JUDGMENT Satyeshwar Roy, J. The petitioner-opposite party No, 1 in Succession Certificate case No. 18 of 1970 of the Court of the 3rd Additional District Judge, Chaibasa filed under Section 372 of the Indian succession Act (hereinafter called as "the Succession Act") has filed this application against the order dated the 15th September, 1971 by which the court below has held that the application filed by opposite party-petitioner was not hit by the provision of section 87-B of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter called as "the Code"). 2. Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Deo was recognised as the Ex-ruler of Seraikela Princely State by the President of India. His eldest son, Tikayat Nripendra Narayan Singh Deo predeceased him and according to the custom prevalent in that family the petitioner being the eldest male member of the eldest son of the ex-ruler succeeded Raja Aditya. Raja Aditya had intermediary interest in the district of Singhbhum which vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. (hereinafter called as "the Act"), The compensation payable to the ex-intermediary under the Act was prepared in the name of Raja Aditya but before any payment could be made, he died and, therefore, the application in question was filed by some of the heirs for a Succession certificate in respect of the amount payable as compensation to Raja Aditya under the Act. 3. The petitioner, who is the opposite party No. 1 in the court below, challenged the maintainability of the application in question on the ground that he being the ex-ruler, the application was not maintainable in view of the absence of the consent of the Central Government as provided under section 86 read with Section 87B of the Code. The learned court below after hearing both the parties, held that section 87-B of the Code had no application in the present case and by the impugned order rejected the objection filed by the petitioner. 4. The only question involved in this application is whether the petitioner could claim protection provided to an ex-ruler under Section 87-B of the Code. It was stated at the Bar that there is no decision of this court regarding the question involved in this application Section 87-8 (i) of the Code runs thus :- “(1). 4. The only question involved in this application is whether the petitioner could claim protection provided to an ex-ruler under Section 87-B of the Code. It was stated at the Bar that there is no decision of this court regarding the question involved in this application Section 87-8 (i) of the Code runs thus :- “(1). The provisions of Section 85 and of sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 36 shall apply in relation to the Rulers of any former Indian State as they apply in relation to the Ruler of a foreign State”. It is, therefore, necessary to look to Section 86 (1) of the Code which only is relevant for this case. Section 86 (1) of the Code reads as follows: “Suits against foreign Rulers, Ambassadors and Envoys- (1) No Ruler of a foreign State may be sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to the Government; Provided that a person may as a tenant of immovable property, sue without such consent as aforesaid a Ruler from whom he holds or claims to hold the property”. Section 86 (1) of the Code provides that without the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government no ex-ruler could be sued in a Court by a suit. 5. Shri N. N. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended that the word "suit" in Section 86 of the Code not only includes suit which is instituted by filing a plaint under Section 26 of the Code but also petitions which are required to be verified in the manner as provided in the Code. Section 372 of the Act provides for filing application to a District Judge for a Succession certificate. That Section, inter alia, provides that such petition shall be signed and verified by or on behalf of the applicant in the manner prescribed by the Code for the signing and verification of a plaint by or on behalf of a plaintiff. He further contended that as the petition contemplated under section 372 of the Act requires to be signed and verified like a plaint, the petition is analogous to a plaint and the proceedings arising out of that must be deemed to be analogous to a suit. He further contended that as the petition contemplated under section 372 of the Act requires to be signed and verified like a plaint, the petition is analogous to a plaint and the proceedings arising out of that must be deemed to be analogous to a suit. In support of his contention that a suit may be instituted not only by filing a plaint but by filing an application in the nature of a plaint, Sri Roy relied in the case of H. H. The Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singhb Bahadur of Udaypur Vrs. The State of Rajasthan and others. That case arose out of an appeal filed by an ex-ruler of Udaipur challenging the reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act on the ground that the reference was not maintainable in view of absence of the consent of the Central Government as provided under Section 87-B read with Section 86 of the Code. The contention raised on behalf of the ex-ruler of Udaipur was repelled. It was held that the proceedings which does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of a plaint would prima facie not be regarded as falling within Section 86 of the Code. Shri Roy strongly relied on the observation of the Supreme Court which is as follows : “A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of plaint.....” (emphasis added) and submitted that petition under the Succession Act as required to be verified in the manner prescribed in the Code for verification of plaint shall be deemed to be “petition in the nature of plaint”. What the Supreme Court meant is that there may be petition in the nature of plaint. But the question to be decided in this case is whether the petition filed under section 372 of the Succession Act can be treated