ORDER M. P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts are these : The petitioner No. 1, Vijay Bahadur Singh, is the father of the petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The notices under Section 10 (2) of the said Act was issued to the petitioner. As certain lands standing in the names of the petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were also included in the holding of the petitioner No. 1, therefore, notices were issued to the petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4 also. Objections were filed by the petitioners. The Prescribed Authority by his order dated 17-6-1969 decided the said objections. A true copy of the said order is Annexure 2 to the petition. Thereafter two appeals were filed - one by the petitioner No. 1 and the other by petitioner No. 2. Both the appeals were dismissed by a common judgment dated May 4, 1977 passed by the Civil Judge, Jalaun at Orai. A certified copy of the said judgment is Annexure 3 to the petition. Now, the petitioners have come up in the instant petition and in support thereof I have heard Shri V. K. S. Chowdhry, learned counsel for the petitioners. In opposition the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. Counsel contended before me that the lands which stood respectively in the names of the petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4 should not have been included in the holding of the petitioner No. 1. In this connection the learned counsel emphasised that the gift deed dated 20-9-1969 had been executed by the father in favour of his four sons and on the basis of the said document the names of the four sons as the donees had been separately recorded over separate lands gifted by the said document. The mutation was effected prior to 24th January, 1971. It was emphasised that mutation was a clear proof of the fact that the donees were in separate possession of the lands gifted to each of them. A reference was made to Sections 40 and 44 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act and reliance was placed on the following cases: Mt. It was emphasised that mutation was a clear proof of the fact that the donees were in separate possession of the lands gifted to each of them. A reference was made to Sections 40 and 44 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act and reliance was placed on the following cases: Mt. Anandi Devi v. Mohan Lal, (AIR 1932 All 444); Om Prakash v. Jugal Kishore, ( AIR 1934 All 847 ); Kashi Prasad v. Ambika Prasad, (AIR 1930 All 611); Beni Prasad v. Gauhar Ali, ( AIR 1945 All 347 ). 3. In AIR 1932 All 444 the head note is as follows: "There is nothing in Section 122 to limit acceptance of a gift to an express acceptance. But the acceptance of a gift may be express or implied. In the case of a gift actual or constructive possession by the donee is undoubtedly proof of acceptance, and in zamindari property, and in especially a case concerning husband and wife, mutation means delivery of possession, and the acts of the husband after mutation are acts on behalf of the wife." It should be seen that in the said case it was observed: "The learned Judge has found that the gift was a real gift intended to be acted upon but the wife having never accepted the gift it was void against subsequent vendees." The Appellate Court laid down that under Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act acceptance by the donee need not necessarily be express. It can be by implication also. 4. In AIR 1934 All 847 it was laid down as under: "The dispute between the parties relating to the entries in those papers had been decided under Section 40 of the Act and if the defendants were not satisfied with that, decision it was open to them under cl. (3), Section 40 to establish their right in the Civil Court. Until they do so there can be no question but that entries in the registers have to stand or in other words that the plaintiff-appellants have a right to be recorded as co-sharers and to sue under Section 222, Tenancy Act, and the defendant-respondents have no right to raise the question of title under cl. (b) of Section 271." 5. Until they do so there can be no question but that entries in the registers have to stand or in other words that the plaintiff-appellants have a right to be recorded as co-sharers and to sue under Section 222, Tenancy Act, and the defendant-respondents have no right to raise the question of title under cl. (b) of Section 271." 5. In AIR 1930 All 611 it was laid down that Sections 39, 40 and 42 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act have to be read together. It was observed: "To start with, therefore, possession and possession alone is the criterion for the entry of name in the revenue papers." 6. In AIR 1945 All 347 the head note is as follows : "There is a presumption from the entries in the Khewat that a person shown 1 herein was then in possession of the property and it is for the other side to prove positively that he had not been in possession." In this connection a reference was made to Section 44 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. 7. Shri Chowdhry next contended that no evidence could be led to show that the gift deed was not intended to be operative. Pie placed reliance on Lachh-man Das v. Ram Prasad, ( AIR 1927 All 422 ). Counsel next referred to Krishna Ayyangar v. Nallaperumal Pillai, ( AIR 1920 PC 56 ), head note (b) whereof lays down as under: "The construction of explanation must depend upon its terms, and no theory of a purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used." A reference was made to Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das, ((1894) ILR 16 All 185) where it was laid down that the delivery to the donee of immoveable property of the deed of gift is sufficient to pass the title to such property to the donee without actual physical possession of such property being taken by the donee. 