JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - An industrial dispute between the petitioners on the one hand and their workmen on the other was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, respondent No. 1 by the government. It appears that the cause of some of the workmen was sponsored by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh which was earlier a registered union but had subsequently been deregistered. Other workmen were represented before the Tribunal by two unions, viz., Mau Mill Karmachari Sangh and Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, U.P. The term 'union' stands defined in Section 2 (x) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. According to that definition 'union' means a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Since Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh had been deregistered difficulty appears to have been felt in regard to its competence in representing the workmen who were being represented by the Sangh when it had not been deregistered. An application was made by respondents 3 and 4, Sarvasri Ram Bali Yadav and Pravin Chaturvedi, before the Industrial Tribunal stating that those workmen who were earlier represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh by a resolution passed in a meeting held on 24th July, 1978, had nominated them as their representatives before the Industrial Tribunal. This application was opposed on behalf of the petitioners inter alia on the following grounds:- (1) that since the Union, viz., Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh, had been deregistered it was no longer entitled to represent any of the workmen; (2) that R. 40 (1) (i) (c) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules could come into play only when there was no union of the workmen. Since there were two other unions already in existence, viz., Mau Mill Karmachari Sangh and Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, U.P. the provisions of R. 40 (1) (i) (c) were not applicable and respondents 3 and 4 could not be nominated to represent those workmen who were earlier represented by Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh: (3) that respondents 3 and 4 be said to be representatives duly nominated; and (4) that even if these respondents had been duly nominated they were not entitled to appear before the Industrial Tribunal in view of the last portion of R. 40 (1) (i) (c). The objection raised on behalf of the petitioners did not find favour with the Industrial Tribunal. The objection raised on behalf of the petitioners did not find favour with the Industrial Tribunal. It was held by the Tribunal that respondents 3 and 4 were entitled to represent the workmen who were previously represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh and who were not represented either by Mau Mill Karmachari Sangh or by Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, U.P. The order of the Industrial Tribunal is dated 31st Aug. 1978 and it is this order which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioners that R. 40 was the relevant rule dealing with representation of parties before a Conciliation Board, Labour Court or Tribunal and respondents 3 and 4 could be held to be entitled to represent the workmen concerned only if it could be shown that they were representatives of those workmen as contemplated by the said rule and not otherwise. The relevant provision in regard to the representation of a workman is contained in R. 40 (1) (i) which reads as hereunder :- "40. Representation of parties.- (1) The parties may, in their discretion, be represented before a Board, Labour Court or Tribunal- (1) in the case of workmen subject to the provision of sub-sec. (3) of S. 6-1, by- (a) an officer of a union of which he is member, or (b) an officer of a federation of unions to which the union referred to in Cl. (a) above, is affiliated, and (c) where there is no union of workmen, any representative, duly nominated by the workmen who are entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board under any order issued by Government or any member of the executive, or other officer; (ii) .............." Sub-sec. (3) S. 6-I reads :- "(3) No officer of a Union shall be entitled to represent any party unless a period of two years has elapsed since its registration under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926, and the Union has been registered for one trade only: Provided that an officer of a federation of unions may subject to such conditions as may be prescribed represent any party." Since Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh stood deregistered it could not in view of the definition of the term 'union' contained in Section 2 (x) aforesaid be treated to be a union within the meaning of cl. (a) and cl. (a) and cl. (b) of R. 40 (1) (i). Further since those workman who were represented by Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh were not members of the remaining two unions viz., Mau Mills Karmachari Sangh and Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh. U.P., any officer of the said two unions or of a federation of unions to which the said two unions may have been affiliated could not therefore, represent the workmen who were earlier represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh. Cls.