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Allahabad High Court · body

1979 DIGILAW 629 (ALL)

A. N. Nayar v. State Of U. P.

1979-05-25

M.M.HUSAIN

body1979
JUDGMENT M.Murtaza Husain, J. 1. This criminal revision is directed against the order dated 6-2-79 passed by the Sessions Judge, Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 1978 whereby he dismissed that appeal and upheld the order dated 20-3-78 passed by a Magistrate of the First Class at Lucknow. Through that order the revisionist was convicted by the learned Magistrate under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and was sentenced to undergo R. I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1000, or in default to undergo further R. I. for three months. 2. The undisputed facts of the case under revision are that the revisionist is running a coffee house in the market of Qaiserbagh in the city of Lucknow. That shop is known as Janta Coffee House. Besides serving coffee to the customers, snacks and refreshments are also prepared at that shop for being sold to customers. A sign-board is displayed out of the shop on which it is written that the medium of cooking used at the Coffee House was groundnut oil. On 24 5 75 the Food Inspector, Sri G. B. Krishna Kumar, P. W. 1, visited revisionist's shop. Some oil was found kept in a tin container inside the kitchen of the shop. The revisionist represented to the Food Inspector that the said container contained groundnut oil which was meant for preparation of edibles at the shop. The Food Inspector purchased 375 milligrams of oil from that container and paid Rs. 3 as its price to the revisionist. Necessary formalities for purchasing that sample and for sealing it were observed. Public Analyst's report was sent for. It disclosed that the sample was not of groundnut oil but it was of safflower oil (Barrey Ka Tel). The Additional Nagar Swastha Adhikari, Lucknow perused the Public Analyst's report and came to the conclusion that the revisionist should be prosecuted under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as he had stored misbranded oil for sale. A complaint was then filed against the revisionist. He admitted that sample of oil was purchased from him by the Food Inspector but he maintained that it was of pure Barrey oil and it was not stored or exposed for sale. A complaint was then filed against the revisionist. He admitted that sample of oil was purchased from him by the Food Inspector but he maintained that it was of pure Barrey oil and it was not stored or exposed for sale. The prosecution relied upon the statements of the Food Inspector and S. K. Saxena, PW 2, about purchase of sample of oil from revisionist's shop by the Food Inspector, Sri G. B. Krishna Kumar. It also relied on Public Analyst's report. The revisionist led no evidence in his defence. The learned Magistrate believed the prosecution evidence and finding the revisionist guilty under Sections 7/16 of the said Act convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid. The appeal preferred by the revisionist before the Sessions Judge against that conviction and sentence was dismissed in its entirety. 3. It has not been disputed before me that sample of oil was purchased by the Food Inspector from the revisionist's shop on 24-5-1975 after paying its price to him. It has also not been disputed that the sample thus purchased was duly sealed and Public Analyst's report was obtained which proved that the sample was of pure Barrey Ka Tel. The contention of the revisionist before this Court is two-fold. Firstly it is alleged that the revisionist had not represented the aforesaid oil to be groundnut oil and had plainly told the Food Inspector that it was Barrey Ka Tel. Secondly, it has been contended that it was not proved that the oil, whose sample was purchased by the Food Inspector, was stored by the revisionist for sale as such. On the other hand, it is contended that it was for preparation of edibles and therefore, the Food Inspector was not competent to purchase its sample and the revisionist cannot be held guilty under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 4. So far as the first contention is concerned, the concurrent finding of the two courts below, based upon oral as well as documentary evidence, is that the revisionist had represented to the Food Inspector that the container of oil, from which sample was purchased by the Food Inspector contained groundnut oil. The Food Inspector as well as R. K. Saxena P. W. 2 have stated about it. An endorsement in revisionist's hand appearing on the back of notice Ex. Ka-1, which endorsement is Ex. The Food Inspector as well as R. K. Saxena P. W. 2 have stated about it. An endorsement in revisionist's hand appearing on the back of notice Ex. Ka-1, which endorsement is Ex. Ka-2, shows that the revisionist had represented the aforesaid oil to be of groundnut. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the revisionist's plea that he had sold sample of oil to the Food Inspector representing the same to be of Safflower is not correct. On the other hand, the two courts below have lightly held that the said sample was sold by the revisionist representing it to be of groundnut oil. The revisionist having falsely represented Safflower to be groundnut oil obviously sold misbranded article of food, and, therefore, he should be held guilty if his second contention does not prevail. Coming to the second contention of the revisionist, it is prosecution's own case that the revisionist is not a dealer in edible oil. On the other hand, he is running a Coffee House where snacks and other articles of food are prepared for being offered to the customers. The oil which was found at the shop of the revisionist at the time of Food Inspector's visit was stored for being used as a medium for cooking those articles. It was never intended for sale as such. In Om Prakash v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1976 SC 195 a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court laid down that :- "The law is now well settled that the act of storing an adulterated article of food would be an offence only if storing is for sale. If adulterated article of food is stored by any person for consumption or for any purpose other than sale, it would not come within the inhibition of the section." 