JUDGMENT : V.K. Mehrotra, J. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution assails an order dated March 8, 1977 of the Rent Control Tribunal, Kanpur passed on an application moved by the present Petitioner u/s 21 read with Section 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The Petitioner seeks quashing of the order aforesaid as also some other reliefs. 2. The Petitioner is the owner landlady of premises No. 98/129, Beconganj, Kanpur of which Mohd. Matin, the third Respondent, is a tenant. The Petitioner made an application u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act III of 1947) for permission to sue the tenant Respondent for his eviction from the premises, inter alia, on the ground that she needed the said premises for her own use and that her need was bonafide, genuine and greater than that of the tenant-Respondent who could conveniently shift to the alternative accommodation in his possession. The tenant-Respondent resisted the application on various grounds and by his order dated December 27, 1971, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer (Addl. District Magistrate, Rationing), Kanpur rejected the application. The Petitioner challenged that order in a revision u/s 3(3) of U.P. Act III of 1947 which was subsequently transferred for disposal to the court of the Addl. District Judge, Kanpur in accordance with Section 43(2)(m) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 which had, in the meanwhile, been enforced. The learned Judge differed from the view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and after comparing the need of the parties and the likely hardship to be caused to them eventually came to the conclusion that the premises were needed bonafide by the Petitioner whose need was greater than that of the tenant-Respondent. By his order dated April 27, 1973, the learned Additional District Judge, set aside that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and directed that the premises in dispute shall stand released in favour of the Petitioner. The tenant-Respondent challenged that order before this Court in writ petition No. 2251 of 1973 which was, however, dismissed by a learned single Judge on March 13, 1975. Special Appeal No. 100 of 1975, in which the tenant-Respondent assailed the judgment of the learned single Judge, was also dismissed by a Division Bench on March 29, 1976. The tenant-Respondent challenged that order before this Court in writ petition No. 2251 of 1973 which was, however, dismissed by a learned single Judge on March 13, 1975. Special Appeal No. 100 of 1975, in which the tenant-Respondent assailed the judgment of the learned single Judge, was also dismissed by a Division Bench on March 29, 1976. The tenant-Respondent unsuccessfully sought a certificate from this Court under Article 133 of the Constitution. His application in this regard was dismissed on April 20, 1976. Thereafter the present Petitioner filed an application u/s 21 read with Section 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act XII of 1972 on July 29/30, 1976 for obtaining possession of the premises in dispute which was, however, dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal, Kanpur by its order dated March 8, 1977 impugned in the present petition and of which a copy has been filed as Annexure 14' to the writ petition. 3. The application of the Petitioner has been dismissed by the Tribunal basically on the ground that the provisions of Section 43(2)(rr) were not applicable to the instant case and that in any case, the application was barred by limitation both under the proviso to that section as also under Rule 18 of the Rules framed u/s 41 of the Act read with Section 34(8) thereof. The Tribunal was further of opinion that the Prescribed Authority could be invited to satisfy himself afresh about the existence of any of the grounds specified in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 by the landlady on an application u/s 21 of the Act made within the time permissible in law and that she could not seek the eviction of the tenant-Respondent from the premises in dispute on the basis of the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge by moving an application u/s 43(2)(rr) of the Act. 4. The submission of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner principally is that in the circumstances of the instant case and having regard to the orders actually passed by this Court earlier, the view taken by the Tribunal as aforesaid, was patently erroneous and that the Petitioner was entitled to be put into possession of the disputed premises on the basis of the order passed in her favour by the Additional District Judge in proceedings initiated by the Petitioner u/s 43(2)(rr) of the Act. The argument also is that having regard to the period for which the proceedings for eviction of the tenant-Respondent remained stayed under orders of appropriate authorities or courts, the application made by the Petitioner u/s 43(2)(rr) of the Act was well within limitation contemplated by that provision or by Rule 18 of the Rules. 