JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal Member. - This is a second appeal against the Judgment and decree dated October 15, 1973 of Shri M. Saidhullah, Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, setting aside the decree of the Assistant Collector First Class, Farrukhabad dated December 19, 1972 in a suit under Section 229-B, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The appellants, Tej Ram and others, sons of Rupa, filed a suit seeking declaration of their Sirdari rights over certain plots claiming to be the grandfather's son's sons and the only heirs of the original tenure holder Raja Ram. The suit was contested by Ahibaran Singh, respondent No. 1, who claimed to be the Sirdar of the land being the adopted son of Raja Ram. The trial court decree the suit. Ahibaran Singh filed an appeal, and the lower appellate court has set aside the decree of the trial court. Tej Ram and his brothers have now come up in second appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants has challenged the theory of adoption of the defendant-respondent by the original tenure-holder Raja Ram. According to him, the whole theory was cooked up for the purpose of taking the cultivation and in fact there was no adoption under the law. Also, the respondent had failed to prove the ceremonies of giving and taking for the purpose of adoption. Further even in the Khatauni of 1378 to 1380 Fasli the name of Dharamjit, the natural father of the respondent No. 1, was recorded and this clearly falsifies the case of the respondent. Also, no independent witness had deposed about the fact of giving and taking, and the evidence of the Pandit and Nai was unreliable. 5. These contention s of the learned counsel must be upheld. No adoption deed has been filed and the theory of adoption rests entirely on oral evidence. Unfortunately for the respondents, where the oral evidence of the plaintiff-appellants is categorical that there was no adoption the evidence of the respondent on this point is contradictory. These contradictions have been brought out in the Judgment of the trial court and have been overlooked by the lower appellate court. Unfortunately for the respondents, where the oral evidence of the plaintiff-appellants is categorical that there was no adoption the evidence of the respondent on this point is contradictory. These contradictions have been brought out in the Judgment of the trial court and have been overlooked by the lower appellate court. Thus, D.W. 1, Dharmajit, the natural father of the respondent Ahibaran Singh, says that the ceremonies connected with adoption had taken place at 6.00 or 9.00 A.M. and that had preceded the actual ceremonies of adoptions. He also says that the adoption took place on Jestha Dassehara day. D.W. 2, Mansa Ram, however, says that the adoption ceremony took place on 'Jestha Poornima', which is quite different from Jestha Dassahara. D.W. 3 Chiraunji Lal says that the adoption ceremony took place at 3.00 of 4.00 P.M. (and not at 8.00 or 9.00 A.M. as stated by the D.W. 1). D.W. 5, Jagannath is quite silent about the 'Havan' and had said that Dharamjit had handed over his son to Raja Ram and a feast had followed, nothing more was done. D.W. - Ram Swarup goes one better and filed his affidavit stating that his statement was obtained under pressure by Dharamjit. (The natural father of Ahibaran Singh). The learned Additional Commissioner had thus erred in misreading the evidence and in omitting to consider the material evidence, and his finding that there was an adoption is quite perverse. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants has also assailed the Judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner on the point of possession. The learned Additional Commissioner has held that the extract from the Khatauni of 1306 Fasli prove the possession of Ahibaran Singh. This is a peculiar observation as Ahibaran Singh had not even been born in 1306 Fasli. Further, it is the defendant-respondent's own case that he is not natural descendant but came into the family by adoption. Thus, even if Himachal (Father's brother of Raja Ram) and one Laxman were recorded in the Khatauni of 1306 Fasli, this does not in any way prove the possession of the respondent. The learned Additional Commissioner has also erred in discarding the entry in the Khatauni of 1359 Fasli on the ground that it pertained to the land situated in district Hardoi. Hardoi and Farrukhabad are adjoining districts and the extract from the Khatauni is relevant for the purpose of proving the pedigrees. The learned Additional Commissioner has also erred in discarding the entry in the Khatauni of 1359 Fasli on the ground that it pertained to the land situated in district Hardoi. Hardoi and Farrukhabad are adjoining districts and the extract from the Khatauni is relevant for the purpose of proving the pedigrees. The entry shows that Himachal, Sumer and Rupa were the sons of Makka as claimed by the plaintiff appellants. The most serious error is that the learned Additional Commissioner has ignored the finding on possession which had been recorded in proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P.C. while this finding is not material for the purpose of title, it is certainly material for the purpose of proving possession. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the lower appellate court has not even discussed the arguments of the counsel of his clients and has not applied his mind to evidence of the parties, the lower appellate court has not done so and has yet reversed the finding. This contention must be upheld. It is a settled principle of law that where the first appellate court reverses the finding of the trial court, it must critically examine the entire evidence afresh and not merely refer to it in a cursory manner. Unfortunately this is the case. