Abdul Hameed v. District Judge Kanpur — 1979 DIGILAW 687 (ALL)

ORDER V.K. Mehrotra, J. - This petition and the connected civil revisions relate to dispute about shop No. 97/317, Talaq Mahal, Kanpur and arise out of controversy between the parties in regard thereto. They are, consequently, being decided by a common judgment. 2. Mohammad Sabir Husain, Mohammad Isarar Husain and Mohammad Anwar Husain who arc all sons of Haji Sadiq Husain are owners (for brevity, the landlords) of the shop in dispute of which one Ahmad Hasan was a tenant. An application for the release of the premises was made under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972) (hereinafter the Act). The tenant filed an objection but during the pendency of the proceedings died on February 20, 1974. One Mohammad Ayub (the third respondent in the writ petition) filed an application in the proceedings on March 13, 1974 for being substituted as an heir of the deceased tenant. Substitution, which was allowed by an order dated March 18, 1974, was made by the landlords on March 19, 1974. Soon thereafter, an application was moved by the landlords on March 25, 1974 alleging that there had been a compromise between them and Mohammad Ayub under which Mohammad Ayub had agreed to vacate the shop unconditionally and the shop was to be released in favour of the landlords. The present petitioner moved an application before the Prescribed Authority on March 25, 1974 purporting to be an objection to the application of Mohammad Ayub dated March 13, 1974 to to be substituted as heir of the deceased-tenant. In this objection, which was supported by an affidavit of the petitioner dated March 24, 1974, it was asserted that the deceased tenant had not left behind either a widow or any son or daughter and that the petitioner who was the own elder brother of the tenant and his two sisters, Smt. Zohra Khatoon and Smt. Saghira Khatoon alone were Iris heirs. It was also asserted that the deceased-tenant did not have any brother by the name of Mohammad Yusuf nor was Mohammad Ayub, who had applied for being substituted in place of the tenant of the shop, purporting to be the son of Mohammad Yusuf, was his nephew. It was also asserted that the deceased-tenant did not have any brother by the name of Mohammad Yusuf nor was Mohammad Ayub, who had applied for being substituted in place of the tenant of the shop, purporting to be the son of Mohammad Yusuf, was his nephew. It was asserted further that Mohammad Ayub was a fictitious person set up by the landlords and that the only heirs who could be brought on record in place of the deceased-tenant were the petitioner and the two aforesaid sisters. In spite, however, of the objection which, according to the respondents, was withdrawn by the petitioner on July 4, 1974, an order of release was passed in favour of the landlords on October 17, 1974. An appeal was filed by the petitioner against this order before the District Judge on November 12, 1974. His prayer, however, for staying the implementation of the order of release was rejected on December 18, 1974. Yet another application for stay was filed by the petitioner on January 10,1975 but it was also rejected by the District Judge. On January 13, 1975, according to the respondents, the petitioner filed suit No. 70 of 1975 but failed to obtain an ex parte injunction against the implementation of the order of release. On January 17, 1975, writ petition No. 657 of 1975 was filed by the present petitioner against the order dated January 10, 1975 passed by the District Judge refusing the interim order against implementation of the release order during the pendency of the appeal before him. The petition was admitted to hearing and an ex parte interim order staying the implementation of the order of release was granted by this court. That order was, however, vacated on April 29, 1975 and on July 29, 1975, an application for review of the order dated April 29, 1975 was also rejected. Meanwhile, the petitioner made several applications in the suit seeking an interim injunction against the implementation of the order of release and one such application was rejected by the learned Munsif before whom the suit is pending on May 22, 1978 after hearing the parties. An appeal against that order (being Misc. Meanwhile, the petitioner made several applications in the suit seeking an interim injunction against the implementation of the order of release and one such application was rejected by the learned Munsif before whom the suit is pending on May 22, 1978 after hearing the parties. An appeal against that order (being Misc. Appeal No. 190 of 1978) having been dismissed on August 31, 1978, the petitioner along with Sagir Ahmad and Anwar Ali, who are all plaintiffs in suit No. 70 of 1975 filed a Civil Revision No. 3652 of 1978 in this court against these orders. This application in revision was admitted for hearing by this Court on October 18, 1978. 3. In the meantime, the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of release dated October 17, 1974 was dismissed by the District Judge on September 9, 1975. This order was assailed in writ petition No. 9971 of 1975 on September 11, 1975. The petition was admitted to hearing and an interim order restraining the implementation of the order of release was passed. This writ petition and the earlier petition No. 657 of of 1975 came up for hearing together. Both the petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge (K. C. Agarwal, J.' on March 2, 1976. Abdul Hamid went up against the dismissal of writ petition No. 9971 of 1975 to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 522 of 1976 under Article 136 of the Constitution. This appeal was decided by the Supreme Court by its order dated Oct. 18, 1976 (since reported in AIR 1977 SC 1912 ). By this order of which a copy has been appended as annexure 5 to the counter affidavit in the present ease of Mohammad Sabir Husain, the 4th respondent and