(a) and (b), therefore, are not relevant for the purposes of the instant case. The whole dispute turns round the interpretation of Cl. (c) thereof. It was urged by counsel for the petitioners that Cl. (c) could apply only to a case where there was no union of workmen at all and since there were two unions already in existence as aforesaid, Cl. (c) was not attracted. We find it difficult to accept this submission for the simple reason that if the interpretation placed by counsel for the petitioners is accepted the workmen who were earlier represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh would be completely deprived of getting themselves representated before the Industrial Tribunal, respondent No. 11 even if in their discretion they chose to get themselves represented through their nominee. As seen above Cls. (a) and (b) could not come to the aid of such workmen and Cl. (c) would also be excluded on the interpretation placed by counsel for the petitioners. This could neither be the intention of Cl. (c) nor this interpretation is borne out even on the plain language of the said clause. In our opinion the words "where there is no union of workmen" in Cl. (c) in view of the definition of the term 'union' and read in juxtaposition to Cls. (a) and (b) have to be read as "where there is no registered union of workmen of which the workman concerned is a member". In the instant case there is no registered union of which those Employee's who were earlier represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh may be members. It is not the case of the petitioners that those workmen are the members of either Mau Mill Karmachari Sangh or Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, U.P. 3. In the instant case there is no registered union of which those Employee's who were earlier represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh may be members. It is not the case of the petitioners that those workmen are the members of either Mau Mill Karmachari Sangh or Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, U.P. 3. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioners that only such person could be a representative of those workmen who came within the purview of the term "or any member of the executive, or other officer" occurring towards the end of Cl. (c). We find it difficult to accept this submission also. The word "or" after the word "government" and before the words "any member" is on the face of it disjunctive. If the interpretation placed by counsel for the petitioner is accepted Cl. (c) would have to be redrafted so as to read "where there is no union of workmen any representative duly nominated by the workman who is a member of the executive or other officer." Such an interpretation would obviously render the words "are entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board under any orders issued by the government, or any" redundant. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statutes that in the garb of interpretation it is not possible for the Court's to redraft the statutory provision in a manner as to render material portions thereof nugatory. On a plain language of Cl. (c) the only interpretation possible seems to be that the said clause contemplates two sets of representatives in those cases where there is no union of the workmen:- (1) any representative duly nominated by the workmen who are entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board under any Orders issued by the government; and (2) any member of the executive or other officer. In the instant case the latter part of the clause, viz.- "or any member of the executive or other officer" is not applicable, and the submission made by counsel for the parties has to be considered with reference to the earlier clause. We, however, wish to point out that the latter clause viz. "or any member of the executive or other officer" does not appear to be happily worded. It is not clear as to what "executive" is contemplated in the said clause of which a member can be a representative. We, however, wish to point out that the latter clause viz. "or any member of the executive or other officer" does not appear to be happily worded. It is not clear as to what "executive" is contemplated in the said clause of which a member can be a representative. Neither is it clear as to who is being referred to by the term "or other officer." 4. In this connection we may refer to Section 36 (1) (c) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which deals with representation of a workman when such workman is not a member of any trade union. It reads: "36. Representation of parties- (1) A workman who is party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by- (a) and (b) ............... (c) where the worker is not a member of a trade union, by any member of the executive or other officer of any trade union connected with, or by any other workman employed in, the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner .as may be prescribed. (2) .............. 5. It appears that the purpose of inserting the words "or any member of the executive, or other officer" in the end of R. 40 (1) (i) (c) was to bring it in conformity with Section 36 (1) (c) of the Central Act but the said purpose could have been better achieved if words "of any trade union connected with the industry in which the workman is employed and duly authorised in this behalf" had also been inserted after the words "or any member of the executive, or other officer." It appears that the aforesaid words have somehow been omitted. 