Fateh Bahadur Singh v. Union of India — 1979 DIGILAW 596 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal in a suit for declaration that the order dated 11th May, 1971, dismissing him from the service and earlier order dated 2nd June, 1960, suspending him from service, and the departmental proceedings taken against him, were illegal, ultra vires, in reflective, unconstitutional, inequitable, void and inoperative, and not binding upon his rights to the post of Upper Division Clerk in the Income Tax Department or right to recovery of his emoluments, etc. The following are the facts: The plaintiff was appointed as Upper Division Clerk in the Income-tax Department of the Government of India on the 6th May, 1964. He was suspended from service on 2nd June, 1969, on the charge of having removed the copies of balance-sheet and account, of Messrs. Gangu Ram Grand Sons, Calcutta, from the file of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi. Memorandum of charge was served on the plaintiff on 5th September, 1969. Inspection of certain documents was asked for, which was allowed, and the plaintiff inspected the record on 23rd September, 1969, but it is alleged by him that all the records sought to be inspected were not made available to him. The plaintiff's request made on 25th September, 1969, for copies of documents was turned down. He filed his written statement on 27th September, 1969, and Sri P. K. Saran, Assistant Director of Inspection (Intelligence) was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. It is then alleged that the entire charge was based on information received by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, from some informer whose identity was not disclosed; that the Inquiry Officer did not conduct the inquiry in an impartial manner and violated the principles of natural justice. On the Inquiry Officer's report, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Varanasi, passed an order dated 11th May, 1971, removing the plaintiff from service, without affording him a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. On the Inquiry Officer's report, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Varanasi, passed an order dated 11th May, 1971, removing the plaintiff from service, without affording him a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. It was contended that the order is illegal, ultra vires, etc., because the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, acted illegally in "blindly following" and accepting the report of the Inquiry Officer; that the Inquiry Officer's report is based on imagination and surmises; that the clerk, Sri Ram Bharti, dealing with collection in the office of the Income Tax Officer, J-Ward, was mainly responsible for removal of the documents, in case it was proved that the documents were kept in the file of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi; and apart from ignoring the evidence of the Income Tax Officers, Sri Ram and Sri C. H. Singh, a letter dated 31st May, 1969, mentioned in the Inquiry report, was never shown to the plaintiff. It was also pleaded that the punishment was too severe and was passed in contravention of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 19(A, and other mandatory provisions of law. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant Government of India, on the pleas that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax had received a verbal complaint to the effect that the plaintiff had removed certain documents from the case file of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi, on receipt of illegal gratification, whereupon the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner made a preliminary inquiry by calling for the concerned files on 13th May, 1969, through Sri C. H. Singh, the then Income Tax Officer (Administration), who demanded the files from the plaintiff. But the files wore not traceable and it was only when a warning was issued to the plaintiff that the concerned files of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi, were found mixed up with the assessment 'files of other individuals, although the files of the partners of the firm were available of their proper place. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax found the papers in question missing from the files of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores. He, thereupon, called for report from the Income Tax Officer, J-Ward, and on receipt of his report and on a consideration of the material on record, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, passed the impugned suspension order on 2nd June, 1969. Chaurasia Stores. He, thereupon, called for report from the Income Tax Officer, J-Ward, and on receipt of his report and on a consideration of the material on record, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, passed the impugned suspension order on 2nd June, 1969. The order was served 'on the plaintiff on the 3rd June, 1969, and a charge-sheet dated 5th September, 1969, was thereafter served on the plaintiff on 9th September, 1969. On receiving the charge-sheet the plaintiff asked for inspection of five items of record. He was allowed to inspect two of them and inspection of remaining three was refused on the ground that the description of papers, sought to be inspected by the plaintiff, was vague, and indefinite. It was pleaded that inspection of these three items was rightly refused. The plaintiff was given opportunity to file his written statement in defence and he filed the same on 27th September, 1969. The plaintiff's request for copies of documents was rightly refused. The Inspecting Assistant Commisssioner of Income Tax, thereafter appointed, by his order dated 29th September, 1969, Sri P. K. Saran, the then Assistant Director of Inspection (Intelligence), Lucknow, as the Inquiry Officer for inquiry into the charges against the plaintiff of which the plaintiff was informed on the 30th September, 1969. The defendant, further, pleaded that the inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer was proper and according to the rules and the plaintiff was given all the opportunities and facilities for defending the same. The inquiry was conducted strictly according to law and