ORDER A.N. Verma, J. - This is a tenant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against orders passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 disposing of an application under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in favour of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal, releasing the accommodation in dispute in favour of the said respondent. 2. The relevant facts as found by the learned III Additional District Judge, Allahabad, respondent No. 1 are these : The respondent No 4 Lucknow Diocesan Trust Association (hereinafter referred to as the Trust) owned certain properties comprising a compound consisting of various residential quarters called "Divinity Compound" 8, Kamla Nehru Road, Allahabad. The petitioners were tenants of the said Trust occupying different quarters in the aforesaid compound. The Trust entered into an agreement for sale of the aforesaid property In favour of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal, respondent No 1 in March 1963. It has been found that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal paid the entire consideration, namely, Rs. 9,970, which was the consideration agreed to between the parties for sale of the said property to the Trust, and the latter in its turn delivered possession of the property to Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal in pursuance of the agreement to sell the said property in favour of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal. In confirmation of this agreement, the Trust wrote letters to the tenants to pay the rent to Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal, whereupon the tenants started paving rent to Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal. Subsequently, a formal agreement in writing was also executed by the Trust on 18-11-76. This should be more appropriately called a memorandum inasmuch as it only reiterates that the trust has in pursuance of the agreement to sell the property accepted the aforesaid sum as the entire consideration for the sale of the property on 1-3-63 from Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal and handed over possession of the said property to her as a result of which, she had become entitled to manage the property as owner thereof, collect rent from the tenants, admit new tenants, evict existing tenants, repair, demolish or reconstruct the building, and do all that a full owner could do in regard to the property in question. Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal filed an application under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act for the eviction of the petitioner claiming to be the (land) lady by virtue of the aforesaid agreement and praying for release of the accommodation in occupation of the petitioners on the ground that her husband was due to retire, as a consequence of which the official quarter given to her husband by his employers, namely Indian Railways, would have to be vacated resulting in great hardship, as she had no other accommodation, wherein she might shift. 3. The above application was resisted by the petitioners inter alia ,on the ground that Sharimati Phoolmani Devi had not yet become the landlady, as legally the property had not vested in her. 4. The Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court dismissed the application of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal on the ground that the application was premature, as her husband has not till then retired Both the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court, however, recorded finding that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal was in law the landlady If the accommodation in question. 5. Aggrieved, Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal filed a writ petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 59 of 1976 which was dismissed by a learned Judge of this Court on 14-4-77 on the ground that the application of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal was premature. The finding of the Appellate Court that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal was the landlady of the accommodation in dispute was, however, upheld by this Court in the said writ petition. Thereupon, the petitioner filed the present application under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act on 19-8-77 with the assertion that her husband had retired from Railway service on 30-11-76, that he had been served with a notice to vacate the Railway quarters, that as her husband had ceased to be in employment, the Railway Authorities were charging exorbitant rent on account of his continued occupation which she and her husband could ill-afford to pay, that she had no other accommodation wherein she might think of shifting that her need is genuine and extremely pressing and certainly greater than that of the petitioners. 6. The above application was again contested by the petitioners on more or less the same grounds. 6. The above application was again contested by the petitioners on more or less the same grounds. The petitioners again raised the plea that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal had not become the owner or landlady of the accommodation in dispute, that though Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal was realising rent from the tenants (petitioners) she was doing so not in her own right as owner and landlady but as the agent of the Trust which is the true owner of the accommodation. The Trust was also made a party to this application of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal. The Trust filed a written statement and admitted that it had received the entire consideration and put Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal in possession over the property as far back as 1963 in part performance of the con- tract, that it had no concern with the management and affairs of the property, and that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal was realising rent in her own right and not as its agent. 7. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal and held that she was the landlady entitled to the release of the accommodation in question and also entitled to file an application under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act, and that her need was more pressing than that of the petitioners. 8. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed three separate appeals which have all been disposed of by a common judgment dated 14-10-1978 by the learned III Additional District Judge, Allahabad. The learned District Judge dismissed all the three appeals and concurred with the finding of the Prescribed Authority. The learned District Judge upon an elaborate discussion of the evidence on record held that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal was a landlady within the meaning of the aforesaid Act entitled to file an application under Section 21 of the Act, that she was realising rent in her own right and not as an agent of the Trust, that all the ingredients of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act have been established in the present case as a result of which legally Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is entitled to occupy the accommodation in her own right. 9. As regards comparative hardship, the learned District Judge has held that the need of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is genuine, bonafide and more pressing than that of the tenants. It is against the last two orders passed by respondent Nos. 9. As regards comparative hardship, the learned District Judge has held that the need of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is genuine, bonafide and more pressing than that of the tenants. It is against the last two orders passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that this writ petition is directed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners challenging the correctness and legality of the aforesaid orders, has submitted the following points for my consideration : (1) Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has legally not become the landlady in law as the property in question, has not been transferred in her favour. (2) The transfer of property could take place only through a registered deed of transfer as required under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that the agreement set up by Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal could not legally result in Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal acquiring the rights of a landlady under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. 