ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - These three petitions are connected ones and they arise out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. While certain common questions are involved, there are certain points which are not common. The common facts are that the petitioners in all the three petitions are Government grantees under the provisions of the Government Grants Act which formerly was known as Crown Grants Act, No. 15 of 1895. A true copy of the grant in each petition has been appended to such petition and marked as annexure 1 in each one of the three petitions. It is identically worded. Cl. (1) in the deed is as follows : - "In consideration of the rent hereinafter reserved and of the covenants on the part of the grantee hereinafter contained the grantor hereby demises to the grantee all that land situated in village (s) Govindpur in Tahsil Bajpur described in the Schedule "A" hereto together with all surface rights, easements and appurtenances whatsoever belonging there to HOLD the said land to the grantee, and his heirs as a hereditary tenant defined in the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act of 1938, subject to such conditions, restrictions and limitations as are imposed under this deed of grant Paying Therefor The Rent Hereinafter Specified. 2. In Writ Petition No. 3763 of 1976, Raghubar Dayal v. State of U. P. the document is dated 11th July, 1956. In Writ Petition No. 4847 of 1976, Vijay Pal Singh v. State the document is dated 1st Mar. 1963 and in Writ Petition No. 3795 of 1976 Pritam Singh v. State of U. P. the document is dated 12-11-1967. The notice under Section 10 (2) was issued to the petitioner in each of the petitions and each one of them filed objections. The prescribed authority decided the said objections. Thereafter the petitioner in each of the petitions filed an appeal which was heard and decided by the Civil Judge, Nainital. The appeal in Writ Petition No. 3763 of 1976, Raghubar Dayal v. State of U. P. and the appeal in Writ Petition No. 3795 of 1976, Pritam Singh v. State were dismissed. The appeal in Writ Petition No. 4847 of 1976, Vijay Pal Singh v. State was partly allowed. The appeal in Writ Petition No. 3763 of 1976, Raghubar Dayal v. State of U. P. and the appeal in Writ Petition No. 3795 of 1976, Pritam Singh v. State were dismissed. The appeal in Writ Petition No. 4847 of 1976, Vijay Pal Singh v. State was partly allowed. Now the petitioner in each of the three petitions has come up in his petition and all the three petitions, as stated above, stand connected and in support of them Shri Rajeshwari Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners, has made his submissions. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the grants made by the Government in the case of all the three petitioners were not leases and as such the definition of holding in Section 3 (9) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act did not take in these grants. Holding has been defined in Section 3 (9) as under: - " holding' means the land or lands held by a person as a bhumidhar, sirdar, asami of Gaon Sahba or an asami mentioned in Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Zarnindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, or as a tenant under the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, other than a sub-tenant, or as a Government lessee, or as a sublessee of a Government lessee, where the period of the sub-lease is co-extensive with the period of the lease;" 3. It is, therefore, clear that a Government lessee is also included in the said definition. Section 3 (17) defines tenure-holder, to mean a person who is the holder of a holding. Therefore, the Government lessee is a tenure-holder under the Act and Section 5 of the Act which imposes ceiling on every tenure-holder in the State is applicable to the Government lessee also. It is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the grants in the instant cases are not leases. I have already reproduced Cl. (1) of the three documents which clearly states that the grantee was to be the hereditary tenant of the land demised on the payment of rent as specified in the document. Cl. I have already reproduced Cl. (1) of the three documents which clearly states that the grantee was to be the hereditary tenant of the land demised on the payment of rent as specified in the document. Cl. (8) (I) of the document is as under: "That this lease shall be governed by the provisions of the Government Grants Act XV of 1895." In Schedule A attached to the document the area of the demised land is specified as well as the rent payable by the grantee. Therefore, there is little doubt that the grants in question are leases whereby land was let out on the payment of rent by the grantee or the lessee. It is a clear case of lease. Sec. 3 (21) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act lays down as under: "The words and expressions not defined in this Act, but used in the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Re- forms Act, 1950, shall have the meanings assigned to them in that Act." 4. Section 133-A of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 lays down as under : "Government lessees, - Every person to whom land has been let out by the State Government shall be called a Government lessee in respect in this Act be entitled to hold the same in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease relating thereto." 