principles of natural justice were not violated. On the transfer of Sri P. K. Saran before completing the inquiry, Sri A. N. Sinha, the then Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Varanasi, was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. He also conducted the inquiry in accordance with law and afforded all facilities and opportunities to the plaintiff for putting forth his defence. Sri A. N. Sinha, submitted report dated 27th February, 1971, which is based on a full consideration of the entire evidence and all the aspects of the case. He found the plaintiff guilty of the charges against him. A copy of the report was given to the plaintiff on 25th March, 1971, along with show cause notice dated 24th March, 1971, in the prescribed form. The plaintiff submitted his explanation on 8th April, 1971. He found the plaintiff guilty of the charges against him. A copy of the report was given to the plaintiff on 25th March, 1971, along with show cause notice dated 24th March, 1971, in the prescribed form. The plaintiff submitted his explanation on 8th April, 1971. The explanation was duly and properly considered by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, who agreed with the Inquiry Officer's report and found the plaintiff guilty of the charges against him and considering the grounds of misconduct, he ordered the plaintiff's dismissal, by order dated 11th May, 1971, which was served on the plaintiff in the afternoon of the 12th May, 1971. The plaintiff appealed to the Commissioner of Income Tax, by a petition dated 14th June, 1971. The Commissioner dismissed the appeal and confirmed the impugned order of dismissal. The plaintiff, thereupon, appeal- ed to the Central Board of Direct Taxes by a petition dated 1st January, 1972. The Board found the appeal to be incompetent and refused to entertain the same. The Board's order was communicated to the plaintiff on 13th October, 1972. The contentions raised by the plaintiff against the validity of the impugned order were specifically denied para-wise in the written statement and it was pleaded that the civil court did not have any appellate or other such jurisdiction over the orders of the disciplinary authority under the said rules, and the impugned orders were neither void nor inoperative, nor ineffective, nor unconstitutional. Other pleas about the validity of the notice and court fees etc. were also raised. 3. The trial court framed the following five issues:- 1. Whether the order dated 11-5-1971 passed by the defendant No. 4 is illegal and ultra vires on the ground set forth in para 15 of the plaint? 2. Whether the notice u/s 80 C. P. C. is illegal ? If so, its effect ? 3. Whether the suit is undervalued and the court fee paid is insufficient ?. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable and the court has no jurisdiction to try the suit ?. 5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 4. Issue No. 3 was taken up as a preliminary issue and it was held that the suit was properly valued and the court fees paid was sufficient. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable and the court has no jurisdiction to try the suit ?. 5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 4. Issue No. 3 was taken up as a preliminary issue and it was held that the suit was properly valued and the court fees paid was sufficient. On issue No. 1, the trial court held that the dismissal order dated 11th May, 1971, was legal and binding upon the plaintiff; on issue No. 2, that the notice under Section 80 was valid; and on issue No. 5, that the suit was maintainable in the civil court. 5. On appeal by the plaintiff, the only point raised was whether the order dated 11th May, 1971, dismissing the plaintiff from service was illegal and ultra vires. On a detailed consideration of the evidence on record, the lower appellate court found that the plaintiff had utterly failed to prove that the order dismissing him from service was passed in violation of the rules and principles of natural justice and proceeded to hold that the order was valid and binding on the plaintiff. The appeal was consequently dismissed and the decree dismissing the suit confirmed. 6. The first point urged by Mr. S. S. Bhatnagar, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant in this court, was that the letter dated 31st May, 1969, written by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax to the Income Tax Officer, and which is the very basis of the Inquiry Officer's report and findings, was not shown to the plaintiff-appellant; and was not even referred to in the list of the documents required to be given under Rule 14 (3) (ii) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'). This omission amounted to a violation of Rule 14 (4). The plaintiff-appellant was seriously prejudiced in submitting his defence and the letter could not have been relied upon by the Inquiry Officer; as it was neither evidence referred to in the Articles of Charge nor tendered in evidence at any stage of the inquiry; and the use of the letter by the Inquiry Officer amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice as it showed that he had made and relied on inquiries made behind the plaintiff-appellant's back. It was, further, submitted in this context that the name of the informer or the statement made by him were never disclosed to the plaintiff-appellant, and the reliance placed by the Inquiry Officer on the information supplied by the informer was, under these circumstances, violative of the canons of natural justice. It was also said that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who wrote the letter did not appear as a witness before the Inquiry Officer and could not, therefore, be cross-examined and that, consequently, the use made by the Inquiry Officer of that letter in arriving at his findings against the plaintiff-appellant was illegal. 7. The next submission made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant was that the Inquiry Officer admitted fresh evidence after the close of the department's case by the Presenting Officer. This, according to the learned counsel, was against the procedure prescribed by R. 14 (15) of the Rules, and inasmuch as the Inquiry Officer could have conducted the Inquiry only in accordance with, and in the manner prescribed by the rules, under which he was appointed, or not at all, his findings are beyond jurisdiction and can be assailed on that ground in collateral proceedings like the suit giving rise to the present appeal. 