Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner was the respondent in M. C.10 of 1978 of the Sub Divisional Magistrate's Court, Chengannur. M. C.10 of 1978 was initiated by the mother of a child for maintenance under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the revision petitioner, the putative father of the minor. Paternity was denied by the revision petitioner. The petition stood posted to 17th June, 1978. The mother of the minor was absent when the case was called. An application had been filed by the revision petitioner for the adjournment of the case along with a medical certificate showing that he was ill. The Magistrate, however, dismissed the application for maintenance for default of the mother, who is the respondent herein. The respondent turned up soon after the dismissal of the petition, on the same day and filed C.M.P. No. 2135 of 1978 for restoration of the application, The learned Magistrate observed that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for restoration of an application for maintenance once it is dismissed for default. The Magistrate, however, re-numbered the case as M. C. 98 of 1978 stating that interests of justice demanded such a course. The present revision petition is filed challenging the above order. 2. The fact that the respondent turned up immediately after the disposal of the petition shows that the Magistrate was rather hasty in dismissing the case and could have adjourned the case in view of the application for adjournment moved on behalf of the present revision petitioner. But the question to be considered is whether the Magistrate, having dismissed the petition, was right in taking up the claim for maintenance by assigning a new number to the case. 3. No decided case of this court has been brought to my notice dealing with the point. Although there is provision in S.126(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside an order of maintenance passed in the absence of the husband a similar provision for restoring an application for maintenance dismissed for default of the petitioner is not provided. It is now fairly well-settled that neglect or refusal to maintain is not an offence in the strict sense of that term. S.403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which corresponds to S.300 of the new Code has no application and, therefore, a second motion for the grant of maintenance is not barred. It is now fairly well-settled that neglect or refusal to maintain is not an offence in the strict sense of that term. S.403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which corresponds to S.300 of the new Code has no application and, therefore, a second motion for the grant of maintenance is not barred. See Mantajali v. Emperor (AIR. 1920 Calcutta 38), Manug Hla Manug v. Ma On Kin (AIR.1927 Rangoon 328), Dina v. Parsram (AIR. 1950 Nagpur 45), Ram Chand v. Jiwan Bai (AIR. 1958 Punjab 431), Nafees Ara v. Asif Saadat Ali Khan (1963 (1) Crl. Q. 394) and Laisram v. Sakhi Devi (AIR. 1965 Manipur 49). The ratio of the decisions is that a dismissal of an application for maintenance is on a par with dismissal of a complaint or discharge of an accused and would not be a bar for a further enquiry into the merits of the case. If the dismissal is on the merits and after taking evidence, the order is final and no fresh application would lie. See Muteswari v. Nand Kumar Singh (17 Crl. L. J. 106). 4. The decisions, however, did not deal with the question as to whether an application for maintenance once dismissed can be restored to file by assigning a different number. It is significant that a Magistrate allowing maintenance under the Code has the discretion to direct payment from the date of the application. Even in a case where a new number is given, the date of the application would be the date when it was originally filed. Therefore, there is not much difference between a case to which a new number is assigned and a case restored to file after dismissal for default. On the other hand, if a new petition is filed for maintenance after the dismissal of the earlier one, the Court would be competent to grant maintenance only from the date of the fresh petition and the claimant would be deprived of the maintenance for the period intervening the two applications. This explains the relevancy of examining the question whether the Magistrate is competent to restore an application for maintenance, dismissed for default by assigning a new number. 5. So far as I could see, there are only two cases where the question as to whether a Court could restore the application for maintenance dismissed for default has been considered. This explains the relevancy of examining the question whether the Magistrate is competent to restore an application for maintenance, dismissed for default by assigning a new number. 5. So far as I could see, there are only two cases where the question as to whether a Court could restore the application for maintenance dismissed for default has been considered. The earlier of the two cases is Hakimi Jan Bibi v. Mouze Ali (II Criminal Law Journal 213). On the date when the application for maintenance stood posted for hearing, the husband appeared and filed written statement offering to maintain the wife if she agreed to live with him. However, the Court dismissed the application as the wife was absent. The wife moved for a restoration of her case stating that her non-appearance was due to illness. The trial court refused to restore the application. The Sessions Judge who took a different view, made a reference to the High Court regarding the propriety of the order. The High Court declined to interfere on the ground that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside the order of dismissal and rehear the case again. 