S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed under sec. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act by the original applicants in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 27 of 1970 filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Bhavnagar. Their Claim Petition having been dismissed by the Claims Tribunal they have approached this Court by way of the present appeal. The appellants original applicants preferred the aforesaid Claim Petition on account of the fatal accident caused to one Bai Ratan who was the wife of original applicant No. 1 and mother of applicants Nos. 2 to 9 contending that she died on account of an accident caused to her when she was travelling on foot on Talaja Palitana Road on 8-7-70. ( 2 ) THE case of the original applicants is that at the relevant time deceased Bai Ratan was going on foot on the Talaja Palitana Public Road proceeding from Palitana to her village Mota Pipaliya. She was walkingon the extreme left side of the road. When she arrived near a Nala on the road known as Unda Nahera an S. T. Bus being No. G. T E. 3409 belonging to respondent No. 2 State Transport Corporation and driven by its driver respondent No. 1 opponent No. 1 came from the opposite side i. e. from the side of Talaja it was a passenger bus. According to the claimants the bus was being driven on the wrong side of the road i. e. on the right hand side of the bus driver. It was alleged by the claimants that it was being driven at an excessive speed and the bus driver had not sounded the horn of the bus to warn Bai Ratan to give way. As a result of this Bai Ratan was knocked down and was seriously injured and died on the spot. It was contended by the claimants that Ratan was aged 48 years at the time of her death and she was quite healthy. The claimants are a family of agriculturists and Bai Ratan was doing agricultural work as a labourer on daily wages and was earning Rs. 4/per day. It was contended by the claimants that Ratan was aged 48 years at the time of her death and she was quite healthy. The claimants are a family of agriculturists and Bai Ratan was doing agricultural work as a labourer on daily wages and was earning Rs. 4/per day. The applicants claimants themselves have their own agricultural lands (about 20 bighas at the time of the filing of the application) and besides the work done by Bai Ratan on daily wages on the lands of others she was also doing agricultural work on the claimants own land. Accordingly Bai Ratans earnings per month were estimated at Rs. 100/and on that basis considering the life span of Ratan an amount of Rs. 15 0 was claimed as compensation by the claimants appellants in the claims petition preferred before the Claims Tribunal. ( 3 ) THE respondent No. 2opponent No. 2corporation filed its written statement at Exh. 12 while respondent No. 1 original opponent No. 1 driver of the vehicle filed his written statement at Exh. 14. It was not disputed by both of them that the accident in question took place at the time and place mentioned in the application and that as a result of the accident Bai Ratan was injured and died on the spot. It was not disputed that the bus involved in the accident namely bus No GTE 3409 was a passenger bus belonging to the respondent T4o. 2 Corporation and was at the relevant time being driven by respondent No. 1 original opponent No. 1. He was admittedly an employee of the respondent No. 2 Corporation and that at the relevant time he was driving the bus in the normal course of his duties as an employee driver of the opponent No. 2 Corporation. However the claim of the claimants was hotly contested on the ground that the respondents No. 1 driver was neither negligent nor rash at all. On the contrary it was submitted that the driver of the vehicle was driving the vehicle with slow speed and on the correct side of the road and was quite careful in driving the bus. It was the contention of the respondent that the accident had taken place wholly on account of the negligence on the part of Bai Ratan and despite every care being exercised by the driver of the vehicle to avert the accident. It was the contention of the respondent that the accident had taken place wholly on account of the negligence on the part of Bai Ratan and despite every care being exercised by the driver of the vehicle to avert the accident. It was the contention of the respondent that Bai Ratan was walking on the road in a zigzag manner and had a quilt on her head and it was she herself who had dashed with the side of the bus and had fallen down and injured herself. The respondents contested the claim of the original applicants that Bai Ratan was aged about 48 years at the time of her death. It was submitted that she was quite old. The claim for compensation was also challenged. It was denied that Bai Ratan was earning Rs. 4 per day and her monthly earnings were Rs. 100/as stated by the claimants. On the aforesaid contentions it was submitted that the Claims Petition deserved to be dismissed. ( 4 ) ON the aforesaid pleadings of the parties the Claims Tribunal framed issues at Exh. 15 and after recording evidence came to the conclusion