one of the landlords, the Supreme Court set aside the order of release passed by the Prescribed Authority and remanded the matter to it "to dispose of the objections of the appellant (the petitioner) dated March 25, 1974 by deciding as to who is the heir....................... .........If Mohammad Ayub is found to be the heir of Ahmad Hasan, respondent Nos. .........If Mohammad Ayub is found to be the heir of Ahmad Hasan, respondent Nos. 4 to 6 (the landlords) will be entitled to obtain the release order in their favour on the basis of the compromise with Mohammad Ayub but if on the other hand, the appellant is found to be an heir of Ahmad Hasan, the abatement of the release application, if any, will be set aside and the appellant will be added as legal representative of Ahmad Hasan and after giving an opportunity to the appellant to file his written statement in answer to the release application within 15 days from the date of his being joined as party, the Prescribed Authority will proceed to dispose of the release application ..................." In consequence of this order of the Supreme Court dated October 18, 1976, the Rent Control Tribunal which had, in the meantime, been constituted at Kanpur under the provisions of the Act dealt with the matter and came to the conclusion in its order dated April 26, 1977 that Mohammad Ayub was the heir of the deceased tenant and that the landlords are entitled to an order of release in their favour on the basis of the compromise entered into by Mohammad Ayub with them. An appeal against this order of the Tribunal was dismissed by the District Judge, Kanpur on May 20, 1977 by a detailed judgment of which annexure 4 to the petition is a copy. This appeal had been preferred by the present petitioner alone. Sagir Ahmad and Anwar Ahmad, the two other plaintiffs in suit No. 70 of 1975 also filed a separate appeal (No. 46 of 1977) challenging the order of release dated April 26, 1977. This appeal was dismissed as not maintainable on May 28, 1977. 4. Aggrieved by the order of release dated April 26, 1977 and of the appellate order dated May 20, 1977, the present petitioner filed writ petition No. 821 of 1977 in this court. The petition was eventually dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court (M. M. Gupta, J.) on March 13, 1978. A copy of the Judgment (since reported in 1978 All Rent Cas 162) is annexure 2' to the counter affidavit of Mohammad Sabir Husain. The petition was eventually dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court (M. M. Gupta, J.) on March 13, 1978. A copy of the Judgment (since reported in 1978 All Rent Cas 162) is annexure 2' to the counter affidavit of Mohammad Sabir Husain. This court, in substance, took the view that once it had been held that the petitioner was not an heir of the deceased-tenant, he was not left with any right to maintain the writ petition. It appears from annexure 3 to the same counter affidavit that Special Leave Petition No. 2286 of 1978 was filed by the present petitioner along with the two daughters of the deceased-tenant, namely, Zohra Khatoon and Sagira Khatoon as well as Sagir Ahmad and Anwar Ali challenging the judgment of this Court dated March 13,.1978 and the order of the District Judge and the Rent Control Tribunal dated May 20, 1977 and April 26, 1977 respectively. This special leave Petition was, however, dismissed by the Supreme Court on May 5, 1978 (copy of the order being annexure 3-A to the counter affidavit). Not content, the present petitioner filed an application for review before the District Judge in respect of the order dated May 20, 1977 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) which was, however, dismissed by the District Judge by order dated August 19, 1978 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) holding, firstly, that the appellate authority had no power under the Act to review its order passed in appeal and, secondly, that the contentions raised in support of the prayer for review were untenable on merits as well. With crusading pertinacity, an application was moved on behalf of the petitioner on August 21, 1978 by his learned counsel for being permitted to address the court on the merits of the matter in greater detail. The learned District Judge dismissed the application with the observation that "while hearing the review petition, I had asked the learned counsel to state the heads of illegalities on account of which he sought a review of the earlier order dated 20-5-1977 .......... The learned District Judge dismissed the application with the observation that "while hearing the review petition, I had asked the learned counsel to state the heads of illegalities on account of which he sought a review of the earlier order dated 20-5-1977 .......... After the grounds were stated by the learned counsel, I did not hear further arguments because I was of the view that the hearing would amount to sitting in appeal over the findings sought to be reviewed..............I do not see any good ground for recalling the order dated 19-8-1978" copies of the application dated August 21, 1978 and the order thereon are appended as Annexures 7 and 8 to the writ petition. The present writ petition seeks the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders of the District Judge dated August 19, 1978 and August 21, 1978 aforesaid as well as the-quashing of the order of release in addition to a prayer for a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus to restrain the respondents to-the petition from interfering with the possession of the petitioner in the shop in dispute. The petition was presented in this court on September 19, 1978 when notice was directed to issue to the respondents and ex parte interim order restraining the eviction of the petitioner from the shop in question was passed. This order was subsequently affirmed after hearing the parties on November 9, 1978. 