S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THESE two first appeals are filed by the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation through its General Manager challenging the common award of compensation as passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rajkot in two compensation cases bearing claim case No. 14/72 and claim case No. 15/72. The appellant Corporation was original respopondent No. 5 in both the claim cases filed by two separate claimants. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the present appeals may now be briefly stated:-ON 28th September 1971 one S. T. bus No. GTE 3870 collided with a motor truck No. GTD 5119 on Bhavnagar-Rajkot Highway. The said collision between the two aforesaid vehicles resulted in death of two passengers who were driven in the motor truck in question. The dependents of the two victims filed two claim cases before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rajkot. Claim case No. 14/72 was filed by the heirs and legal representatives of deceased Naran Apla while claim case No 15/72 was filed by the heirs and legal representatives of deceased Kana Kachara. In both these claim case the driver of motor truck in question was joined as opponent No. 1 while the owner of the motor truck was joined as opponent No. 2. He expired pending the claim petition before the Tribunal and his heirs were duly brought on record in each of the two claim cases. Opponent No. 3 in both the claim cases was insurance company with which the motor truck was insured at the relevant time. Opponent No. 4 was the driver of the S. T. bus that collided with the truck and opponent No. 5 was the State Transport Corporation which was the owner of the S. T. bus in question. ( 3 ) THE case of the claimants in both the claim petitions was that on 28 both the deceased and some other persons were taken as paid passengers by the driver of the motor truck No. GTD 5119. They were charged Rs. ( 3 ) THE case of the claimants in both the claim petitions was that on 28 both the deceased and some other persons were taken as paid passengers by the driver of the motor truck No. GTD 5119. They were charged Rs. 1 per passenger and 0-25 P. for each can of milk which was carried by these passengers including the two deceased; that the deceased were permitted to travel in the truck in question from village Halenda on Bhavnagar-Rajkot Highway; that the said truck was proceeding towards Rajkot; that on its onward journey towards Rajkot the said truck was involved in a collision with the oncoming S. T. bus driven by Patel Limba Dahya who was opponent No. 4 in both the cases. This S. T. bus was coming from Rajkot side while the truck in question was proceeding towards Rajkot side; that the truck was filled with bags of fertilizers; that the accident in question took place near the culvert on the road. It is the case of the claimants that the bus was coming from the opposite side; that the driver of the truck did not stop nor did he slow down his vehicle but went on driving rashly and negligently and that too on wrong side of the road occupying most the space of the road. It is further averred by the claimants that as soon as the driver saw the S. T. bus coming from the opposite direction he came right across the road on the other side; that the truck and the S. T. bus collided and the impact was on the right side of both the vehicles. It is further the case of the claimants that even after the impact the truck went 23 meters and 80 centimeters away from the place of accident; that it left the road and went on its side turtled twice and rolled in a ditch which was having one foot of water. Deceased Naran Apala and deceased Kana Kachara who were sitting on the bags of fertilizers loaded in the said truck fell in water and were crushed under the bags of fertilizers. It is further averred that the driver of the bus also drove his vehicle rashly and negligently and dashed the bus with the truck and the culvert due to which the parapet wall 6 ft. It is further averred that the driver of the bus also drove his vehicle rashly and negligently and dashed the bus with the truck and the culvert due to which the parapet wall 6 ft. in length on the northern side of the road was demolished and the bus proceeded further and dashed against a babul tree and stopped there; that the deceased passengers of the truck viz. Naran Apala and Kana Kachara died oh account of the injuries received by them as a result of the aforesaid accident. It is the case of the claimants in both the claim petitions that the drivers of both the motor vehicles viz. the S. T. bus and the motor truck were rash and negligent; that they drove their respective vehicle by committing breach of the rules and regulations pertaining to the safety of the traffic which would be found on the highway; that both the drivers drove their vehicles with wanton disregard for human life and drove on the curve and the Nala with excessive speed. The claimants contend that if the respective drivers had taken reasonable care and observed the rules of the road this unfortunate accident would have been avoided. Therefore the case of the claimants in both the petition is that the deceased had died due to rash and negligent driving on the part of both the drivers; that as the truck in question belonged to original opponent No. 2 and that it was being driven by opponent No. 1 both of them were joined as parties to the claim petition. They also joined the insurance company which had insured the truck as opponent No. 3 and as already stated above the driver of the S. T. bus was joined as opponent No. 4 and opponent No. 5 as its owner. The common contention