JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 14th July,1977 passed by third Additional Session Judge, Jalaun at Orai dismissing the appeal that was filed by the applicant against his conviction under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 2. On 22nd November, 1974, at about 3 p.m., Food Inspector, Kadaura collected a sample of mustard oil from the applicants shop in accordance with law. One part of the sample was sent to the public analyst who reported it to be adulterated. It was also found that the applicant did not have any licence to sell mustard oil. A prosecution was therefore, launched against the applicant for selling adulterated oil as also for selling the same without any licence. The trial court held the applicant guilty of selling adulterated mustard oil and, in consequence of that conclusion, convicted him under section 7 read with section 16 (i) of the Act and sentenced him to six months R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. Aggrieved against his conviction and sentence the applicant filed an appeal in the court of sessions at Orai. Learned III Additional Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal, found it devoid of substance and dismissed the same vide order dated 14th July, 1977. Dissatisfied with it, the applicant has come up in revision before this court. 3. The first contention raised by learned counsel for the applicant before me was that there was no valid sanction in the case. Learned counsel pointed out that sanction in the instant case was accorded by the Deputy Chief Medical Officer and not by the District Medical Oilier of Health as "shown by the statement on oath made by Dr. D.R. Prabhakar (P.W.2). 4. Accepting that the sanction in the instant case was accorded by the Deputy Chief Medical Officer (health), it is apparent on a perusal of the notification referred to in the judgment of the lower appellate court that the Deputy Chief Medical Officer of Health was competent to grant the sanction. Consequently, the sanction cannot be said to have been accorded by a person not competent to do so. 5. It was further urged that the order sanctioning the prosecution does not count in any facts and, consequently, it stands vitiated. I am once again unable to agree. Consequently, the sanction cannot be said to have been accorded by a person not competent to do so. 5. It was further urged that the order sanctioning the prosecution does not count in any facts and, consequently, it stands vitiated. I am once again unable to agree. The sanction has been accorded on a document which contained all the relevant facts. It should, therefore, follow that the facts constituting the offence were before the sanctioning authority when he accorded the sanction. In that context, it cannot be said that the Deputy Chief Medical Officer accorded the sanction without applying his mind to the facts of the case. It may further be added that the Deputy Chief Medical Officer of health himself entered the witness box a d made statement on oath that he accorded sanction after looking into the relevant papers. In view of the statement on oath made by the Deputy Chief Medical Officer of Health, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected. 6. It was next urged that since the alleged article of food, on the own showing of the prosecution, was an adulterated article, it was not open to the authority concerned also to prosecute the applicant for selling it without licence. There is substance in the argument. A perusal of section 16 of the Act would show that clause (1) (a) (i) thereof makes the selling of adulterated or misbranded article an offence. Selling of article of food without licence is made an offence in clause (a) (ii) of section 16 (1) of the Act. A perusal thereof would show that it does not apply to any article of food referred to in clause (I). As already stated earlier clause (i) inter alia, refers to the adulterated article of food. It should therefore, follow that selling of adulterated article of food without licence would not fall under section 16 (i) (a) (ii) of the Act. Learned Deputy Government Advocate could not refer me to any other provision in the Act making sale of adulterated article of food without licence punishable. In the instant case since the mustard oil collected from the possession of the applicant, on the own showing of the prosecution, was adulterated, the applicant could not further be prosecuted for selling it without licence. In the instant case since the mustard oil collected from the possession of the applicant, on the own showing of the prosecution, was adulterated, the applicant could not further be prosecuted for selling it without licence. The argument however, appears to be only academic because on a perusal of the judgment of the trial court, I find that the trial court convicted the applicant only for selling adulterated mustard oil. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant next urged on the own showing of food inspector the applicant has told him at the time when the latter was collecting sample that the mustard oil was not meant for human consumption but was for burning purposes. Learned counsel stressed that there is nothing on record to indicate that the mustard oil, out of which the sample was collected by the food inspector, was meant for human consumption and, consequently, the applicant could not have been convicted under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. I find force in this contention. 8. There is no controversy about the fact that section 16(1) only applies to an article of food imported, manufactured, stored, sold or distributed for human consumption. In other words, an article which is not meant for human consumption could not be covered by section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. The question then arises is whether there was any evidence before the court below to warrant a conclusion that the mustard oil out of which the sample was collected, was meant for human consumption. Out of the four witnesses explained by the prosecution, the evidence of Dr. D.R. Prabhakar (P.W.2) is of formal nature and needs no reference. Banwari Lal Nigam (PW1) Food Inspector, Shiv Narain Bhartiya (P.W.3), and Badlu Prasad (P.W.4) merely stated that on the date and time alleged by the prosecution, the food inspector collected a sample out of the mustard oil at the shop of the applicant. None of the aforesaid witnesses stated that at the time of the collection of the sample the applicant had stated that the mustard oil was meant for human consumption. None of the aforesaid witnesses stated that at the time of the collection of the sample the applicant had stated that the mustard oil was meant for human consumption. On the contrary, according to the admission elicited in in the crors-examination of Banwari Lal Nigam Food Inspector, Rakesh Kumar, owner of the shop leached there when the food inspector was still collecting sample and at that very time Rakesh Kumar told him that the mustard oil was meant for burning purposes and not for human consumption, it was also put to the food inspector that there was label to that effect on the tin which contained mustered oil stating that the oil was meant for burning purposes. The food inspector first denied that suggestion but latter modified his answer and said that if there was any such label on the tin, it was not decipherable. That indicates that the food inspector did not carefully examine the tin before collecting sample out of it. Badlu (P.W.4) stated in cross-examination that there was a label on the tin. He too having however, Stated that since the label was stained with oil, the writing thereon was not decipherable. A suggestion was put to him thereafter that it was stated on the label that the tin contained burning oil, and to that Badlu only stated that he could not say whether it was so stated on the label or not. 9. The above being the state of evidence, there is no escape from the conclusion that there was no material on record warranting a concision to the effect that the oil out of which the sample was collected was meant for human consumption. It is a matter of common knowledge that a groccer keeps edible as well as non-edible articles at his shop. The mere fact that there were some edible articles at the shop could not form a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the mustard oil, out of which the sample was collected, was meant for human consumption. Needless to say that it was for the prosecution to prove that the article out of which the sample was collected, was meant for human consumption. As already stated, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden in that respect. Therefore, the finding recorded by the trial court that the mustard oil, out of which sample was collected, was for human consumption cannot be maintained. As already stated, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden in that respect. Therefore, the finding recorded by the trial court that the mustard oil, out of which sample was collected, was for human consumption cannot be maintained. 10. This revision is, accordingly allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the lower appellate court are set aside. The applicant is on bail, he need not surrender. The bonds furnished by him shall stand discharged.