5. Meanwhile, in Civil Suit No. 70 of 1975, an application for amendment of the plaint was filed by the plaintiffs, namely, Abdul Hamid (the present petitioner), Sagir Ahmad and Anwar Khan. This application was dismissed by the learned Munsif trying the suit by order dated February 25, 1978. The plaintiffs have assailed the order before this court by filing the connected Civil Revision No. 2647 of 1978 which was admitted to hearing on August 22, 1978. 6. Saghir Ahmad and Anwar Khan, plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit, claimed to be partners with the deceased-tenant carrying on business in the disputed premises since February, 1971. The relief originally claimed in the suit was for a perpetual injunction restraining the Landlords (the defendants in the suit) from dispossessing or evicting the plaintiffs from the shop in pursuance of release order dated October 17, 1974. The relief originally claimed in the suit was for a perpetual injunction restraining the Landlords (the defendants in the suit) from dispossessing or evicting the plaintiffs from the shop in pursuance of release order dated October 17, 1974. The plaintiffs claimed that Mohammad Ayub was a fictitious person and that the order of release having been passed in their absence and on the basis of a compromise entered into by the said Mohammad Ayub, was illegal. They also asserted that the petitioner never withdrew his objection dated March 25, 1974 to the substitution of Mohammad Ayub as legal representative of the deceased-tenant. A copy of the plaint as originally presented is annexure I to the affidavit of Haider Ali, pairokar of the plaintiff-applicants filed in support of the stay application in Civil Revision No. 2617 of 1978, Annexure 2 to the same affidavit is a copy of the amendment application which has been dismissed by the learned Munsif by his order which has been impugned in the said revision. By this application, the plaintiffs, inter alia, sought to add paragraphs 13A to 13F to the plaint whereby they sought to bring on record the facts leading to the judgment of the Supreme Court and the order of release dated April 26, 1977 passed in consequence thereof. In addition, they re-asserted that the compromise was collusive and that Mohammad Ayub was a fictitious person and was not the heir of the deceased-tenant and further that the Tribunal had passed the order of release dated April 26, 1976 arbitrarily inasmuch as, the plaintiffs were not afforded proper hearing by it. The relief clause was also sought to be amended by seeking the substitution of April 26, 1977 as the date of the order of release instead of October 17, 1974 and of the Rent Control Tribunal for the Prescribed Authority. 7. On behalf of the petitioner, it has strenuously been urged by his learned counsel that the learned District Judge was in error in refusing to review his order dated May 20, 1977 dismissing the petitioner's appeal against the order of release dated April 26, 1977 upon the view that he had no power of review and further without going into the merits of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner in detail. The precise submission is that reading Section 22 with Section 10 (2) of the Act it was clear that finality had been attached to the order passed in appeal by the District Judge who could exercise power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure while exercising appellate jurisdiction on account of Rule 22 (f) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 framed in exercise of powers under Section 41 read with Section 34 (1) (g) of the Act. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon the decision of a Bench of this Court in the case of Sita Ram Sikhaula v. Prescribed Authority (1978 All Rent Cas 91). 8. The first question that calls for consideration, therefore, is whether the District Judge as an appellate authority under the Act had power to review his earlier judgment. It will be useful at this stage to refer to some provisions of the Act. The orders passed by the District Magistrate under Sections 8 and 9 which relate to disputes about determination of standard rent can be challenged by the aggrieved party in an appeal before the District Judge under Section 10 which reads thus : - "10. Appeal against order under Sections 8 and 9. - (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the District Magistrate under Section 5 or Section 9 may, within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal against it to the District Judge, and the District Judge may either dispose of it himself or assign it for disposal to an Additional District Judge under his administrative control, and may recall it from any such officer, or transfer it to any other such officer. (2) The appellate authority may confirm, vary or rescind the order, or remand the case to the District Magistrate for re-hearing, and may also take any additional evidence, and pending its decision, stay the operation of the order under appeal on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit. (3) No further appeal or revision shall lie against any order passed by the appellate authority under this section, and its order shall be final." 9. Section 16 deals with allotment and release of the vacant buildings. (3) No further appeal or revision shall lie against any order passed by the appellate authority under this section, and its order shall be final." 