of the claimants was that opponents Nos. 2 and 5 were vicariously liable for the tortious acts of their respective drivers and the insurance company which had insured the truck was also liable to make good the compensation claim as it had insured the offending truck. (HIS Lordship after considering the facts and assessing the evidence in the case held that the accident in question was caused due to the composite negligence and rashness of the drivers of both the vehicles of the S. T. bus and the Goods Truck. (HIS Lordship after considering the facts and assessing the evidence in the case held that the accident in question was caused due to the composite negligence and rashness of the drivers of both the vehicles of the S. T. bus and the Goods Truck. The Court also held that the owner of the truck was liable to make 800d the claim of the claimants in both the claim petitions. His Lordship further observed :-) ( 4 ) THAT takes us to the third point for determination and that pertains to the computation of compensation payable to the concerned claimants in both the claim petitions. As a result of the aforesaid accident two lives were lost. Deceased Naran Apala and deceased Kana Kachara who were carried in the truck in question were crushed below the manure bags were suffocated and died when the truck had turned turtle because of the collision with the S. T. bus. The dependents and legal representatives of deceased Naran Apala filed claim case No. 14/72 while dependents of deceased Kana Kachara filed claim case No. 15/72. In claim case No. 14 the claim for compensation was to the tune of Rs. 50 0 The Tribunal awarded Rs. 19 0 But at the stage of present appeal No. 258 the claimants have restricted their total claim to Rs. 30 0 in their cross objections. We will have to decide their claim for compensation in F. A. No. 258/74 arising out of claim case No. 14/72 in the light of the restricted claim. In claim case No. 15/72 the dependents of Kana Kachara also claimed Rs. 50 3 before the Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 34 240 The claimants in their cross objections in F. A. No. 257/74 have claimed an additional amount of Rs. 15760/to make up the total. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the basis of the claimants claims for compensation as put forward by the respective claimants it would be necessary to have a glance at the relevant evidence on record. At the outset we may say that the claimants seek to get compensation on the basis that both the deceased had dual sources of income at the time of their death. Each of the deceased had income from agriculture and also income from the milk business. At the outset we may say that the claimants seek to get compensation on the basis that both the deceased had dual sources of income at the time of their death. Each of the deceased had income from agriculture and also income from the milk business. The annual income of each of the deceased is sought to be calculated on the basis of this twin sources of income and on that basis compensation for economic loss and loss to the estate is sought to be recovered from the concerned opponents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) NOW so far as the income from the other sources is concerned viz. agriculture operations we may mention that the Claims Tribunal has in para 17 of its judgment took the view that so far as agriculture lands were concerned even after the deaths of the deceased the lands remained intact with the dependents. As corpus remained intact the claimants could not claim by way of compensation loss of income which the deceased was earning from agriculture. On that reasoning the Claims Tribunal held that the economic loss which the claimants suffered on account of the death of the deceased was to the extent that they had to engage a servant Valera Dana. The Claims Tribunal held that because of the engagements of the Sathi the Claimants had to be out of pocket to the extent of Rs. 2000 per year by way of salary and other expenses incurred as they had to feed him and give him shelter and clothing. The Tribunal further held that the Sathi had to be paid Rs. 2000/by way of salary and giving him food shelter and clothing will require Rs. 1000/so the economic loss to the family was estimated of Rs. 3000/per year for a period of three years till the eldest son to the deceased became major and could mind agricultural operations. Thus Sathi will have to be paid for three years and on that basis the Tribunal calculated the figure of economic loss of the Rs. 9000. 00. Mr. S. M. Shah made a serious grievance regarding the aforesaid approach of the tribunal. Thus Sathi will have to be paid for three years and on that basis the Tribunal calculated the figure of economic loss of the Rs. 9000. 00. Mr. S. M. Shah made a serious grievance regarding the aforesaid approach of the tribunal. He submitted that even though the agriculture lands remained as they were the economic loss suffered by the dependents has got to be measured by applying appropriate multiplier with datum figure of the net income that used to come from the agriculture operations which depended on the capacity of the deceased to work and labour and as the work and labour and on the personal supervision and energy possessed by the deceased. Thus the income which he got was the net benefit to the dependents which would be permanently lost to the members of the family now and hence the income from agricultural lands could not have been discarded by the Claims Tribunal only on the supposition that the corpus of agricultural holding remained the same on this aspect we have the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 