5. The Learned Counsel for the tenant Respondent, on the other hand, tried to canvass the correctness of the view taken by the Tribunal and has in this regard, submitted that the order of the learned Additional District Judge passed in an application u/s 3 of U.P. Act III of 1947 upon transfer of the pending revision to him u/s 43(2)(m) could not be treated to be an order u/s 21 thereof; that in any case the application made by the Petitioner was barred by limitation, particularly, under Rule 18 of the Rules; that permission having been granted not by any authority under U.P. Act III of 1947 but by the Additional District Judge subsequent to the repeal of that Act, the summary procedure contemplated by Section 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was not available to the Petitioner; that the finding regarding bonafide need of the Petitioner and about the comparative hardship likely to be caused to her and to the tenant-Respondent had to be gone into once again before the eviction of the tenant-Respondent could be sought by recourse to Section 43(2)(rr) and that, in any case, the order of the Tribunal impugned in the present writ petition, could be challenged by the Petitioner in an appeal u/s 22 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 so that the present writ petition is not maintainable on that account. 6. We may at the outset deal with the submission of the Learned Counsel for the tenant-Respondent regarding the maintainability of the present petition. Section 22 of the 1972 Act provides, that any person aggrieved by an order u/s 21 or Section 24 may within thirty days from the date of the order prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge, and in other respects, the provision of Section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such appeal. The order impugned in the present writ petition admittedly is not one u/s 21 or Section 24 of the Act. The order impugned in the present writ petition admittedly is not one u/s 21 or Section 24 of the Act. It is in the nature of an enforcement of eviction order which has not been made appealable. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy to the Petitioner. 7. Section 43 of the 1972 Act provides in detail about the continuance or otherwise of proceedings initiated under the provisions of U.P. Act III of 1947 and pending immediately before the commencement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. Clause (m) of Sub-section (2) of that section provides in express terms that any revision relating to the grant of permission u/s 3 of the old Act pending immediately before the commencement of the Act before the Commissioner shall stand transferred to the District Judge, and his decision shall be final. It is undisputed that the revision filed by the Petitioner u/s 3(3) of U.P. Act III of 1947 against the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer refusing permission to sue the tenant-Respondent for his eviction was pending on the date of the commencement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. By operation of law, therefore, it stood transferred for disposal to the District Judge and was eventually decided by the Additional District Judge. The Petitioner's prayer for the grant of permission having been rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the revision related to permission u/s 3 of the old Act. The order passed in that revision by the Additional District Judge was in the nature of grant of permission referred to u/s 3 of the old Act to the Petitioner on one of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the 1972 Act, having been granted on the basis that the Petitioner required the premises in dispute bonafide and that the refusal of permission to her was likely to cause greater hardship to her. The order passed by the Additional District Judge in this regard was upheld by this Court in earlier writ petition No. 2951 of 1973 and Special Appeal No. 100 of 1975. The order passed by the Additional District Judge in this regard was upheld by this Court in earlier writ petition No. 2951 of 1973 and Special Appeal No. 100 of 1975. This court repelled the submission made on behalf of the tenant-Respondent that the order of the Additional District Judge could only be treated to be grant of permission u/s 3 of the old Act necessitating the filing of a suit for ejectment and could not amount to an order of release u/s 21 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 so as to become executable under the provisions of that Act. In the words of the Bench deciding the Special Appeal, “In case the Appellant (tenant-Respondent) does not vacate the accommodation in question in obedience to the impugned order the Respondent No. 3 (the Petitioner) will necessarily have to take recourse to proceedings under the new Act for the implementation of the said order. The error pointed out by the Learned Counsel is thus, in our opinion, only in regard to the form of the order and does not in any way relate to the substance of the matter....” From these observations, it is clear that inter-parties there is a decision of this Court which has become final between them and is to the effect that the order of the Additional District Judge could be implemented by the present Petitioner by taking proceedings under the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. In this view of the matter, it is not open to the tenant-Respondent to raise objection to the executability of the order of the Additional District Judge by recourse to proceeding u/s 43(2)(rr) of the Act on the footing that it was not in the nature of an order to which the provisions of the aforesaid section were applicable. In any case, we are of opinion that on the clear phraseology of Section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act the order of the Additional District Judge can be given effect to by recourse to proceedings under that section in the circumstance of the instant case wherein it amounts to permission of a nature referred to in Section 3 of the old Act and has been obtained on a ground specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the new Act and has become final after the commencement of the said Act. 8. 