7-A. The last submission made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant was that in any view of the matter, the punishment imposed on the appellant was so disproportionate to the charge of loss of certain papers from a particular file, that it could be termed an arbitrary exercise of its powers by the disciplinary authority, and was liable to be struck down as such. It was urged in this context that the charge levelled against the appellant made no mention of any dishonest motive on his part and the best that could be said to be established against the appellant was that the papers in question were not found in the file of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi, although they were said to have been there when the file was sent to the record-room, and the appellant was, therefore, technically responsible for the loss of those papers as he was the record-keeper. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi, although they were said to have been there when the file was sent to the record-room, and the appellant was, therefore, technically responsible for the loss of those papers as he was the record-keeper. The suggestion in the written statement of the defendant-government that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the papers on receipt of illegal gratification, had never before been set forth or voiced, and it only shows that the disciplinary authority acted on the basis of that suspicion, and the fact that the authority did so without setting out that suspicion in the charge and without giving the plaintiff-appellant any opportunity whatsoever of explaining the same or meeting it, vitiates the action taken against him, for violation of the fundamental rule of natural justice that no man shall be punished without being heard. 8. As to the first point raised by Mr. Bhatnagar, the charge-sheet was served on the plaintiff-appellant with a memorandum dated 5th September, 1969, which is signed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Varanasi, and states that the undersigned proposes to hold an injury against the plaintiff-appellant "under R. 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965,"; that the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in respect of which the inquiry was proposed to be held, was set out in the enclosed articles of charge (Annexure T'); that the statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in respect of each article of charge, Was enclosed as Annexure 2'; and that a list of documents by which, and list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge were proposed to be sustained was also enclosed as Annexures 3' and 4'. The memorandum proceeds to set out the requirements of the other 1979 Lab. I. C./70 VIII rules and it cannot be said that the memorandum and the articles of charge annexed thereto were, in any way, illegal or defective on their face. There was only one charge which may as well be quoted. It was : "That the said Shri Fateh Bahadur Singh while functioning as U. D. C. (Record Keeper of J. Ward) in Income-tax Office, Varanasi during the period 1968-69 removed the copies of' balance-sheets and copy of account of M/s. Gangu Ram Grans (sic) Sons, Calcutta from the file of M/s. Chaurasia Stores; Varanasi and has thereby contravened Rr. It was : "That the said Shri Fateh Bahadur Singh while functioning as U. D. C. (Record Keeper of J. Ward) in Income-tax Office, Varanasi during the period 1968-69 removed the copies of' balance-sheets and copy of account of M/s. Gangu Ram Grans (sic) Sons, Calcutta from the file of M/s. Chaurasia Stores; Varanasi and has thereby contravened Rr. 3 (1) (i) and 3 (1) (ii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964." The statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in respect of the articles of charge runs as follows:- "Shri Fateh Bahadur Singh, U. D. C. (under suspension) was posted in Income-tax Office, Varanasi during 1968-69 and he was working as Record Keeper of J-Ward. On the information received that Shri Fateh Bahadur Singh has removed the copies of balance-sheets and copy of account of M/s. Gangu Ram Grand Sons, Calcutta from the files of M/s. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi, the file of M/s. Chaurasia Stores were called for. On perusal of the files, it was found that the copies of balance-sheets and copy of account were not available on record and has thus proved the information. Shri Fateh Bahadur Singh took this file from his I. T. O. on 17-12-1968 and did not return the same in spite of several reminders by the I. T. O. The files were given by him only on 30-5-1968 and in between he removed the documents and this is contravention of Rr. 3 (1) (i) and 3 (1) (ii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964." The list of documents specified were; 1. Assessment record of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi; 2. Letter F. No. 302C/J dated 31-5-1969 from Shri Ram, the then Income-tax Officer, J-Ward, Varanasi, addressed to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Varanasi. 9. The list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge were proposed to be proved were;- 1. Sri C. H. Singh; and 2. Sri Sri Ram; the former for that he received the file of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi, from the table of Sri Fateh Bahadur Singh, U. D. C. and the latter to depose that he received copies of the balance-sheet, copy of the account of Messrs. Gangu Ram Gransons, Calcutta, which were placed on the files before they were taken by Fateh Bahadur Singh on 17-12-1968. 10. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi, from the table of Sri Fateh Bahadur Singh, U. D. C. and the latter to depose that he received copies of the balance-sheet, copy of the account of Messrs. Gangu Ram Gransons, Calcutta, which were placed on the files before they were taken by Fateh Bahadur Singh on 17-12-1968. 