5. Again a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court considered the implication of the terms "stores" and "storing for sale" occurring in Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon etc., AIR 1976 SC 621 . Again a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court considered the implication of the terms "stores" and "storing for sale" occurring in Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon etc., AIR 1976 SC 621 . After considering the relevant provisions of the Act, their Lordships laid down that :- "From a conjoint reading of the above referred provision it will be clear that the broad scheme of the Act is to prohibit and penalise the sale, or import, manufacture, storage or distribution for sale of any adulterated article of food., The terms "store" and "distribute" take their colour from the context and the collection of words in which they occur in Sections 7 and 16. "Storage" or "distribution" of an adulterated article of food for a purpose other than for sale does not fall within them is chief of this section. That this is the right construction of the terms "store" and "distribute" in Section 16 (1) will be further clear from a reference to Section 10. Under that section the Food Inspector, whom the Act assigns a pivotal position for the enforcement of its provisions, is authorised to take samples of an article of food only from particular persons indulging in a specified course of business activity. The immediate or ultimate end of such activity is the sale of an article of food. The section does not give a blanket power to the Food Inspector to take samples of an article of food from a person who is not covered by any of the sub-clauses of sub-section (1) (a) of sub-section (2). The three sub-clauses of sub-section (1) (a) apply only to a person who answers the description of a seller or conveyer, deliverer, actual or potential of an article of food to a purchaser or consignee or his consignee after delivery of such an article to him. Sub-section (2) further makes it clear that sample can be taken only of that article of food which is "manufactured", "stored" or exposed for sale. Sub-section (2) further makes it clear that sample can be taken only of that article of food which is "manufactured", "stored" or exposed for sale. It follows that if an article of food is not intended for sale and is in the possession of a person who does not fulfil the character of a seller, conveyer, deliverer, consignee, manufacturer or storer for sale such as is referred to in sub-sections (1) (a) and (2) of the section, the Food Inspector will not be competent under the law to take a sample and on such sample being found adulterated, to validly launch prosecution thereon. In short the expression "store" in Section 7 means ''storing for sale" and consequently storing of an adulterated article of food for purposes other than for sale would not constitute an offence under Section 16 (1) (a)." 6. It is thus obvious that storing contemplated by Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as it stood at the time of occurrence involved in the present case i.e. 24-5 -75 meant storing for sale and not for any other purpose. Reliance was placed on behalf of the State upon an earlier decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Food Inspector, Calicut v. Cheru Katthil Gopalan, AIR 1971 SC 1725 , wherein it was observed that the person from whom article of food was purchased by the Food Inspector need not be a dealer as such in that article. That observation has been modified in the two subsequent decisions referred to above wherein it has been clearly laid down that ''storing" for purposes of the Act should be "Storing for Sale" and not for any other purpose. It is true that sale of the sample of an article of food by any person to the Food Inspector is technically speaking a "sale" but the primary requirement of Section 7 of the Act, as it stood at the time of the occurrence of this case, was storage of the article in question for sale and not for any other purpose. If that ingredient of the offence contemplated by that section was not established the Food Inspector was not authorised to purchase sample of the article concerned and the sale of sample to the Food Inspector, voluntarily or under compulsion, could not bring the seller within the four corners of the penal provisions of the Act. If that ingredient of the offence contemplated by that section was not established the Food Inspector was not authorised to purchase sample of the article concerned and the sale of sample to the Food Inspector, voluntarily or under compulsion, could not bring the seller within the four corners of the penal provisions of the Act. It is noteworthy that after the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon, AIR 1976 SC 621 the legislature amended the relevant provisions of Sections 7 and 10 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act through Amending Act No. 34 of 1976 which came into force on 1-4-1976. Through that amendment storing of an adulterant was made penal under Section 7 of the Act and an explanation was also added to that section which specifically laid down that a person shall be deemed to store any adulterated food or misbranded food, or any article of food referred to in clause (iii) or clause (iv) or clause (v) of the Act, if he stores such food for the manufacture therefrom of any article of food for sale. Through the introduction of this amendment in the Act storage of an adulterated or mis-branded medium of cooking for the purpose of preparing edibles therefrom has become penal, but those provisions did not exist when the occurrence involved in the present case took place. 7. In Jaya Sheena Shetty v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 CrLJ 1827 , it has been laid down by a learned single Judge of Bombay High Court that prior to the amendment of relevant provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on 1 - 4-1976 expressions "store" or "storing for sale" occurring in Section 7 of the Act did not cover storing of an adulterated article of food for purposes other than for sale, though the position has become otherwise since the introduction of those amendments. Finding myself in respectful agreement with those observations, I hold that when the occurrence involved in* the present case took place, storing of an adulterated or misbranded medium of cooking for the purpose of preparing edibles therefrom was not an offence as it did not come within the definition of the term "store" or "storing for sale" then occurring in Section 7 of the Act, though the same has become a penal offence since the amendments incorporated in Section 7 of the Act on 1-4-1976 through Amending Act No. 34 of 1976. 8. The result, therefore, is that the Food Inspector was not justified in purchasing sample of oil from the revisionist which was kept in his shop for preparation of edibles and not for sale as such. Even if sample was purchased and the same was found to be misbranded the revisionist could not be convicted under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, because he was not storing the said oil for the purpose mentioned in Section 7 of the Act as it then stood. The conviction of the revisionist ordered by the two courts below is thus illegal and has to be set aside by this Court. I, therefore, allow this revision and set aside revisionist's conviction and sentences ordered by the Courts below. Fine, if already paid, shall stand refunded to him. The revisionist is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are discharged. Revision allowed.