Judgement BAHARUL ISLAM, J. :- This appeal is by the plaintiff and is directed against the judgement and decree passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 2, Cachar, Silchar. 2. The facts material for the purpose of disposal of this appeal may be stated thus : Plaintiff Panmal Ranka and defendant No. 2 Puranmal Ranka, are brothers. They were the partners of a registered partnership firm known as M/s. Ganga Textiles situated at Jamira, Part IV, in the Hailakandi Sub-division in the district of Cachar at a distance of about 12 miles from the Mizo border. The firm was insured with defendant No. 1, the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. and obtained an insurance policy for the period from 24-5-1966 to 24-5-1967 for a sum of Rupees 30,000/- on terms and conditions set out in the policy issued by the defendant No. 1. During the continuance of the said policy the partnership firm was dissolved and defendant No. 2 gave up all his rights, claims and interest in the firm. It has been alleged by the plaintiff that on 9-11-1966 at night a gang of armed people forcibly entered the shop house of the firm, looted property including cash of Rs. 9,000/- and set fire to the shop house which was completely gutted. The plaintiff then sent information to defendant No. 1 about the loss and demanded payment in terms of the policy. Accordingly an assessor of the defendant No. 1 came to the place of occurrence and assessed the loss of the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was expecting satisfaction of the claim the defendant No. 1 informed the plaintiff its inability to entertain the claim of the plaintiff under the policy alleging that the loss sustained by the plaintiff was the result of the act of hostilities of the Mizo rebels and was therefore not covered by the policy. The plaintiff, therefore, was compelled to file the suit claiming Rs. 30,000/- with costs against the defendant No. 1. 3. Defendant No. 1 only has filed a written statement and contested the suit. His material pleas are that the plaintiff is not the policy holder of the insurance policy in question; there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and as such the suit by the plaintiff was incompetent. 3. Defendant No. 1 only has filed a written statement and contested the suit. His material pleas are that the plaintiff is not the policy holder of the insurance policy in question; there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and as such the suit by the plaintiff was incompetent. The second material plea is that the insurance policy does not cover the risk of any loss or damage caused by the Mizo hostiles occasioned by or through any consequence of the Mizo rebellion. 4. The trial court framed a number of issues including the following which are material : "(1) Has the plaintiff cause of action ? (2) Is the suit maintainable ? (4) Has there been privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendants ? (7) Is the loss of property of the insured by arson and looting due to the act of the Mizo rebels ?" The trial court decided issues Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in favour of the plaintiff but decided issue No. 7 against the plaintiff. Hence this appeal. 5. Shri N.M. Lahiri, learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, appearing for the appellant, submits that the decision of the trial court on issue No. 7 is erroneous; while Shri S.K. Sen, learned counsel appearing for the respondent (the Insurance Company) submits that the decision of the trial court on issue Nos. 1, 2 and 4 in favour of the plaintiff is erroneous. His submission is that the learned trial court having held that there was not privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 ought td have held that the suit by the plaintiff was incompetent. 6. It is necessary first to examine the contention of the respondent inasmuch as, if it is held that the suit by the plaintiff is incompetent, it will not be necessary for us to examine the contention of the appellant. 7. What was insured was admittedly the registered partnership firm, M/s. Ganga Textiles; that the firm was dissolved and that one of the partners, namely, defendant No. 2, retired from the firm are not in dispute. 7. What was insured was admittedly the registered partnership firm, M/s. Ganga Textiles; that the firm was dissolved and that one of the partners, namely, defendant No. 2, retired from the firm are not in dispute. There is also no dispute that this suit has been brought, not by the firm, but by one of the partners, namely, Panmal Ranka, whose case is that on dissolution, all the properties of the firm and its assets and effects passed on to him and that he was carrying on business in the name of the firm, M/s. Ganga Textiles, of which he was the proprietor and as such he claims he is competent to file this suit. Partnership and partnership firm are defined under Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act of 1932 (hereinafter called the Act). Partnership has been defined as the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually partners and collectively a firm. It is clear from the definition that there cannot be a partnership firm of one person. Dissolution of a partnership firm is provided for under Section 39 of the Act. Section 40 of the Act provides that a partnership firm may be dissolved with the consent of all the partners or in accordance with a contract between the partners. 