S. B. Wad. J. ( 1 ) THE question for the decision in this appeal as a preliminary question, is whether the order of the learned single Judge of this court (Sultan Singh, J.) rejecting the appellant s application made under the proviso to Sub Rule ( of Rule 92 of Order XXI Civil Procedure Code is appealable under Order XLIII (l) (j) of the Code. Rule (1) and said Proviso run as follows: 92. (1) "where no application is made under rule 89 rule 94 or rule 91 or where such application is made and disallowed the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. Provided that, where any property is sold in execution of a decree pending the final disposal of any claim to or any objection to the attachment of such property, the court shall not confirm such sale until the final disposal of such claim or objection-" The proviso was added to Rule (1) by Act 104 of 1976. The question of appealability would depend upon the true construction and effect of the said proviso. The question of law stated above arose in the following circumstances: ( 2 ) THE present appellant purchased the suit property in an auction for Rs. 54,000. 00 in December 1964, in the execution of a decree in a suit filed by one Jatinder Prakash against Bhag Mal Jain (who is now succeeded by his legal representatives, respondents 9 to 14 in the present appeal)-the debtor in the said suit had mortgaged the suit properly to one Bal Kishan Dass (Whose legal representatives are respondents I to 8 in the present appeal ). In January 1966, a sale certificate was issued in the name of the appellant. The appellant did not fake any steps to redeem the suit property from Bal Kishan Dass, In the meanwhile, in the mortgage suit between Bhag Mal Jain and Bal Kishan Dass, a preliminary decree was passed in favour of Bal Kishan Dass which was was converted into a final decree on 12-8-71. After the final decree was passed, the appellant filed civil suit on 15-11-71 for declaration and injunction alleging that the final decree in favour of Bal Kishan Dass was otainea by fraud and collusion between the parties. The said suit is still pending. After the final decree was passed, the appellant filed civil suit on 15-11-71 for declaration and injunction alleging that the final decree in favour of Bal Kishan Dass was otainea by fraud and collusion between the parties. The said suit is still pending. In pursuance of of the decree passed in favour of Bal Kishan Dass. the suit property was put to auction and M/s- Delhi Packing Private Limited purchased the suit property for Rs. 1. 40 lacs. On 4-9-78 the appellant and one Vidya Sagar filed objections to the confirmation of sale in favour of M/s. Delhi Packing Private Limited under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code The said application was rejected and the sale was confirmed by Kapur, J. of this High Court. F. A. O. (OS) No. 39 of 1978 was filed against the said order of Kapur, J. by the appellant which is admitted and pending disposal in this court. However, no stay was granted in favour of the appellant. Contrary to his earlier case, the appellant filed another civil suit on 22. 11. 78 for the redemption of mortgage of the suit property. M/s. Delhi Packing Private Limited the auction purchaser is not a party to either of the suits filed by the appellant. But before filing the suit for redemption the appellant filed an objection bearing 1. A. No. 3474/78 under the proviso to Sub Rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI The Auction Purchaser-M/s. Delhi Packing Private Limited also filed an application DA. No. 392"/78) for the confirmation of sale in its favour. On these facts the learned Single Judge held that although the appelland s application (1. A. No. 3474/78) is purported to be made under the proviso to Sub Rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI, the said proviso was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present rase. The learned Judge also noted that the earlier application filed by the appellant under Order XXI Rule 90 was rejected by the Single Judge of this court and the appeal taken against the said rejection by the appellant is still pending disposal in this court. Sultan Singh, J. by his order dated 24. 11. 73 thus rejected the application and granted the application of M/s. Delhi Packing Private Limited for confirmation of sale. Against this order of Sultan Singh, J. the present appeal is filed. Sultan Singh, J. by his order dated 24. 11. 73 thus rejected the application and granted the application of M/s. Delhi Packing Private Limited for confirmation of sale. Against this order of Sultan Singh, J. the present appeal is filed. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant contended that the true effect and necessary consequence of the impugned order is "refusing to set aside a sale" within the meaning of order XLTIf (DCj) and hence the appeal was maintainable. He contended, in the alternative, that the appeal was maintainable under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. The learnel counsel for the appellant fairly conceded that there was no direct authority on the proviso in question. He cited at the bar serveral decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts to the effect that order of confirmation is a necessary corollary of and order refining to sit aside a sale The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that an order passed on an application under the proviso in question is neither an order setting aside the sale nor an order refusing to set aside the sale within the meaning of Order XLIII (1) (j ). The learned counsel further contended that in any case since the appellant s application under Order XXI Rule 90 has already been once rejected by this court, the second application challenging the confirmation of sale is not tenable in law. In support of the second contention the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon 43 Calcutta Weekly Notes, P. 352 and 1964 Kerala Law Times, Pg. 720. We are inclined to uphold the respondent s objections to the maintainablity of the present appeal. ( 4 ) AS stated earlier the proviso to Sub Rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI has come up as an amendment for the first time in February 1977 when the amending Act came into operation. The plain reading of the proviso makes it clear that the object of the proviso is to enjoin the courts a duty of not confirming a sale where the attachment is under objections till such objections are finally disposed of by a competent court. If the confirmation is made when the attachment itself is challenged, legal complications may arise resulting in multiplicity of proceedings. If the confirmation is made when the attachment itself is challenged, legal complications may arise resulting in multiplicity of proceedings. The legislature has, therefore, stepped in to ensure that no final decision in regard to confirmation of a sale is taken by a court where the objections to the attachment are pending. The legislature certainly did not intend any final or conclusive order (of confirmation or non confirmation of sale) under the proviso in question. Since the proviso has recently been added, we tried to trace the legislative history of the proviso. Unfortunately, neither the Law Commission Report (Fifty-fourth Report) on the Cods of Civil Procedure 1908, nor the report of the Select Committee of the Parliament throw any light on the said proviso The terminology employed in the proviso is, however, similar to the terminology of Rule 58 (2) of Order XXI, Rule 58 of Order XXI has undergone a vital change by the amending Act 104 of 1976. The amendment now envisages that the adjudication under Rule 5s would be final and conclusive adjudicatun, and would be appealable as if it is were a decree. In contrast an order under the proviso to Sub Rule (1) of Rule 92 of Order XXI is only an interim order. It is not necessary to discuss the authorities cited at the bar by the learned counsel for the appellant since they have no direct bearing on the proviso in question. The Code of Civil Procedure was extensively amended by Act 104 of 1976, one of the objects of which was to reduce delays of disposal of the cases in the courts. With that end in view, clauses (b), (e), (g), (h), (m), (o) and (v) are deleted from Rule I of Order XLIII abolishing appeals incertain cases. Although the proviso in question has been added by the new amendment, there is no consequential amendment. To clause (j) in Rule I of Order XLIII. We cannot presums, that when the legislature was abolishing a right to appeal incertain cases with the said object in view, it intended to create a new right of appeal and that too in case of interim orders. We, therefore, reject the appellant s contention and uphold the respondent s preliminary objection. We cannot presums, that when the legislature was abolishing a right to appeal incertain cases with the said object in view, it intended to create a new right of appeal and that too in case of interim orders. We, therefore, reject the appellant s contention and uphold the respondent s preliminary objection. ( 5 ) WE are in respectful agreement with the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court and Kerala High Court (43 Calcutta Weekly Notes, P. 352 and 1964 Kerala Law Times, P. 720) and hold that once an application to set aside a sale is made, a second application against the confirmation of sale is not maintainable. On this ground also the appeal is not maintainable against the impugned order. ( 6 ) THE question whether an appeal would lie under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act is concluded by the decision of a bench of five judger of this court in University of Delhi and another v. Hafz Mohd said and others, ILR 1972 (2) Delhi, page 1. The said decision has been re-affirmed by the Division Bench consisting Bench consisting of Deshpande, C. J. and Goswamy, J. in Smt Shanta Sabharwal v. Smt. Sushila Saoharwal F. A. 0. (OS) No. 3 ) of 1978) decided on February 23, 1979. The Division Bench has given some additional reasons in support of the ratio of the University of Delhi case and has also held that there was no necessity of re-consideration of the decision of the decision of five judges bench in University of Delhi. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons stated above? we dismiss the appeal as not maintainble. In view of the fact that the questions stated above hive come up for decision for the first time, we do not make any order as to costs.