JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - One of the representatives of Defendant No. 2 and Defendant No. 3 have carried this appeal against the affirming judgment and decree of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge of Puri. 2. Plaintiff filed the suit on 25-3-1966 for specific performance of contract between him and Defendant No. 1 dated 16-2-1964 (Ext. 7) on the allegation that the 'Ka' schedule' land belonged to one Uchhab Bharati and upon his death to his two son's Ghanashyam (Defendant No. 1) and Biswanath. Biswanath sold his interest in the property to Ghanashyam under Ext. 10 dated 15-1-1963 and thus Ghanashyam became absolute owner of the disputed property having an extent of 1.87 acres. This property being an estate vested in the State under the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act with effect from 29-4-1963 and an application was made by the ex-intermediary u/s 8-A of the Abolition Act for settlement of the land with him. Notwithstanding the agreement under Ext. 7, on 4-3-1964. the Defendant No. 1 sold the suit land to Defendant no 2. On 16-8-1965, the proceeding u/s 8-A of the Abolition Act was finalised. The objection of the Plaintiff was overruled and the land was settled on raiyati basis with Ghanashyam (Defendant No. I) under Ext. H. 3. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement alleging that Plaintiff was never a tenant of the property, Plaintiff was not in possession, he was not entitled to settlement under the Estates Abolition Act, the sale by Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendants 2 and 3 was valid and Plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance of contract: 4. Defendants 2 and 3 filed a separate written statement adopting essentially the stand of Defendant No. 1 . They further maintained that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice and they were in possession of the property. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the agreement (Ext.7) was genuine, Plaintiff was only a tenant under Ghanashyam (Defendant No. 1), Defendants 2 and 3 had prior knowledge of the agreement and in view of the fact that Defendant No. 1 had become owner of the property following settlement under the Estates Abolition Act, the agreement was available to be enforced against him. 6. On appeal by the Defendants, the lower appellate Court reiterated the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge and declined to interfere. 6. On appeal by the Defendants, the lower appellate Court reiterated the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge and declined to interfere. 7. Mr. Pal appearing for the Appellants raises three contentions in the main: (i) u/s 40(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act. a suit for specific performance of contract is not maintainable; (ii) The agreement (Ext. 7) came after the vesting notification. Defendant No. 1 had no subsisting interest on the date of the agreement and therefore, the agreement could not create any interest which could be subjected to enforcement; and (iii) There was no justification to decree specific performance of contract in the facts of the case. 8. In my opinion, none of these contentions can succeed. Sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Land Reforms Act provides: Every suit for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of land, instituted after the 26th day of September, 1970 and before the commencement of the Orissa Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973 shall abate and no suit for the specific performance of any such contract entered into before such commencement shall be maintainable. President's Act 17 of 1973 became operative with effect from 2-10-1973. The instant suit having been filed on 25th of March, 1966, the first part of Sub-section (2) is not attracted. According to Mr. Pal. the second part of the Sub-section has a wider application and irrespective of the date of contract, the suit is not maintainable. This submission is wholly misconceived. 26th day of September, 1970, is the relevant date under the statute for several purposes. Transfer made after that date is not recognised as valid u/s 39 of the Land Reforms Act. In, the definition of 'family' occurring in Section 37(b) of this Act for purposes of partition, that is the relevant date. Liability for submission of return is determined with reference to possession of land on that date. 26th day of September, l970, occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 40 has, therefore, to be accepted as the date with reference to which the mischief becomes operative and Sub-section (2) does not intend to touch suits filed before the 20th day of September, 1970. The period for institution of suits for specific performance under the Limitation Act is three years from the date of contract or the date stipulated for performance. The period for institution of suits for specific performance under the Limitation Act is three years from the date of contract or the date stipulated for performance. 2-10-1973, being three years after the 26th September, 1970, ordinarily a suit in respect of contracts entered into before 26th September, 1970 could not be filed after the enforcement of the President's Act 17 of 1973. Sub-section (2) is not amenable to such construction as has been contended by Mr. Pal and the present suit cannot be bad on account of Sub-section (2). 9. Admittedly by the date of the agreement (Ext. 7) the vesting notification had come. Defendant No. 1 as ex-intermediary was, however, continuing in possession on the date of the agreement and an application u/s 8-A of the Abolition Act was made in time and has been allowed. Section 7(1) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act provides that on and from the date of vesting, the lands indicated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that Sub-section are to be deemed to have been settled by the State Government with the intermediary. u/s 8-A (3) of the said Act provision has been made that on failure of filing the claim within the period allowed by law, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Section 7, the right to make a claim shall stand extinguished and the property shall be deemed to have vested and the intermediary can be deemed to have been dispossessed. Defendant No. 1 - ex-intermediary was thus in possession on the date of agreement in terms of the statutory provision and has ultimately obtained a settlement. He having become the true owner of the property is bound by the contract and the subsequent transferees with notice are not entitled to resist the enforcement of the agreement. The decisions relied on by Mr. Pal on the footing of loss of title have no application to the facts of a case like the one in hand because the ex-intermediary was not a trespasser and title ha s been conferred 'on him as a result of the settlement. The principle in Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is attracted. 10. The two Courts below have concurrently found that the agreement was genuine and they have further found that Defendants 2 and 3 had notice of the agreement. 11. It was also contended by Mr. The principle in Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is attracted. 10. The two Courts below have concurrently found that the agreement was genuine and they have further found that Defendants 2 and 3 had notice of the agreement. 11. It was also contended by Mr. Pal that in view of the notification under the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, the suit has to abate. There is no dispute that a notification with regard to the disputed property has been made, but relief for specific performance is not available in the hands of the machinery created by the special statute and nothing has been shown to me which would require the suit to abate. There is no force in this contention too: 12. In the circumstances, all the contentions advanced in appeal having been rejected, the second appeal has to be dismissed. I direct both the parties to bear their own costs in the appeal. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed