JUDGMENT : K.N. SINGH, J. 1. Union of India has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur granting temporary injunction in favour of Kedar Rai, Plaintiff-Respondent, restraining the Union of India and the General Manager, North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur from removing the Plaintiff from service during the pendency of his suit, 2. Kedar Rai is employed as a Clerk in the North Eastern Railway. He was served with charges of misconduct, and after enquiry the appointing authority namely, the Assistant Personnel Officer awarded a minor punishment to the Plaintiff-Respondent by reducing him to a lower scale in the time scale of his pay. The order of punishment was reviewed by the Deputy Chief Personnel Officer, the next higher authority who affirmed the order of the Assistant Personnel Officer. Subsequently the General Manager took cognizance of the matter and issued a notice to the Respondent calling upon him to show cause as to why punishment awarded to him be not enhanced and converted into removal from service. The Respondent on receipt of the show cause notice filed a suit in the Munsif's court for declaration that the order of the Senior Personnel Officer was illegal and void and for the recovery of the arrears of salary and also for the issue of a permanent injunction restraining the Union of India and the General Manager from enhancing the punishment awarded to the Plaintiff Respondent. The Respondent made an application for the issue of a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 of the CPC restraining the Union of India and the General Manager from removing him from service/till the disposal of the suit. The Munsif held that the Plaintiff had no prima-facie case and no irreparable loss would be caused to him if the injunction was not granted to him. On these findings the Munsif rejected the interim injunction application. On appeal by the Plaintiff-Respondent the Additional District Judge by his order dated 29.9.1973 set aside the order of the Munsif and granted ad-interim injunction to the Plaintiff-Respondent restraining Defendant-Petitioners from removing the Respondent from service. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged that the District Judge committed patent error in granting temporary injunction as no case was made out for the issue of temporary injunction. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged that the District Judge committed patent error in granting temporary injunction as no case was made out for the issue of temporary injunction. The power of Civil Court to grant interim injunction pending decision of a suit is regulated by the provisions of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 lay down the circumstances under which a temporary injunction can be granted, unless those circumstances exist, a court has no jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction but even if those circumstances exist the rules-do not compel the court to grant temporary injunction in all cases. The power to grant temporary injunction under the said rule is within the discretion of the court which should be exercised in accordance with reason, on sound judicial principles. A person seeking relief of temporary injunction must satisfy the court that he has a prima-facie case, namely the issues raised by him in the suit would in all probability be decided in his favour and he would be entitled to the relief claimed by him in the suit. He must further satisfy the court that its interference is necessary to protect him from irreparable injury and lastly he must show that the mischief or injury which is likely to be caused in the absence of the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise in granting it. Broadly speaking, the court before granting injunction must satisfy itself about the existence of three factors: Firstly that there is a prima-facie case in favour of the Plaintiff, secondly that irreparable injury will accrue to the Plaintiff if the injunction is not granted and the injury which may be caused to him cannot be compensated in term of money, and thirdly, the balance of convenience is in favour of the Plaintiff. Unless all these three conditions are satisfied, no temporary injunction should ordinarily be granted. But it does not mean that where all these conditions are satisfied, a temporary injunction must be granted. Even if all these three conditions are satisfied, the court may refuse to grant temporary injunction on the ground of delay, acquiescence or other relevant circumstances. 4. Specific Relief Act, 1963, regulates the Court's power to grant permanent and temporary injunction. But it does not mean that where all these conditions are satisfied, a temporary injunction must be granted. Even if all these three conditions are satisfied, the court may refuse to grant temporary injunction on the ground of delay, acquiescence or other relevant circumstances. 4. Specific Relief Act, 1963, regulates the Court's power to grant permanent and temporary injunction. While considering the question of granting injunction order to a party, the court must also consider the provision of Chapter VII of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which regulates the preventive relief. Sections 36 - 42 deal with injunctions. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, inter-alia, lays down that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent a breach of contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced or equally efficacious relief can be obtained by the Plaintiff by any other usual mode of procedure except in the case of breach of trust. In a suit where the Plaintiff seeks relief for permanent injunction restraining the employer from terminating the Plaintiff's services, if the Plaintiff claims temporary injunction restraining the Defendant from terminating his services, the court must address itself to the provisions of Chapter VII of the Specific Relief Act and specially to provisions of Section 41 of the Act. If the court cannot grant permanent injunction by way of final relief u/s 41 of the Act, it has no jurisdiction to grant any temporary injunction during the pendency of the suit. It is well settled principle that whenever there is a termination of contract of the service, a declaration that the contract of service still subsists, cannot be granted in the absence of special circumstances as the courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of service. The court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of the employee whom he no longer wishes to employ. In that event, it is not permissible to the court to issue any permanent injunction restraining the employer from terminating the services of his employee in accordance with the conditions of contract of service. 