant had an interest in the plot. 14. The next question which in this context arises is whether the rights of the appellant as an asami came to an end because of the compromise in the criminal case under Section 145 Cr. P. C. The trial court as stated above observed that surrender or extinction of tenancy right took place by implication as new licensee rights were created by the compromise. The lower appellate court observed, that in any case, the defendant gave up his position as a subtenant and accepted that of a licensee coupled with transfer of property at the time of the compromise, that the sub-tenancy rights of the defendant came to an end, that the compromise did not require registration. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents also urged that under the terms of the compromise the appellant became licensee. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents also urged that under the terms of the compromise the appellant became licensee. The learned counsel for the appellant first of all pointed out that no case oi surrender was pleaded in the plaint nor any issue about it was framed in the case and as such both the courts below could not find that the appellant had impliedly surrendered his rights of sub-tenant and that his right as a sub-tenant had come to an end on account of the compromise. It is pertinent to note that in this case the respondents did not at all set up the case that previously the appellant was a sub-tenant of the plots, that he gave up his rights as such and that he accepted to be a licensee merely for taking fruits of the trees. Obviously no issue was framed in the case to this effect. Therefore, there is considerable force in the contention of the appellants counsel that the courts below could not make out a case for the respondents. The appellant's counsel referred to two cases in which it was held that the court could not carve out a new case for any party. Param Sukh Lal v. Gaya Din, 1969, All LJ 766. Shanbaggakannu v. Muthu Bhattar, AIR 1971 SC 2468 , Both these cases go to help the appellant. 16. In this connection it has to be pointed out that the Z. A. and L. R, Act indicates the manner in which an asami can surrender his rights. Section 184 lays down that an asami may surrender the whole of his holding or any part thereof by giving a notice in writing to the Land Management Committee or the land-holder as the case may be, intimating his intention to do so and by giving up possession thereof. There are two main ingredients of this section - (1) notice to the Land Management Committee or the landholder. As there takes place a compromise between the parties, so it may be taken as a notice to the land-holder i. e. respondents; and (2) he should immediately give up possession. In the present case the appellant did not hand over possession either of the holding or of the grove to the respondents on the date of the compromise. As there takes place a compromise between the parties, so it may be taken as a notice to the land-holder i. e. respondents; and (2) he should immediately give up possession. In the present case the appellant did not hand over possession either of the holding or of the grove to the respondents on the date of the compromise. The only thing which can be said is that previously the appellant used to pay rent as is clear from the various receipts on the record and that under the compromise the appellant agreed to pay Rs. 300.00 per month along with some fruits. Thus, there was some variation in the amount of rent or compensation for taking the fruits. Under this compromise the appellant did not divest him- self from the holding. In the face of this statutory provision there is hardly any question of any surrender, express or implied of the rights of an asami by the appellant. The courts below did not consider Section 184. 17. There is one other feature of the case. The appellant became asami after the coming into force of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and at least one year before the compromise in the criminal case. According to the courts below the appellants right of sub-tenancy extinguished because of the compromise. This finding has been adopted by the respondents counsel. Under Section 145, Cr. P. C., the only concern of the Magistrate was to find as to which of the parties was in the possession. It was no concern of the Magistrate to find as to what were rights of the parties in the suit plots. The question of title cannot be gone into in a proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P. C. Therefore in these proceedings the Magistrate could not have accepted a compromise which affected the title of any of the parties. In this way the terms of the compromise went beyond the scope of Section 145, Cr. P. C. If the parties intended to settle terms which went beyond the scope of Section 145, Criminal P. C. and to extinguish the appellants interest in the plots, the compromise should have been got registered as provided in Section 17 (1) fb) of the Registration Act, 1908. P. C. If the parties intended to settle terms which went beyond the scope of Section 145, Criminal P. C. and to extinguish the appellants interest in the plots, the compromise should have been got registered as provided in Section 17 (1) fb) of the Registration Act, 1908. This section lays down that a non-testamentary instrument which purports or operates to extinguish any right in immoveable property of the value of Rs. 100.00 and upwards shall be registered. In the present case the respondents have valued their case of ejectment at Rs. 1000/-. It is, therefore, obvious that immovable property of the value of more than Rs. 100.00 is involved. There is an exception to the above rule contained in Section 17 (1) (b). That exception is in clause (vi) of subsection (2). Clause (vi) reads. "any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding." It means that a decree or order of a court relating to subject-matter of suit or proceeding need not be registered. In this case the compromise as stated above went beyond the scope of Section 145. Therefore, clause (vi) is of no help to the respondents. 