8. Counsel next placed reliance on Buddhan Singh v. Nabi Bux, ( AIR 1962 All 43 ) (FB) and Sonawati v. Sri Ram, ( AIR 1968 SC 466 ) to contend that possession should be legal and not wrongful. 9. Shri Chowdhry emphasised that in the instant case the rent receipts and irrigation slips were in the names of petitioners Nos. Counsel next placed reliance on Buddhan Singh v. Nabi Bux, ( AIR 1962 All 43 ) (FB) and Sonawati v. Sri Ram, ( AIR 1968 SC 466 ) to contend that possession should be legal and not wrongful. 9. Shri Chowdhry emphasised that in the instant case the rent receipts and irrigation slips were in the names of petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4 separately and the said fact went to establish that the gift deed was a genuine one and had been fully acted upon. 10. I have considered all these submissions. However, I feel that within my limited jurisdiction in writ petition, I cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Court. It should be seen that the aforesaid case law relied on by Shri Chowdhry in no way lays down that in law there cannot be ostensible ownership. It is well known that benami transactions have been prevalent in this country for a long time and such transactions are not illegal. The apparent title vests in one person but the real title vests in another. When the apparent title vests in one it is obvious that the title deed is bound to be in his favour. On the basis of such deed mutation also takes place and rent receipts etc. are bound to be issued in the name of the apparent title holder. These facts, however, do not rule out the ostensible nature of the title. The term 'benami itself implies that some one ostensibly holds the property but the real title vests in some one else. Therefore, the fact that a gift deed was executed by the father in favour of his four sons and that subsequently mutation was also effected in the names of the four sons on the basis of such gift deed and subsequently rent receipts, irrigation slips etc. were granted in the names of; each son separately, will not be inconsistent with the case of the State that the real tenure-holder was the father, namely, the petitioner No. 1. Explanation I to Section 5 of the Ceiling Act makes the position absolutely clear. were granted in the names of; each son separately, will not be inconsistent with the case of the State that the real tenure-holder was the father, namely, the petitioner No. 1. Explanation I to Section 5 of the Ceiling Act makes the position absolutely clear. It lays down as under: Explanation I: "In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, all land held by him in his own right, whether in his own name, or ostensibly in the name of any other person, shall be taken into account". The Division Bench In Yadunath Singh's case (1978 All WC 187) has clearly laid down that it is open to the ceiling authorities to ignore a document even though the same has been executed before 24t.h January, 1971 if the same lacks reality. In my opinion, therefore, the contention of Shri Chowdhry cannot be accepted that in the facts of the instant case it was not open to the ceiling authorities to have examined whether despite the execution of the gift deed the real tenure-holder continued to be the father. Once it was open to the said authorities to go into the said question, it has to be seen that the finding recorded by them is a pure finding of fact. See Meenakshi Mills case ( AIR 1957 SC 49 ). The Prescribed Authority and the appellate court have chosen to place reliance on the statement of the Lekhpal who stated that all the sons were living with the father and that it was the latter who was in cultivatory possession of the land. The tractor belonged to the father which was utilised for the purposes of cultivation of the entire land. The appellate court has also emphasised that the petitioners case was that the land was formerly ancestral sir and khudkasht before the abolition of zamindari and that in the same some of those sons who were in existence on the date of vesting had vested shares. If that was the position then one would have expected a partition deed between the father and the sons. There could be no question of a gift by the father of more than his proportionate share in such property. If that was the position then one would have expected a partition deed between the father and the sons. There could be no question of a gift by the father of more than his proportionate share in such property. It has been emphasised in the order of the Prescribed Authority that there is no evidence whatsoever to support the allegation of the petitioners that the land in question was, ancestral sir and khudkasht before the abolition of zamindari. Shri Chowdhry also did not point to any such evidence on record. It is obvious that the tenure-holder got recitals made in the gift deed with an eye on the case law. The gift deed has been described as the family settlement because genuine family settlements have found approval in the case law. A recital about ancestral sir and khudkasht was also made in the gift deed. It is well known that the established case law is that where the land was ancestral sir -and khudkasht