9. Section 16 deals with allotment and release of the vacant buildings. Sub-section (5) of this section provides in clause (a) that where the landlord or any other person claiming to be lawful occupant of the building or any part thereof comprised in the allotment or release order satisfies the District Magistrate that such order was not made in accordance with clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be, of sub-section (1), the District Magistrate may review the order. No appeal has been provided against an order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 16 but it is open to correction by the District Judge in a revision under Section 18 (1) where the District Magistrate has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law or has acted in exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The District Judge as Revising Authority can confirm or rescind the final order passed under Section 16 or remand the case to the District Magistrate. Section 19 enables the District Magistrate to make re-allotment of a building or a part thereof released in favour of the landlord in certain circumstances. An order passed bv the District Magistrate under Section 19 is revisable by the District Judge under Section 18 in the same manner as an order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 16. An order passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 of the Act can be assailed by a person aggrieved by it in appeal before the District Judge and the provisions of Section 10 mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such appeal. A landlord has been given a right to recover immediate possession of a building let out by him under Section 24-R where he is required to vacate a residential public building in his occupation. A landlord has been given a right to recover immediate possession of a building let out by him under Section 24-R where he is required to vacate a residential public building in his occupation. An application for recovery of possession by the landlord is to be made to the District Magistrate and is to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in Section 24-C of which sub-section (7) provides that no appeal or second appeal would lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the District Magistrate but enables the District Judge, for the purpose of satisfying himself that an order made by the District Magistrate under that section is according to law, to call for the records of the case and to pass such order in respect thereto as he deems fit. Sub-section (8) of Section 24-C then lays down that "where no application has been made to the District Judge on revision, the District Magistrate may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provisions of Order XLYII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure." Section 34 which deals with the powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them reads in its material parts as under: "34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them - (1) The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or any (appellate or revising authority) shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing (any appeal or revision) under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters namely,- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits; (c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation; (d) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any party or requiring security for costs from any party; (f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith; (g) any other matter which may be prescribed." ...................................... "(8) For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proofs, rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed." 10. It is noticeable that clauses (a) to, (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 34 do not vest, inter alia, the appellate authority with the power of review of its earlier judgment. Section 38 lays down that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act or in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 41 enables the State Government by notification in the Gazette to make Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, including any rule, prescribing fee in respect of any proceeding under the Act. The Rules so framed are required to be laid before the legislature under Section 42. Amongst the Rules framed by the State Government in exercise of its rule-making power, is Rule 22 which reads thus : - "22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Section 34 (1) (g)). The Rules so framed are required to be laid before the legislature under Section 42. Amongst the Rules framed by the State Government in exercise of its rule-making power, is Rule 22 which reads thus : - "22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Section 34 (1) (g)). The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under the Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely - (a) the power to dismiss an application or appeal for default and to restore it for sufficient cause; (b) the power to proceed ex parte, and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed ex parte; (c) the power to award costs and special costs to any successful party against an unsuccessful party; (d) the power to allow amendment of an application or memorandum of appeal; (e) the power to consolidate two or more cases or eviction by the same landlord against different tenants; (f) the power referred to in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the authority concerned." No specific power has been conferred upon the appellate authority even under this Rule, to review its earlier judgment though under clause (f) it can exercise the power referred to in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the authority concerned. 