8. It is the case of the plaintiff that the partnership firm was dissolved under a Deed of Dissolution of Partnership dated 10-8-1966 proved as Ext. 1 in the suit. In spite of that the learned trial court has found that "the firm M/s. Ganga Textiles is still in existence." This finding is contrary to the plaintiffs own admitted case and is erroneous. The only question for decision is whether the plaintiff, one of the partners of the partnership firm that was insured, can bring the suit. That is possible if the policy was assigned to him in accordance with law and the agreement between the parties. 9. The only question for decision is whether the plaintiff, one of the partners of the partnership firm that was insured, can bring the suit. That is possible if the policy was assigned to him in accordance with law and the agreement between the parties. 9. Section 135 of the T.P. Act provides : "Every assignee by endorsement or other writing, of a policy of insurance against fire in whom the property in the subject insured shall be absolutely vested at the date of the assignment, shall have transferred and vested in him all rights of suits as if the contract contained in the policy had been made with himself." This Section provides that the assignment may be by endorsement or even by other writing of the policy of insurance against fire etc. It is not denied that there is no endorsement of an assignment of the policy on the insurance policy. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the assignment of the policy is included in Ext. 1. Learned counsel bases his submission on clause V of Part 4 of the Deed for Dissolution of Partnership. Clause V is in the following terms : "(V) The first party shall carry on the said business that is carried on under the name and style of Messers. Ganga Textiles for his own benefit from the 15th day of August, 1966 and shall take over all debts and liabilities of the partnership outstanding on the same date as also all stock in trade, materials and effects and book debts belonging to the partnership on that date." Learned counsel submits that the expression effects includes the insurance policy. In our opinion, the submission has no substance, for, what under Cl. V were transferred were the stock in trade, materials and effects belonging the partnership firm and in which the defendant No. 1 had share, but the insurance policy was not included in the "effects" of the partnership as it concerned the insurer a third party who had a say in the matter in accordance with clause (d) of Condition 8 of the policy. Clause (d) of Condition 8 of the insurance policy which is material is in the following terms : "8. Clause (d) of Condition 8 of the insurance policy which is material is in the following terms : "8. Under any of the following circumstances the insurance ceases to attach as regards the property affected unless the insured, before the occurrence of any loss or damage obtains the sanction of the Company signified by endorsement upon the policy by or on behalf of the Company : (a) to (c) x x x x x x x x x (d) If the interest in the property insured pass from the insured otherwise than by will or operation of law." It is not the plaintiffs case that the interest in the property of the insured firm passed to the plaintiff by will or by operation of law. It is his definite case that it passed on to him by the act of the partners. The case, therefore, is covered by Condition 8 (d). In accordance with this clause, therefore, the insurance ceased to attach as regards the property effected by the loss as the insured, namely, the registered partnership firm did not obtain any sanction of the company by endorsement upon the policy either by or on behalf of the company. As such, interest in the registered firm so far as the insurance is concerned, did not pass on to the plaintiff and the policy did not protect the plaintiff and as such he had no locus standi to bring this suit. The submission of the respondent on the maintainability of the suit by the plaintiff prevails and the plaintiffs suit is liable to be dismissed on this point alone. 10. It has been found by the trial court that the plaintiff or the registered partnership firm did not comply with Condition 8(d). It has however erroneously found that the plaintiff was competent to file the suit as he was carrying on the business under the name and style, M/s. Ganga Textiles. It has erroneously equated the one man proprietary firm, M/s. Ganga Textiles, to the registered partnership firm, M/s. Ganga Textiles. The former is but an alias of the proprietor. As we have held against the plaintiff on this point, we need not examine the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant on the other point raised by the appellant. 11. In the result the appeal is dismissed but we leave the parties to bear their own costs. The former is but an alias of the proprietor. As we have held against the plaintiff on this point, we need not examine the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant on the other point raised by the appellant. 11. In the result the appeal is dismissed but we leave the parties to bear their own costs. K. N. SAIKIA, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed. ____________