10. In the only charge levelled against the plaintiff-appellant, there is no mention of the allegation that he removed the papers in question on receipt of illegal gratification nor is there any reference to the letter* dated 31st May, 1969, from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Varanasi, to which the letter of the Income-tax Officer, dated 31st May, 1969, was a reply. The contents of that letter of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner are quoted in the report of the inquiry officer which he submitted on the conclusion of the enquiry to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Varanasi. The first paragraph of the letter, quoted in the inquiry officer's report, shows that the informer had told the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Varanasi, that the partners of the Varanasi firm had approached the record-keeper (Fateh Bahadur Singh) and paid Rs. 1,000/- and removed the balance-sheet and copies of the accounts of the Calcutta Firm from the record. The fact that the above allegations contained in that letter quoted in the Inquiry Officer's report, shows that the statement made by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of his having received information that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the documents in question on receipt of Rs. 1,000/- as illegal gratification, was present to the mind of the Inquiry Officer at the time when he recorded his findings. The Inquiry Officer has referred to the contents of that letter at the very outset of the report by saying that he would like to give the background of events which led to the framing of the charge against the plaintiff-appellant and starting of disciplinary proceedings against him. There was no charge against the plaintiff-appellant that he had removed the papers on receipt of illegal gratification. The charge simply was that he had removed the papers which was against the conduct rules. There was nothing more than the information given by the informer to support the allegation that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the papers on receipt of illegal gratification. The charge simply was that he had removed the papers which was against the conduct rules. There was nothing more than the information given by the informer to support the allegation that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the papers on receipt of illegal gratification. The preliminary inquiry made by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner before suspending the plaintiff-appellant and serving the charge-sheet on him and commencing the disciplinary proceedings, was directed towards finding out whether there was any evidence to fix the responsibility on the plaintiff-appellant for removal of the t documents in question from the file of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi. No effort was made to find out whether there was any reliable evidence to prove the allegation of receipt of illegal gratification by the plaintiff-appellant. It was probably assumed that such evidence would not be easily available and from the fact that the responsibility for removal of the papers was fixed on the plaintiff-appellant, it was inferred that the plaintiff-appellant must have done so for illegal gain, without, however, saying so expressly. This is also the process of reasoning adopted by the Inquiry Officer. The fact that the charge was considered serious enough to order the plaintiff-appellant's dismissal from Government service, shows that the disciplinary authority regarded the charge to be very serious. Disappearance of relevant documents from files in Government Departments, like the Income-tax Department, is undoubtedly a serious matter. It can but be gainsaid that whenever such a case comes to the notice of a responsible officer it is his duty to fix the responsibility and punish the official found responsible for the disappearance of.the document in question from the files The record-room of Income-tax Office normally contains thousands of files and the record-keeper must be responsible for the safe keeping of all the papers in all the files committed to his charge. But there are cases and cases. There may be a case of sheer inadvertent negligence on the part of the record-keeper. There may be a case where the record-keeper does not himself know as to how and when some of the papers are lost from the files in his custody, for he is neither supposed to check each and every paper contained in the files when he receives the same for keeping them in the record-room or to see that it contains all those papers when the same go out of the record-room. It is difficult to say that a record-keeper could reasonably be dismissed from service for negligently losing some papers from files kept in the record-room of which he was in-charge, howsoever valuable or important the papers lost may have been. The importance or value of the papers lost can only justify more intensive search (for them. It cannot magnify the degree of negligence of the record-keeper. It would only magnify the negligence of the record-keeper. In a case like the present one, the only circumstance on account of which the record-,keeper could justifiably be dismissed from Government service would be a finding that he deliberately removed the papers in question, on receipt of illegal gratification, from the files given in his custody. Looked in this light, it cannot be said that the information received by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the papers in question on receiving illegal gratification, did not exert its weight on the mind of the Inquiry Officer, when h found that the plaintiff-appellant was guilty of removing the documents mentioned in the articles of charge and that he had thereby contravened Rr. 3 (1) (i) and 3 (1) (ii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, or that it did not weigh heavily on the mind of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner when he decided to impose the maximum penalty of dismissal from service on the plaintiff-appellant. Even in the notice to show cause against the proposed punishment served by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Varanasi, on the plaintiff-appellant, there is no indication of the fact that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had provisionally