11. The principle in regard to the existence or otherwise of a power of review is not in doubt. As observed by Seshagiri Aiyar J. of the Madras High Court in A. Shetty v. Hegade (AIR 1919 Mad 244): "It is settled law that a case is not open to appeal unless the State gives such a right. The power to review must also be given by the Statute. Prima facie, a party who has obtained a decision is entitled to keep it unassailed, unless the Legislature had indicated the mode by which it can be set aside. A review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same Officer who decided the case. The power to review must also be given by the Statute. Prima facie, a party who has obtained a decision is entitled to keep it unassailed, unless the Legislature had indicated the mode by which it can be set aside. A review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same Officer who decided the case. There is at least as good reason for saying that such powei should not be exercised unless the Statute gives it, as for saying that another Tribunal should not hear an appeal from the Trial Court unless such a power is given to it by Statute". This State of law was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Har Bhajan Singh v. Karam Singh ( AIR 1966 SC 641 ). In that case, the Supreme Court, while upholding the decision of the Punjab High Court, observed that: "There is no provision in the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Preven lion of Fragmentation) Act granting express power of review to the State Government with regard to an order made under Section 42 of the Act. In the absence of any such express power, the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, cannot review his previous order of dismissing the application of the petitioner under Section 42 of the Act. Hence, the subsequent review order of the Director is ultra vires and without jurisdiction and the High Court was right in quashing that order by the grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." In coming to the said conclusion, the Supreme Court applied the principle laid down by it earlier in the case of Patel Churii Bhai Daji Bhai v. Narayan Rao Khanderao Jambekar ( AIR 1965 SC 1457 ) and in which it was observed that: "These orders passed by the Collector in exercise of his revisional powers were quasi-judicial and were final. The Act does not empower the Collector to review an order passed by him under Section 76-A, In the absence of any power of review, the Collector could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and hold that there were grounds for annulling oi reversing the Mahalkaris order. The subsequent order dated February 17, 1959 reopening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The High Court ought to have quashed the order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on this ground." 12. The subsequent order dated February 17, 1959 reopening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The High Court ought to have quashed the order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on this ground." 12. The provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder noticed above clearly indicate that wherever the Legislature intended to confer a power of review upon any authority under the Act it said so in express terms. It did not confer that power upon the appellate authority whose decision has been made final under the Act. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it is clear that such a power cannot be attributed to the appellate authority by implication. In a recent decision in the case of Shiv Behari Sharma v. Addl. Dist. Judge, Kanpur (1977 All WC 679), M. P. Saxena, J. held that: "The petition so far as it is directed against the second order is within time but it may be stated at the very out-set that the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) does not prescribe any remedy by way of review and the review application was rightly rejected. As observed in the case of Manhoo Mal v. Mullu (1963 All LJ 731) (FB) if the petitioner challenges a later order passed on the review application, he can succeed only on showing that refusal to review an earlier order was refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or was based on a manifestly illegal view. In the instant case, there being no remedy for review under U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, the learned Additional District Judge was right in rejecting the review application on this score and the writ petition against it is without any force." 13. In Sita Ram Sikhaulas case (1978 All Rent Cas 91), the facts were these : Father of the petitioners was the owner of the building in question. He filed an application under Section 21 of the Act before the Prescribed Authority for evicting his tenants. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners father died and an application for substitution was filed giving the names of certain heirs. That application was opposed by the tenant on the allegation that there were certain heirs who had not been impleaded. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners father died and an application for substitution was filed giving the names of certain heirs. That application was opposed by the tenant on the allegation that there were certain heirs who had not been impleaded. The Supreme Court directed the petitioners by order dated August 20, 1975 to implead the other heirs as well. The petitioners did not comply with that order to implead other heirs as well. A compromise was entered into between the petitioners on one hand and the contesting tenant on the other who later filed an application for setting aside the compromise on the ground of fraud. The petitioners raised a preliminary objection before the Prescribed Authority that the said question could be decided only in a regular suit and not on a miscellaneous application before it under Section 151 C. P. C. The Prescribed Authority found that there were other illegalities in passing the compromise decree and, therefore, set aside the compromise decree by its order dated February 10, 1976. This order was challenged by the petitioners before this court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in which it was argued on their behalf that it was not open to the Prescribed Authority to review the order under Section 151 C. P. C. when the tenant had the other remedy of filing a regular suit for challenging the compromise decree. Reliance was placed upon an earlier decision of this court in the case of Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram ( AIR 1957 All 820 ) in which a Division Bench had, inter alia, observed that: "The defendant has no right to pray for quashing of the compromise and the setting aside of the decree on an application made under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure." and that "it is not open to any party to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the court when he had another remedy open to him but did not pursue it." The Bench which decided Sia Rams ease dismissed the petition observing, inter alia, that- "for all these illegalities, the compromise decree was not a lawful one and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority under the inherent powers set aside the compromise decree. This power has been conferred on the Prescribed Authority under Section 31 (f) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and Rule 22 (f) of the Rules framed therein. In the petition, it has not been alleged that the various illegalities pointed out by the Prescribed Authority in his order were not there. All that has been said in the petition is that if the Prescribed Authority wanted to exercise inherent powers then he should have given adequate opportunity to the petitioners to meet those points. The illegalities pointed out by the Prescribed Authority in his order were borne out from the record as is clear from the observations made by it in its order. It is open to the petitioners to have pressed for an opportunity before the Prescribed Authority if they so chose. The Prescribed Authority had simply looked into the record and found the illegalities pointed out by him. He had passed the order on the basis of the compromise and if he was satisfied that there were illegalities in passing the order he had inherent powers to rectify the same. No man should suffer at the hands of the court. Even if there had been no power for review the court can rectify the obvious mistake committed by it. Section 34 (f) of the Act clearly contemplates that the Prescribed Authority can pass an order on the basis of a lawful compromise. The words of Section 34 (f) are in pari materia with the words of Order XXIII, Ride 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it was bounden duty of the Prescribed Authority to satisfy himself as to whether the compromise was a lawful one. 14. The decision of the Bench in Sia Rams case is not an authority for the proposition as has been canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the power of reviewing their decision can be attributed to the authorities under the Act. The Bench, as is clear from the observations extracted above, proceeded upon the basis that the Prescribed Authority could set aside its earlier decision in exercise of its inherent powers where by simply looking into the records it finds that it committed a manifest illegality whereby injustice was being caused to a party and the circumstances were such where the party could be said to suffer at the hands of the court. Where it was the bounden duty of the authority under the statutory provisions under which it was constituted to satisfy itself whether the compromise was a lawful one before acting upon it and the authority discovered that it was not so, the power of the authority to rectify its Own error in proceedings to act upon the compromise without such satisfaction was upheld by the Bench in that case. 15. The learned District Judge has not committed any manifest error of law in taking the view in his order dated August 19, 1978 (annexure 6 to the writ petition) that the appellate authority had no power to review its own order passed in an appeal. On this conclusion, it is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the present petition. If the appellate authority had no power to review its earlier order dated May 20, 1977, the fact that the petitioners counsel was not heard in greater detail about the alleged illegalities in the order dated May 20, 1977 or that the additional evidence which was sought to be placed before the appellate authority by the petitioners counsel was not taken into consideration would not entitle the petitioner to relief in the present proceedings. More so, when the decision dated May 20, 1977 was not interfered with by this court in writ petition No. 821 of 1977 decided on March 13, 1978 long after the application for review (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) dated August 27, 1977. A perusal of the application dated August 27, 1977 for review shows that the grounds sought to be put forward on behalf of the petitioner were practically the same which were raised before this court in writ petition No. 821 of 1977. A perusal of the application dated August 27, 1977 for review shows that the grounds sought to be put forward on behalf of the petitioner were practically the same which were raised before this court in writ petition No. 821 of 1977. Review of the order of the appellate authority dated May 20, 1977 was principally sought on the ground that the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was the legal heir of the deceased-tenant was based upon non-consideration and mis-appreciation of the material on record, the question had not been dealt with in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court for no positive finding had been recorded as to how was Mohammad Ayub an heir of the deceased-tenant; that in several earlier cases it was asserted that the petitioner was a brother of the deceased-tenant and that evidence about documents relating to the earlier cases were out of the mind of the petitioner "at the time when his appeal was heard and the Tribunal gave its decision so that they could not then be filed." These grounds of invalidity of the order dated May 20, 1977 were negatived by this court in that decision against which the special leave petition was, as noticed above, dismissed by the Supreme Court. 