JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - These two first appeals by Sri Johri Mai (now represented by his heirs and legal representatives), are directed against the order of Civil Judge, Bareilly dated 26-7-1969 rejecting his request for executing the order dated 13-3-1967 passed by Registrar Co-operative Society. It is said Gur Grah Uddyog Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Sahkari Samiti Ltd.) was a Co-operative Society registered as such on 23-11-1965. One Sri Laxmi Narain, Secretary of the Society had for the purposes of Society taken certain machinery belonging to Sri Johri Mai on lease and it was agreed that a sum of Rupees 2,000/- per annum was to be paid as rent therefor. Subsequently there was some dispute between the parties in connection with the machinery and the rent payable therefor and the Registrar Co-operative Societies acting under Rule 115 of the Rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act referred the same to the arbitration of Sri J. P. Jain, the District Industries Officer. 2. In the reference whereas Sri Johri Mai Vice President of the Sahkari Samiti was cited as the plaintiff, Sri Laxmi Narain Secretary and Sri Ram Kumar President of the Sahkari Samiti were arrayed as defendants. The arbitrator vide his award dated 9-8-1966 directed that the said machinery be returned to the plaintiff Sri Johari Mai. Being aggrieved by the award Sri Laxmi Narain and Sri Ram Kumar, the two defendants went up in appeal before the Assistant Registrar Co-operative Society who held that the machinery in question belonged to the Sahkari Samiti and that it could not be handed over to any of its members. In the result, he allowed the appeal and set aside the award made by the Arbitrator. 3. Therefore, the plaintiff Sri Johri Mai as also the defendant Ram Kumar President of the Sahkari Samiti filed second appeals before the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Society, who on 13-3-1967 allowed the appeals and set aside the order of the Assistant Registrar holding that the owner of the machinery was Lala Johari Mal. 4. On 2-8-1967, Sri Johari Mai moved the court of Civil Judge, Bareilly to execute the aforementioned decision of the authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act as against the society. Sri Laxmi Narain Secretary and Sri Ram Kumar President and to take possession of the machinery from the Society and to deliver the same to him. 5. 4. On 2-8-1967, Sri Johari Mai moved the court of Civil Judge, Bareilly to execute the aforementioned decision of the authorities under the Co-operative Societies Act as against the society. Sri Laxmi Narain Secretary and Sri Ram Kumar President and to take possession of the machinery from the Society and to deliver the same to him. 5. Two sets of objections were filed against the aforesaid application dated 2-8-1967 filed by Sri Johari Mai. First set of objection was by Ram Kumar who pleaded that as no decree had been passed against the Sahkari Samiti and as he had ceased to be its President the order passed by the Dy. Registrar could not be executed against them. Moreover as the objector was not an officer of the society, the arbitration proceedings against him were invalid and that In any case the order made by the Dy. Registrar had merely decreed the right of Sri Johari Mai and that such declaratory orders are not capable of execution. 6. Laxmi Narain filed the second set of objection on his own behalf and on behalf of Ram Kumar. He, inter alia, pleaded that as the Samiti had not been made a party before the Assistant Registrar, the authorities under the Cooperative Societies Act had no jurisdiction to pass any decree against it. 7. The Civil Judge disposed of both the objections which were separately numbered by a common judgment. He held that even if in the reference only the Secretary and the President had been arrayed as defendants and the Sahkari Samiti itself was not made a party the fact remains that the real dispute that had been referred to the arbitration, was that between Johari Mai and the Sahkari Samiti which was represented by its Secretary and the President. Any irregularity in not impleading the Sahkari Samiti did not vitiate the award which was binding on the Sahkari Samiti. Merely because Sri Ram Kumar, subsequently resigned the office of the President Sahkari Samiti, it did not render the award made against him illegal and without jurisdiction. The learned Judge, however, held that the award made by the arbitrator had merged into the order passed by the Dy. Registrar Co-operative Society which was merely an order declaring the rights of the parties and was not capable of execution. The learned Judge, however, held that the award made by the arbitrator had merged into the order passed by the Dy. Registrar Co-operative Society which was merely an order declaring the rights of the parties and was not capable of execution. He further held that under the new Co-operative Societies Act no second appeal lay to the Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Society, and as such the order made by him was completely without jurisdiction and did not affect the appellate order passed by the Assistant Registrar where under the award made by the District Industries Officer had been set aside and it had been held that the machinery in question belonged to the Cooperative Society. In the result he allowed both the objections and rejected the request of Sri Johri Mai for executing the award as it stood after the decision of the Dy. Registrar dated 13-3-1967. 