37 of 1972 decided on 3-2-1975 by B. K. Metha and N. H. Bhatt JJ judgment by B. K. Metha J. In the aforesaid decision this Court had to deal with a similar case where the deceased who had died in motor accident had left agricultural lands and the question was as to how compensation payable to his dependents was to be computed. It was observed that the evidence in the case before the Division Bench clearly established that the deceased was cultivating lands S. Nos. 401 402 and 403 totally admeasuring 80 Bighas on rental basis. It was found in that case that the Tribunal erred in computing the income of Rs. 7500/from agricultural operations. The Tribunals approach was not found to be justified and it was then observed that the Tribunal preferred to adopt this approach in view of a decision of Allahabad High Court in Nathu Ram v. Mr. Chand Kaur A. I. R. 1927 All 684 which laid down that in case of a cultivator a different basis of assessing compensation should be adopted and after the death of the deceased cultivator the agricultural holding remained intact in the hands of his heirs. Chand Kaur A. I. R. 1927 All 684 which laid down that in case of a cultivator a different basis of assessing compensation should be adopted and after the death of the deceased cultivator the agricultural holding remained intact in the hands of his heirs. The Division Bench disagreeing with the said decision observed as under :-"we do not think that this approach is at all justified when we are considering what should be compensation for the loss of life in a fatal accident. The principles are too well known now to be referred to and they have been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Services Ltd. v. R. M. K. Veluswami A. I. R. 1962 S C. 1 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhangvati A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1750 and C. K. S. Iyers case (Supra) and following the Supreme Courts decision and a decision of this Court in Hirji Virji Transport v. Bashiram Bibi 12 G. L. R. 783 following the above decisions. It should be emphasised that in fatal accidents a fair amount of damages has to be assessed not by way of giving solatium but as compensation which is proportionate to the injury Under sec. 1a of the Fatal Accidents Act; the Court has to compensate for the loss which results to the defendants by way of losing the amount which would have been spent on them by the deceased during the life time of his expected usual life. While under sec. 2 the estimate of compensation is to the loss of the estate of the deceased. Under the first head the loss has an element of maintenance while under the second head the loss has a saving element though the Court should not assess twice over the loss under the first head. Under Lord Wrights formula laid down in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collaries Ltd. 1942 A C. 601 which is usually applied the loss is ascer tained by first arriving at the estimate of the annual dependency amount from the income of the deceased after deducting the amount which be would have spent on himself. and the damage on this head of loss to the dependents is arrived at by awarding a lump sum amount which is calculated by applying a proper multiplier to the amount of one years dependency. and the damage on this head of loss to the dependents is arrived at by awarding a lump sum amount which is calculated by applying a proper multiplier to the amount of one years dependency. The different approach which the learned Member of the Tribunal has adopted because the deceased happened to be a cultivator has no justifying basis. Even in cases of victims under the Fatal Accidents who may be non-cultivators there may be some properties in the nature of investments savings etc. which may come in the hands of the heirs and representatives of the deceased as a result of his death and which were also available in the life time of the victim. That would however not justify a Tribunal to take a different view in assessment of damages on the first head under sec. IA of the Fatal Accidents Act merely because some property remains intact and is available to the dependents. In our view therefore the learned Member of the Tribunal was clearly in error in this case in two respects. The first error he committed was in reaching the conclusion that the net income of the deceased was only Rs. 1500/on the queer reasoning that that should be assessed from the actual loss in which the applicants are exposed as a result of the demise. We do not concur at all with this reasoning of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has to address itself for purposes of ascertaining the damages under the first head under sec. IA of the Fatal Accidents Act as to what was the loss to the dependents and that loss is ascertained by first arriving at the estimate of the actual dependency amount from the income of the deceased after deducting the amount which would have been spent by him. It may be that while determining what proper multiplier should be applied the Tribunal should keep in mind what has remained intact with the dependents but in our opinion that would not have a bearing on the question as to what was the actual income of the deceased. In our view therefore on reading of the evidence the fact which has been established as uncontroverted fact. In our view therefore on reading of the evidence the fact which has been established as uncontroverted fact. is that the deceased was cultivating 80 Bighas of land out of which for 55 Bighas he was paying rent at the rate of Rs 60/per bigha after 1969 and he was cultivating free hold land the remaining 25 