5. The principle that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will normally be granted, is well accepted but there are three exceptions to this rule. 5. The principle that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will normally be granted, is well accepted but there are three exceptions to this rule. A declaration may be granted, (1) where a public servant is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 or statutory rules, (2) reinstatement of a dismissed worker under industrial law by labour or industrial tribunal, (3) where a statutory body acts in breach of mandatory obligation imposed upon it under a statute. Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, (1969) 2 SCC 838 . The Supreme Court considered the question at length in the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli vs. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1976 SC 888 and reiterated that declaration and restoration of service in case of contract of employment would indirectly amount to specific performance of contract for personal service. Such a declaration is not permissible under the Specific Relief Act subject to the three well recognized exceptions. The Supreme Court held that a teacher of a degree college was not entitled to any declaration that the contract of employment subsisted or to any injustice against the Executive Committee of Degree College, as the College was not a statutory body. 6. In the instant case the Plaintiff-Respondent holds civil post under the Union of India and as such he is entitled to protection of Article 311 of the Constitution and also of the statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of his service. His case therefore, falls within one of the three exceptions as noted earlier. The Plaintiff Respondent, however, claimed relief for the issue of a permanent injunction restraining the Union of India, the employer and the General Manager, a statutory authority restraining them from terminating the Plaintiff's service. If under the terms of contract of service or under the statutory rules, the General Manager and the Union of India have power to terminate the services of the Plaintiff-Respondent, it is not open to a court to grant any permanent injunction restraining them from exercising their contractual or statutory power. But even assuming that the court has power to grant permanent injunction in such matters, the Plaintiff-Respondent was not entitled to temporary injunction as no irreparable loss or injury could be caused to him in the absence of temporary injunction. But even assuming that the court has power to grant permanent injunction in such matters, the Plaintiff-Respondent was not entitled to temporary injunction as no irreparable loss or injury could be caused to him in the absence of temporary injunction. If the Plaintiff-Respondent's services were to be terminated in the absence of interim injunction order, he could claim salary and the Plaintiff-Respondent could be compensated in terms of money for the injury caused to him by the refusal of the interim injunction. 7. The Plaintiff-Respondent failed to make out any prima-facie case for the issue of interim injunction. According to the Plaintiff-Respondent, the General Manager had no jurisdiction to review the punishment awarded to him under Rule 25 of the Railway Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, as the Deputy Chief Personnel Officer, the next higher authority had already reviewed the same. Rule 25 confers power of review of punishment awarded to an employee by the authorities mentioned therein which includes the General Manager. Rule does not lay down that if once the punishment is reviewed by one authority, other higher authorities have no jurisdiction to consider the matter. Since the General Manager is empowered under the said rule to review punishment awarded to a railway employee, prima-facie, he has jurisdiction to review any punishment imposed upon the railway servant by a subordinate authority. Since the Deputy Chief Personnel Officer, was subordinate authority to the General Manager, the latter had jurisdiction to review his order. The Additional District Judge wrongly held that the General Manager had no jurisdiction to review the order of the Deputy Chief Personnel Officer and therefore a prima-facie case has been made out. We are of the opinion that the Plaintiff-Respondent failed to make out any prima-facie case. Moreover, the General Manager had merely issued a show cause notice to the Plaintiff-Respondent but he did not submit any reply to the notice instead he rushed to the court for obtaining injunction order. Learned Additional District Judge failed to appreciate that the order of the General Manager was amenable to review by the next higher authorities, namely, the Railway Board and the President of India as mentioned in Rule 25. If the General Manager was to pass order of removal against the Plaintiff-Respondent, he could pursue his alternative remedy against that order under the statutory rules of service. If the General Manager was to pass order of removal against the Plaintiff-Respondent, he could pursue his alternative remedy against that order under the statutory rules of service. For this reason also, the Plaintiff-Respondent was not entitled to any temporary injunction. 8. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the Additional District Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in holding that a prima-facie case was made out by the Plaintiff and that irreparable loss would occur to him if he was removed from service. We, therefore, quash the order of the Additional District Judge dated 29th September, 1973 and restore the order of the Munsif dismissing the Plaintiff-Respondent's interim injunction application. Parties shall bear their own costs.