JUDGMENT Hari Lal Agrawal, J. This application is directed against an order of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge holding that the plaintiff's suit abated under Section 4 (1) (c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the petitioner challenges this order on the ground that the nature of the suit a such that it was not hit by the mischief of Section 4 (1) (c) of the Act. 2. It appears that on an earlier occasion some of the parties to the suit fought a litigation up to this court in Second Appeal No. 775 of 1965 which ended into a compromise. The present suit has been filed by opposite party nos. 1 and 2 for a declaration that the said compromise decree was null & void & not binding on them. During the pendency of this litigation, the plaintiffs made a gift to the petitioner who had already made an application for his addition as a co-plaintiff in the court below, on the ground of devolution of interest in his favour. That petition was allowed by the court below on the 7th April, 1976 and accordingly, the petitioner has challenged the order making the original plaintiffs as opposite parties. Section 4 (1) (c) of the Act lays down that every proceedings for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal etc., shall stand abated. On the basis of this provision, it was contended by Mr. Kumar Brajendra Nath for the petitioner that inasmuch as the only relief that the plaintiffs sought fn the suit was for it declaration that the compromise decree aforesaid was void, the court below was not called upon on the facts of this case to decide any question of correction of records, muchless declaration of any rights or interest in the land. 3. 3. It is no doubt true that some allegations have been made in the plaint of the present suit and one of the grounds advanced by the plaintiffs for challenging the compromise decree is the right of one of the parties to enter into the compromise and as it was also contended on the basis of the said allegation by the learned counsel for the opposite party, that the 'suit was hit by the mischief of Section 4 (1) (c) of the Act, having given my anxious consideration to the situation arising in this case, I am of the opinion, that inasmuch as the grounds for setting aside a compromise decree under the provisions of order 23 are very much limited, the court below is not very much concerned in this case with the -circumstances enumerated in clause (c) of Section 4 (1) of the Act, as mentioned above -It may well be that if the plaintiffs succeed in getting the declaration, then the second appeal will become at large and all those questions may perhaps become open for decision. But the suit constituted as it is, at the moment is not covered by the mischief of Section 4 (1) (c) of the Act. I would accordingly, in disagreement with the view of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge that indirectly the questions of title was involved in the suit, allow this application and set aside the order. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Application allowed