ORDER K.P. Singh, J. -This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Deoria camp Shahjahanpur dated 7-9-1974 whereby the revision petitions filed by the contesting parties were decided. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details. there are a number of khatas namely 8, 11, 12 and 13 in respect of which the petitioner had claimed right on the ground that the disputed land is a reserved forest, whereas the contesting opposite parties have claimed bhumidhari and sirdari rights in the disputed land. It is not disputed before me that the disputed land forms part of old plot No. 4. The aforesaid plot No. 4 measures about 300 acres. The contesting opposite parties were claiming about 150 acres land as their bhumidhari due to purchase from the tenure-holders of that area, and the contesting opposite parties were claiming about 150 acres land on the basis of their adverse and continuous possession. 2A. The Consolidation Officer through his judgment dated 23-2-1972 did not accept the claim of the contesting opposite parties and gave judgment for the Forest Department. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Consolidation Officer the contesting opposite parties had preferred appeals and the judgment of the Consolidation Officer was modified as is evident from Annexure 5 attached to the writ petition. Thereafter both the parties preferred revision petitions which were decided through the impugned judgment. The petitioner has come to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the disputed land was held as the property of the petitioner under the provisions of Indian Forests Act, hence the provisions of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings are inapplicable. Secondly he has contended before me that the appellate authority and the revisional court have patently erred in recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of adverse possession. Thirdly he has contended that the contesting opposite parties did not prefer their claim under the provisions of Indian Forests Act. Their right became extinguished under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act. Fourthly he has contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has manifestly erred in ignoring the material evidence adduced by the petitioner and on this ground the learned counsel for the petitioner suggested that the impugned judgment should be quashed. 4. Their right became extinguished under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act. Fourthly he has contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has manifestly erred in ignoring the material evidence adduced by the petitioner and on this ground the learned counsel for the petitioner suggested that the impugned judgment should be quashed. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. He has submitted that the petitioner had also filed objections under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and when the judgments have gone against the petitioner, it is not open to the petitioners to allege that the Act is inapplicable to the disputed land. Secondly he has contended that on the findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority and the revisional court the contesting opposite parties have succeeded in establishing that they have asquired sirdari rights on the basis of their continuous possession and the aforesaid finding is based on evidence on the record and are not amenable to interference in writ jurisdiction. He has further submitted that the petitioner has not produced the final map before the consolidation authorities to indicate that the disputed land belongs to the Forest Department, hence no interference should be made with the impugned judgment and the writ petition should be dismissed. He has further contended that the disputed land being tenancy land of tenure-holders they never vested in She Gaon Sabha or Forest Department, and the petitioner has utterly failed to show that the disputed land had vested in the Forest Department, hence the writ petition should be dismissed. 5. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. 6. As regards the petitioners contention that the provisions of the U P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are not attracted since the disputed land was held as the property of Forest Department, in the proceedings under the Forests Act, I think that the aforesaid plea is not open to the petitioner. The petitioner had filed an objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and when its claim has not been recognised qua a portion of the disputed land, it cannot assail the judgment on the ground that the provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act were inapplicable. 7. The petitioner had filed an objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and when its claim has not been recognised qua a portion of the disputed land, it cannot assail the judgment on the ground that the provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act were inapplicable. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the appellate authority and the revisional court have patently erred in recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of adverse possession. 8. It is noteworthy that the provisions of S. 210 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act have been recently amended and have been given retrospective effect. In this view of the matter the contesting opposite parties cannot acquire sirdari rights in the disputed land. 9. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted before me that the judgment under challenge was given at a time when there was no amendment, hence in writ jurisdiction the impugned judgment cannot be interfered with on the basis of a subsequent amendment. He has invited my attention to the ruling reported in AIR 1977 All 408 , Gopi Nath Goel v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Meerut, wherein a Division Bench of this Court has observed that if a judgment was in conformity with law prevailing at that time, it cannot be said to suffer from any error of law apparent on the face of the record merely because the law has been changed with retrospective effect subsequent to that judgment. 