Bighas. . . . . . . . "the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court puts the question beyond any pale of controversy. The Tribunal in the case before the Division Bench had committed same error which has been committed by the Tribunal in the present case relying on the Allahabad decision. The Tribunal in the aforesaid decision had excluded the income of the deceased from the agricultural operation on the ground that agricultural holding remained intact with the dependents. The Division Bench in the aforesaid decision disagreed with the Allahabad view and clearly held that the extent of holding of a cultivator in the hands of the dependents may be a relevant factor while deciding the multiplier of the income from agriculture as earned by the deceased and the income from agricultural holding could not be considered to be irrelevant. In the present case also the Tribunal perhaps labouring under the same view as the Allahabad High Court has done came to the conclusion that agricultural holding of the dependents of Naran remained the same and therefore the income of the deceased from agriculture could not be considered for the purpose of computation of compensation. It is therefore obvious that the income of the deceased from agriculture will have to be considered for the purpose of arriving at the correct figure of compensation payable to the claimants. It is true as observed by the aforesaid Division Bench that the extent of the holding of the lands with the dependents will be relevant while applying proper multiplier for the purpose of capitalising the figure the net earning of the deceased when dependency benefit is to be computed. But no other emphasis can be placed on the fact of the agricultural holding remaining intact in the hands of the dependents. We will have therefore to compute proper compensation keeping in view agricultural holding of the deceased in the light of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment. But no other emphasis can be placed on the fact of the agricultural holding remaining intact in the hands of the dependents. We will have therefore to compute proper compensation keeping in view agricultural holding of the deceased in the light of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment. We may also refer at this juncture to the observations found in Kemp and Kemp The quantum of Damages Vol I 4 edition at page 151. We find certain relevant observations on the aspect of damages for personal injury. It has been observed by the learned authors that completely collateral matters cannot be invoked by a tortfeasor to reduce the damages payable to the victim of his tort. This is the general principle to be applied while considering whether a deduction should be made from plaintiffs damages because of the incidence of some benefit pecuniary or otherwise. The fact that the dependents have inherited agricultural holdings of the deceased because of the tortious act of the tortfeasor who killed him is totally irrelevant and is completely a collateral matter. This could not be pressed in service for reducing damages payable to the dependents of the deceased. Under the said topic pertaining to The incidence of benefits the learned authors had an occasion to refer to pensions which may be paid to certain victims who may have suffered injuries on account of tortious act of a tortfeasor. It has been observed that no deduction is to be made in respect of any pension payable to a plaintiff as the result of his injuries. It makes no difference whether the pension is payable as of right or is discretionary nor whether it is contributory or non-contributory. The aforesaid observations been based by the learned authors on a decision from the House of Lords in Parry v. Cleaver 1970 A. C. 1 which had overruled the decision of the Court of Appeal in Browning v. War Office (1963) I Q. B. 750. In the case of Parry v. Cleaver 1970 A. C. 1 the facts were that the plaintiff police constable who was aged 35 years and had served for 12 years in the police force was severely injured by a motor car driven negligently by the defendant in that case on January 4 1963 He had made compulsory contributions of *1 3s. 1d. 1d. a week to a police pension fund out of his pay of * 21. 18s. 3d. a week This entitled him as of right to a pension on being discharged from the police force for disablement. On June 30 1964 he was so discharged owing to disablement resulting from his injuries and thereafter received a police pension of * 3 18s. 4d. a week (or *204 a year) payable for the rest of his life. He also earned *13 16s. a week at clerical employment. The question was whether in computing damages payable to the victim due to the tortious act of the defendant the police pension received by him on account of injury was deductible or not. In the aforesaid case the learned trial Judge held that the disablement pension was collateral and was liable to be ignored in assessing losses suffered by the victim. But the Court of Appeal holding that the pension must be taken into consideration reduced the decree of damages from *15 500 to *7 937 The dissatisfied plaintiff had approached the House of Lords in further appeal and allowing his appeal it was held by the House of Lords that the police pension should be ignored in assessing the plaintiffs financial loss and that the damages should be assessed at *9 500 It was observed by Lord Reid in the majority decision that moneys received under a contract of insurance are not to be taken into account in assessing damages since it would be unjust that money spent by an injured man on premiums should enure to the benefit of a tortfeasor and a contributory pension scheme is