8. Johari Mai has now filed these two appeals under Section 47, Civil P. C. against the order of the Civil Judge dated 26-7-19,69 allowing the two objections filed by Sarvasri Ram Kumar and Laxmi Narain. 9. It will thus be seen that the two objections that prevailed before the executing court were: - (1) That as no second appeal lay to the Deputy Registrar, the second appellate order dated 13-3-1967 made by him was without jurisdiction. If that order is ignored the order passed by the Assistant Registrar on 9-8-1966 shall stand and there can be no question of executing any award against the defendant and, (2) that in any case the order passed by the Dy. Registrar, on 13-3-67 is merely declaratory order which is not capable of execution. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant Johari Mai urged that both the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge refusing his request are incorrect and are not tenable. 11. So far as the first ground is concerned, Rule 113-A of the Rules framed under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act specifically provides for a second appeal against an appellate order made by the Assistant Registrar in an appeal against an award made by an arbitrator under Section 13 of the Cooperative Societies Act. Subsequently the Legislature enacted U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (U. P. Act No. 11 of 1966) which was published in the U. P. Gazette on 5-4-1966. Subsequently the Legislature enacted U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (U. P. Act No. 11 of 1966) which was published in the U. P. Gazette on 5-4-1966. Under this enactment, the provisions relating to second appeals under Rule 113, (113-A) of the Rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act 1912 had been done away (with). Learned Civil Judge was of opinion that as the appeal against the award dated 11-2-1966 was decided by the Assistant Registrar after the publication of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act 1965 on 5-4-1966 no second appeal under the rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act 1912 could be filed. He, therefore, concluded that the order of the Deputy Registrar, dated 13-3-1967 allowing the second appeal was without jurisdiction. 12. We find that even though the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, whereby the right to file a second appeal against the appellate order of the Assistant Registrar had been done away with was published on 5-4-1966, Section 1 (3) thereof provided that the Act so published was to come into force from such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint in that behalf. The notification referred to in Section 1 (3) of the 1965 Act was subsequently issued fixing 28-1-1968 as the date for coming into force of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. Accordingly on 9-8-1966 when the Assistant Registrar decided the appeal as also on 13-3-1967 when the Deputy Registrar decided the second appeal the provision of U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 had not been enforced and the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 together with the rules framed thereunder including rule 113-A continued to be fully operative and effective. It appears that the fact that the provisions of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 had not been brought into force till 26-1-1968 somehow escaped the notice of the learned Civil Judge. We are, therefore, of opinion that the two objections filed by Ram Kumar and Laxmi Narain cannot be allowed on the ground that the Dy. Registrar Co-operative Society had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order made by the Assistant Registrar. 13. So far as second of the two grounds mentioned by the executing court for not executing the decision of the Dy. Registrar Co-operative Society had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order made by the Assistant Registrar. 13. So far as second of the two grounds mentioned by the executing court for not executing the decision of the Dy. Registrar dated 13-3-1967 is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant urged that while it is true that in the operative portion of his order, the Deputy Registrar Co-operative Societies merely mentioned that the order of the Assistant Registrar was i being set aside and that Lala Johari Mal was being declared to be the owner of the machinery that was being used by Sahkari Samiti the order read in the light of the order passed by the Assistant Registrar would lead us to the conclusion that what the Deputy Registrar had done was to direct that as Johari Mai who was the owner of the machinery was entitled to its possession. He relied upon a decision of the court in the case of Ragho Prasad v. Pratap Narain Agarwal 1969 All LJ 975 and contended that where there was some ambiguity in a decree, it is always open to the executing court to construe it with reference to the order under appeal. 14. Even assuming that in a case where second appellate courts decree is ambiguous it is open to the executing court for the purposes of construing to refer to the decree passed by the lower appellate court. The question for such a reference would arise only in a case where there is some ambiguity in the second appellate decree. If, the decree is clear and unambiguous and by no stretch of imagination could cover relief which although prayed for but was not granted, no question of construing the same with reference to that passed by the lower court can possibly arise. 