10. No doubt the aforesaid observations support the contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties, but it is noteworthy that the learned Judges who decided the aforesaid case have expressed themselves in 1978 (U. P.) R. C. C. 223, Mukhtar Ahmad v. Additional District Judge and the relevant paragraphs of their judgment are as below:- Para. 8. "Sri S.P. Shrivastava learned counsel for the applicants contended that in holding that a decision in an appeal cannot be said to suffer from any manifest error on account of any subsequent change in law, we have overlooked the following observation of Gajen-dragadkar, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the court in M. Venkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1958 SC 875 ), "prima facie it may appear somewhat strange that an order which was good and valid when it was made should be treated as patently invalid and wrong by virtue of the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. But such a result is necessarily involved in the legal fiction about the retrospective operation of the amendment Act." Para. 9. "In Selection Committee for admission to the Medical and Dental College Bangalore v. M. P. Nagraj. (AIR 1972 Mys 44), a Division Bench of Karnatak High Court of which one of us was a member held that where a decision of court overlooks a ruling of the Supreme Court there arises an error apparent on the face of the record. Justifying review of the decision which is contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court in view of the aforesaid decision it is clear that our orders in Civil Misc. Writ No. 366 of 1976: (Reported in AIR 1977 All 408 ) which overlooked the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court and is contrary to it suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of it (our orders)." In view of the aforesaid observations I think that the view of this Court, it appears, is that if the order of a subordinate authority is patently erroneous by virtue of retrospective operation of the amendment of the Act, the judgment can be quashed in writ petition. During the course of the arguments I had suggested to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that prima facie his submissions were not acceptable to me and now I am fortified by the opinion of the Judges whose decision was relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties to substantiate his claim that in writ petition if the order was good according to law on the date of decision should not be interfered with in extraordinary powers of this Court. 11. As regards the petitioners contention that the right of the tenure-holders became extinguished as they had not filed their claims before the Forest authorities, it is sufficient to mention that it is for the petitioner to establish beyond doubt that the tenancy land of a tenant had been validly acquired by the petitioner. 11. As regards the petitioners contention that the right of the tenure-holders became extinguished as they had not filed their claims before the Forest authorities, it is sufficient to mention that it is for the petitioner to establish beyond doubt that the tenancy land of a tenant had been validly acquired by the petitioner. In this connection I would like to mention that if a particular piece r land is a tenancy land and not in the nature of a forest it cannot be validly acquired by the petitioner and in this connection the ruling reported in AIR 1977 All 192 , State of U. P. v. Mahant Avaidh Nath should be kept in view. 11A. Since 1 have indicated above that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has committed an error in recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of adverse possession in 100 acres of land as according to the amended law the contesting opposite parties cannot acquire sirdari rights in the aforesaid area, I think it proper to quash the impugned judgment and ask the Deputy Director of Consolidation to re-examine the claim of the contesting opposite parties in the light of the observations made above. 12. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that material evidence has been ignored by the Deputy Director of Consolidation I would like to point out that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while re-examining the claim of the contesting opposite parties would pay heed to the contention of the petitioner whether material evidence exists on the record to justify the claim of the petitioner. 13. As regards the contention raised on behalf of the contesting opposite parties that the writ petition should be dismissed as the petitioner has failed to establish that the disputed land had been validly acquired by the petitioner. Prima facie the petitioner has acquired right in the disputed land due to notification under Section 20 of the Indian Forests Act; but as I am sending the case back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for re-examining the claim of the contesting opposite parties based on adverse possession I permit the contesting opposite parties to take up all legal pleas open to him and the Deputy Director of Consolidation shall re-examine them in accordance with law. 14. 14. Since the disputed land consists of tenancy plots as well as Parti, Forest, Nadi etc. it would not be proper for me to throw the writ petition on the objection raised by the contesting opposite parties. The contentions raised on behalf of the contesting opposite parties centre round the questions of fact which should be determined before his contentions may be accepted, hence I have left the question open to be decided by the Deputy Director of Consolidation first. 15. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment is hereby quashed and the Deputy Director of Consolidation is directed to decide the claims of the parties in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.