a form of insurance. The products of a contributory pension scheme are in fact delayed remuneration for current work. Lord Pearce observed that the character of the plaintiffs pension rights brought them within the general principle that private insurance by a plaintiff is not to be taken into account and there is no adequate equitable reason for excluding that principle. While concurring Lord Wilberforce observed that the police pension should not be considered in computing damages recoverable from a third person for proved loss of earning capacity because (a) that pension was payable in any event and was not dependent on loss of earning capacity and (b) it was the reward of preinjury services and therefore not relevant to the loss of post-injury wages. Thus it has been firmly established by the aforesaid decision that any collateral benefit which an injured man got because of the injury could not be pressed in service to reduce the damages payable by the wrongdoer to the victim. On the same lines is the decision of the Kings Bench Division in Liffen v. Watson 1940 (1) K B. 5. 56. In the aforesaid case the facts were that a domestic servant had received personal injuries. Before she received injuries she was given free boarding and lodging facilities by her employer. But after her injuries as she was rendered useless for the work which she W15 doing she was discharged from the employment and after the accident she had to live with her father to whom she made no payment for boarding and lodging. In an action brought by the victim it was urged by the tortfeasor that the victim was already given free lodge and boarding by her father and therefore the very loss of free lodge and boarding facilities at the place of her erstwhile employer should not be considered while computing damages. The Court of Appeal negatived the said plea on behalf of the tortfeasor and held that the plaintiff victim was entitled to recover damages not only in respect of her loss in wages but also in respect of the loss of board and lodging and consequently the decision of the trial Judge was set aside and while allowing the appeal Slesser L J. On behalf of the Court of Appeal observed that if the Judge at the new trial came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs contract with her employer was as she alleged that she should be paid a certain amount of wages in cash and given certain benefits in the shape of board and lodging in kind a payment which was expressly excepted from the Trucks Act in the case of a domestic servant there was no reason why in the assessment of damages the loss of the board and lodging should not stand on the same footing as the loss in cash of the wages. If since the plaintiffs discharge from hospital her father had provided her with board and lodging in his home that was no reason why she should not be heard to say that the facility of lodge and board provided by her employer was as much a loss to her as if she had lost the actual sum in money. It had been said that there was no authority in the matter. None was needed. It was a matter of general principle that a wrong doer must recompense a plaintiff for the damage which naturally flows from the wrongdoing. Goddard L. J. while concurring with Luxmoore L. J. observed that in his view the learned trial Judge was wrong. The question whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages under that head from the defendant did not depend on whether or not she had made a contract for board and lodging with someone else. The plaintiff lost her right to the board and lodging provided by her employer because she was rendered by the accident unfit to work. It did not matter whether after the accident she was taken in by her father or a friend to whom she might say:- I cannot make a contract with you but I will pay you something if I recover damages. The only consideration was what the plaintiff lost. She lost the value of the board and lodging just as she lost her wages and she was entitled to be compensated for that loss. What she did with the compensation when she received it was a matter for her and nobody else. If she liked to pay her father for the board and lodging he has given to her she could do 50. Perhaps he had got some claim on her but however that might be what was done with the compensation could not affect the question. (Emphasis supplied.) The aforesaid decision of the Kings Bench also clearly establishes the basis that in computing damages payable by the wrongdoer the tortfeasor it would be no defence to say that after the injuries in question there was no actual loss suffered by the victim and the correct basis is as to what is the actual loss on account of the injuries caused by the tortfeasor. We may also refer to the observations of the learned authors in Kemp and Kemp Quantum of Damages referred to by us earlier in Vol. I at page 230. While considering the question of computing damages under the fatal accidents the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 awardable to the dependents on account of injuries resulting from the death of the deceased it has been oberved that the Court is perfectly entitled to consider the case of each dependent separately and occasionally this is the only satisfactory method. But in most cases the Court first assesses the dependents loss as a whole and then apportions the damages amongst the dependents. The method usually adopted is stated by Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd. 1942 A. C. 601. Therein it has been observed as under :-"there is no question here of what may be called sentimental damage bereavement or pain and suffering. It is a hard matter of pounds shillings