that the claimants failed to establish that the accident in question took place due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the S. T. bus-original opponent No. 1. On the aforesaid findings reached by the Tribunal the question of compensation did not survive for consideration by the Tribunal but alternatively the Tribunal gave its findings on the question of damages and held that the claimants were entitled only to nominal damages to the tune of Rs. 1009/to Rs. 2000 in case it was held that the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the S. T. Bus. On the aforesaid finding the Tribunal ultimately dismissed the claim petition directing the parties to bear their own costs. As stated earlier that order which was passed by the Tribunal has made the original claimants to come to this court by way of the present appeal. ( 5 ) MR. A. P. Ravani the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants claimants contended that the findings reached by the Tribunal to the effect that the driver of the S. T. Bus was not rash and negligent was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Mr. ( 5 ) MR. A. P. Ravani the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants claimants contended that the findings reached by the Tribunal to the effect that the driver of the S. T. Bus was not rash and negligent was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Mr. Ravani submitted that there was ample evidence and circumstances were well established on the record to show that the accident was caused because of the rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the S. T. Bus and consequently the claimants were entitled to maintain their claim petition. Mr. Ravani further submitted and pointed out that the damages assessed by the Tribunal were too conservative and the claimants were entitled to full compensation as claimed by them. Mr. Ravani stated that even though the original claimants had demanded Rs. 15. 000 by way of compensation in the present appeal they have restricted their claim only to Rs. 10 0 and the said amount was a modest amount which deserves to be granted in full. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid resume of facts as established on the record of this case clearly indicates that the S. T driver namely the original opponent No. 1 had driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner with the result that the on coming pedestrian was fatally hit. It is pertinent to note that at the relevant time the Palitana Talaja road was running straight. Whatever curvatures were there on the road were at a long distance as deposed to by the witnesses. The S. T. bus was coming from Talaja side while Ratan was proceeding towards Talaja side. Thus the pedestrian in question was coming from the opposite direction. The evidence shows that she was walking on the left side of the road i. e. quite on her correct side. Under these circumstances when the S. T. bus was being driven from the opposite direction on a straight road and when the S T. bus was a crowded bus and when there was drizzling of rain falling at that time as deposed to by the witness the duty of the driver of the vehicle especially in such a circumstance was to be extra vigilent and more careful so as to see that the on coming pedestrians are not run over by his vehicle. The conductor of the S. T. bus has deposed that the driver of the S. T. Bus had sounded the horn But it should be appreciated that when there was drizzling of rain Bai Ratan must have covered her head with a quilt to save her from the rain water. The driver should have therefore acted with more care and should have visualized that his horn may not have been heard by the pedestrians on account of the drizzling of the rain water as well as the fact that her ears were covered by a quilt to serve as a protection from the rain water. Under these circumstances he should have driven the vehicle most carefully and if it were so this unfortunate accident would have been avoided and a precious life would not have been lost. Save and except of sounding the horn it appears; the S. T. Bus driver felt no other duty on his part to take care and he seems to have driven the heavily loaded vehicle with passengers with lot of speed and that has resulted in this unfortunate accident. Even apart from the aforesaid fact which clearly emerges from the record a further fact that is also well established is that even after the impact the dead body is stated to have been lying 40 to 50 feet away from the bus as seen from the Panchnama. The Panchnama recited that there were wheel marks of the application of breaks which extended upto about 50 feet on the east of the place where the bus was standing at the time of preparation of the Panchnama. Mr. Shah submitted that in a heavy rain such wheel marks cannot remain after a couple of hours when the Panchnama was made and these recitals in the panchnama appear to be false ones. The claims Tribunal was inclined to accept the aforesaid submission on behalf of the respondent. It is not possible for us to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. Shah for the simple reason that the