JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is revision against the order and judgment dated February 10, 1972 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division in Appeal No. 332 of 1972 arising out of the order dated September 13, 1971 passed by the Collector, Fatehpur in a case under Section 198(2) of the UPZA and LR Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The revisionist, Gaya Prasad had filed an application before the Collector, Fatehpur for cancellation of the allotment made to the opposite partied No. 1 and 2, Babu Lal and Dipati, by the opposite party No. 3, Land Management Committed, Wajidpur. The collector dismissed the application holding that no irregularity had been committed in the allotment of land. Gaya Prasad filed an appeal against this order before the Additional Commissioner who has rejected it on the preliminary ground that the Land Management Committee, which was a necessary party, had not be to impleaded. Gaya Prasad has now come up in revision. 4. The only question for consideration in this revision is whether the appeal could have been dismissed on the ground of non-impleadment of the Land Management Committee. The learned counsel for the revisionist has cited a number of rulings on this point. The first is Nathu v. Bhurey Singh 1964 RD 344, in which learned members R.R. Mathur and S.N. Mitra have held as follows :- "If the courts below considered that in such a case the State Government is a necessary party then the court had also the power to implead the State Government under Order I, Rule 10(2), CPC, but the case should not have been dismissed for want of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties vide Order I, Rule 9, CPC. I consider that in a case of this nature it would be proper to implead the State Government as a necessary party for determining the title of the plaintiff appellant. But as has already been stated above, the suit could not be thrown out for want of a necessary party." 5. The second decision is Smt. Sudama v. Board of Revenue 1965 RD 233, in which a learned Judge has held as follows : "All the persons who are necessary parties in a suit cannot necessarily be necessary parties to an appeal unless the Statute makes it necessary. The second decision is Smt. Sudama v. Board of Revenue 1965 RD 233, in which a learned Judge has held as follows : "All the persons who are necessary parties in a suit cannot necessarily be necessary parties to an appeal unless the Statute makes it necessary. The suit having been decreed only in favour of Ahmad Yar Khan, in my opinion, the State of U.P. and the Gaon Sabha were not necessary parties in appel arising out of the ejectment suit against the petitioners. In any view of the matter, even if the lower appellate court thought that they were proper parties, it should have exercised its jurisdiction under Order XLI, Rule 20 and should have impleaded them as parties. Further, I find that since the names of the State of U.P. and the Gaon Sabha were not to be found in the trial court's decree, the non-impleadment of these parties could have been condoned, for it is a well established principle of law that no one should suffer for the mistake of the court. If the decree did not disclose the names of the parties the petitioners could justifiably urge before the court that no decree having been passed in favour of these persons, it was not necessary for the petitioner to have impleaded them. Therefore, in my opinion the first appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal on this preliminary point." 6. The third is Lakht Narain v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1971 RD 326, in which another learned Judge has held that the Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director were not justified in throwing away the appeal and the revision on the preliminary point without going into the merits. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite party has, on the other hand, cited Kr. Sarjeet Singh v. Dy. director of Consolidation 1967 RD 309 in which a learned Judge has taken a contrary view and has held as follows : "The decision of the revision application necessarily involved a decision as to the rights of all the co-tenure holders. In that view of the matter, the Deputy Director of Consolidation was patently right in holding that all were necessary parties to the revision application. In that view of the matter, the Deputy Director of Consolidation was patently right in holding that all were necessary parties to the revision application. The mere circumstance that Inderjit Singh alone contested the claim of the petitioner before the Consolidation Officer cannot derogate from the effect of the subsequent order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) that all the co-tenure holders and not Inderjit Singh also were interested in the plots comprised in the Khata. Accordingly it is not possible to hold that there is any error in the view taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that in order to maintain the revision application the petitioners should have impleaded the several tenure holders." 8. Another decision cited is Kadhora v. Mangua 1973 RD 57, in which a learned member has taken the view that if the appellant had knowledge of the fact that a party was impleaded as necessary party, he cannot take the stand that the decree of the court did not show the name. 9. The latest decision cited before me is Arya Ayurved Trust v. Board of Revenue 1975 RD 225 , which the Hon'ble Mr. Satish Chandra, J. (now C.J.) has taken the view that Order I, Rue 9, CPC provides that no suit shall be defaulted by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the court may in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy as far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. 10. The position which emerges in the present case is as follows : The real contesting parties in the case are Gaya Prasad on the one hand and Babu Lal and Bipati, the allottees, on the other. The Land Management Committee is only a pro forma respondent in the first appeal. The first appeal could not be dismissed on the technical ground of non-impleadment of the Land Management Committee. If the Additional Commissioner considered that the Land Management Committee was a necessary party, he could have ordered its impleadment, but could not have dismissed the appeal. Thus, the impugned order of the Additional Commissioner amounts to failure in the exercise of jurisdiction. 11. The result is that I hereby allow the revision, set aside the impugned order, and remand the first appeal to the Additional Commissioner for decision in accordance with law in the light of the above observations.