Judgment B. P. Sinha, J. 1. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India the petitioner has challenged an order contained in annexure 5 has also prayed for the issuance of writ of mandamus directing the respondents to allow him to resume his duties. 2. Shortly stated the facts are these. A vacancy for the post of a clerk occurred in Hindu Uchcha Vidyalaya, Hazaribagh. In response to a advertisement the petitioner along with two others applied for being appointed to the said post. On 30th March, 1977, the Secretary of the Managing Committee sent a recommendation to the Subdivisional Education Officer, Hazaribagh for the appointment of one Akhauri Bhujang Bhushan Sahay. The petitioners name was put at serial no.3 in order of preference. It appears that on 18th of June, 1977, the Board of Secondary Education issued a Circular that appointments to the post of clerks in the Schools should be made on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates. On 16th of June, 1977, however, the Subdivisional Education Officer appointed the petitioner as a clerk on a temporary basis on the basis of the Boards Letter no.4041-4221, dated 1 -3-1975. The Secretary of the Board directed the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School by a letter, dated 17th of July, 1978, to allow the petitioner to join his post. These two orders are contained in Annexures 3 and 4. It is stated that the petitioner joined the School on 18-7-1978 but the Headmaster did not allow him to sign the attendance register. On 29th of July, 1978, an order was issued by the District Education Officer, hazaribagh that, in view of the order passed by Shri Ghulam sarwar the Minister for Education, Govt. of Bihar, the appointment of the petitioner was postponed until further orders. It is this order contained in annexure 5 which is under challenge in the present writ application. It reads as under :t has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that Annexure 5 is not a Government order and the District education Officer should not have acted on the basis of an order passed by the Minister concerned. 4. Mr. It reads as under :t has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that Annexure 5 is not a Government order and the District education Officer should not have acted on the basis of an order passed by the Minister concerned. 4. Mr. Radha Raman, Learned Additional Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that this application should be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has not been able to establish his right. According to him, the appointment of the petitioner itself is illegal as it preceded the Boards Circular dated 18th June, 19/7. The appointment of the petitioner is not under challenge before me. He was appointed in terms of Boards letter dated 14-3-1975 and not dated 18-6-1977. The appointment seems to be on the basis of highest marks obtained by the petitioner amongst the candidates for appointment and is thus according to merit. If the appointment of the petitioner was not in accordance with law it was open to the Government to take appropriate steps according to law. 5. The question for consideration, however, is whether a Minister by a letter under his own signature can direct an officer to pass a particular order. The Ministers direction in this case is in the form of a letter addressed by him to the District Education Officer. In the said letter which was produced before me by the learned Addl. Advocate General it is stated that the minister wanted someone else to be appointed about which he had personally spoken to the Officer concerned but in spite of it the petitioner had been appointed. The Minister had, therefore, ordered the District Education officer to postpone the appointment and take necessary steps in the matter such orders expressed in the name of a Minister cannot be said to be a Government order. Any executive action of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Article 166 of the Constitution of India provides that orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor. Any executive action of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Article 166 of the Constitution of India provides that orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor. This provision has been held to be directory in the case of Dattatraya V/s. State of Bombay (AIR 1952 s. C.181) but the order can be challenged on the ground that it was not made by the Governor. In the case of State of Bombay V/s. Purshottam Jos (A. I. R 1952 S. C.317), Bose, J. , observed "the Constitution does not require a magic incantation which can only be expressed in a set formula of words what the court has to see is whether the substance of the requirements of article 166 (1) is there", 6. The order in the present case has been issued by the order of the minister and is not even professed to be issued in the name of the Governor. This is not even a case of substantial compliance of Article 166 A Minister can take a decision on his own responsibility but it has to be made and expressed in the name of the Governor. If it is not done so it can be challenged on other grounds. Non-compliance with the provisions of Article 166 would therefore, lead to the result that the order in question would lose the protection which it would otherwise enjoy it was not even suggested on behalf of the State in this case that the impugned order was in fact made bv the governor. That being the position, the order contained in Annexure 5 must beheld to be illegal and without jurisdiction. It is, therefore set aside and quashed. 7. The application is accordingly allowed and the order passed in annexure 5 is quashed. There shall, however, no order as to costs. Petition allowed.