case of the opponents as reflected in the trend of the cross examination of the claimants witness Chhagan Khima Exh. 43 completely gives a go bye to this defence. In para 5 of the cross examination of witness Chhagan Exh. It is not possible for us to accept the aforesaid submission of Mr. Shah for the simple reason that the case of the opponents as reflected in the trend of the cross examination of the claimants witness Chhagan Khima Exh. 43 completely gives a go bye to this defence. In para 5 of the cross examination of witness Chhagan Exh. 43 a suggestion was made on behalf of the opponents themselves that the driver of the S. T. Bus had applied breaks twice or thrice before the collision. If that was the case it must necessarily follow that the application of breaks twice or thrice by the driver when the vehicle was in speed would necessarily result in the wheel masks being impressed on the surface of the road and that is actually what the panchnama recites. Hence the recitals in the panchnama cannot be said to be incorrect when the application of breaks even more than once is admitted by the other side. It is also pertinent to note that when the panch witness Kanji Ramji was examined as Exh. 37 for proving the punchnama he was shown the recitals in the panchnama and he admitted the recitals mentioned therein and that is how the panchnama was proved. Under the circumstances it is crystal clear that the on coming bus which was driven by the opponent No. 1 must have been driven in great speed even though it was raining on the road. The opponent No. 1 should have realised that when he was driving an over crowded bus and when it was heavily raining his visibility was likely to be affected. Under the circumstances it was much more important for him to have driven the vehicle very cautiously and carefully. Mere sounding of horn in such a situation would not absolve him of such further duties towards the users of the road. In this case it appears that the original opponent No. 1 the bus driver seems to have thrown of all these considerations to the wind and appears to have rested content only with sounding of the horn. The very fact that the bus driver after the impact drove the bus upto a distance of 50 feet shows that the bus must have been driven at the relevant time with lot of speed. The very fact that the bus driver after the impact drove the bus upto a distance of 50 feet shows that the bus must have been driven at the relevant time with lot of speed. Even after the application of breaks twice or thrice by the driver the bus could not stop immediately but on the contrary the bus went onwards upto 50 feet. This fact alone shows beyond any doubt that the bus driver question must have been driven with great speed at the time when this unfortunate accident was caused and the helpless pedestrian was killed. It is further pertinent to note that the evidence reveals that the dead body of the deceased was found lying by about 2 feet near about from the northern side of the tar road. That shows that the victim was proceeding on her correct side and at that stage the bus seems to have hit her. To that extent it would be clear that at the time of the impact the bus must have gone on its wrong side. Thereafter the driver seems to have driven his vehicle to the left side of the road having gone 50 feet ahead and seems to have stopped. Thus it appears that at the relevant time when the impact was caused the victim was dragged on her correct side while the bus must have come with its full speed and must have gone on wrong side that is the extreme right side of the bus and seems to have knocked down Bai Ratan and then the driver seems to have taken the bus ahead upto 50 feet. Tie ultimately could stop it after the application of breakes twice or thrice and ultimately stopped on the right side of the road. This fact also clearly establishes the rashness and negligence on the part of the S. T. Bus driver. As stated by us earlier even the severe injuries caused to the deceased also establish the speed with which the on coming S. T. Bus must have dashed with the victim. The result W1s that she fell down first having the impact on the right leg and while she fell down she must have received injuries from the right rear wheel of the bus otherwise the blood stains would not have been found on the rear right wheel of the bus. The result W1s that she fell down first having the impact on the right leg and while she fell down she must have received injuries from the right rear wheel of the bus otherwise the blood stains would not have been found on the rear right wheel of the bus. It is axiomatic to say that in the driving of a vehicle on a public way there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not endanger the life of the rightful users of the road may be either vehicular user or pedestrians. The aforesaid circumstances enumerated by us fully establish the rashness and negligence on the part of the S. T. Driver and we have not the slightest doubt about the same. We therefore hold that but for the rash and negligent driving on the part of the S. T. Bus driver this unfortunate accident would not have