15. In the instant case, we find that while setting aside the order passed by the Assistant Registrar dated 9-8-1966 the Dy. Registrar had merely applied his mind on the question of title to the machinery that was in use of the Sahkari Samiti. He did not apply his mind on the question as to whether Johari Mai was in fact entitled to recover possession of the machinery from the Samiti. Registrar had merely applied his mind on the question of title to the machinery that was in use of the Sahkari Samiti. He did not apply his mind on the question as to whether Johari Mai was in fact entitled to recover possession of the machinery from the Samiti. As stated earlier the parties which had been arrayed in the dispute that was referred for adjudication to the arbitrator Sri J. P. Jain were on the one hand Johari Mai Vice President of the Samiti and Sri Laxmi Narain and Sri Ram Kumar the President of the Samiti on the other. The dispute between Johari Mai and the Sahkari Samiti with regard to the possession of their machinery had not been referred. Reasons given by executing court viz. that as Sri Ram Kumar and Laxmi Narain had been impleaded in their capacity as President and Secretary of the Samiti (respectively) could be said that it w-as the dispute between Johari Mai and Sahkari Samiti through its President and Secretary which had been referred to the arbitrator does not appeal to us. R. 115 under the Co-operative Societies Act 1912 under which the dispute had been referred enables a reference to be made only if there is dispute between persons belonging to following four classes. 1. Between members or past member of the Society or persons claiming through member or past member. 2. Between a member or past member or a person so claiming and the society or its committee or any officer of the Society 3. Between the society or its committee or any officer of the society and 4. Between two or more registered societies. 16. If at all, the instant case falls under the second category mentioned above according to which a dispute between a member or past member or person so claiming and the society or its committee or its officer can be referred to arbitrator. We find that classes of persons falling in this category and the dispute amongst whom can be referred to the arbitrator can further be subdivided into following classes: - (1) Dispute between member or a past member of the society, and the society, (2) Dispute between member or past member and any Committee of the Society, and (3) Dispute between member or past member and any officer of the Society. The dispute which has been referred in the instant case comes under sub-category No. (iii). The rule itself contemplates a distinction between a dispute between a member or past member and officer of the society cannot be equated with a dispute between member and the society itself. In the case before us no dispute between Sri Johari Mai and the Samiti itself had been referred to the arbitrator. Accordingly even if there had been some ambiguity in the order passed by the Deputy Registrar it would not have been so construed as to bind the Sahkari Samiti which on its own was not a party to the proceedings and could not be required to part with the property in its possession. The order on the face of it is merely a declaratory order and for the reasons mentioned above we are unable to construe it as directing Sahkari Samiti to deliver possession of the machinery to Johari Mai. The executing court was in our opinion justified in holding that the order of the Deputy Director was not executable. 17. Learned counsel then urged that in the instant case the arbitrator had held Lala Johari Mai to be the owner of the machinery and had directed delivery of its possession to him. In appeal the Assistant Registrar found that the ownership of the property vested in the Sahkari Samiti and not in Johari Mai and he made the order for setting aside the award made by arbitrator. When in the second appeal the Deputy Registrar set aside the order of the Assistant Registrar it meant that he had restored the order passed by arbitrator. When in his order the Deputy Registrar observed that Lala Johari Mai was the owner of the property he had merely stated the reason for restoring the order of the arbitrator. He relied upon the following observations made by the Supreme Court in the case State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 . When in his order the Deputy Registrar observed that Lala Johari Mai was the owner of the property he had merely stated the reason for restoring the order of the arbitrator. He relied upon the following observations made by the Supreme Court in the case State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 . "In the next place, while it is true that a decree of a court of first instance may be said to merge in the decree passed on appeal therefrom or even in the order passed in revision it does so only for certain purposes, namely, for the purposes of computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree as in Batuk Nath v. Munni Devi 41 Ind App 104 : (AIR 1914 PC ,65) or for computing the period