6. Reverting to the earlier part of the clause it would be seen that only such person can be a representative within the meaning of the said cl. (c) who has been "duly nominated by the workmen who are entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board under any orders issued by the Government". We have, therefore, to find out who are these workmen who are entitled to duly nominate a representative. For respondents 3 and 4 it was urged by their counsel that anyone who may have been by a resolution passed in the meeting of such workmen nominated to represent them will be their representative within the meaning of cl. (c). We have, therefore, to find out who are these workmen who are entitled to duly nominate a representative. For respondents 3 and 4 it was urged by their counsel that anyone who may have been by a resolution passed in the meeting of such workmen nominated to represent them will be their representative within the meaning of cl. (c). In our opinion it is not possible to accept this submission. Had this been the intention the words "who are entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board under any orders issued by the government" occurring after the words "duly nominated by the workmen" would not have been used at all. It is, therefore, apparent that it is not all the workmen who are entitled to nominate "any representative" but only such workmen "who are entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board under any orders issued by the government". Our attention has been invited by counsel for the petitioners to an order under Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, published vide Notification No. 7248 (S.T.)/XXXVI-A-280 (S.T.)-1958 dated Dec. 31, 1958 (published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary of the same date) as amended from time to time. Cl. (2) of that Order deals with reference of disputes to Conciliation Board. Sub-cl. (1) (i) deals with the case of a workman and it reads as follows: "2. 31, 1958 (published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary of the same date) as amended from time to time. Cl. (2) of that Order deals with reference of disputes to Conciliation Board. Sub-cl. (1) (i) deals with the case of a workman and it reads as follows: "2. Reference of disputes to Conciliation Board - (1) An application for the settlement of an industrial dispute may be made before the Conciliation Officer of the area concerned in Form I with five spare copies thereof - (i) in the case of a workman (a) subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of S. 6-1, by an officer of a union of which he is a member, or by an officer of a Federation of Unions to which such union is affiliated; or (b) where no union of workmen exists by five representatives of the workmen employed in a concern or industry, duly elected in this behalf by a majority of the workmen employed in that concern or industry at a meeting held for the purpose, or by all workmen employed in the concern if their number is not more than five: Provided that where no union of workmen exists and the application is made by representatives of the workmen duly elected as aforesaid, a copy of the resolution adopted at a meeting held for the purpose shall be attached to the application in Form I, and (ii) .... .... ...." 7. Clause (a) quoted above is not attracted to the facts of the instant case. In respect of cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) it was urged by counsel for the petitioners that even the five representatives contemplated by this clause had to be the Employee's of the concern or industry by whose workmen they are to be duly elected. We are inclined to agree with this submission both on the plain language of R. 40 (1) (i) (c) and of cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) as also keeping in view the intention of the legislature in this behalf as expressed in Section 36 (1) (c) of the Central Act quoted above. First we will refer to Section 36 (1) (c) aforesaid. It envisages representation of a workman when such workman is not a member of any trade union which term is in pari materia with cl. First we will refer to Section 36 (1) (c) aforesaid. It envisages representation of a workman when such workman is not a member of any trade union which term is in pari materia with cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) of the order which deals with a case where there is no union of workmen of which such workman is a member. Such workman is to be represented either by any member of the executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with the industry in which the workman is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed or by any other workman employed in the industry in which the workman is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. Emphasis is on the words underlined by us. The representative covered by that clause has also to be a workman employed in the industry in which the workman sought to be represented is employed. 8. Now we refer to the language of Rule 40 (1) (i) (c) and cl. 2 (1) (i) (b). As seen above the workmen who are entitled to nominate "any representative" under R. 40 (1) (i) (c) are not all the workmen but only "such workmen who are entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board under any orders issued by Government". (Emphasis on workmen supplied). Clause 2 (1) (i) (b) is a clause of an order "issued by Government" which prescribes the persons" who are entitled to make an application before a Conciliation Board" as contemplated by R. 40 (1) (i) (c). When these persons are referred to as "workmen" in R. 40 (1) (i) (e) as emphasised above the five representatives who are to be duly elected under cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) will have to be "workmen". And this is borne out from the language of cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) also. An application contemplated by this clause in the case of a workman where no union of workmen exists can be filed: (i) by five representatives of the workmen employed in a concern, or industry, duly elected in this behalf by a majority of the. workmen employed in that concern or industry at a meeting held for the purpose if the number of workmen is more than five. (ii) by all workmen employed in the concern if their; number is not more than five: 9. workmen employed in that concern or industry at a meeting held for the purpose if the number of workmen is more than