5. Therefore, it has to be held that the expression Government lessee used in Section 3 (9) of the Ceiling Act has the same meaning as in Sec. 133-A of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Learned counsel placed reliance on Byramjee J. (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State ( AIR 1965 SC 590 ) where on a construction of the grant dated Sept. 22, 1847, it was held that the same did not amount to a lease under a Bombay enactment. In the said case it was observed: "The grant does not purport to demise merely a right of enjoyment of land: it confers rights of ownership in land. There is again no contractual right reserved either expressly or by implication, to determine the grant. In the said case it was observed: "The grant does not purport to demise merely a right of enjoyment of land: it confers rights of ownership in land. There is again no contractual right reserved either expressly or by implication, to determine the grant. The reservation of the reversion and reversions remainder and remainders yearly, and rents, issues and profits of all the lands hereditaments and profits in the premises clause, is of the nature of a restriction upon the estate transferred and does not restrict the quality of the estate. The rent to be demanded was again not stipulated as consideration for the grant of the right to enjoy land, but expressly in consideration of granting freedom from liability to pay assessment. The conclusion of the trial Court and the High Court that the villages were not held under a lease within the meaning of Section 2 (d) of Act 47 of 1951 must be accepted." 6. In the instant case it will be seen that the position is quite different. The grant has been specifically described as a lease. The grantee has been termed as a hereditary tenant, as defined in the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 mid there is a clear stipulation for the payment of rent as consideration for the demise of land. In my view, AIR 1965 SC 590 is not at all applicable to the facts of the instant case. Learned counsel contended that where the Government is a zamindar and owner of a Mohal Sarkari then if some land is granted, the grantee would be a lessee but not otherwise. I have failed to appreciate the logic of this contention. With the abolition of zamindari the Mahals ceased to be in existence. In the instant case it is not disputed that the land which was demised belonged to the State of Uttar Pradesh. In any case, the petitioners as grantees, cannot dispute the title of the grantor, namely, the State of Uttar Pradesh. 7. With the abolition of zamindari the Mahals ceased to be in existence. In the instant case it is not disputed that the land which was demised belonged to the State of Uttar Pradesh. In any case, the petitioners as grantees, cannot dispute the title of the grantor, namely, the State of Uttar Pradesh. 7. Learned counsel place reliance on Secy, of State v. Lal Mohan Choudhury (AIR 1935 Cal 746) where it was laid down as under : (1) "The position of the Government in regard to Khas mahal lands is that of an ordinary landlord, the Government occupying no higher position than that of a Zamindar; the settlement granted to the plaintiffs in the case before us, was by the Khas Tahsildar, an officer of the Government in charge of a khas mahal, the Government being in possession of that mahal merely as a private proprietor. (2) The Crown Grants Act, 1895, was an enactment relating to the grants from the Crown, authorising certain limitations and restrictions upon such grants made under its authority. A lease granted by a Government officer in charge of a khas mahal cannot fall within the category of grants from Crown as referred to in the Crown Grants Act." 8. Learned counsel also drew my attention to Para 54 of the Report of the Tarai and Bhawar Development Committee dated Aug. 8, 1947. Attention was also drawn to appendix 8 (g) at page 297. 9. Attention may also be drawn to the U. P. Amendment in Sections 2 and 3 of the Grown Grants Act, 1895. The proviso in the U. P. Amendment lays down: "Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent, or deemed ever to have prevented the effect of any enactment relating to the acquisition of property, land reforms or the imposition of ceiling on agricultural lands." 