Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the accused in S. T. Case No. 283 of 1976 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kozhikode. He was convicted by the Court for an offence punishable under S.16(1)(a)(i) read with S.7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, 'the Act') and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of fine, he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. The conviction and sentence were confirmed in Crl. A. 69 of 1977 of the Sessions Court, Kozhikode. 2. The case against the petitioner is as follows. The petitioner is a milk vendor. On 10-8-76 at about 8-20 A. M., pw. I approached the petitioner and purchased 675 milli-litres of buffalo milk, following the formalities prescribed under the Act. Out of the three bottles containing the sample, one bottle was sent to the Public Analyst and the two remaining bottles were entrusted with the Local Health Authority. On 18-9-1976 after receipt of report from the Public Analyst, a complaint was presented in Court against the petitioner for the offences already mentioned. On the same day, the Food Inspector despatched a copy of the certificate of analysis to the petitioner along with an intimation as provided in S.13 (2) of the Act as amended by Act 34 of 1976 informing the petitioner that if he desired to have the sample further analysed, he might make an application to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate where the complaint had been presented within 10 days of the date of receipt of the intimation. The petitioner, however, did not proceed to get the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. He was in due course tried and convicted for the offence. He admitted the sale; but contended that he was carrying the milk at the instance of some other person. He denied knowledge that the milk was adulterated. The Chief Judicial Magistrate relied upon the evidence of pw. 1, the Food Inspector and pw. 2, one of the attestors to the mahazar and convicted the petitioner. It is against the above conviction that the revision petition has been filed. 3. The main contention put forward on behalf of the revision petitioner is that there has been non-compliance of the provisions contained in R.90) of the Act. 1, the Food Inspector and pw. 2, one of the attestors to the mahazar and convicted the petitioner. It is against the above conviction that the revision petition has been filed. 3. The main contention put forward on behalf of the revision petitioner is that there has been non-compliance of the provisions contained in R.90) of the Act. R.90) as it stood on the date of sampling imposed a duty on the Food Inspector to send by registered post, a copy of the report received from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days of the receipt of the said report in all cases where the sample did not conform to the provisions of the Act or Rules. It is the admitted case that no copy was sent to the petitioner within 10 days of the receipt of the report by the Food Inspector and, therefore, there has been non-compliance of the above rule. But the stand taken by the complainant is that R.90) need not be followed after the amendment of the Act in 1976 since S.13(2) of the amended Act prescribes a different procedure. The purchase of the sample was after the amended Act came into force. Ext. P10, the intimation issued to the petitioner is in conformity with, the provisions contained in in S.13(2). The argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that eventhough the amended Act had come into force, R.90) stood intact on the date of the purchase and, therefore, the Food Inspector should have complied with the provision. The learned Sessions Judge before whom the above contention was raised did not accept it and observed that R.90) stood deleted and the procedure followed by the Food Inspector was in conformity with R.9 A framed after the amendment of the Act The learned judge also held that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner. The appeal against the conviction and sentence was dismissed. 4. In this Court, reference was made by the revision petitioner to the decision in Crl. A. 286/ 77 disposed of by Subramonian Poti, J. The appeal in that case was against the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. One of the grounds of acquittal was non-compliance of the provisions contained in R.90). 4. In this Court, reference was made by the revision petitioner to the decision in Crl. A. 286/ 77 disposed of by Subramonian Poti, J. The appeal in that case was against the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. One of the grounds of acquittal was non-compliance of the provisions contained in R.90). It was argued before this Court that the acquittal was unsustainable in view of the conditions of the provisions contained in R.9A. The learned judge observed that R.9A had no application since it came into force on 4 1-1977 and that R.90) which was in force on the date of the purchase should have been complied. The learned judge also held that the sampling by the Food Inspector was defective in the sense that the necessary formalities had not been complied with and, therefore, refused to interfere with the order of acquittal. No definite opinion is seen expressed in the above case on the consequences of non-compliance of R.90). 