Short Note : 1. The applicant has filed this appeal against the judgment of acquittal of the respondent of the offence under section 500 IPC, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore, in criminal case No.232 of 1973 on 24th July 1973. Held: The appellant himself argued his case before me, and urged that the learned trial Court has not property considered and appreciated the evidence and material on record. After going through the same, I am unable to agree with this submission. The learned trial Court has considered and discussed at length the evidence of each of the appellant's witnesses in detail. It has been found that there are material contradictions in the statements of Gowardhan PW.1 the appellant, and Shrikishan PW. 4. It has also been proved from the evidence that the witnesses examined by the appellant in support of his case are all interested witnesses. Even certain facts which have been admitted by Deo Narain PW.5, have been denied by the appellant. The evidence of Deonarayan PW.5, does not at all appear to be natural and convincing, as a according to his own statement, while he was standing at the Dharamkanta Chhota-sarafa Indore, he heard the respondent telling some person that he should not try to enter into family relations with the appellant as he has become insolvent. It appears, according to Deonarayan that this person wanted to get his son married with another daughter of the appellant, and thereafter only he wrote the letter Ex. P.1. Admittedly there are over writings in the date mentioned in the letter. That apart there is no mention of this letter in Ex. P-2. Besides, it is not known to which Gowardhan, the respondent was referring to and on what basis he presumed that the reference by name Gowardhan is to the appellant himself who is a resident of Ujjain. 2. All this evidence adduced by the appellant appears to be concocted and unnatural, which make it unbelievable. The view taken and the conclusion reached by the trial Court, which is based on proper consideration and appreciation of evidence cannot be said to be unreasonable one. 3. 2. All this evidence adduced by the appellant appears to be concocted and unnatural, which make it unbelievable. The view taken and the conclusion reached by the trial Court, which is based on proper consideration and appreciation of evidence cannot be said to be unreasonable one. 3. It has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that though in an appeal from an order of acquittal the powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions are as extensive to an appeal against an order of conviction, yet as a rule of prudence, it should always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (i) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnessess; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he had been acquitted at the trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellant Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses". Where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court should as a matter of judicial caution, refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the Court below. In other words, if the main grounds on which the Court below has based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and cannot be entirely and effectively dislodge or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the acquittal. Applying this test I find that the appellant has completely failed to prove his case against the respondent, as the necessary evidence required to prove the case of defamation is wanting in this case. Appeal dismissed.