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to Rajpat v. Balikaran, 1957 R.D. 321, in which the following observations have been made: "Unless I am much mistaken, this case is illustrative of the hurry and the lack of care shown not unoften by Additional Commissioners in setting aside trial court's findings of fact. There may be some excuse for not examining a matter with all possible care when it is intended to uphold an order. When, however, an order allowing an appeal is to be passed it becomes extremely important that the trial court's finding should receive the fullest consideration and the findings should not be set aside without weightier reasons being given that those which are to be found stated in the Judgment of the trial court examined. I have very little doubt in my mind that the trial court examined the case with more care and more comprehensively than did the Additional Commissioner. I am most reluctant to interfere with a finding of fact unless. I have very little doubt in my mind that the trial court examined the case with more care and more comprehensively than did the Additional Commissioner. I am most reluctant to interfere with a finding of fact unless. I am satisfied that it is perverse and wholly contrary to the weight of the evidence on record. If, however, a second appeal comes involving a finding of fact and the finding is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence on record the finding has to the interfered with and the correct findings of the trial court have to be restored." 8. The same principle has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.D. Gopalan v. Commr. H.R. and C.E. Madras, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1716 in which the following observations have been made: "We apprehend that the uniform practice in the matter of evidence has been that if the trial Court has given cogent and detailed reasons for not accepting the testimony of a witness the appellate Court in all fairness to it ought to deal with those reasons before proceeding to form a contrary opinion and accepting the testimony which has been rejected by the trial court." 9. This principle has also been followed by the Board of Revenue in Raghubit v. Chhedi, 1972 R.D. 252 in which the following observations have been made: "Apparently, the learned lower appellate court in its anxiety to quickly dispose of the case did not very much care to go to deep into the various points which presented themselves for a decision. It must be emphasized here that there should be no hurry to rush through the matter and conveniently avoid proper evaluation of material points in dispute in adjudicating rights of the parties, more so when facts and evidence could no longer be questioned in subsequent stages of the litigation. The courts of first appeal, therefore, have an important and vital function to perform in finally shifting facts and evidence as their findings of facts are final. This responsibility can only be squarely discharged when they apply themselves earnestly and devote greater time and attention to the consideration of the points in issue." 10. On the question of adoption, the learned counsel for the appellants has cited the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Kishori Lal v. Mst. Chaitibai, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 504 which lays down the following test. On the question of adoption, the learned counsel for the appellants has cited the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Kishori Lal v. Mst. Chaitibai, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 504 which lays down the following test. "As an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicions of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. Failure to produce accounts, in circumstances such as have been proved in the present case, would be a very suspicious circumstance." 11. "It is quite clear that the evidence of the defendant respondent in the instant case fails to pass the above test. The theory of adoption thus falls through and the lower appellate court's finding to the contrary is illegal, perverse and based on misreading of evidence. The trial court's finding that the adoption was not proved is based on a proper judicial consideration of the evidence. 12. The trial court has held that the plaintiff appellants are the father's father's sons of Raja Ram and are his heirs. unfortunately, the lower appellate court has not even considered this aspect as if it was irrelevant. However, the plaintiff-appellants' case was based on this assumption and the lower appellate court has clearly gone astray in not considering it. On this point also the trial court's finding in favour of the plaintiff-appellants is sound and is based on a detailed discussion and scrutiny of the oral and documentary evidence. 13. On the point of possession also the trial court's finding is in favour of the plaintiff-appellants. The lower appellate court has failed to consider this point and has not recorded any clear cut finding as to who was in possession of the land. I see no reasons to discard the finding of the trial court on the point of possession. 14. The result is that the lower appellate court's Judgment suffers from serious errors and cannot be sustained. I hereby allow this second appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate court and restore the order of the trial court.