18. The respondents counsel urged that the compromise did not create any rights in the land and, therefore, it did not require registration. According to him the respondents were only entitled to take fruits. Fruits are moveable property under Section 2 (9) of the Registration Act. In this section expression "moveable properly" has been defined as including standing timber, growing crops and grass, fruit upon and juice in trees and property of every other description except immoveable property. It is no doubt true that under the compromise the appellant was only entitled to take fruits. 19. The respondents counsel referred to the case of Ahmedkhan Jamat-khan v. Mohammad Khan, AIR 1937 Nag 116 in which it was held that the right to collect biri leaves was movable property as defined in Section 2 (9) of the Registration Act. There is no dispute to this principle. But in the instant case the appellant was an asami and as such he had interest in the immovable property i.e. holding/plots. There is no dispute to this principle. But in the instant case the appellant was an asami and as such he had interest in the immovable property i.e. holding/plots. His rights in the holding could not be extinguished by a simple compromise and that his rights could only be extinguished either by following the procedure provided under Section 184 of the U. P. Z,. A. and L. R. Act or by a registered document as required by Section 17 (1) (b). Therefore, Section 2 (9) of the Registration Act and the case relied upon by the respondents counsel are not of any help to the respondents. 20. The respondents counsel referred to the case of Babu Ram v. Inam Ullah, AIR 1935 All 411 . There is hardly anything in this case which goes to help the respondents. 21. In this .connection it may be pointed out that on the basis of the decision of this Court in the case of Ghissu v. Hashim Ali, 1954 All LJ 295, the lower appellate court on a construction of the compromise expressed the view that the appellant was licensee with a grant. In the case of Ghissu, it was clearly observed that a license coupled with a grant cannot be revoked in view of the provisions of Section 60 (a) of the Indian Easements Act. The lower appellate court has held that despite this the appellant was liable to be ejected because of the conditions contained in the compromise. The respondents counsel urged that Section 60 was subject to a contract to the contrary. There is no dispute to this proposition because for creating a license no particular formalities are required to be observed. A license can come into existence orally or by a writing which need not be registered, if rights in land are not created. The position which, however, emerges is that as the compromise in question went beyond the scope of the provisions of Section 145, Cr. P. C. and it purported to extinguish the rights of the appellant in the plots as an asami it should have been registered. As it was not registered it cannot be given effect to, nor it can have the effect of extinguishing the asami rights of the appellant. 22. The appellants counsel then urged that the civil courts had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for ejectment of an asami. As it was not registered it cannot be given effect to, nor it can have the effect of extinguishing the asami rights of the appellant. 22. The appellants counsel then urged that the civil courts had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for ejectment of an asami. This is no doubt true. But the jurisdiction depends upon the allegations of the plaint. In the plaint as stated above the respondents did not come up with the allegations that the appellant was their asami and that they wanted to eject him for the breach of the terms of the compromise. The respondents based their entire case on the basis of the compromise. Therefore, as the allegations of the plaint stand, the civil courts had jurisdiction to try the suit. It will be noticed that the question of jurisdiction was not raised in the written statement, nor any issue was framed in the case. The trial court made a passing reference to it. It observed, "Defendants objection about the jurisdiction of this court to grant possession is also based on the same footing i.e. possession from lessee". The question of jurisdiction was not raised even before the lower appellate court. In these circumstances, it is not correct to say that the civil courts did not have jurisdiction to try the suit. 23. It is now to be considered which of the reliefs claimed can be granted to the respondents. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that an asami can be ejected at any time. This may be true. But in the instant case, the respondents have not sought ejectment of the appellant as an asami. They have just based their case on the compromise. 24. For the entire discussion of the material on record and the findings arrived at above, in the suit as framed, the respondents cannot get the relief of possession, nor they can eject the appellant. The respondents concealed the true facts and based their claim on a piece of document which did not affect the asami rights of the appellant. Therefore, for this the respondents have to thank themselves and they cannot expect a decree for possession in the present case. With regard to the decree for Rs. 300.00 the appellant has not disputed it in the written statement. Therefore, this part of the decree cannot be disturbed. 25. Therefore, for this the respondents have to thank themselves and they cannot expect a decree for possession in the present case. With regard to the decree for Rs. 300.00 the appellant has not disputed it in the written statement. Therefore, this part of the decree cannot be disturbed. 25. In view of the above, appeal partly succeeds and partly fails. The decree for recovery of Rs. 300.00 passed by the trial court in favour of the respondents and against the appellant and confirmed by the lower appellate court shall stand. The decree for possession over the suit plots passed by the trial court in favour of the respondents and against the appellant and confirmed by the lower appellate court shall stand set aside. In this respect the respondents suit will stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs throughout.