occurred. ( 7 ) SO far as the duty of a vehicle driver on a public road to take care is concerned the same is now well settled by a series of judgments of various Courts. We may only mention one judgment on the point in the case of London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson And Another reported in 1949 All England Law Reports Vo. 1 page 60. There the House of Lords was concerned with the duty of an omnibus driver when he drove near the crossing even controlled by lights. The implied duty to take care on the part of the omnibus driver in such a situation was very high. The House of Lords held that when the omnibus driver was prevented by the Stationary taxi cab from seeing that there was no foot passenger on the crossing and nevertheless approached at such a speed that he could not stop before reaching the crossing he was guilty certainly and he can be said to have violated regulation No. 3 of the Pedestrian Crossing Places (Traffic) Regulations 1941 But even apart from the breach of such statutory rule the duty of an omnibus driver has been laid down by the House of Lords. Lord Uthwatt in his concurring judgment in the aforesaid decision observed that he desired only to register his dissent from the view expressed by Lord Greene M. R. (1947 2 All E. R. 512) that the drivers are entitled to drive on the assumption that other users of the road whether drivers or pedestrians would behave with reasonable care. Disagreeing with the said view of Lord Greene M. R. Lord Uthwatt observed that it is common experience that many do not. A driver is not of course bound to anticipate folly in all its forms but he is not in His Lordships opinion entitled to put out of consideration the teachings of experience as to the form those follies commonly take. Thus the drivers of motor vehicles have to be conscious of the common human experience that the users of the road whether drivers or pedestrians do not always behave with reasonable care and keeping this possibility in view sufficient care has to be taken by the concerned Bus Vehicle driver on a public way. On the facts and circumstances of the present case the driver of the S. T. Bus should have been even much more careful as it was already raining on the way and as his own bus was crowded with passengers. When it was raining the noise of the rain was likely to deafen the ears of the drivers of the on coming vehicles or the pedestrians whose visibility also would naturally be affected. To drive a vehicle during rains will not be as simple as to drive a vehicle in bright sun shine and the duty to take care in the situation in which the vehicle in question was driven was much more and the driver could not have rested content with merely sounding of the horn. The driver of the S. T. Bus should have realised that mere sounding of the horn may not be of any avail as it may not be heard due to the incessantly falling rain on the road and when the pedestrian on the other side was one who had covered her ears with a quilt to prevent being drenched by rain water. Under such circumstances she may not hear the sound of the horn. Under such circumstances she may not hear the sound of the horn. The evidence of the Bus conductor shows that Bai Ratan did hear the sound of the horn but very late and then she went helter skelter. If the bus was not driven with high speed she would not have been instantaneously killed by the impact as we find in the present case. Thus it is apparent to us that the opponent No. 1 the driver of the S T. Bus was not at all careful but on the contrary both in a rash and negligent manner he drove his vehicle on that fateful day. ( 8 ) THAT leaves the further question whether the S. T. Bus driver should be blamed entirely or whether the unfortunate victim also contributed her own mite towards the unfortunate accident. As the conductor of the S. T. Bus has deposed it appears that the deceased Ratan before the impact had covered her ears by a quilt to save her from the rain water. Consequently the sounding of the horn may not have immediately been heard by her and she may not have noticed the oncoming S. T. vehicle immediately. She was a rustic villager and she would naturally have been frightened when she was placed in such a predicament being all of a sudden confronted by a speedy vehicle from the opposite side. Thus being panicky she must have gone helter skelter on the road. To that extent she also seems to have contributed to her own calamity. Thus Mr. Shah is right when he submitted that the pedestrian also would be guilty of contributory negligence. We are inclined to accept this submission of Mr. Shah. But in the facts and circumstances of the case we find that the major rashness and negligence rested on the shoulders of the S. T. driver. As the pedestrian Bai Ratan may be negligent to certain extent her contributory negligence cannot be more than 25% and 75% of negligence would rest on the shoulders of the S. T. Bus driver. ( 9 ) THE House of Lords in the case of Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Led. reported in 1951 Vol. As the pedestrian Bai Ratan may be negligent to certain extent her contributory