10. The proviso in the U. P. Amendment lays down: "Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent, or deemed ever to have prevented the effect of any enactment relating to the acquisition of property, land reforms or the imposition of ceiling on agricultural lands." 10. The next contention, which Shri Rajeshwari Prasad raised, is like this: When the notification under Section 9 of the Act was issued calling upon every tenure-holder holding land in excess of ceiling area applicable to him to submit a statement in respect of all his holdings, the petitioners were not liable to submit such statements inasmuch as they were covered .by Section 6 (h) which was as follows: "land let out after the enforcement of this Act to a Government lessee for reclamation and cultivation or for cultivation of such specialised crops or for other such purposes as may be prescribed." 11. The said clause was deleted with effect from 8th June, 1973 by the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974 (U. P. Act II of 1975). In Section 1 (2) of the Act it was laid down: "This section and Section 9 shall come into force at once, and the remaining sections shall be deemed to have come into force on June 8, 1973." 12. The deletion of Cl. (h) was done by Section 7 of the .Amendment Act which shall be deemed to have come into force on June 8, 1973. It is contended that unless there has been a default on the part of the tenure-holder to comply with Section 9 no proceeding could be taken under Section 10 (2) of the Act. In Section 10 (1) the expression used is "In every case where a tenure-holder fails to submit a statement.. ....". It is contended that in the instant case there was no failure on the part of the petitioners to comply with the provisions of Section 9 because as a matter of fact when the general notice under Section 9 was issued the petitioners stood exempted under Section 9 (h) which was then in existence and which was subsequently deleted. ....". It is contended that in the instant case there was no failure on the part of the petitioners to comply with the provisions of Section 9 because as a matter of fact when the general notice under Section 9 was issued the petitioners stood exempted under Section 9 (h) which was then in existence and which was subsequently deleted. It was argued that the fiction whereby the deletion was made retrospective with effect from 8th June, 1973, could not be stretched to cover a situation where no default was really committed into a situation where in law such default should be deemed to have been committed by fiction. Learned counsel placed reliance on Sylhet Loan and Banking Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ahmad Maitoba (AIR 1946 Cal 337) where it is laid down as under: "The second general rule is that: "You should not give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than you can plainly see the Legislature meant: (1886) 31 Ch D 402, per Bowen LJ at pp. 408 and 409; (1913) 17 Cal WN 889 at p. 912; (1945) 49 Cal WN 552 at p. 557)." 13. He also relied on S. Section Gadgil v. Lal and Co. ( AIR 1965 SC 171 ) where it was laid down as under: "That provision must be read subject to the ride that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the Legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectivity than is expressly mentioned, nor to authorise the Income-tax Officer to commence proceedings which before the new Act came into force had by the expiry of the period provided, become barred." 14. Learned counsel contended that when Clause (h) of Section 6 (1) was deleted by the U. P. Act No. 2 of 1975, the Amendment Act should have made a clear provision that the Government lessees shall be treated as defaulters under Section 10 of the Act and that proceedings in their case could be taken under Section 10. In my view, this contention is untenable. It is settled law that a fiction must be given full scope to effectuate the intentions of the Legislature. The celebrated observations of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. In my view, this contention is untenable. It is settled law that a fiction must be given full scope to effectuate the intentions of the Legislature. The celebrated observations of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council ( 1952 AC 109 at p. 132) are being reproduced below: "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affair as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." 15. When the Legislature deleted Cl. (h) of Section 6 (1) with retrospective effect from 8th June, 1973, it is obvious that full effect should be given to the said retrospective deletion. Events which took place after 8th June, 1973, will have to be taken into consideration in deciding the case of a Government lessee. The notice issued under Section 9 subsequent to 8th June, 1973, has to be held to be applicable to him also, and, therefore, Section 10 will also be applicable to such a Government lessee. 