Judgment P. S. Sahay. J. 1. -the petitioners were convicted by the trial court under section 332 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment each. 2. The prosecution story, in brief, was that Chuni Lal Singh P. W.1 was working as Canal Tahsil Peon in Bikramganj Circle. On 22.12.1968 at 6.30 a. m. he went on cycle to Ghusia ;kalan. He kept his cycle in the village at the house of Sattadar Rajeshwar Singh (P. W.4) and started making collection. He visited the house of petitioner Surendra as there were dues standing in the names of his wife, Shail Kumari and his mother-in-law, Moti Rani Kuer. He had also made demands earlier and was not paid the dues. He renewed his demand on that date also from petitioner Rewati Raman. Just then his son petitioner Surendra came out and said that P. W.1 was making unnecessary demands and was thus lowering them in the estimation of the general public. Both the petitioner caughthold of P. W 1, and petitioner surendra assaulted him with a Chappal and petitioner Rewati assaulted him with a wooden Chappal on account of which he sustained a bleeding injury on the head. There was hulla and P. W, 1 was rescued. A written report was submitted by P. W.1 to the Tahsildar (P. W.2) who forwarded the petitions to the assistant Revenue Officer (P. W.3 ). This was submitted to the police, on which a formal first information report was drawn up. Investigation was started by (P. W.6) who referred (P. W.1) to Bikramganj hospital for medical examination. Dr. R. Prasad (P. W.7) examined him and found a lacerated wound 2" above the left ear, besides a scratch on the elbow joint, which were simple in nature. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and the petitioners were put on trial. 3. Seven witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. The defence of the petitioners was that (P. W.1) had falsely implicated them and that there were no dues with any member of their family. The learned Magistrate accepted the prosecution case and convicted the petitioner, as stated above. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that the prosecution has failed to prove that there was any due with any relative of the petitioners and the documents have been with held by the prosecution. The learned Magistrate accepted the prosecution case and convicted the petitioner, as stated above. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that the prosecution has failed to prove that there was any due with any relative of the petitioners and the documents have been with held by the prosecution. He has further held that the prosecution has failed to prove that P. W.1 had gone to the house of the petitioners in discharge of his official duty, and so the charge under section 332 of the penal Code has not been proved against them. But at the same time, he has held that the petitioners voluntarily caused hurt to P. W.1 and, therefore, convicted them of the minor offence under Sec.323 of the Code, instead of Sec.332, and sentence them to rigorous imprisonment for three months each. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners have preferred this revision. 4. Mr. Parmanand Saran Sinha learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has contended that on the finding of the appellate court that there were no dues with the family of the petitioners, the act of going to their house and demanding money in presence of so many persons was a clear act of trespass and it was a deliberate attempt on the part of P. W.1 to intimidate, insult and annoy the petitioners and even if some force was used, on offence has been committed by the petitioners. Leanred counsel appearing on behalf of the State has, however, contended that P. W.1 was admittedly a public servant and was acting in good faith under colour of his office, and, in that view of the matter, the petitioners are not protected under Sec.99 of the Penal Code, and they have been rightly convicted for having caused hurt to P. W.1. Sec.99 reads as follows: "99. Acts against which there is no right of private defence.-There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law. "there is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law. "there is no right of private defence in cases in which there is tim e to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities. " Extent to which the right may be exercised.-The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence. " Reading the above provisions, it is absolutely clear that if a public servant acting in good faith, even if he may not be acting strictly in accordance with law, does an act, it cannot be said to be illegal. In the instant case, the lower appellate court has recorded a clear finding that the prosecution has failed to prove that there were any dues with the family members of the petitioners. There is also a clear finding that P. W.1 was not acting in the discharge of his official duty. The result will be that he had gone to the house of the petitioners for collecting dues without any authority, just like a common man. It is further clear from the evidence, which has been discussed by the two courts below, that such demands had been made earlier from the these petitioners by P. W.1. If there were no dues and still P. W.1 has been pestering the petitioner from time to time, his action is bound to cause annoyance and insult to the petitioners and, according to the evidence, such demand had been made in presence of many persons of the village In my considered opinion, therefore, section 99 of the Penal Code cannot be pressed into service in favour of the prosecution in the instant case. The petitioners were, therefore, justified in causing some minor injuries to P. W.1, under section 104 of the Penal Code, in exercise of the right of private defence. This section reads as follows ; "104. The petitioners were, therefore, justified in causing some minor injuries to P. W.1, under section 104 of the Penal Code, in exercise of the right of private defence. This section reads as follows ; "104. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.-If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief or criminal trespass not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions mentioned in Sec.99, to the voluntary causing the wrong-doer of any harm other than death. " The peon had undoubtedly gone to the house of the petitioners to collect dues when there were no dues at all, and in a situation some force was used causing some injuries to P. W.1. The petitioners cannot be said to have exceeded the right of private defence against P. W.1 who was a trespasser in the eye of law. If P. W.1 went to the house of the petitioners to collect taxes, knowing fully that there were no dues with them or their family members and, on demand, if he was manhandled and received some minor injuries, he has to thank himself for such act. Law cannot give protection to such public servants, who should be rather more careful in the discharge of their official duties, otherwise they may meet the same fate as it was done to P. W 1. 5 In the result, the application is allowed aud the conviction and sentence passed against the petitioners are hereby set aside. Application allowed.