before the abolition of zamindari, in the same the sons who were in existence on the date of vesting would be entitled to claim proportionate share along with the father even though the latter alone may be recorded as the sole bhumidhar in the khatouni. Therefore, the said recital was made in the gift deed but no evidence has been brought on the record in support of the said recital. In the objections it was stated that the two sons of the petitioner No. 1, namely, the petitioner No. 2 and the petitioner No. 3, were in existence on the date of vesting. However, in the witness-box it was admitted that the petitioner No. 3 was not in such existence as he was born in 1954. In view of all these aspects and circumstances, it cannot be said that the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court were not entitled to record a finding that the real tenure-holder was the petitioner No. 1 alone and that the petitioners Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were merely ostensibly recorded over different plots. Even if the said finding were held to be erroneous on a reappraisal of evidence on record. still, as I emphasised above, I cannot do the same in my limited writ jurisdiction. I should like to emphasise that the petitioners did not append a true copy of the gift deed dated 20-9-1969 with the petition. Even if the said finding were held to be erroneous on a reappraisal of evidence on record. still, as I emphasised above, I cannot do the same in my limited writ jurisdiction. I should like to emphasise that the petitioners did not append a true copy of the gift deed dated 20-9-1969 with the petition. No copies of the statements of the witnesses were appended with the petition. It should be seen that the Court deciding a writ petition cannot be expected to appreciate the contentions of the petitioner unless such data is placed before the Court. Therefore, the first contention raised by Shri Chowdhry is rejected. 11. The next contention related to plot No. 212 area 0.18 acre. It was claimed that the same was abadi. The claim was not accepted because the revenue papers did not support the same. No interference can be made in the writ jurisdiction with such a finding. 12. It was next contended that the finding in respect of plots Nos. 460, 374 and 454 holding the same as irrigated plots was not in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 4-A of the Act. In my opinion, this contention is correct. The Division Bench pronouncement in Jaswant Singh's case (1979 All LJ 25) was rendered after the judgment of the appellate court. Therefore, the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court did not have the benefit of having the guidance which had been laid down in the said case. 13. It has also seemed to me that there was some reduction in the area of the land during the consolidation proceedings on account of the change in the valuation of the plots or due to some land having been taken for public purpose. On the basis of the law laid down in Satyapal Singh v. .State of U. P. (1979 All WC 217), the authorities below should have given effect to such reduction in the area during the consolidation proceedings. It must be emphasised that the Full Bench in Ram Charans case (1978 All WC 677) has laid down that the ceiling authorities are not bound by the verdict of the consolidation authorities. It must be emphasised that the Full Bench in Ram Charans case (1978 All WC 677) has laid down that the ceiling authorities are not bound by the verdict of the consolidation authorities. Therefore, even if the consolidation authorities carved out separate plots for the sons of the petitioner No. 1, still, it was open to the ceiling authorities to have clubbed the entire lands entered in the names of the sons in the holding of the father treating the latter as the real sole tenure-holder. However, if there was some reduction in such total holding during the consolidation proceedings on account of the change in the valuation of the plots or on account of some land being taken for public purpose then the benefit of such reduction should have been given to the petitioners. 14. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the order of the Prescribed Authority, annexure 2 to the petition and the judgment of the appellate court, annexure 3 to the petition, are hereby quashed in so far as plots Nos. 460, 374 and 454 have been treated as irrigated and in so far as the benefit of the reduction of area during the consolidation proceedings on account of the change in the valuation of the plots or on account of some land being taken for public purpose has not been granted to the petitioners. The case is remanded to the Prescribed Authority with a direction that the parties shall be allowed an opportunity to lead additional evidence on the said two points. In respect of plots Nos. 460, 374 and 454, the controversy shall be decided in the light of Section 4-A as interpreted in Jaswant Singhs case (supra). The benefit of the reduction in area during consolidation proceedings due to the change in the valuation of the plots or due to some land being taken for public purpose shall be granted to the petitioners. It is again made clear that the finding recorded by the ceiling authorities that the petitioner No. 1 alone was the real tenure-holder even though certain land stood in the names of his sons shall remain intact and shall not be disturbed. The surplus land in the hands of the petitioner No. 1 shall be redetermined thereafter. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.