JUDGMENT Vyom Prakash, J —This second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree of District Judge, Una, dated 13th December, 1978, whereby the judgment and decree of Sub Judge, Una, dated 15th February 1978, was affirmed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that Ram Lai appellant filed a suit for declaration and injunction and in the alternative for possession with respect to the land measuring 5 kanals 5 marlas entered in Khasra number 1208 as detailed in the Jamabandi of 1971-72 of village Badehir, Tehsil Una. The plaintiff alleged that he is in possession of the disputed land as a tenant-at-will under the defendant for the last so many years from the time of his forefather. It was further alleged that the defendant-respondent got wrong entries incorporated in the revenue records showing defendants possession on the disputed land and that on the basis of these incorrect entries the defendant is threatening to interfere in the plaintiffs possession. On these allegations the plaintiff prayed for a relief of declaration with injunction and in the alternative it was pleaded that if during the pendency of the suit the defendant takes forcible possession, then a decree for possession be granted. 3. The defendant contested the suit of the plaintiff and alleged that the plaintiff is not in possession of the disputed land and is not a tenant under him. It was further alleged that a wrong entry regarding possession of the plaintiffs father Santu had been made in the revenue records although Santu had died since long and that this wrong entry regarding the possession of Santu was corrected by order of the Revenue Officer, dated 5th June, 1976. In a net shell the defendant denied the plaintiffs status as a tenant on the suit land. 4. Replication was filed by the plaintiff and he alleged that the entries regarding the extinguishment of the name of Santu by the Revenue Officer are unauthorised and has been made collusively without giving any notice to the plaintiff or without any enquiry, and that the defendant is an influential person and as such had made wrong entries incorporated regarding his self cultivation. 5. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed: "1. Whether the plaintiff is the tenant-at-will of tbe land in dispute as alleged ? OPP 2. Relief. 5. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed: "1. Whether the plaintiff is the tenant-at-will of tbe land in dispute as alleged ? OPP 2. Relief. The trial court after discussing the evidence dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding that the plaintiff is not a tenant of the suit land. The plaintiffs appeal before the District Judge was also dismissed and the learned District Judge also held that the plaintiff has failed to prove his tenancy and possession over the disputed land. 6. In this second appeal, Shri Kapil Dev learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has assailed the finding of both the lower courts and has submitted that substantial questions of law are involved in the case. He further submitted that both the courts below have misread the documentary and the oral evidence and have also misconstrued the law regarding the tenancy and the hereditability nature of the tenancy rights. He has referred to the various revenue record entries produced by the parties in the case and has also referred to the evidence of both the parties to establish that plaintiffs father Santu was in fact a tenant on the suit land from 1952 till his death somewhere in 1972-73, and thereafter the tenancy rights devolved upon the plaintiff by inheritance. It was also submitted by him that the defendant had altogether failed to prove any relinquishment or abandonment by Santu regarding his tenancy rights or his dispossession by ejectment or otherwise from the suit land. The main argument of the appellants learned counsel is that if possession of Santu on the suit land is once proved as a tenant, then unless and until the relinquishment or abandonment of the tenancy rights by Santu is pleaded or proved by the defendant or the dispossession of Santu in a legal manner is proved by^ the defendant, the rights of the plaintiff cannot be said to be extinguished. /The appellants counsel laid great stress upon the fact that there is a presumption both backward and forward regarding the continuity of a state of things which is proved to have existed at a certain time within reasonable proximate time and he developed his argument to the effect that Santu, the deceased father of the appellant, was admittedly in possession of the disputed land as a tenant and as such under the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (Punjab Act No. 10 of 1953) read with the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (Himachal Pradesh Act No. 8 of 1974) the said tenancy rights have devolved upon the appellant as the same are heritable. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent Shri Kedar Ishwar vehemently submitted that the appellant has not been able to discharge the onus regarding the proof of his tenancy on the suit land and that the appellant is not, in fact, the tenant of the suit land. He referred to the entries of the revenue records from the year 1965 to 1970 and contended that the father of the appellant, Santu deceased, had in fact left the cultivation of the land and that the respondent-landlord was in possession of the same. He further contended that the entries of the Jamabandi 1971-72 showing Santu as a tenant and thereafter of the Girdawaris from Kharif 1972 to Rabi 1979 were clearly wrong because Santu had died and the name of a deceased was being shown in the revenue records. He further contended that the revenue officer correctly passed the order for correcting the record on 5-6-1976 because the revenue entries in favour of Santu deceased were, prima facie, wrong and unauthorised. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant did not care to produce the death entry of Santu and as such presumption should be raised against him. It was also argued that the concurrent findings of the courts below should not be disturbed in a second appeal. 8. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records and the judgments of the lower courts. It was also argued that the concurrent findings of the courts below should not be disturbed in a second appeal. 8. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records and the judgments of the lower courts. As an important question regarding the consideration and interpretation of the different entries of the revenue records is involved in the present case and the question of onus is also raised and the statutory presumption regarding the entries of the revenu records are to be considered, therefore, I have minutely scrutinised both oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties in this case and have considered the judgments of the courts below to find out as to whether the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the challenge to the correctness of the findings of the courts below is justified or not. It is true that in a second appeal the decision on a question of fact should not be lightly interfered with but where the reasoning is based upon some mis-interpretation of law then the High Court is definitely within its power to scrutinise the evidence and can set aside such findings if the same are arrived at on a wrong assumption of law. 9. In this case if the pleadings of the parties are perused then it is evident that the respondent only pleaded that the appellant is not a tenant of the suit land and no case of any relinquishment or surrender of tenancy by Santu deceased was pleaded. It was only alleged by the respondent that a wrong entry regarding possession of Santu, who was dead since long, had been made in the revenue records and that such a wrong entry was corrected vide order of the Revenue Officer, dated 5-6-1976. As no case of relinquishment or surrender by Santu deceased had been pleaded, therefore, only one issue regarding plaintiffs status as a tenant was framed. 10. A perusal of the revenue records, namely, Jamabandis for the year 1952-53 (Exhibit P. 3) and 1956-57 (Exhibit P. 4) prove that Sautu father of the appellant was occupying the suit land as a tenant-at-will. In the Jamabandi of 1971-72. 10. A perusal of the revenue records, namely, Jamabandis for the year 1952-53 (Exhibit P. 3) and 1956-57 (Exhibit P. 4) prove that Sautu father of the appellant was occupying the suit land as a tenant-at-will. In the Jamabandi of 1971-72. (Exhibit P. 1) and the entries of Khasra Girdawaris from Kharif 1973 to Rabi 1976 (Exhibit P. 2) again Santu is shown to be a tenant of the suit land. It appears that no Jamabandi was prepared between 1956-57 and 1971-72 because none of the parties have cared to produce any Jamabandi pertaining to this period. However, both the parties have produced entries of khasra Girdawari from the Kharif 1957 to Rabi 1972, which are Exhibits P. 5, P. 6, D. 7 and D. 8. A perusal of these entries of the khasra Girdawari show that Santu father of the appellant was in continuous possession of the disputed land upto Rabi 1965 while there is a note in the khasra Girdawari that from Kharif 1965 the land is under self-cultivation (i. e. in possession of landlord. This entry continued upto Kharif 1969 and in Rabi 1970 there is again a change showing Santu father of the appellant as a tenant of the suit land. The reports or the orders upon the basis of which these entries in the Girdawari were made have not been produced on the record by either side. It is not explained as to how and in what manner the name of Santu was expunged from the revenue records in Kharif 1965 and why Santu was again entered as tenant-at-will in Rabi 1970. It is an admitted proposition of law that if there is a conflict between the entries of the Jamabandi and the khasra Girdawari then in that case the entries of Jamabandi will prevail, because entries of the khasra Girdawari do not carry presumption of correctness and truth and they are liable to be corrected by subsequent Jamabandi. As in this particular case after the entries of the Girdawaris referred to above the Jamabandi for the year 1971-72 (Exhibit P. 1) had been prepared, therefore, these entries of the khasra Girdawaris will have no value and the entries of the Jamabandi will prevail and carry a presumption of correctness and truth. As in this particular case after the entries of the Girdawaris referred to above the Jamabandi for the year 1971-72 (Exhibit P. 1) had been prepared, therefore, these entries of the khasra Girdawaris will have no value and the entries of the Jamabandi will prevail and carry a presumption of correctness and truth. In short, there is no Jamabandi from the year 1952-53 to the year 1971-72 where the name of Santu father of the appellant as a tenant is missing, or, in other words, the respondent is never shown in possession in any Jamabandi between this period. 11. The authority Ambika Prasad Thakur and others, etc. v. Ram Ekbai Rai (dead) by his legal representatives and others etc., AIR 1966 SC 605 clearly lays down that if a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may sometimes be drawn. This ruling was followed in Sain Ram v. Lal Singh, 1972 Simla Law Journal 13 and there too it was held that inference regarding the continuity of a thing or a state of things which is shown to exist can be drawn within a reasonable proximate time both forwards and backwards. 12. In view of the above documentary evidence it can safely be presumed that Santu, deceased father of the appellant, was in continuous possession of the disputed land upto 1972 when the Jamabandi entries had been prepared. Even subsequently in the Girdawari (Exhibit P. 2) Santu is entered as a tenant of the suit land. The next documents upon which the learned counsel for the respondent relied and laid great stress were Exhibits D. 3 and D. 4. Exhibit D. 3 is a copy of the order, dated 5-6-1976 passed by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Una, and Exhibit D. 4 is a copy of the report Roznamcha of the Patwari, dated 26th July, 1976. In fact this report of the Patwari is based upon the order of the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade. Una, which is Exhibit D. 3. If the contents of Exhibit D. 3 are perused then it is evident that respondent Ram Rakha filed an application on 12-2-1976 against Santu, impleading him as a respondent. This application was for correction of khasra Girdawari. Una, which is Exhibit D. 3. If the contents of Exhibit D. 3 are perused then it is evident that respondent Ram Rakha filed an application on 12-2-1976 