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1979 DIGILAW 631 (ALL)

Sukhbasi v. Nathu Ram

1979-05-31

H.N.AGARWAL

body1979
JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the Judgment and decree dated December 31, 1971 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, in appeal No. 12 of 1971 confirming the Judgment and decree of the trial court in suit No. 1/15 under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Respondent No. 1, Nathu Ram had filed a suit claiming to be the Sirdar of plot No. 16/1 in village Jarihapur and seeking the ejectment of the defendant-appellant Sukhbasi as a trespasser. Both the courts below have decreed the suit with costs and damages. 4. The ground taken in the second appeal the firstly, that the findings recorded by the courts below are entirely, perverse, secondly that the learned Additional Commissioner's view that the defendant-appellant can be ejected without payment of loan advanced by him to the plaintiff-respondent and defendant-respondent No. 4, is against the law; thirdly, that the learned Additional Commissioner had committed an error of law in discarding the genuineness of the agreement on the ground that the Lekhpal's statement regarding time for payment of money did not tally with time of payment of loan mentioned in the whiten agreement; and lastly that the defendant-appellant is not a possession of the disputed land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law and without the consent of the plaintiff-respondent and, therefore, the suit under Section 209 is not maintainable. 5. The facts of the case may be briefly stated. According to the plaintiff-respondent the defendant appellant, Sukhbasi, trespassed over the land in 1372F without any right and without his consent. Sukhbasi, however, claims that he is not a trespasser. On the other hand, according to him, the plaintiff-respondent as well as the defendant-respondent No. 4 had taken a loan of Rs. 15/- from him in June, 1955 and had in lieu of the loan given possession of the land to him. A further sum of Rs. 500/- was advanced on July 18, 1961 to the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-respondent No. 4 and an agreement was executed. He claims to be in possession by virtue of this agreement. 15/- from him in June, 1955 and had in lieu of the loan given possession of the land to him. A further sum of Rs. 500/- was advanced on July 18, 1961 to the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-respondent No. 4 and an agreement was executed. He claims to be in possession by virtue of this agreement. There is indeed, on record an agreement dated July 18, 1961, executed by the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-respondent No. 4 in which they admit to have received a sum of Rs. 2000/- as loan - Rs. 15/- earlier and Rs. 500/- at the time of execution of the deed from the defendant-Appellant and admitted the possession of the defendant-appellant over the plot. Oral evidence was also produced to corroborate the contents of this document. The findings of the courts below disbelieving this agreement on account of minor discrepancies in oral evidence are entirely perverse. Where the terms and conditions of an agreement are recorded in writing, no oral evidence to vary those terms and conditions is admissible in law. No where have the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-respondent No. 4 denied that the document in question does not bear their thumb impression. On the other hand the plaintiff-respondent admits in his cross-examination that he and Lajja Ram, respondent No. 4 have taken loan of Rs. 2000/- from the defendant-appellant and that a Panchayat was held on this question. He, however, has tried to wriggle out the contents of this document by saying that he does not know what has been written in the document. This is a lame excuse and cannot be accepted. The plaintiff's witness Sardar Khan as well as all the witnesses produced by the defendant-appellant also corroborate the fact of the loan advanced by the defendant-appellant. There is not the slightest evidence to suggest that the loan advanced has been repaid or that the possession delivered to the defendant-appellant, as recorded in the agreement dated July 18, 1961, was ever disturbed. Thus the case of the plaintiff-respondent that the defendant-appellant trespassed over the land in an unlawful manner and without his consent in 1372F falls to the ground. 6. As regards the question whether plaintiff-respondent is entitled to regain possession even without the repayment of the loan, it has been held in Khachermal v. Board of Revenue, 1969 R.D. 200. Thus the case of the plaintiff-respondent that the defendant-appellant trespassed over the land in an unlawful manner and without his consent in 1372F falls to the ground. 6. As regards the question whether plaintiff-respondent is entitled to regain possession even without the repayment of the loan, it has been held in Khachermal v. Board of Revenue, 1969 R.D. 200. "Where the title in the plot was not transferred to the defendant and the transference of possession to him was intimately connected with transaction of loan, where under the transferor had taken certain sums of money from the defendant, the transferor could not have legitimately required the defendant to restore possession without having repaid the loan. He could not have sued for possession on the ground that the defendant was a bare licensee whose licence was revocable at will because he was under an obligation implicit in the transaction entered into by him with the defendant that the would not get back possession till he repaid the loan." 7. I am entirely in agreement with the above view. The defendant-appellant is not a trespasser but is licensee and his licence to remain in possession can be terminated only when the loan amount is repaid. The courts below have erred in law in ordering his ejectment as a trespasser. 8. The result is that I hereby allow the second appeal and set aside the orders of the courts below. The suit stands dismissed.