6. The identical point was considered in Bhagwan Singh v. Gurnam Kaur (68 Punjab Law Reporter 127). After referring to Hakimi Jan Bibi v. Mouze Ali (II Crl. L. J 213), already mentioned, and Babu Ram v. Ramji Lal (66 Punjab Law Reporter 196), which arose under S.145 Cr. P. C., the court observed: "The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the Court in its inherent powers can always review its judgment and the Magistrate's action in restoring the petition when the petitioner reappeared on the day when it was dismissed in default must be upheld. In the absence of any provision in the Code itself, the power of restoration cannot be spelled out from the general provisions." 7. The stand taken by the respondent is that even assuming that a restoration is not provided for, it is open to the Court to restore the application in exercise of its inherent powers. Reference is made to the decision in In re Raman Narayanan (1972 KLT. 901). In that case, the name of a person was wrongly entered as the 5th accused in the police charge-sheet. The mistake was realised after the service of summons to all the accused. Reference is made to the decision in In re Raman Narayanan (1972 KLT. 901). In that case, the name of a person was wrongly entered as the 5th accused in the police charge-sheet. The mistake was realised after the service of summons to all the accused. The Sub Inspector expressed regret and sought removal of his name and substitution of the name of the real accused. The Magistrate discharged the person and directed summons to be issued to the real accused. The propriety of the order and whether the Magistrate had inherent power to discharge came up for decision of this Court. A Division Bench of this Court referred to various rulings available on the point and held that the order of discharge did not call for interference. The following observations in Hariram v. The State (AIR 1956 Madhya Bharat 17) were approved: "It is an established proposition of law that court of justice must possess inherent powers, apart from the express provision of law, which are necessary to their existence and the proper discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. The Criminal Procedure Code or for the matter of that no procedural law is ever exhaustive and in cases, where circumstances required it, the courts have acted on the assumption that they possess inherent powers (as of right) to do justice for which they really exist. At the same time it must be remembered that a court has no inherent power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. In this view of the matter every court whether Civil or Criminal in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, shall be deemed to possess as inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as are necessary in the course of the administration of justice. The rule of inherent powers has its source in a latin maxim "Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceder evidetur id sine quo ipsa esse non potest" which means that when law gives anything to any one, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist." 8. The rule of inherent powers has its source in a latin maxim "Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceder evidetur id sine quo ipsa esse non potest" which means that when law gives anything to any one, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist." 8. In a separate judgment, Narayana Pillai J. observed: "In express terms S.561A of the Criminal Procedure Code applies only to High Courts and what the section does is only to declare that the inherent power already possessed by the High Courts is not taken away by the provisions of the Code. But that does not mean that the other Courts do not have inherent power. In the absence of express provision every court, whether Civil or Criminal, has in its very constitution inherent power to do the right and undo a wrong in the administration of justice." 9. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Hariyana High Court in State v. Mehar Singh (1974 Crl. Q. 970) and a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor v. P. K. Prakasa Reddy (1973 (1) Andhra Weekly Reporter, 291) also took the view that Subordinate Criminal Courts possessed inherent powers to be exercised when circumstances warrant. 10. Reference may in this connection be made to the observations in Emperior v. Nazir Ahmed (AIR. 1945 P. C. 18) where the Privy Council had occasion to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power, available in the case of High Courts under S.561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Lord Porter said: "It has sometimes been thought that S.561A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code, and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act." 11. A similar observation is seen made in Jairam Das v. Emperor (AIR. 1945 PC. 94). 12. The identical view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Nairn (AIR. 1964 SC. 703). 13. A similar observation is seen made in Jairam Das v. Emperor (AIR. 1945 PC. 94). 