against Santu, impleading him as a respondent. This application was for correction of khasra Girdawari. A perusal of the order which is very brief, clearly shows that the application came up for decision before the Revenue Officer on 5-6-1976 in the presence of Ram Rakha landlord and some members of the Panchayat The members of the Panchayat verified that Santu had died some 5 years back and that thereafter land-owner is in possession of the land. On the basis of this, the Revenue Officer opined that the name of Santu, who is died, is wrongly recorded as a tenant and, therefore, the Revenue Officer accepted the application of the landlord-respondent. The aforesaid order or any other document or oral evidence does not show that any notice of this application/enquiry was ever given to the appellant. This order even does not show that any evidence regarding the cultivation by appellant was taken or enquired into. As this order, Exhibit D. 3 only pertains to the proceedings regarding correction of khasra Girdawari entries which were in favour of a deceased person and further more as the proceedings were exparte, therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be held that such an order can bind the plaintiff-appellant who was never a party to the same and who had never been afforded any opportunity to contest this application. The respondent should have impleaded the present appellant as a party and there was no occasion to implead a dead person (Santu) as a party when no notice could ever be served upon him after 12-2-1976 i. e., a date on which Santu had admittedly died. 13. There is no documentary evidence on the file to prove as to when Santu died. In the statement of respondent as DW 5 he has tried to bring out a new cause by stating that Santu had relinquished the tenancy during his life-time when he had fallen ill. This case was never pleaded in the written statement and as such the same is clearly an after-thought. The defendant-respondent has stated that Santu died 4/5 years back and if his statement is taken as correct then it comes to the year 1972-73. This case was never pleaded in the written statement and as such the same is clearly an after-thought. The defendant-respondent has stated that Santu died 4/5 years back and if his statement is taken as correct then it comes to the year 1972-73. Similarly DW1 has stated that Santu died about 6/7 years back, i.e. in the year 1970-71 and that after the death of Santu the landlord is in possession of the disputed land. Neel Kanth (DW2) has stated that Santu died about 5/6 years back, i.e. in the year 1971-72 and that since then the landlord is in cultivating possession of the suit land. Raja Ram (DW4) is a person who states that he is cultivating the land on behalf of the landlord for the last 5/6 years, i.e. from the year 1971-72. This evidence of the witnesses for the defendant clearly proves that during the life-time of Santu he was in cultivating possession of the land and it was only after the death of Santu that the landlord came in possession of the land. These witnesses did not support the new case set up by the landlord regarding relinquishment of tenancy by Santu as has been stated above. 14. The plaintiffs oral evidence is of Chint Ram (PW1) who states that Santu died about 10 years back, i.e. 1967 and that after that the plaintiff-appellant is in cultivating possession of the suit land. Dina (PW2) states that Santu died about 5 years back, i.e. in 1972 and after his death the plaintiff-appellant is in cultivating possession of the suit land. The plaintiff as PW3 has stated that his father Santu died about 3 years back and 4th year is running. According to him, Santu died in 1973-74. He has further stated that after the death of Santu he is in cultivating possession of the land. If the evidence of both the parties is weighed then it is clear from the evidence of plaintiff as PW3 and defendant as DW5 that Santu died somewhere in the year 1973. Even the evidence of PW2 and DW2 also support this fact. The best person to depose about the factum of death of Santu is the plaintiff himself as he has the direct and special knowledge about this fact and his evidence is, in fact, accepted by defendant as DW5. Even the evidence of PW2 and DW2 also support this fact. The best person to depose about the factum of death of Santu is the plaintiff himself as he has the direct and special knowledge about this fact and his evidence is, in fact, accepted by defendant as DW5. In view of this it is not at all worthwhile to consider or rely upon the evidence of PW1 (Chint Ram) who has casually stated that Santu died some 10 years back because he has no special knowledge about this fact. The statements of other witnesses, namely, PW2, DW1 and DW2 are also not based upon any special knowledge. They could only give the period by approximation. In view of all this it is clearly proved that Santu died somewhere in the year 1973 approximately. 15. After discussing the oral and the documentary evidence it is clear that Santu remained in possession of the disputed land till the year 1973 approximately when he died. It is not at all proved that Santu ever relinquished or abandoned the tenancy rights at any time during his life-time It is also not pleaded or proved that Santu was ever ejected from this land during his lifetime. Hence it can be safely presumed that after the death of Santu the rights of tenancy which could be inherited by his son, the present appellant, devolved upon him, and as such the appellant became a tenant of the suit land. The oral evidence produced by the plaintiff-appellant regarding his possession and tenancy is in conformity with the documentary evidence and as such there is no reason to disbelieve the version of the plaintiff that he is in possession of the disputed land as a tenant. 16. In view of the above discussion, the plaintiff-appellant has been able to prove that he is a tenant-at-will of the land in dispute and as such disagreeing with the findings of the lower courts, I have no hesitation in deciding issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. 17. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees of both the courts below are set aside. The plaintiffs suit for declaration and injunction, as prayed for, is decreed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.