negligence cannot be more than 25% and 75% of negligence would rest on the shoulders of the S. T. Bus driver. ( 9 ) THE House of Lords in the case of Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Led. reported in 1951 Vol. 2 All England Law Reports p. 448 had an occasion to consider the question of contributory negligence on the part of the pedestrians who are faced with a situation in which the motor vehicles dash against such pedestrians It was observed in the aforesaid decision that when contributory negligence is set up as a defence its existence does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed by this want of care to his own injury. For when contributory negligence is set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiffs claim the principle involved is that where a man is part author of his own injury he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in full. This however is not to say that in all cases the plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence owes to the defendant no duty to act carefully. Indeed it would appear that in cases relating to running down accidents such a duty exists. The proposition can be put even more broadly. Generally speaking when two parties are so moving in relation to one another as to involve risk of collision each owes to the other a duty to move with due care and this is true whether they are both in control of vehicles or both reproceeding on foot or whether one is on foot and the other is controlling a moving vehicle. ( 10 ) THUS the duty to take care is not a one sided affair. ( 10 ) THUS the duty to take care is not a one sided affair. All the users of the road are such that in case it is found that a pedestrian by a particular behaviour has contributed to his own misery resulting from the impact of a vehicle on the road he would also be liable for contributory negligence the extent of which will of course depend upon the facts of each case. In the aforesaid decision of the House of Lords the earlier view of Denning L. J. in the case of Davies v. Swan Motor ( no. Ltd. reported in (1949) 1 All E. R. 631 is not endorsed in full. Denning L. J. in Davies v. Swan Motor Co. Ltd. s case has observed as under:-"when a man steps into the road he owes a duty to himself to take care for his own safety but he does not owe to a motorist who is going at an excessive speed any duty to avoid being run down". THIS view of Denning L. J. was not approved by the House of Lords in Nances case ( supra ) whrerein the House of Lords disapproved the view that when a man steps into the road he owes a duty to himself to take care for his own safety but he does not owe any duty to a motorist who is going at an excessive speed and could not agree with it. Under the circumstances it is well established that the pedestrian using the public road has also some duty towards himself as well as to the other users of the road and if that duty is not properly carried out the question of contributory negligence on the part of such a pedestrian would immediately arise. ( 11 ) ON the facts and circumstances of this case as we have already observed we find that Bai Ratan who went helter skelter on the road by getting panicky on the sudden emergence of a speedy vehicle has also contributed to a small extent atleast (to the extent of 25% by her own negligence) to the unfortunate accident which cost her life. As a result of the aforesaid discussion we hold that the finding arrived at by the Claims Tribunal on issue No. 1 cannot be a justified one in this case and it must be held that the claimants have proved that the accident in question which took place on the 8th July 1970 on Palitana Talaja Road was mostly due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the S. T. vehicle and to that accident deceased Ratan had contributed to the extent of 25% being her part of contributory negligence. ( 12 ) THAT takes us to the point No. 2 for determination. That pertains to the assessment of proper damages be awarded to the claimants who claim to be the dependants of deceased Bai Ratan. The Claim Tribunal had fraimed issue No. 2 regarding this question and in the alternative the Claims Tribunal considered that question and came to the conclusion that the agricultural holdings of the claimants had not been affected in any manner by the exit of Ratan from the scene and consequently no much loss seems to have been caused to the claimants on account of the death of Bai Ratan and hence in the view of the Learned Judge nominal damages to the tune of Rs. 1 0 to 2 0 could have been awarded in case they had succeeded on issue No. 1. In our view the aforesaid reasoning of the Claims Tribunal is not at all justified on the facts of the present case as well as in the light of established legal position. The entire evidence of witness Khoda Bhagwan shows that he had large extent of agricultural lands that the deceased Ratan used to help him in his agricultural operations as well as in the household matters. They had eight children. They would also naturally be looked after by the deceased. It is his further case that till the life time of Bai Ratan he he had not engaged