five. (ii) by all workmen employed in the concern if their; number is not more than five: 9. In the instant case the number of workmen concerned is admittedly more than five. If the five representatives contemplated by this clause were not to be workmen of the concern or industry but could be even outsiders two simple words "such workmen" would have been used in place of the words "the workmen employed in that concern or industry" occurring after the words "majority of" and before the words "at a meeting" and recourse to pointless repetition of words or tautology would not have been taken. The obvious purpose in using the existing language was to emphasise that even the five representatives who were to be duly elected by the workmen of a concern or industry had also to be workmen of that concern or industry. Further in those cases where the total number of workmen in the concern is not more than five the application contemplated by this clause is to be made by all workmen employed in that concern. In other words the intention is that if the number of workmen is not more than five the application is to be made by all workmen and if this number is more than five it is to be made by five workmen duly elected by a majority of the workmen in the manner contemplated by the said clause as their representatives. Thus the persons who are entitled to make an application contemplated by the said clause are in each case to be workmen. 10. Counsel for respondents 3 and 4 on the authority of certain decisions cited by him urged that in case of any doubt such interpretation was to be preferred which leaned in favour of workmen. In our opinion, firstly there seems to be no doubt, secondly the construction which we are placing is in no way against the workmen and thirdly. even if it were, it is not open to the Court's to take recourse to legislation in the garb of interpretation. 11. In our opinion, firstly there seems to be no doubt, secondly the construction which we are placing is in no way against the workmen and thirdly. even if it were, it is not open to the Court's to take recourse to legislation in the garb of interpretation. 11. If R. 40 (1) (i) (c) is interpreted in the manner so as to make it permissible to the workmen to straightway nominate even less than five representatives as was done in the instant case by the resolution passed in the meeting held on 24-7-1978 whereby two persons only namely respondents 3 and 4 were authorised to represent them it would render the aforesaid cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) unworkable. On the other hand if the duly elected five representatives as contemplated by cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) of the Order were alone to represent jointly even for the performance of such acts which are not contemplated by any provision of law to be performed jointly by them, e.g., conducting cross-examination or addressing arguments it would again create an unworkable situation. The only harmonious construction seems to be that in those cases where there is no union of workmen as contemplated by R. 40 (1) (i) (c) of the Rules and Cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) of the Order and the number of workmen of such concern or industry is more than five they have to first elect five representatives as aforesaid. It is these five representatives who will be entitled to sign an application before a Conciliation Board i. e. the application contemplated by cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) as also to do any other act which may under any provision of law be required to be done by such five representatives jointly. For representing the workmen for any other purpose e. g. conducting cross-examination or addressing arguments these five duly elected representatives can nominate "any representative" as contemplated by R. 40 (1) (i) (c). It would not be out of place to point out that in a situation like this it is the duty of the court to place a harmonious construction over the provisions of R. 40 (1) (i) (c) of the Rules and cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) of the Order, so that no part of these provisions is either rendered nugatory or unworkable and no injustice is caused to either party. 2 (1) (i) (b) of the Order, so that no part of these provisions is either rendered nugatory or unworkable and no injustice is caused to either party. Having given our anxious consideration to the problem we are of opinion that the interpretation that we have placed on these provisions fulfils this requirement. 12. It is settled law that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden (see Ram Chandra v. Govind, AIR 1975 SC 915 . It has not been disputed by counsel for respondents 3 and 4 that these respondents have not been nominated by five representatives who may have been duly elected as contemplated by cl. 2 (1) (i) (b) of the Order aforesaid. Apparently, therefore, they were not entitled to represent those workmen who were earlier represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh and the order of respondent No. 1 taking a contrary view cannot be sustained. 13. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to this extent that the impugned order dated 31st Aug. 1978, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, respondent No. 1, in so far as it holds that respondents 3 and 4 are entitled to represent the workmen who were previously represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh is quashed. The interim order is vacated. It would be open to those workmen who were earlier represented by the Textile Udyog Karmachari Sangh to make a fresh application to respondent No. 1 in regard to their representation before the said respondent in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.