12. The identical view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Nairn (AIR. 1964 SC. 703). 13. Dealing with inherent powers, the Supreme Court observed in J. M. D. Syndicate v. I. T. Commissioner, New Delhi (AIR. 1977 SC. 1348): "The courts have power, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition, to pass an order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. To hold otherwise would result in quite a number of cases in gross miscarriage of justice." 14. The above observations of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court are wide enough to suggest that even the Subordinate Courts are possessed of inherent powers to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of Court. But the observations were made while dealing with the inherent powers of the High Courts. 15. The only case which has been brought to my notice and where the inherent power of subordinate Criminal courts has been considered by the Supreme Court is Bindeshwari Prasad v. Kali Singh (AIR. 1977 SC. 2432). In that case, the Sub Divisional Magistrate made over a complaint presented before it to another Magistrate for enquiry under S.202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, thereafter dismissed the complaint under S.203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the complainant was absent. The complainant thereafter appeared before the Magistrate and filed an application for recalling his order. That petition was ultimately allowed. The irregularity of the order was challenged and the matter ultimately came up before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed: "We, however, need not dilate on this point because there is absolutely no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (which applies to this case) empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him. Code of Criminal Procedure does contain a provision for inherent powers, namely, S.561A which, however, confers these powers on the High Court and the High Court alone. Unlike S.151 of Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers. In these circumstances, therefore, the learned Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to recall the order dismissing the complaint. Code of Criminal Procedure does contain a provision for inherent powers, namely, S.561A which, however, confers these powers on the High Court and the High Court alone. Unlike S.151 of Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers. In these circumstances, therefore, the learned Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to recall the order dismissing the complaint. The remedy of the respondent was to move the Sessions Judge or the High Court in revision." 16. The above conclusion is apparently based on the difference in language between S.561A of the Code Criminal Procedure, 1898 and S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The specific mention of the High Court is continued in S.482 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. It would appear that the maxim 'Expressio Unis est exclusio alterius' - express mention of one thing implies exclusion of another thing has application in deciding the scope of S.561A and whether Subordinate Criminal Courts are vested with inherent powers, in otherwords, the express mention of inherent power in respect of the High Court implies that Subordinate Courts have no such power. In the absence of inherent power, the Subordinate Criminal Courts are not competent to revise their own orders in view of S.362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. The learned Advocate General to whom notice of the petition had been given initially took the stand that even subordinate courts should be deemed to have inherent powers. Reference was made by him to the decision in In re Raman Narayanan (1972 KLT. 901) besides certain observations in S. D. O. Faizabad v. S. N. Singh (AIR 1970 SC 140), Assistant Collector, C. E. v. N. T. Co. of India Ltd. (AIR. 1972 S. C. 2563), J. M. D. Syndicate v. I. T. Commissioner, New Delhi (AIR. 1977 SC. 1348) and 1976 (2) A.E.R. 937. But he fairly conceded that in view of the decision in Bindeshwari Prasad v. Kali Singh (AIR. 1977 SC 2432) which directly deals with the point, it is no longer open to a party to contend that the subordinate Criminal courts have inherent powers. It follows that whenever a situation arises which necessitates the exercise of the inherent power, the aggrieved party may have to approach the High Court for necessary reliefs. 18. 1977 SC 2432) which directly deals with the point, it is no longer open to a party to contend that the subordinate Criminal courts have inherent powers. It follows that whenever a situation arises which necessitates the exercise of the inherent power, the aggrieved party may have to approach the High Court for necessary reliefs. 18. In the instant case, the dismissal of the petition was due to default of the respondent to turn up in time. The respondent is not without any remedy as it is open to the minor to file a fresh petition for maintenance. In view of the existence of another remedy, this is not a fit case for invoking of the inherent jurisdiction even by this Court, if a motion had been made on that behalf by the respondent. The revision petition is accordingly allowed.Crl. M. P. 2135 of 1978 filed by the respondent for restoration of the application for maintenance will stand dismissed.