16. As a matter of fact, no real prejudice has been caused to the petitioners. It is obvious that they would not have filed any voluntary statement under Section 9 because even to-day they are contending that they are not liable to be proceeded against under the ceiling law being Government grantees and not Government lessees. Under Section 10 (1) the statement has to be prepared by the prescribed Authority or he may cause the same to be prepared by any person subordinate to him. Such statement has to contain the particulars prescribed. A copy of such statement is served upon the tenure-holder under Section 10 (2) and he gets an opportunity to file such objection. In the instant case such procedure was followed and, therefore, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the tenure-holder by holding that Section 9 was applicable to him. by fiction inasmuch as Cl. A copy of such statement is served upon the tenure-holder under Section 10 (2) and he gets an opportunity to file such objection. In the instant case such procedure was followed and, therefore, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the tenure-holder by holding that Section 9 was applicable to him. by fiction inasmuch as Cl. (h) of S, 6 (1) was deleted retrospectively with effect from June 8, 1973. 17. Apart from the aforesaid contentions, the only other contention, which was pressed before me, related to the land which was treated irrigated in Writ Petition No. 3763 of 1976 Raghuber Dayal v. State and in Writ Petition No. 3795 of 1976 Pritam Singh v. State. No such grievance has been raised in writ petition No. 4847 of 1976 Vijay Pal Singh v. State. It may also be stated that there are certain findings of facts recorded by the authorities below, which were sought to be questioned in the three writ petitions concerning sale-deeds, gift-deeds, and a particular person being major or minor etc. But these contentions were not pressed before me when the petitions were heard and rightly so. Even if they would have been pressed, before me, I would not have accepted them because I am not exercising any appellate power in the writ jurisdiction. In respect of the said findings it cannot be said that there was no evidence in support thereof and I cannot do a reappraisal of evidence to arrive at a different finding. However, so far as the controversy about the land being irrigated or unirrigaled involved in the said two writ petitions namely Nos. 3763 of 1976 Raghuber Dayal v. State and 3795 of 1976 Pritam Singh v. State, I feel that as the authorities below did not have the guidance which was subsequently given by the Division Bench of this Court in Jaswant Singh v. State (1978 All WC 577), therefore, the said controversy was not decided by them on a proper interpretation of the Section 4-A of the Act. I may mention that the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions: 1978 Ali WC 577, Jaswant Singh v. State; 1977 All WC 402, Chasi Ram v. State of U. P.; 1978 All LJ 956, Abid Ali Khan v. Vlth Addl. I may mention that the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions: 1978 Ali WC 577, Jaswant Singh v. State; 1977 All WC 402, Chasi Ram v. State of U. P.; 1978 All LJ 956, Abid Ali Khan v. Vlth Addl. District and Sessions Judge; 1978 All LJ 613 Gaya Din v. State 'of U. P.; 1978 All LJ 1034, Maharaj Singh v. State. 18. Accordingly, while writ petition No. 4847 of 1976 Vijay Pal Singh v. State of U. P. is dismissed, the Writ Petitions No. 3763 of 1976 and No. 3795 of 1976 Pritam Singh v. State of U. P. and others are hereby allowed and the order of the Prescribed Authority and the judgment of the appellate court are hereby quashed in so far as the said controversy about the land being irrigated or unirrigated is concerned. The two cases in the said writ petitions are remanded the Prescribed Authority with a direction that the parties shall be allowed an opportunity to lead additional evidence on the said controversy in the light of the law laid down in Jaswant Singhs case (supra). Thereafter, the Prescribed Authority shall deal with each separate plot which is claimed by the petitioners to be unirrigated and state how both the requirements mentioned in any of the three categories of Sec. 4-A of the Act stand satisfied or do not stand satisfied with regard to each such plot. Thereafter, the plot shall be treated as irrigated or unirrigated in the light of the law laid down in said case. The surplus land shall be redetermined thereafter. It is made clear that no other controversy shall be allowed to be raised before the prescribed authority or before the appellate court in case an appeal is filed against the fresh decision of the prescribed Authority. In the circumstances, there will be no order, as to costs in any of the three petitions.