16. The aforesaid heads of apparent illegality in the order dated May 20, 1977 were stated before the appellate authority on behalf of the petitioner at the state of the hearing of the application for review and were not found to be illegality of the kind which would justify exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 C. P. C. as, in the opinion of the appellate authority "the submissions (made) required it to sit in appeal over the judgment dated May 20, 1977 which was not permissible under Section 151 C. P. C." The view taken by the appellate authority cannot be said to suffer from any apparent error of law. After all, inherent powers under Section 151 C. P. C. are only intended to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and cannot be interpreted to mean that whenever a court after wrongly deciding the case between two parties discovers that the decision was erroneous, it has inherent jurisdiction to re-open the matter and to set it right by reversing the earlier decision. In the instant case that is precisely what the petitioner wanted the appellate authority to do through his application for review. 17. On the conclusion that the appellate authority had no power to review its earlier order and in the circumstances in which the petitioner sought the review, it is obvious that he is not entitle to any relief in the writ petition. 18. Civil Revision No. 3652 of 1978 is directed, as noticed earlier, against the order dated August 31, 1978 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 190 of 1978 against the order dated May 22, 1978 of the Munsif refusing to grant an interim injunction against the implementation of the order of release during the pendency of suit No. 70 of 1975. The grant or otherwise of an interim injunction was a matter of discretion with the courts below. They have chosen not to grant interim relief as prayed by the plaintiffs in the suit. No error of jurisdiction or material irregularity in the procedure followed by them in making the order has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicants. In the circumstances of the present case, the refusal to grant an interim injunction against the implementation of the order of release during the pendency of the suit cannot be characterised to be even improper. Besides, an application in revision under Section 115 C. P. C. against the appellate order dated August 31, 1978 is not maintainable in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.) Limited, v. Dwarkadish Dayal ( AIR 1979 All 218 ). 19. Civil Revision No. 2647 of 1978 is against the order dated February 25, 1978 passed by the Munsif trying suit No. 70 of 1975 rejecting the plaintiffs prayer for amendment of the plaint. It has been mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment that the plaintiffs wanted through the application for amendment the addition of certain paragraphs to the plaint basically in regard to the facts leading to the subsequent order of release dated April 26, 1977 and were seeking the substitution of that date for the date of the earlier order of release, namely, October 17, 1974 in the relief clause. The learnqd Munsif rejected the application on the view that the order dated April 26, 1977 gave a fresh cause of action to the plaintiffs on the basis whereof they could file a fresh suit. According to the learned Munsif, the cause of action for suit No. 70 of 1975 as furnished by the order of release dated October 17, 1974 did not survive after the subsequent order of release dated April 26, 1977. As such, according to the learned Munsif, the plaintiffs could not be permitted to continue suit No. 70 of 1975 on the basis of the fresh cause of action. The view taken by the learned Munsif is clearly untenable. The nature of tire suit was not likely to undergo any change on account of the proposed amendment which, in fact, mainly aimed at bringing on record the subsequent events in the litigation between the parties in regard to the disputed shop and sought relief in respect of the order of release subsequently passed. The plaintiffs could, even according to the learned Munsif, file a fresh suit in regard to the subsequent order of release dated April 26, 1977. It is obvious that the course which, according to the learned Munsif, could be adopted by the plaintiffs, could only have led to multiplicity of the proceedings. It is settled that multiplicity of proceedings in respect of the same subject-matter of dispute should be avoided and normally an application for amendment should be granted unless, of course, it has the effect, amongst others, of changing the nature of the suit. The prayer for amendment is not to be refused on technical considerations unless it results in real injustice to the other side. It appears from the order of the learned Munsif that the plea that any injustice was likely to be caused to the defendants by the proposed amendments was not even raised before him. The sole consideration which appears to have weighed with him was that the order of release dated October 26, 1977 afforded a fresh cause of action to the plaintiffs and that no plea in respect of that cause of action could be permitted by way of amendment of the plaint in a suit founded upon the earlier cause of action furnished by the order of release dated October 17, 1974. It is apparent that the learned Munsif failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him on a patently erroneous assumption as to the legal position. The order, therefore, cannot be sustained. 20. The result of the discussion aforesaid therefore, is that the writ petition as well as Civil Revision No. 3652 of 1978 fail. They are dismissed with costs. Civil Revision No. 2647 of 1978 succeeds and is allowed. The order of the trial court dated Feb. 25, 1978 rejecting the amendment application of the plaintiffs in suit No. 70 of 1975 is set aside. The Munsif, is directed to consider and dispose of the said application afresh in accordance with law. The applicants in this Civil Revision shall be entitled to their costs.