of limitation for an application for final decree in a motgage suit as in Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh 58 Ind App 197: ( AIR 1926 PC 93 ). But as pointed out by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Juscurn Boid v. Prithichand Lal 46 Ind App 52 : ILR 46 Cal 670 at pp 678 and 679: ( AIR 1918 PC 151 at pp. 152-153) whatever be the theory under other systems of law under the Indian Law and procedure an original decree is not suspended by the presentation of an appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree on appeal is merely one of dismissal." And contended that the theory of merger of original courts decree with the appellate court decree is only for certain specified purposes only. The decree passed by the original court does not lose its identity merely because subsequently the appellate court hears the matter and passes another decree. Accordingly, if the order setting aside the trial courts decree is set aside the decree passed by the trial court is revived unless there is something in the decree setting aside the appellate courts decree to limit the extent of such revival. 18. We are unable to accept this submission. The observations made by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Noohs case were considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gojer Brothers v. Ratan Lal Singh ( AIR 1974 SC 1380 ). 18. We are unable to accept this submission. The observations made by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Noohs case were considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gojer Brothers v. Ratan Lal Singh ( AIR 1974 SC 1380 ). In paragraph 30 of the judgment the learned Judges of the Supreme Court made the following observations: - "The observations last quoted from the judgment of Das C. J. do lend support to the contention of the respondent that the principle of merger has at best, a limited application, but we are of the view that the observations are evidently made in the context of the peculiar facts of the case and their, application ought not to be extended beyond those facts." 19. In Gojer Brothers case, the Supreme Court has held that in a case where the decree passed by the trial court is either set aside or modified or even affirmed after hearing the parties, the doctrine of merger applies. The observations made by them in paragraphs 10-11 of the judgment indicate that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court were of opinion that subject to certain exceptions the general rule appeared to be that the judgment of the subordinate court loses its identity by its merger with the judgment of the superior court. In paragraph 15 of the judgment, the learned Judges observed thus: - "In cases where the decree of the trial court is carried in appeal and the appellate court disposes of the appeal after a contested hearing the decree to be executed is the decree of the appellate court and not of the trial court. In paragraph 15 of the judgment, the learned Judges observed thus: - "In cases where the decree of the trial court is carried in appeal and the appellate court disposes of the appeal after a contested hearing the decree to be executed is the decree of the appellate court and not of the trial court. In Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh, 53 Ind App 197: ( AIR 1926 PC 93 ) the Privy Council while holding that the limitation of three years within which an application for final decree must be made runs from the date of decree of the appellate court, quoted with approval the statement of law contained in the judgment of the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court to the following effect: 'When an appeal has been preferred it is the decree of the appellate court which is the final decree in the cause." Proceeding further, the learned Judges in paragraph 18 of the judgment observed thus: - "The fundamental reason of the rule that where there has been an appeal the decree to be executed is the decree of the appellate court is that in such cases the decree of the trial court is merged in the decree of the appellate court. In course of time this concept which was originally restricted to appellate decrees on the ground that an appeal is a continuation of the suit, came to be gradually extended to other proceedings like revisions and even to proceedings before quasi judicial and executive authorities." It, therefore, necessarily follows that after the order made by the arbitrator was, in appeal, set aside by the Assistant Registrar it had merged in the appellate courts order and had lost its identity. The order of the Deputy Registrar, setting aside the order of the Assistant Registrar cannot be construed as meaning that he was reviving the order passed by the arbitrator. The Deputy Registrar had to pass his own order which was to be final. It is true that under the Act no particular form for making the final order in such a case has been prescribed and in some cases for construing the final order it may become necessary to refer to the original order, but then it does not mean that the order to which reference is made stands revived. 20. In the circumstances, we find no merit in the aforesaid submission. 20. In the circumstances, we find no merit in the aforesaid submission. Both the appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. 21. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.