5. A single judge of the Bombay High Court had occasion to consider the effect of non-compliance of R.90) in the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Mohanlal Hanumandas Vaishnowa & Ann (1978 All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal, 183). The learned judge observed that R.90) was a provision intended to protect the person from whom the sample was collected. The purpose was to avoid manipulations at the hands of persons collecting the sample. The rule was held to be mandatory. The same expression of opinion was made by another judge of the same High Court in an earlier case, State of Maharashtra v. Jessu Dosa (1978 F.A.J.19). The matter came up for decision before a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad v. J. Muralidhar (1977 Crl. Q. 1634). Regarding the scope of R.90), the Bench observed: "A reading of the said rule would show that a duty is cast on the Food Inspector to send a copy of the report which he has received from the Public Analyst within 10 days of its receipt to the person from whom the sample was taken But it is evident from R.90) that where the report of the Public Analyst is against the person from whom the sample was taken, the Food Inspector is duty bound to send a copy. of the report to such person within 10 days of its receipt by him We are not laying any undue emphasis on the word 'shall' used in the rule; but we are of the opinion that having regard to the scheme of the Act and the severity of the punishment; the Legislature had insisted on the requirement of sending the report of the Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken as a protection for safeguarding the liberty of the subject. From what has been stated above, we should not be misunderstood as having held that even a delay of one day over and above ten days would be enough to throw out the case of the complainant for non-compliance with R.90) of the Rules. Of course, if there is some delay in sending the report, the complainant's case cannot be thrown out unless the accused shows that even this slight delay has caused prejudice to him It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule regarding the delay in sending the report of the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken. Every case will have to depend on its circumstances. But when the report of the Public Analyst was not sent to the accused even until the filing of the complaint, then to our mind, in such a case, the accused could be acquitted without his pleading prejudice." The learned judges followed the dictum in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad (A. I. R.1962 SC. 1694) that the question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specified provision which, for instance, sets out the consequences of the omission to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the require-has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof. 6. The above case arose before S.13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was amended by Act 34 of 1976. S.13(2) of the unamended Act, no doubt, enabled the accused-petitioner to make an application to Court after the institution of the prosecution to send part of the sample mentioned in sub-clause (1) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S.11 to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. S.13(2) of the unamended Act, no doubt, enabled the accused-petitioner to make an application to Court after the institution of the prosecution to send part of the sample mentioned in sub-clause (1) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S.11 to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. It did not provide for the supply of a copy of the Analyst's report to the accused. It was only under R.90) that a direction was made for the supply of a copy of the report to the accused in the case within 10 days of the receipt of the report. By the amendment, a change was effected and the Statute itself provided for the supply of a copy of the report. S.13(2) as amended reads: "On receipt of the report of the analysis under sub-section (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under S.14A, forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory." S. 14A directs that the vendor should, if so required, disclose to the Food Inspector the address and other particulars of the person from whom he purchased the article of food. A casual reading of S.13(2) as amended would show that there is material difference between the provisions contained therein and R.90) in so far as when a copy of the Analyst's report should be supplied to the accused. A casual reading of S.13(2) as amended would show that there is material difference between the provisions contained therein and R.90) in so far as when a copy of the Analyst's report should be supplied to the accused. While S.13(2) as amended directs the forwarding of a copy of the Analyst's report after the institution of the prosecution and limits the period within which the accused should make an application for getting the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory, R.90) directed supply of a copy within 10 days or the receipt of the report by the Food Inspector but did not refer to or prescribe any time limit for the making of an application for getting the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory The conflict between the two provisions was set right by deleting R.90) and adding R.9A. R.9A only repeats the provision in S.13(2) as amended and provides the manner in which the copy is to be delivered. It may be delivered either by registered post or by hand. The change came into force only on 4-1-1977. 7. The sample in the instant case was taken on 10-8-1976, after the amended Act came into force and before R.90) was deleted. What the Food Inspector did was to follow the procedure prescribed in S.13(2) in preference to R.90). The question is whether he was right in doing so and whether he was obliged to follow the procedure in R.90) which was still in the statute book. 8. It is well recognised principle of interpretation that Rules framed under a Statute should not be allowed to override any specific provision in the Statute itself. The purpose of framing rules is to supply matters which are subsidiary to the provisions of the Act and or to prescribe a procedure for the proper working of the Act. The Statute itself may authorise framing of rules to carry out its provisions. In such cases, the rules framed have the same force as the Statute. But all the same, a rule cannot militate against the provisions of the Act and cannot go beyond the scope of the Act. The Statute itself may authorise framing of rules to carry out its provisions. In such cases, the rules framed have the same force as the Statute. But