11. Learned counsel for Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal on the other hand contended that on the facts found by the learned District Judge, Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal must be held to be the landlady of the accommodation in dispute within the meaning of Section 3(j) of the aforesaid Act entitled to file an application under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act. Learned counsel contended that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is not a mere rent collector, but has been found by the courts below to be a person entitled to occupy the accommodation or collect rent thereof in her own right and inasmuch as admittedly Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has been collecting rent from the petitioners, Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is clearly a landlady within the meaning of that term as defined by the aforesaid Act. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no substance in this writ petition. The view taken by the courts below is correct in law and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 13. Before I deal with the legal submission made by the parties I may mention that the findings of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that the need of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is bonafide and genuine, and that her need is more pressing than that of the petitioners was not questioned before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners. However, the concurrent finding recorded by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on this issue appears to be completely unexceptionable in law. 1 and 2 that the need of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is bonafide and genuine, and that her need is more pressing than that of the petitioners was not questioned before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners. However, the concurrent finding recorded by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on this issue appears to be completely unexceptionable in law. Moreover, the question whether her need is genuine or not, is not open to review in a writ petition except on grounds of the impugned orders disclosing errors of law which are apparent on the face of the record. No such error exists in the orders under challenge. Indeed learned counsel for the applicants did not even attempt to question the correctness of the findings of the first two respondents on that issue. 14. In my view, analysing the above submissions of counsel for the parties, the main question which falls for determination is whether on the facts found by the courts below Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is a landlady of the accommodation in dispute. The team 'landlord' has been defined in the Act. The definition is an inclusive one and it reads : "3(j) 'Landlord', in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let would be, payable, and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such person". Section 3 begins by saying : "In this Act unless the context otherwise requires--" Unless, therefore, the context otherwise requires, we have to confine ourselves in finding out whether a person answers the description of a landlord to the meaning given to the word 'landlord' as defined in the Act. We cannot look elsewhere for the definition of the word 'landlord' or landlady' the question, therefore, whether Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has become a full owner or not under the Transfer of Property Act, is in my view, not relevant to the controversy. What has to be seen is whether Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is a person to whom rent is payable. It is not disputed that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has been receiving rent from the petitioners ever since the aforesaid agreement was reached between the Trust and herself in the year 1963. What has to be seen is whether Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is a person to whom rent is payable. It is not disputed that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has been receiving rent from the petitioners ever since the aforesaid agreement was reached between the Trust and herself in the year 1963. It has also been found that the petitioners were inducted as tenants by the Trust prior to the year 1963, but after the year 1963, the petitioners have been paying rent to Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal. The question which next falls for consideration is whether Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has been realising rent in her own right or as agent or attorney of the Trust. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying on two decisions of this court in E. E. Dayal v. Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal reported in 1977 All. L.J. 223 : ( AIR 1977 N.O.C. 37) and Subedar Balwant Singh v. VII Addl. Distt. Judge Bareilly reported in 1978 All L.R 332 : submitted that an agent of the landlord authorised to collect rent has been held not to be entitled to the right conferred upon a landlord under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act. Relying on this position of law as enunciated in the above two 'decisions learned counsel for the petitioners contented that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal might be entitled to collect rent but till she became the owner of the property, she would be deemed to be collecting rent only as an agent of the Trust inasmuch as there has been no transfer of property under the Transfer of Property Act in favour of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal. The argument is misconceived. The mere fact that Sharimati Phoolmani Dayal has not yet become a full owner. of the property by reason of there being no formal deed of transfer executed in her favour, does not lead to the conclusion that she is not capable of realising rent in her own right. In order that a person may be able to realise rent in his own right, it is not necessary that that person should be the full owner of the property For it is not difficult to conceive of cases where a person would be entitled to realise rent in his own right, even though he may not be the full owner of the property. Holders of limited or life estate, mortgages in possession, lessees having a right to sublet, are for example, category of persons entitled to occupy and enjoy the property in their own rights. When this category of persons realises rent, he does so in his own right and on his own account. It can hardly be gainsaid that the above category of persons would consequently fall within the definition of landlords, as persons to whom rent is payable by the tenant in occupation, as these persons do not realise rent as agents, or attorneys of the true owner. Consequently, such persons would be clearly entitled to file an application under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act. 16. In my view the position of a person who takes possession of the property in part performance of a contract for a sale of the said property in his favour fulfilling all the requirements of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act is analogous to the position of holders of a limited or life estates mortgagees in possession, lessees having the right to sublet, for such a person also holds the property in his own right. This right to retain possession rests on the express previsions of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act. If the transferor is debarred from challenging the right of transferring by virtue of the aforesaid provision of Transfer of Property Act to retain possession, much more would be a person who has been inducted as a tenant by the transferor. The petitioners, therefore, cannot urge that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has no right to realise rent, in her own right, and that till a sale deed is executed in her favour, she, will be entitled to realise rent only as the agent of the Trust. The Trust has taken an unambiguous stand that since the year 1963, respondent No. 3 has been realising rent in her own right. This result also flows from the effect of provisions of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act on the rights of the parties. 