as “petition in the nature of plaint”. In my opinion, the observation of the Supreme Court does not support the contention of Shri Roy. Order VII, rule 1 of the Code lays down the particulars to be stated in the application. The particulars required to be given under Section 372 of the Succession Act are certainly not similar to those required to be given under Order VII, rule 1 of the Code. 6. Order VII, rule 1 of the Code lays down the particulars to be stated in the application. The particulars required to be given under Section 372 of the Succession Act are certainly not similar to those required to be given under Order VII, rule 1 of the Code. 6. Shri Roy contended that proceedings under Probate and Administration Act shall be a suit and therefore, proceeding for succession certificate shall also be deemed to be a suit. Shri Roy refereed to the case of Sufal Bala Shahu Vrs. Saila Bala Dasi. In that case question arose as to whether a proceeding under Probate and Administration Act shall be deemed to be a suit in the sense in which the word has been used in Probate and Administration Act and Bengal Regulation, 1893. With reference to that Act and Regulation it was held that a proceeding under Probate and Administration Act shall be deemed to be a suit. That case has no application to the present case. 7. Shri Roy then contended that the provision of Section 141 of the Code has been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Section 141 of the Code reads thus: “The procedure provided in this code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction”. Plain reading of Section 141 of the Code will show that the procedure of the Code has been made applicable to a proceeding other than suit in any court of civil jurisdiction, procedure only shall therefore, apply in such cases and not any substantive right which has been given in the Code unless it has been made so applicable in a proceeding other than a suit. Appeal for instance is substantive right. Section 384 of the Succession Act provides for preferring an appeal from the order of a District Judge granting, refusing or revoking a certificate if the whole Code was applicable to all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction, then there was no necessity for making provision for appeal in Section 384 of the Act. Section 87-B read with section 86 of the Code is substantive right and in my opinion by the terms, of Section 141 of the Code it has no application in a proceeding arising out of an application under section 372 of the Succession Act. Section 87-B read with section 86 of the Code is substantive right and in my opinion by the terms, of Section 141 of the Code it has no application in a proceeding arising out of an application under section 372 of the Succession Act. Shri Roy in support of his contention that provisions of Section 87-B of the Code shall apply to the present application relied on the case of Ramji Sao and others Vrs. Most Jageshwari and other. In that case applicability of Section 87-B was not in issue and the decision therefore has no application to the present case. 8. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party referred to the case of Indrajit Singhji Vijaysinghji Vrs. Rajendrashinghji. In that case petition for grant of Letters of Administration with Will annexed was filed in the Bombay High Court by the third son of late Maharaja of Rajpipla. The ex-ruler of Rajpipla filed Caveat supported by an affidavit and under the Rules of the Bombay High Court the petition was converted into a suit. It was contended on behalf of the ex-ruler that in view of the provision of Section 87-B read with section 86 of the Code the suit was not maintainable. It was held that the application filed under the Act or petitions which are filed under the Act and registered as suit because of the High Court Rules cannot be deemed to be a suit as envisaged in Section 86 of the Code. In that case the implication of Section 141 of the Code to a proceeding other than a suit was also considered. It was held that Section 87-B of the Code will apply to suits instituted in the manner laid down in the Code. I respectfully agree with the law laid down in that case and applying the same to the present case, it must be held that Section 87-B of the Code has no application to an application filed under Section 372 of the Succession Act. 9. It is relevant to notice section 387 of the Succession Act. I respectfully agree with the law laid down in that case and applying the same to the present case, it must be held that Section 87-B of the Code has no application to an application filed under Section 372 of the Succession Act. 9. It is relevant to notice section 387 of the Succession Act. Section 387 of the Act reads as follows : “No decision under this Part upon any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or any other proceeding between the same parties and nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debt or security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to account there for to the person lawfully entitled there to.” Therefore, the decision of a court as to any question of right between the parties in a proceeding under this part i.e. Part X is in no way final between the parties and does not bar the trial of the same question in any other legal proceedings between the same parties. If the proceeding in question under the Succession Act is a suit then the decision to any question of right between the parties shall have to be treated to be final. But the Succession Act itself lays down in Section 387 that it shall not be treated as final. Moreover, Section 387 of the Act provides that the question involved in a proceeding under the Act can be a subject matter of a trial in a suit. It follows, therefore that a proceeding under part X of the Act cannot be treated as a suit. The contention of Shri Roy that the proceeding in question is a suit fails. 10. In the result, the application is dismissed with cost assessed at Rs. 100/-. Application dismissed.