8. It has been urged on behalf of the tenant-Respondent that the decision of the Additional District Judge was upheld by this Court in the earlier writ petition and the Special Appeal relying heavily upon the observation contained in a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sibte Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1973 AWR 489 which has since been over-ruled by a Full Bench in the case of Karam Chand v. Balmukund and Ors. 1976 AWC 428 . As such, according to the submission, the decision of this Court in the earlier proceedings could not be said to be binding inter-parties. This submission, to our mind, has no substance. The question which was for consideration before the Full Bench was as to whether a revision relating to grant of permission u/s 3 of the old Act, pending immediately before the commencement of the new Act before the Commissioner and transferred to the District Judge after the commencement of the new Act, is to be disposed off in accordance with the provisions of the old Act or was to be deemed to be an application for a proceeding u/s 21 of the 1972 Act and to be disposed off in accordance with the provisions of the new Act. The Full Bench answered the question by laying down that such an application has to be decided by the District Judge in accordance with the procedure and conditions laid down u/s 21 of the new Act and not in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. The matter about the execution of the order passed by the Additional District Judge on a revision transferred u/s 43(2)(m) of the Act was not up for consideration before the Full Bench. The reliance upon the Full Bench decision by the Learned Counsel for the tenant-Respondent is inappropriate. 9. The decision of the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Others Vs. The reliance upon the Full Bench decision by the Learned Counsel for the tenant-Respondent is inappropriate. 9. The decision of the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Others Vs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 SC 2355 , upon which reliance has been placed by the Learned Counsel for, the tenant-Respondent, itself lays down in paragraph 5 of the report that “if an issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be re-opened between them in another proceeding, the previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res-judicata; the reasons for the decision are not res-judicata.... A decision on an issue of law will be as res-judicata in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law.” The question as to whether the order passed by the Additional District Judge in favour of the Petitioner could be implemented by recourse to proceeding under U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was decided in favour of the Petitioner by this Court in the earlier proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution and that decision, it is admitted, has become final inter-parties. 10. The only other submission of the Learned Counsel for the tenant-Respondent which requires consideration is about the enforcement of the order of the Additional District Judge having become barred by limitation. As noticed earlier, the Prescribed Authority has refused to give effect to the order passed by the Additional District Judge in favour of the Petitioner basically on the ground that the application made by the Petitioner in that regard was barred by time. 11. The first proviso to Section 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 says that no application under Clause (rr) shall be maintainable on the basis of a permission granted u/s 3 of the old Act, where such permission has become final more than three years before the commencement of the new Act. 11. The first proviso to Section 43(2)(rr) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 says that no application under Clause (rr) shall be maintainable on the basis of a permission granted u/s 3 of the old Act, where such permission has become final more than three years before the commencement of the new Act. To attract the bar contemplated by this proviso, it is necessary that the permission should have become final more than three years before the commencement of the new Act which was enforced with effect from July 15, 1972. In other words, permission u/s 3 of the old Act should have obtained finality by July 14, 1969. Obviously, the situation contemplated by this proviso does not obtain in the present case. It has strenuously been contended by the Learned Counsel for the tenant-Respondent that the application made by the Petitioner on July 29/30, 1976 u/s 43(2)(rr) was barred in any case, by limitation as provided under Rule 18 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter the “Rules”). To appreciate this argument, the rule aforesaid may be read at this stage. 18. Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings: (1) where an application of a landlord against any tenant for permission to file a suit for eviction u/s 3 of the old Act, on any ground mentioned in Section 21(1) has been finally allowed or rejected on merits either before or after the commencement of the Act, whether by the District Magistrate or on revision by the Commissioner or the State Government or under Clause (i) or Clause (m) of Section 43(2) by the District Judge, and the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction makes an application u/s 21 on the same grounds within a period of six months from such decision or from the commencement of the Act, whichever is later, the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive: Provided that the period during which the operation of any permission as aforesaid is stayed by order of any court or authority shall be excluded in computing the said period of six months. (2) Where an application of a landlord against a tenant u/s 21 for the release of any building or any specified part thereof or any surplus land appurtenant to such building is rejected on merits and a fresh application on the same ground is made within a period of one year from that decision the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive. 12. A careful perusal of the rule would reveal that it lays down a rule of evidence in respect of fresh proceedings in two situations contemplated by Sub-rule (1) and Sub-rule (2). In the former case, if the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction on the basis of permission obtained u/s 3 of the old Act on any grounds mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 21 makes a fresh application u/s 21 on the same grounds within a period of six months from the final decision on the application u/s 3 of the old Act or from the commencement of the new Act whichever is later, the findings recorded in the proceedings under the old Act are to be accepted as conclusive in the subsequent proceedings. Likewise, in the latter case, the findings recorded in proceedings u/s 21 while rejecting the application of the landlord for release on merits are to be treated as conclusive by the Prescribed Authority if a fresh application is made on similar grounds by the landlord again for release within a period of one year of the earlier decision. This rule, in our opinion, is not concerned with the question of limitation within which an application should be made by the landlord u/s 43(2)(rr). That limitation is contained only in the proviso to Clause (rr) aforesaid. Gulati J. did not lay down in the case of Mohammad Daud v. Smt. Kamar Jahan 1975 AWC 26 , as has been contended by the Learned Counsel for the tenant-Respondent, that Rule 18 provided a limitation for an application under Clause (rr) of Section 43(2) of the Act. On the contrary, the learned Judge held, as has been held by us, that Rule 18 provides for statutory presumption of conclusiveness about findings recorded in the previous litigation between the parties on similar grounds for a specified period. On the contrary, the learned Judge held, as has been held by us, that Rule 18 provides for statutory presumption of conclusiveness about findings recorded in the previous litigation between the parties on similar grounds for a specified period. In that case, the authorities under the old Act had taken the view in proceedings u/s 3 that the need of the landlady was not greater than that of the tenant and that she was, therefore, not entitled to eject the tenant. Upon enforcement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 the landlady applied again for similar permission u/s 21(1)(a) for release of the premises and succeeded. This Court quashed the order of release passed in favour of the landlady on the ground that the statutory conclusiveness about the findings recorded in the earlier proceedings had been ignored by the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority in dealing with the matter. That decision does not assist the tenant-Respondent in this case. 13. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, we are of opinion that the Tribunal erred in holding that the Petitioner's application for eviction of the tenant-Respondent from the premises in dispute was barred by limitation. Its decision dated March 8, 1977 cannot therefore, be sustained. In the view that we are taking, it is not necessary to consider the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that even on the assumption that Rule 18 of the Rules applied in the instant case, the application was well within limitation having regard to the periods during which the operation of the permission remained stayed by orders of the appellate authority under the new Act as well as this Court in the earlier proceeding before it and the Civil Judge, Kanpur in original suit No. 159 of 1976 which, according to the Petitioner, was got filed by the tenant-Respondent by one Mohd. Ibrahim for declaration that he was a co-tenant in the premises in dispute. 14. The writ petition is, consequently, allowed. The order of the Rent Control Tribunal, Kanpur, dated March 8, 1977 (Annexure 14) is quashed, the Petitioner's application dated July 29/30, 1976, u/s 43(2)(rr) shall be expeditiously disposed off in accordance with law. The Petitioner shall be entitled to her costs from the tenant-Respondent No. 3