all the same, a rule cannot militate against the provisions of the Act and cannot go beyond the scope of the Act. In the instant case, S.13(2) directs that a copy of the report should be delivered over to the accused after the institution of the prosecution and also that an intimation should be given to the person concerned that he might make an application to the Court within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. Being a provision in the Statute, the authority concerned is obliged to follow the procedure, in all cases where the sample is taken after the commencement of the Act. The Food Inspector had, therefore, to send a copy of the report after the prosecution was launched and also to intimate the accused that he, if so desired, should move for the examination of the sample kept with the Local (Health) Authority within 10 days of the receipt of the copy, it is significant to note that since S.13(2; provides a time limit for application for examination of the sample by the Central Food Laboratory, the accused in the usual course, is not expected to make an application afterwards. This speaks to the importance of complying with S.13(2) in the case of offences after the amended Act came into force. If R.90) was to be followed, no intimation was to be sent by the Food Inspector and to that extent there would have been contravention of S.13 (2) and the accused would have been prejudiced. There is no question of complying with R.9A because R.9A only prescribes the mode of service of copy and does not cast any additional duty on the Food Inspector or Local (Health) Authority. To hold that the Food Inspector or the Local (Health) Authority concerned should have complied with the provisions contained in S.13(2) as also R.90) would amount to enlarging of the statutory obligation, which is beyond the function of the rule-making authority. There is thus conflict between the provisions of the Statute and the R.90). To hold that the Food Inspector or the Local (Health) Authority concerned should have complied with the provisions contained in S.13(2) as also R.90) would amount to enlarging of the statutory obligation, which is beyond the function of the rule-making authority. There is thus conflict between the provisions of the Statute and the R.90). In such cases, the statutory provision should prevail in preference to the procedure prescribed by the rules. It follows that after Act 34 of 1976 came into force the Local (Health) Authority is obliged to comply with the provisions of S.13(2). The omission to comply with the direction in R.90) (since deleted) will not affect the prosecution. 9. There is no case for the revision petitioner that the provisions contained in S.13(2) have not been complied with or that he did not get an opportunity to have the sample kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. No such case was put forward when the matter was pending in the trial court. The objection based on non-compliance of R.90) was taken for the first time in the appellate Court. The inference is that it is an after-thought and no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner due to the non-compliance. It follows that the conviction is not liable to be set aside because of the omission of the Food Inspector to comply with R.90). 10. On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that milk is primary food and, therefore, it must be established that the petitioner was carrying the same for the purpose of sale. Assuming that it is so, the testimony of pw. 2, the owner of the Lucky Star Hotel is that petitioner is a milk-vendor and he used to supply milk to the hotel. There is no evidence to the contra. The petitioner's case that he was carrying milk to somebody else stands unproved. 11. That the petitioner sold buffalo milk to pw. 1, the Food Inspector is not disputed. The petitioner had nothing to say against the evidence of pw.1 on the point. Ext. P8, the report of the Public Analyst shows that the milk did not conform to the standards prescribed for buffalo milk under the P.F.A Rules and that it contained not less than 28% of added water as calculated from the milk-solids-not fat content. The milk was, therefore, adulterated. 12. Ext. P8, the report of the Public Analyst shows that the milk did not conform to the standards prescribed for buffalo milk under the P.F.A Rules and that it contained not less than 28% of added water as calculated from the milk-solids-not fat content. The milk was, therefore, adulterated. 12. On behalf of the petitioner, a contention was raised that there has been non-compliance of R.16,17 and 18 of the P.F.A. Rules. The case is that there has been failure on the part of the Food Inspector to follow the formalities prescribed under the above rules. But pw. I, the Food Inspector has proved the several documents in connection with the sampling which prima facie show that the formalities have been complied with. There was no cross-examination on the point. No objection based on non-compliance of the provisions of the rules was raised while the case was pending in the courts below. It is not open to him to raise the issue in revision. 13. contention has been raised that the extra water noted at the time of analysis is not proved to be due to adulteration. The argument is that a case of adulteration cannot be spelt out solely from the report of the Public Analyst. But the petitioner had no such case when the case was pending in the trial court. Once it is made out from the report of the Public Analyst that the milk contained extra water and it did not conform to standards prescribed, the presumption is that it is adulterated. See Kisan Trimbak Kothula v. State of Maharashtra (1977 SCC. (Crl.) 97). 14. t follows that the finding of the courts below that the buffalo milk was adulterated does not call for interference. The conviction of the petitioner has, therefore, to be upheld. Since the sentence passed is the minimum provided for the offence, it does not require any modification. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. Dismissed.