any Santhi whatsoever. That shows the extent of help which Bai Ratan must have been giving in the agricultural operations apart from the work which she must be putting in for looking after the big household consisting of 8 children and the parents and the husband and herself. Mr. That shows the extent of help which Bai Ratan must have been giving in the agricultural operations apart from the work which she must be putting in for looking after the big household consisting of 8 children and the parents and the husband and herself. Mr. Shah seriously contended that the evidence of Khoda Bhagwan nowhere establishes the extent of earning of Bai Ratan as a labourer. He submitted that when the husband was holding agricultural lands to the extent of 90 Bighas it is impossible to believe the case of the witness that Bai Ratan had worked as a Farm Labourer outside. This appears to be so. We are not inclined to accept the case of the claimants that Ratan may be doing some work in the agricultural fields of others but that does not mean that she was not helping her family in the agricultural operations which she used to aid and the fact that she used to run a big household cannot be lightly treated. Any how no amount of monetary compensation can ever redress the wrong done to such a house holder when the cementing factor is gone for ever. It would remain irretrievable. No amount of compensation can meet the pain and suffering of those who are left behind. The extent of the household work which the deceased used to do and the extent of the help which she used to render in the agricultural operations of her husband would be difficult to be compensated in terms of money. Still however an attempt has to be made to roughly estimate the extent of the economic loss suffered by the dependants when such a foundation stone of the household is gone for ever. ( 13 ) WE may refer with advantage to the observations of Kemp and Kemp. In their book captioned the quantum of damages in Vol. 1 1975 Edition in Chapter No. 26 the learned authors have dealt with claims for compensation arising out of death of wife. It has been observed in this context that the court still has to take into account the prospects of the husbands remarriage and a fortiori the fact of remarriage if he has remarried by the date of the trial; whereas such factors are not to be taken into account in the case of a wifes claim for the death of her husband. Apart from this important difference of principle there is in theory no difference between a wifes claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts for the death of her husband and a husbands claim for the death of his wife. But in practice there is a considerable difference since the husband is usually the main if not the sole support of the household. It follows that the pecuniary loss suffered by a husband through his wifes death is usually comprised of loss of the services which his wife had gratutiously rendered for him. The observation of Scrutton J. in Berry v. Humm and Co. (1915) 1 K. B. 627 has been referred to by the learned authors. We may at this juncture refer to the aforesaid decision of the King Bench in the case of Barry v. Humm and Co. (1915) 1 K. B. 627. Scrutton J. in the aforesaid decision was concerned with the question of computation of compensation to be paid to a husband in the case of death of his wife. In Berrys case (supra) the plaintiff a workman earning 38s a week sued the defendants to recover damages for the death of his wife who was knocked down by a motor taxicab belonging to the defendants and instantly killed. The wife had performed the ordinary household duties of a woman in her position and in consequence of her death the plaintiff had to employ a housekeeper and to incur extra expenses of management by the house keeper instead of by his deceased wife. The jury assessed the plaintiffs damages at 50%. Scrutton J while determining the claim of the plaintiff in the aforesaid case held that under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (Lord Campbells Act) the damages recoverable in such an action are not limited to the value of money lost of the money value of things just but include the monetary loss incurred by replacing services rendered gratutiously by the deceased where there was a reasonable prospect of their being rendered freely in future but for the death and therefore held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the damages assessed by the jury. The learned Judge while considering the question posed before him in Barrys case (supra) held that it is clear that at common law in the present state of the authorities the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury. But that common law rule in tort has been interferred with by Lord Campbells Act which allows the executor of the deceased to bring an action for the benefit of the wife husband parent or child of the deceased in which the jury may award them damages proportioned to the injury resulting to them from the death. The learned Judge took the view that even gratuitous services rendered have got to be evaluated in terms of money for the renderer of gratuitous services