reached the conclusion that the case was a fit one for dismissing the plaintiff-appellant from service on account of the fact that he was believed or found to have removed the papers from the files on receipt of illegal gratification. The Inquiry Officer's report does not contain any such finding, but as demonstrated above, the penalty of dismissal from service could not have been reasonably imposed or proposed against the plaintiff-appellant unless the disciplinary authority was convinced that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the papers on receipt of illegal gratification. The Inquiry Officer's report does not contain any such finding, but as demonstrated above, the penalty of dismissal from service could not have been reasonably imposed or proposed against the plaintiff-appellant unless the disciplinary authority was convinced that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the papers on receipt of illegal gratification. This was not the charge against the plaintiff-appellant nor was this specified as one of the imputations against him in support of the charge against him nor was the plaintiff-appellant ever afforded any opportunity of meeting the imputation or of being heard in respect of it. 11. The question is whether the inquiry proceedings and the action taken against the plaintiff-appellant is vitiated for the said reasons. The finding is that the plaintiff-appellant removed the papers in question from the file of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi. The Civil Court does not sit in appeal on such findings or an action taken by the disciplinary authority on their basis. The real question is whether the omission of the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority in confronting the plaintiff-appellant with their suspicion, or may be their belief, based on the information received by them, that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the papers on receipt of illegal gratification, was such as to render the action taken wholly null and void for violation of the principles of natural justice, and/or the statutory rules 14 (3) and (4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. 12. There are two more aspects of the matter raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant. The first aspect is the one raised by his second contention already noticed in the earlier part of this judgment. That refers to the basic finding of the Inquiry Officer that the plaintiff-appellant was guilty of having removed the papers from the files in question. The learned counsel has challenged that finding and urged that it was procedurally ultra vires the Inquiry Officer, for violation of Rule 14 (15) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The other aspect relates to the fact that order of the disciplinary authority does not show that the representation made by the plaintiff-appellant against the proposed punishment of dismissal had been considered by the disciplinary authority inasmuch as the final order passed by him does not properly discuss the points raised by the plaintiff-appellant in his representation. 13. The other aspect relates to the fact that order of the disciplinary authority does not show that the representation made by the plaintiff-appellant against the proposed punishment of dismissal had been considered by the disciplinary authority inasmuch as the final order passed by him does not properly discuss the points raised by the plaintiff-appellant in his representation. 13. Rule 14 (15) of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965, runs as follows: "If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the inquiring authority may, in its discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the list given to the Government servant or may itself call for new evidence or recall and re-examine any witness and in such case the Government servant shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and an adjournment of the inquiry for three clear days before the production of such new evidence, exclusive of the day of adjournment and the day to which the inquiry is adjourned. The inquiring authority shall give the Government servant an opportunity of inspecting such documents before they are taken on the record. The inquiring authority may also allow the Government servant to produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interests of justice. Note: - New evidence shall not be permitted or called for or any witness shall not be recalled to fill up any gap in the evidence. Such evidence may be called for only when there is an inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence which has been produced originally." 14. The order-sheet maintained by the Inquiry Officer shows that on 7th August, 1970, the statements of Sri C. H. Singh and Sri Sri Ram, Income-tax Officers were recorded and copies of the same were supplied to the plaintiff-appellant and also to the Departmental Presenting Officer. The plaintiff-appellant thereupon signified his intention of filing his statement of defence in writing. He was allowed to do so, and to file the same on or before 20th August, 1970. He was also required to produce all his evidence on that day. The plaintiff-appellant thereupon signified his intention of filing his statement of defence in writing. He was allowed to do so, and to file the same on or before 20th August, 1970. He was also required to produce all his evidence on that day. This stage of the inquiry proceedings was the stage of R. 15 (16) of the Rules which runs as follows;- "When the case for the disciplinary authority is closed, the Government servant shall be required to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded and the Govt, servant shall be required to sign the record. In either case a copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed." However, instead of proceeding with the next stage of recording evidence of the plaintiff-appellant on the 20th August, 1970, as envisaged by Rr. 14 (17) and (18), after the filing of the statement in writing of his defence by the plaintiff-appellant on 13th August, 1970, the Inquiry Officer made a note of the absence of the plaintiff-appellant and the Presenting Officer on the 20th August, 1970, and thereafter directed on the 1st September, 1970, that a copy of the written statement of defence filed by the plaintiff-appellant may be sent to the Presenting Officer who should be asked to file the written brief, if any, within a week of the receipt thereof. The next note on the order-sheet is dated 7th September, 1970, which runs as follows:- "I had received a telephonic call from I. A. C. Varanasi and Shri J. P. Singh, Presenting Officer for sending the personal file of Shri F. B. Singh, U. D. C. (under suspension) and M/s. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi to I. A. C. Varanasi. Send the records along with a forwarding letter to I.A.C. Varanasi under insured cover." Thereafter on 17th September, 1970, in response to a letter dated 14th September, 1970, from the Presenting Officer, he was allowed time to file his reply on or before 25th September, 1970 along with the records and sent a copy to I.A.C. Varanasi for information. The Inquiry Officer seems to have been changed at this stage and the order sheet records a note which is dated 30-9-1970 over 17-11-1970 by the new Inquiry Officer and bears his signatures dated 17-11-1970. The Inquiry Officer seems to have been changed at this stage and the order sheet records a note which is dated 30-9-1970 over 17-11-1970 by the new Inquiry Officer and bears his signatures dated 17-11-1970. It records the making of an application by the Presenting Officer requesting for pier-mission to introduce one more witness and further evidence. Notice of the application having been given to the plaintiff-appellant on the 19th November, 1970, the Inquiry Officer, directed the production of the witness and the evidence on 25th November, 1970, with a note that detailed reasons for the order could not be typed out because of the absence of the stenographer but would be made over within two days. There is, however, a further note on the margin dated 21st February, 1971, that no separate order was given to the parties on this point but the same has been discussed in the inquiry report. The statement of Sri Ram Bharti was recorded on 25th November, 1970. Copies of that statement were given to the plaintiff-appellant and an opportunity was given to him to inspect the documents mentioned in the letter of the Presenting Officer which was done on 26th November, 1970. On 3rd December, 1970, the Presenting Officer closed his case. The Inquiry Officer required the plaintiff-appellant to state his defence either orally or in writing and to submit the same on 10th December, 1970, on which date the plaintiff-appellant filed his statement of defence and closed his case. He was, thereupon, required to appear on 14th December, 1970, for being questioned by the Inquiry Officer in order to enable him to explain the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence. On 14th December, 1970, the statement of the plaintiff-appellant was recorded and both the sides were required to submit their respective briefs by 21st December, 1970. While the Presenting Officer submitted a written brief, the plaintiff-appellant said that he did not have to submit any. This was followed by the Inquiry Officer's report dated 27th February, 1971. The plaintiff-appellant was required by a memorandum dated 24th March, 1971, to show cause against the proposal to impose the penalty of dismissal from service. The plaintiff-appellant submitted his representation on 8th April, 1971, against the proposed punishment. The order dismissing him from service is dated 11th May, 1971. It is a long order running into 22 closely typed fool scape sheets of paper. The plaintiff-appellant submitted his representation on 8th April, 1971, against the proposed punishment. The order dismissing him from service is dated 11th May, 1971. It is a long order running into 22 closely typed fool scape sheets of paper. A copy of it is Ext. 1 on record. 15. The further evidence examined by the Inquiry Officer was of Sri Ram Bharti on 25th November, 1970, after the initial close of the evidence for the department on 7th August, 1970. It cannot be said that the plaintiff-appellant was procedurally prejudiced by the examination of Sri Ram Bharti on 25th November, 1970, for, he was again given an opportunity of submitting his statement of defence. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, however, contended that the case for the disciplinary authority was closed on the 7th August, 1970, and that is apparent from the fact that the plaintiff-appellant was required to and did submit his statement of defence in writing. That stage could be reached only after the disciplinary authority had closed its case and once the disciplinary authority had closed its case, there could be no going back to the stage of cl. (15) of R. 14 of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965. It is, however, difficult to agree with this submission of the learned counsel, for, cl. (15) of ft. 14 permits the examination of new evidence or the recalling of and re-examination of any witness, who had earlier been examined not only for the disciplinary authority, but also where the Government servant desires the production of new evidence. Clause (15) of R. 14 is an enabling provision. The opening clause thereof, "If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority." Indicates that new evidence for the disciplinary authority will not be permitted to be examined after the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The stage of the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority can be said to be reached when there is nothing more to be said on behalf of the disciplinary authority. It cannot be restricted in meaning to the close of the evidence on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The stage of the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority can be said to be reached when there is nothing more to be said on behalf of the disciplinary authority. It cannot be restricted in meaning to the close of the evidence on behalf of the disciplinary authority. It cannot be doubted that the Presenting Officer had closed the evidence to be led for the disciplinary authority on the 7th August, 1970, and on that the Inquiry Officer passed on the stage of clause (16) of Rule 14 