17. In the case of Prem Chand v. Pushpawati Devi reported in 1977 All Ren. Case 292, a learned Judge of this Court (K.N. Seth. J.) has hell that the provisions of Section 21 of the aforesaid Act can be taken aid of even by a tenant as against his sub-tenant. 17. In the case of Prem Chand v. Pushpawati Devi reported in 1977 All Ren. Case 292, a learned Judge of this Court (K.N. Seth. J.) has hell that the provisions of Section 21 of the aforesaid Act can be taken aid of even by a tenant as against his sub-tenant. It has been held that the benefit conferred on landlords under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act is not limited only to owners of the building. I am in full agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge in that case. If a lessee can be held to have the right of making an application under Section 21 of the Act, I see no reason why a person who has come in possession over the property in part performance of the contract, cannot also make an application under Section 21 of the Act. 18. Therefore, find no substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has no right to make an application under Section 21 of the Act until she becomes full owner of the property. 19. I may now deal with the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In E.E. Dayal v. Smt. Phoolmani Dayal (1977 All L.J. 223) (supra), it has been held by a learned Judge of this Court that a person entitled merely to collect rent, is not entitled to make an application under Section 21 of the aforesaid Act. Incidentally, that was a case between this very landlady and another tenant of hers, namely B.E. Dayal in that case, the Court only had the letter of the Trust addressed to Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal and other tenants wherein Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal had been authorised to collect rent from the tenants. On the basis of the material which was placed on the record in that case, it was held that Shrimati Pnoolmani Dayal was only an agent of the true owner, and therefore, not entitled to make an application under Section 21 of the Act. On the basis of the material which was placed on the record in that case, it was held that Shrimati Pnoolmani Dayal was only an agent of the true owner, and therefore, not entitled to make an application under Section 21 of the Act. In the present case, the landlady Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal filed additional material including the above mentioned written agreement dated 18-11-76 on the basis of which the learned District Judge has held that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has clearly established her right as a transferee entitled to the benefit of Section 53-A of tie Transfer of Property Act as the definition of 'landlord' given in Section 3 (j) itself suggests. In the context of rights conferred under Section 21 of the Act, the view taken by the learned Judge that an agent entitled only to collect rent is not a person competent to make an application under Section 21 of the Act, with respect, appears to be correct. The same view has been taken in the case of Subedar Balwant Singh v. VIII Addl Dist. Judge reported in 1978 All L.R. 332, by Satish Chandra, C.J. However, the position of the agent authorised only to collect rents is materially different from the position of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal who is not only authorised to collect rent but to occupy and enjoy all the rights which the Trust itself possessed in regard to the accommodation in dispute. Consequently the personal privilege which is available to an owner-landlord under Section 21 must he held to be equally available to a person of the description of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are, therefore, clearly distinguishable on facts and are not in any was inconsistent with the view which I am taking in the case. 20. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are, therefore, clearly distinguishable on facts and are not in any was inconsistent with the view which I am taking in the case. 20. In the case of S.M. Gopalkrishna v. Ganeshan Chetty reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1750, their lordships of the Supreme Court constructed the provisions of Section 14 (1) Madras Buildings, Lease and Rent Control Act, 1960, the provisions of which section were more or less similar to the definition of the landlord as given in Section 3 (j) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and held that even a person holding a life interest in the property falls within the definition of the word 'landlord' within the meaning of the aforesaid Act, and the provisions of the said enactment being self-contained and complete Code regulating the rights of a 'landlord' and a tenant as defined in the Act, any controversy as regards the rights and relations between the landlord and a true owner was foreign to the scheme of the Act. All that has to be seen is whether a person who claims to be the landlord has a right to receive rent and to occupy the premises in his own right. The controversy, therefore, whether the rights of Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal have ripened into the rights of a full owner under the Transfer of Property Act is beyond the purview of the Act. It is sufficient that under the aforesaid agreement, she has entered into possession of the property and is entitled to receive rent from the petitioners in her own right and on her own account. That being so, reference to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act by the learned counsel for the petitioners and other contentions to the effect that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has not yet become a full owner appears to be out of place and is not relevant. In my opinion the view taken by the court below that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is the landlady of the accommodation in dispute is correct. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal reported in AIR 1928 Allahabad 726 (26 All. In my opinion the view taken by the court below that Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal is the landlady of the accommodation in dispute is correct. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal reported in AIR 1928 Allahabad 726 (26 All. L. J. 1084), in which it was held that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, delivery of possession means delivery of actual possession and not constructive delivery. This case has absolutely no relevance to the controversy with which we are concerned. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners also faintly argued that the property in question stands over land leased by the Government which lease has expired and hence Shrimati Phoolmani Dayal has no right over the property. In the first place, this question of fact cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in a writ petition, not having been raised in the court below. Secondly, in my view, we are not concerned with the lease-hold rights of the landlords in respect of the land over which the accommodation in dispute is standing. We have to determine the rights of the parties as regards the accommodation. This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners has, therefore, No substance. 23. For the reasons stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed with costs.