was snatched away by the accident in question. ( 14 ) IN Kemp and Kemp in volume I on quantum of damages it is further observed in this connection by the learned authors that probably the test way of assessing the husbands damages in such cases is to calculate his net pecuniary loss upon an annual basis and then to apply a suitable multiplier to it. In determining the multiplier regard would be had to the respective ages of the husband and his deceased wife and their children where part of the wifes services was comprised of looking after them; regard would also be had to the husbands chances of remarriage and thereby acquiring another wife to render these services for him and also to the usual factors such as the uncertainties of life and the fact that the husband would be receiving a lump sum payment. Sometimes however it is possible to assess one particular item of damage separately with a considerable degree of accuracy for instance where the husband has to pay a babyminder to look after his young child while he is out at work and where this expense will last for only a limited period until the child is old enough to go to school. In such case it would be simpler to assess this as a separate item of damages and add it to the sum reached by applying a suitable multiplier. In such case it would be simpler to assess this as a separate item of damages and add it to the sum reached by applying a suitable multiplier. Thereafter the learned authors have given a catalogue of various items of pecuniary losses arising to the husband on the death of his wife and the items enumerated are as under:- (1) Loss of wifes contributions to household from her own earnings. (2) Expenses of employing a housekeeper or servant to perform services which wife had rendered gratuitously; (3) Expenses of providing boarding and lodging for such housekeeper or servant. (4) Additional expenses caused by having household run by housekeeper or servant instead of wife. (5) Expense of furnishing room and providing requisite amenities for housekeeper or servant. (6) Expense of sending children away to boarding school. (7) Expense of buying childrens clothes instead of having them made by wife. (8) Expense of having his own clothes etc. mended instead of having them cared for and mended by wife. (9) Having to eat meals out instead of having them cooked by wife. (10) Loss of element of security where husbands employment was insecure or his health bad and where wife had been accustomed to go out to work to keep the home going when husband was not working etc. ( 15 ) THUS all these facts have got to be kept in view while determining the damages on account of the untimely death of the wife and then the economic loss is to be ascertained for those who are left behind. Under the circumstances it is not as if that the accidental death of a nonearning wife means nothing to her dependants and other family members and the economic loss to them would be practically nil as assumed by the Tribunal in the present case. If the deceased wife was earning then her earning would certainly be considered for computing the net economic loss to her family members. If the deceased wife was earning then her earning would certainly be considered for computing the net economic loss to her family members. But even if she was not earning the gratuitous services rendered by her would now be required to be substituted by other modes which will have their own economic importance and value and that the pecuniary benefit from these services in the domestic front as well as in the agricultural operation of the husband when the wife may have acted as a helpful hand as in the present case will have to be assessed on the totality of all circumstances and a proper figure of multiplicant has to be arrived at and having considered the relative ages of the wife and the husband and the dependants a proper multiplier has to be adopted. As the Claims Tribunal did not adopt the aforesaid correct approach for assessing the damages in the instant case we will have to make an attempt in the same direction afresh. ( 16 ) THE evidence which we have discussed above clearly shows that the deceased Bai Ratan was of great help to the large household of which she was a member. She looked after the household and also helped the husband in his agricultural operations. Considering the gratuitous services rendered by her as well as the economic losses which her husband suffered on account of the untimely death of his wife it would be reasonable to assess the net economic losses to the dependants atleast at the figure of Rs. 75/per month which would be a global figure and which will take care of all the relevant factors enumerated by us above. This in our view is a most conservative estimate of the economic loss suffered by the claimants on account of the untimely death of Ratan. We are conscious of the fact that Rs. 75/per month would really be no substitute for the void created in the household of the claimants on account of the exit of Ratan but it would be only an incomplete but modest substitute for the losses suffered by the claimants on account of the untimely death of Ratan. If Rs. We are conscious of the fact that Rs. 75/per month would really be no substitute for the void created in the household of the claimants on account of the exit of Ratan but it would be only an incomplete but modest substitute for the losses suffered by the claimants on account of the untimely death of Ratan. If Rs. 75/per month is taken as the net economic loss suffered by the claimants on account of the unfortunate accident which snatched away Ratan from their midst this would be the multiplicant which can be taken as a datum figure and on that basis the economic loss per annum would be Rs. 990. 