and pence subject to the element of reasonable future probabilities. The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years purchase". THUS the proper method of evaluating the figure of compensation in case of fatal injury as well as personal injury case has been to arrive at a reasonable multiplication or the datum figure culled out from the net income of the victim and by adopting reasonable multiplier depending upon the facts of the case proper capitalised figure is arrived at. This method has stood the test of time and is well accepted by series of judgments some which we have already referred in the course of this judgment. In the light of this settled legal position we have to approach the question of computation of compensation in the present case. As we have already stated above the Tribunal approached the case from entirely a wrong angle. In the light of this settled legal position we have to approach the question of computation of compensation in the present case. As we have already stated above the Tribunal approached the case from entirely a wrong angle. We will have therefore to approach the question by applying proper principle as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in F. A. No. 37 of 1974 and in the light of the legal position as emerging from the other decisions mentioned by us above. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HIS Lordship in F. A. No. 257/74 allowed additional compensation of Rs. 15 760 with proportionate costs and interest. His Lordship in F. A. No. 257 awarded the total claim of Rs. 50 0 which were to be distributed between the widow and the minor children. His Lordship also directed that the net amount of Rs. 40 0 representing the share of the minors shall be invested in the Schedule Bank. His Lordship then further observed :- ( 7 ) THIS takes us to the fourth and last point for determination which arises for our consideration and which pertains to the liability of the insurance company original opponent No. 5 in both the claim cases. It is clear from the evidence discussed by us above that both the deceased were paid passengers travelling in the truck in question when it met with the accident. This has been clearly brought out in the evidence of eye witnesses Devayat Raning Ex 73 and Ghogha Kunvera Ex. 84 that the driver of the truck had charged Rs. 1. 25 per passenger and 0-25 p. per can while permitting them to board the truck for their onward journey to Rajkot. In case of such paid passengers in goods truck the question regarding liability of the insurance company if such truck met with an accident is now well settled by the Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Ambaben Manilal v. Usmanbhai 19 G. L. R. 914. The aforesaid decision of the Full Bench clearly lays down that if passengers are carried gratuitously in a goods vehicle the insurance company would not be liable to answer the claim of compensation arising out of injuries caused to such passengers. The aforesaid decision of the Full Bench clearly lays down that if passengers are carried gratuitously in a goods vehicle the insurance company would not be liable to answer the claim of compensation arising out of injuries caused to such passengers. If on the other hand passengers are carried for hire or reward in the goods truck the insurance company will be answerable for the claims arising out of injuries caused to such passengers as result of accident. In the present case it is clearly established on record that both the deceased were passengers for hire or reward and they had paid Rs. 1. 25p. per head. They had also paid 0-25 per can for the carriage of their milk cans. Thus it can be said that the deceased passengers in question were carried in the goods truck on payment. They were also passengers who had hired the truck in question for carrying their milk cans. Thus it can easily be seen that both the deceased were passengers who were carried in the truck for hire or reward and consequently under the law the insurance company original respondent No. 5 would remain liable to satisfy the claim amount payable to the concerned claimants. Mr. Oza for the insurance company submitted that the Claims Tribunal has exonerated the insurance company and there was no appeal and consequently the question of liability of the insurance company could not be reopened. It is difficult for us accept that submission. There is a two-fold answer to the said submission firstly the claimants have already filed cross objections challenging that part of the award which was against them. Cross objections are filed in both the appeals. It is true that the claimants have not taken specific contentions regarding the liability of the insurance company In their cross objections but it would be an additional ground which can certainly be permitted as a pure question of law as emerging from the aforesaid F. B. decision. The second answer to Mr. Ozas submission is that we can always exercise our powers under Order 41 Rule 33 of the C. P. C. We can certainly go into the question about liability of the insurance company to pay compensation. The second answer to Mr. Ozas submission is that we can always exercise our powers under Order 41 Rule 33 of the C. P. C. We can certainly go into the question about liability of the insurance company to pay compensation. We therefore go into the said question and come to the conclusion that the original opponent No. 3 the insurance company in both the cases would be liable to satisfy the compensation award in both the claim cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . [the rest of the Judgment is not material for the reports. ] orders accordingly. .