of the said Rules by asking the plaintiff-appellant to state his defence. The close of the evidence may, in that sense, be regarded as the close of the case for the disciplinary authority for the purposes of clause (16) of Rule 14 of the said Rules. But, if it is so regarded, and if according to the true interpretation of clause (15) of Rule 14, new evidence cannot be examined after such a close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority, then in that case, there could never be an occasion for examining new evidence or recalling and re-examining any witness. Even so, the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority" on 7th August, 1970, could not be so irretrievable as to disentitle the Inquiry Officer from admitting fresh evidence by putting the clock back and allowing fresh evidence to be led on behalf of the disciplinary authority even after the plaintiff-appellant had filed his statement of defence in writing. The action of the Inquiry Officer could not be said to be procedurally ultra vires as he did have the jurisdiction to entertain fresh evidence under clause (15) of Rule 14. His doing so, after having received the statement of defence may have been irregular but such irregularity, does not. vitiate the inquiry unless substantial prejudice is established to have been, caused, and that too is more a consideration to be taken into account by an appellant or supervisory authority than by) the civil court, for the jurisdiction of a civil court goes to the examination "of questions of ultra vires, procedural or otherwise, and no further. vitiate the inquiry unless substantial prejudice is established to have been, caused, and that too is more a consideration to be taken into account by an appellant or supervisory authority than by) the civil court, for the jurisdiction of a civil court goes to the examination "of questions of ultra vires, procedural or otherwise, and no further. At any rate, the record of the proceedings taken by the Inquiry Officer amply shows that no procedural prejudice could be said to have been caused by the examination of Sri Ram Bharti after the close of the evidence for the disciplinary authority, for the Inquiry Officer afforded the fullest opportunity to the plaintiff-appellant of again stating his defence after the evidence of Sri Ram Bharti had been taken. 16. Coming back to the question whether the inquiry, the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer and the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority were vitiated by reason of the fact that the plaintiff-appellant was not confronted with or shown the letter dated 31st May, 1969, from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Varanasi, to the Income-tax Officer, at any stage earlier than the service of the Inquiry Officer's report along with the notice to show cause against the proposed punishment. 17. It remains to be noticed that R. 3 (1) (i) and (ii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, for the contravention of which the plaintiff-appellant was charged, require every Government servant at all times to maintain (i) absolute integrity; and (ii) devotion to duty. The articles of charge and the imputations of misconduct served on the plaintiff-appellant do contain a reference to the said rule. The question is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the mere mention of Rule 3 (1) (i) and (ii) in the same, was sufficient to give notice to the plaintiff-appellant that he was charged with having misconducted himself by accepting illegal gratification, in the absence of any specific mention of that fact as the motive for removal of the papers from the files with which he was specifically charged. 18. 18. In case, it is assumed that the charge as framed did include by implication the charge of receiving illegal gratification as the motive for removal of the papers from the file in question, the importance of disclosing the letter dated 31st May, 1969, written by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to the Income-tax Officer, as one of the documents in the list of documents relied upon for proving the charge under clause (3) of Rule 14 of the C. C. A. Rules cannot but be gainsaid; and according to the procedure prescribed, the plaintiff-appellant would have become entitled to inspect the said letter if it had been included in the list of documents relied upon, to submit his written statement of defence under clause (4) of Rule 14 of the C. C. A. Rules. It would be idle to speculate on the written statement of defence which the plaintiff-appellant would have submitted in case the said letter had been disclosed to him before he submitted his written statement of defence under clause (4) of Rule 14. However, in his representation in reply to the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty, the plaintiff-appellant contended, apart from pleading that the letter was not evidence referred to in the articles of charge and that it was not tendered in evidence at any stage of the inquiry, that the fact that the letter was given to the Inquiry Officer showed that lie had been making private inquiries behind the appellant's back and was being privately briefed by the department; and that the information given by the informer and the fact that the informer had named the plaintiff-appellant were concealed from the plaintiff-appellant although they formed the very basis of the inquiry against him. It was also contended that although according to the said letter, department had positive evidence of the informer against the plaintiff-appellant and it acted upon his statement, he was never produced at the inquiry, with the result that his statement made before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in private could not be tested by cross-examination and the placing of reliance on that information, thus, violated the canons of natural justice. The plaintiff-appellant also contended that the version of Sri Sri Ram, Income-tax Officer, before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, as disclosed by the said letter was different from the version given by him, in his statement before the Inquiry Officer and because the contents of the said letter were not known to the plaintiff-appellant when Sri Sri Ram, Income-tax Officer, was examined before the Inquiry Officer, he could not be confronted with the version given by him to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and its veracity could not, therefore, be tested by cross-examination. That version, could not, therefore, be relied upon by the Inquiry Officer as the doing so, is violative of the elementary principles of evidence. Lastly, it was contended that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, who wrote the letter which was the very basis of the enquiry, against the plaintiff-appellant, did not appear as a witness before the Inquiry Officer, with the result that the veracity of the statements contained in the letter could not be tested by cross-examination. The letter was, as such, wholly inadmissible in evidence. 