JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for declaration that he is the adopted son of Raghupati Singh. 2. The two courts below have held that the point in issue between the parties, namely whether the plaintiff is the adopted son of Raghupati Singh, was res judicata and the suit was not maintainable in view of Holdings Act, by reason of the judgment by the High Court in C. M. Writ Petition No. 3450 of 1960 dated 6th May, 1960, quashing the order of the Dy. Director of Consolidation and directing that the name of the defendant shall be recorded as the tenure-holder in place of her deceased husband Raghupati Singh. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the view of the two courts below that the trial of the plaintiffs claim for the declaration that he is the adopted son of Raghupati Singh was barred by Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, or by res judicata is erroneous in law. He relied on Noor Khan v. Board of Revenue, 1977 All WC 394; in which K. N. Seth, J. repelled the argument that the suit in the revenue court in that case was barred by Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, with the following observations: "Proceedings under Chapt. III of the Act are confined to the preparation of record of rights. If a persons name is shown as a tenure-holder of the land, he can possibly have no grievance in that proceeding. The details about parentage, residence etc. are not material in that proceeding. Moreover, the consolidation authorities are concerned with regard to rights of a person as a tenure-holder and this alone they are competent to adjudicate upon. The question of parentage of a person does not relate to any right in the land. Such a matter can be adjudicated upon only by regular courts. Even if such a dispute is raised before the consolidation authorities, they would not be competent to decide it. While preparing the record of rights the consolidation authorities are not concerned with the shares which the different tenure-holders have in the land. They are also not competent to take proceedings for partitioning of the respective shares of the tenure-holders. Objections contemplated under Chap. While preparing the record of rights the consolidation authorities are not concerned with the shares which the different tenure-holders have in the land. They are also not competent to take proceedings for partitioning of the respective shares of the tenure-holders. Objections contemplated under Chap. III have to be confined to the arrangement of the consolidation scheme and cannot go beyond it. In this view of the matter it cannot be accepted that the objection relating to the parentage of the petitioner could or ought to have been raised in consolidation proceedings. Since the matter did not relate to any right in the land and could not have been raised in consolidation proceedings the bar created by Section 49 of the Act is not attracted and the court was competent to adjudicate upon the dispute." 4. That case is distinguishable on two grounds. Firstly, the suit in that case was in the revenue court which h,as no jurisdiction as such to declare whether a person is the adopted son of another. Such a declaration in the form of a decree can be granted only by a civil court. In that view, the principle of that decision should be applicable with greater force in the present case. Nevertheless, the other distinction in that case was the fact that the question of parentage was not raised or adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities. In the present case, it was specifically raised and decided against the plaintiff by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, whose order has been upheld by the judgment of this court dated 6th May, 1966, in the Writ Petition No. 3458 of 1960. The determination of the question about the plaintiffs parentage was necessary for determining the rights of the contending parties as a tenure-holder of the land by the consolidation authorities. The argument raised in Noor Khans case (supra) before K. N. Seth, J., was that the words "in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act", in Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, bars the jurisdiction of a civil or revenue court to try the question which was not raised before the consolidation authorities but which could or ought to have been raised before them. The learned Judge observed in that context that "if a persons name is shown as the tenure-holder of the land, he can possibly have no grievance in that proceeding, and that "the details about the parentage, residence, etc. are not material in that proceeding", that the "consolidation authorities are concerned with regard to the rights of a person as a tenure-holder and this alone they are competent to adjudicate upon" and that "the question of parentage of a person does not relate to any right in the land". In the present case, however, the question of parentage of the plaintiff was involved in and the determination of his claim to the land as tenure-holder thereof, depended on the adjudication of his parentage and the question of parentage was, in fact, raised and decided against him. 5. However, the plaintiff has not claimed in the present case any declaration or adjudication of his rights as a tenure-holder of the land which were in question before the consolidation authorities, nor is the adjudication of any other right arising out of the consolidation proceedings involved in the present case. The question of the plaintiffs parentage was in issue before the consolidation authorities and has been decided against him. Yet S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act cannot be said to bar the present suit. The question of the plaintiffs parentage was in issue before the consolidation authorities and has been decided against him. Yet S. 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act cannot be said to bar the present suit. Nevertheless, it has been held by the Supreme Coiurt in Smt. Raj Laxmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33 ; that "the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved" and further that the contentions regarding the competency of the former Court to try the subsequent suit is one of the limitation engrafted on the general, rule of res judicata by .S. 11 of the Civil P. C. and has application to suits alone; and that when a plea of res judicata is founded on general principles of law, all that is necessary to establish is that the court that heard and decided the former case, was a court of competent jurisdiction; that it does not seem necessary in such cases to further prove that it has jurisdiction to hear the later suit; and that "A plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction, like revenue Courts, land acquisition Courts, administration Courts etc. "which are not entitled to try a regular suit and only exercise a special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute." 6. It cannot be disputed that the consolidation authorities exercise a special jurisdiction conferred on them by statute. Their decisions are made final in respect of the matters which they are competent to decide. The plaintiff being the adopted son of Raghupati Singh iwas the very basis of the title which he claimed as a tenure-holder of the land before the consolidation authorities. By the suit giving rise to the present second appeal, he has claimed a declaration that he is an adopted son of Raghupati Singh. It is the same title which has been decided against him by the consolidation authorities. No property appears to be involved in the suit, as the plaint now stands, but it appears that in the plaint as originally filed some agricultural land, most probably the same which was the subject-matter of the dispute before the consolidation authorities, was shown to be 'the property affected by the declaration sought. No property appears to be involved in the suit, as the plaint now stands, but it appears that in the plaint as originally filed some agricultural land, most probably the same which was the subject-matter of the dispute before the consolidation authorities, was shown to be 'the property affected by the declaration sought. Even if it had been some other property in respect of which relief had been claimed in the suit on the basis that the plaintiff is the adopted son of Raghupati Singh, the claim was bound to fail in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Raj Laxmi Dasis case (supra). The fact that no relief is claimed in respect of any property on that basis and only a declaration of status has been claimed does not in my opinion make any difference and the principle enunciated in Raj Laxmi Dasis case (supra) squarely covers the present case also; and it must be held that the trial of plaintiffs claim is barred by the general principles of res judicata. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.