00. Now remains the question of finding out a suitable multiplier. As observed earlier multiplier will depend upon the relative age of the deceased at the time of her death and the ages of those who are left behind. Mr. Shah contended with emphasis that the evidence on record shows that Ratan was a very old lady at the time of her death. Reliance was placed on the evidence of Dr. Harjivan Madhavji Ghelani. At the time of the postmortem her age was shown to be 60 as seen from the postmortem notes Exh. 50 but he immediately corrected himself by saying that this age was given to him by the relatives of the deceased. Thus the Doctor made it clear that he stated about the age of the deceased from what he was told by the relatives of the deceased. Consequently mere mentioning of the age of the deceased at 60 years on the basis of hear say will be neither a conclusive evidence nor a positive evidence regarding her correct age. Nobody knows who gave the Doctor the said age. On the contrary we have got positive evidence on the record when the claimant No. 1 Khoda Bhagwan the husband of the deceased had deposed that she was 48 years at the time of her death. The very fact that the first son of the deceased was aged 35 years in 1973 when Khoda Bhagwan had deposed at Exh. 36 the said son Bachubhai must be aged 32 years at the time of the accident which took place in July 1970 As Bai Ratan was a rustic belonging to the rural society she must have married quite young. 36 the said son Bachubhai must be aged 32 years at the time of the accident which took place in July 1970 As Bai Ratan was a rustic belonging to the rural society she must have married quite young. Thus if her first son was aged 32 years in 1970 she could have reasonably been aged 50 years at the time of the accident. The Claims Tribunal on the basis of the aforesaid positive evidence has taken the view that the deceased must have been aged 50 years at the time of her death. We see no reason to differ from the said conclusion reached by the Claims Tribunal. Thus we can safely take the age of the deceased as 50 years when she met with the unfortunate accident. Looking to her advanced age at the time of her death we feel that a multiplier of 8 will meet the ends of justice. We are conscious of the fact that in the case of victims of the age group between 90 to 35 years the usual multiplier taken is 15 but because of the advanced age of 50 years we think it safe to take the multiplier of 8 which will take into consideration all the imponderables and uncertainities underlying the assessment of damages. We have already arrived at the multiplicant at the annual figure of Rs. 900/and with the multiplier of 8 for the purpose of capitalisation we came to the total of Rs. 7200. 00. Thus the claimants will be entitled to Rs. 7200/towards the economic loss suffered by them on account of the untimely death of Bai Ratan. To this we will have to add conventional figure of loss of expectation of life. We find that this conventional figure was usually taken at 3 0 but subsequently with the passage of time this conventional figure is raised to Rs. 5 0 on account of the fall in the purchasing power of money. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Justice M. P. Thakkar and N. H. Bhatt in First Appeal No. 524 of 1976 decided on 21st August 1978 had an occasion to consider this question. M. P. Thakkar J. speaking for the Division Bench in the aforesaid case took the view that on account of the rise in prizes and the fall in the purchasing power of mo heney conventional figure of Rs. M. P. Thakkar J. speaking for the Division Bench in the aforesaid case took the view that on account of the rise in prizes and the fall in the purchasing power of mo heney conventional figure of Rs. 3 0 has got to be now substituted by the figure of Rs. 5 0 We well therefore add Rs. 500 to the amount of Rs. 7200/being compensation for the loss of expectation of life and for pain and suffering. Thus the total figure when worked out comes to Rs. 12 200 We can take the global figure of Rs. 12 0 as proper compensation which can be awarded to the claimants. But as we have found that Ratan must have contributed by her negligence to the unfortunate accident to the extent of 25% and as the claimants claimed amount on account of her death we will have to slice down this figure to 75% and consequently we arrive at the figure of Rs. 9 0 after deducting 25 towards the contributory negligence of the deceased. [the rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] appeal allowed. .