19. It cannot be said that the aforesaid contentions raised by the plaintiff-appellant were such as to merit no consideration. The disciplinary authority has in his 22 pages long order of punish-men, relied upon the contents of the said letter and as to its admissibility, it has met the objection of the plaintiff-appellant by saying that the letter was on the assessment records of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi, which were handed over to the Inquiry Officer and these assessment records were inspected by the plaintiff-appellant, who can, therefore, be supposed to have been aware of the same and that there was no substance in the allegations that the Inquiry Officer made any private inquiry behind the plaintiff-appellant's back. The letter was. however, not specifically included in the list of the documents relied upon by the department for proving the articles of charge against the plaintiff-appellant. The letter was. however, not specifically included in the list of the documents relied upon by the department for proving the articles of charge against the plaintiff-appellant. The information that the plaintiff-appellant had removed the papers in question, on receipt of illegal gratification, formed the very basis of the charge and the departmental proceedings against the plaintiff-appellant, but even then it was neither specifically ref erred to in the articles of charge or the imputations of misconduct on which it was based or in the list of the documents relied upon as evidence in support of the said charge, nor was any evidence produced in support of the allegation of receipt of illegal gratification. It can, therefore, be justly said that the plaintiff-appellant was not afforded a treasonable opportunity of meeting the charge of receiving illegal gratification which was supposed to be the motive for his having removed the papers in question from the files of Messrs. Chaurasia Stores, Varanasi. Since the allegation was the very foundation and ultimately the most important reason for imposing the maximum penalty of dismissal from Government service on the plaintiff-appellant, it can be said with some justifies ion that he did not have a fair trial. 20. Mr. R. K. Gulati, Senior Standing Counsel for the Income-tax Department, assisted by R. Ashoka Gupta, cited a number of authorities before me and contended that the civil court cannot sit in appeal over the orders of the disciplinary authority and cannot interfere with the punishment simply because it may appear that on the facts found the punishment is too severe. It was further contended that the plaintiff-respondent was throughout aware of the case against him and the inquiry proceedings or the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority cannot be interfered with by a civil court on mere technicalities such as those now put forth by the plaintiff, which had, in truth, no substance. It cannot be disputed that the civil court does not sit in appeal in these matters nor is it competent for it to interfere with the disciplinary action taken, on the ground that the punishment imposed on the Government servant appears to be too severe, or on the ground that the findings are not justified by the material on record. However, the present case does not appear to be a case of that kind. However, the present case does not appear to be a case of that kind. There was, as shown above, a violation of the rules of natural justice and of Rule 14 (3) and (4) of the C. C. A. Rules, such as to vitiate the inquiry. The disciplinary authority failed to remedy the situation in spite of plaintiff-appellant's specific representation on the point in response to the notice to show cause against the proposed punishment. However, there does not appear to be any infirmity or illegality in the orders dated 2nd June, 1969, suspending the plaintiff-appellant from service and initiating the disciplinary proceedings against him. Only the inquiry was bad and the plaintiff-appellant was punished with dismissal from the service otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law for the inquiry. The final order of the disciplinary authority dismissing the plaintiff-appellant from service was, therefore, illegal and void and the court must declare it to be so. 21. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the two courts below are set aside. The suit is decreed in part. It is declared that the order dated 11th May, 1971, of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Varanasi, dismissing the plaintiff-appellant from the service of the Income-tax department of the Government of India is illegal and void. The orders dated 2nd June, 1969, suspending the plaintiff-appellant from service and initiating the disciplinary proceedings against him are, however, lawful and valid and it shall be for the disciplinary authority to reconsider the representation of the plaintiff-appellant dated 8th March, 1971, in response to the notice dated 24th March 1971 requiring him to show cause against the proposed penalty and to pass such orders thereon as may be just and lawful in the light of the observations made in this judgment, whether by exonerating the plaintiff-appellant altogether of the charge against him, or by giving him a lesser punishment than dismissal or removal from service or by ordering a fresh inquiry take appropriate action on the result of such inquiry. The plaintiff-appellant shall be entitled to his cost throughout.