JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - The Collector of Varanasi has filed this first appeal against the award dated Sept. 26, 1967 of the Tribunal constituted under Section 371 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 for the Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi (hereinafter "the Tribunal") given by it in Reference No. 8 of 1955. By the impugned award, the Tribunal enhanced the compensation payable for acquisition of the land of Munshi Durha Vinayak Lal, the claimant respondent (since deceased and now represented by his widow, Smt. Jadubanshi Devi (for brevity "the claimant) situate near Durga Kund in the city of Varanasi as well as for a a pakka well, a kachcha construction, fruit bearing and other trees and the crop of Bora and Bhindi existing thereon. 2. On Dec. 17, 1949, a notification under Section 36 of the U. P. Town Improvement Act (corresponding to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act) was issued for acquisition of land including the area of plot No. 1939 and part of plot No. 1940 belonging to the deceased-claimant, Durga Vinayak Lal by the Collector for Improvement Trust, Varanasi for project No. 3 1949-50 of the Bhelupura Housing and General Development Scheme. A notice under Section 42 of the Town Improvement Act (corresponding to Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act) was published in the U. P. Gazette and served on the claimant on Oct. 19, 1953. An objection was filed by the claimant on Nov. 27, 1953. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded a sum of Rs. 11,196/- by his award dated July 5, 1955. Being dissatisfied, the claimant sought a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act disputing the award on various grounds. One of the grounds taken was that the Land Acquisition Officer had erred in awarding compensation for the acquired land on the basis that it was agricultural land. According to the claimant, the same should have been calculated as for land appurtenant to a residential bungalow and should have been valued at the prevailing market rate for similar land. The claimant also disputed the rate at which compensation had been awarded for the pakka well and the kachcha construction as also for the fruit bearing and other trees as well as Bora and Bhindi crop raised by him in the space between those trees. The claimant also disputed the rate at which compensation had been awarded for the pakka well and the kachcha construction as also for the fruit bearing and other trees as well as Bora and Bhindi crop raised by him in the space between those trees. There was some dispute between the claimant and the Collector about the area out of plot' No. 1940 which had been acquired. According to the Collector, it was, 0.16 acres whereas according to the claimant, it was 0.35 acres. In its reply, the Collector justified the basis of the compensation for the acquired land as agricultural land as well as the amounts awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of the remaining items. The parties adduced oral and documentary evidence before the Tribunal. 3. The Tribunal framed as many as 7 issues as arising from the pleadings of the parties. Of these, issues Nos. 3 and 7 were in regard to the correct basis of compensation and the rate at which it should be awarded. Dealing with the plea of the appellant about the nature of land being agricultural on the date of the initial notification under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act, the Tribunal observed that "the opposite party (the Collector) did not adduce any evidence to show that the land of the applicant acquired for the Improvement Trust was being used as agricultural land" and that "we, therefore, believe the applicants (claimants) evidence that the applicants land acquired for the Improvement Trust on which there was garden and on a part of which there was kachcha structure, which was said to be a servants quarter, was appurtenant to the bungalow of the applicant which was situate in Mohalla Durga Kund in the city of Varanasi and that it was not an agricultural land. The land should, therefore, be valued not as agricultural land but as land appurtenant to bungalow of the applicant in the city of Varanasi. The facts of this case are almost similar to the facts of the case of Babu Kailash Chandra Jain v. Secretary of State ( AIR 1946 PC 132 ). In that case, the land appurtenant to the building was valued at the prevailing, market rate of the land and not agricultural land. The same principal should be adopted in the present case." 4. In that case, the land appurtenant to the building was valued at the prevailing, market rate of the land and not agricultural land. The same principal should be adopted in the present case." 4. The Tribunal then proceeded to consider the exemplars filed by the claimant to show the prevailing market rate in the locality and having considered the evidence in that respect, held that the "land of plot No. 1940 acquired by the Collector adjoins the mainroad leading (to) the Durga Kund. We estimate the value of the said land of plot No. 1940 at Rs. 600/- per biswa. The land of plot No. 1939 (309 acres) was to north of and behind the land of plot No. 1940.......... We are of opinion that the average value of the land of plot No. 1939 would have been Rs. 400/- per biswa and we estimate accordingly." The Tribunal further held that "0.24 acres of land of plot No. 1940 and 3.09 acres of land of plot No. 1939 had been acquired by the opposite party (Collector)." Calculating the value of the land of plot No. 1940 at Rs. 600/- per biswa and that of plot No. 1939 at Rs. 400/- per biswa, the Tribunal determined the total value of the acquired area of the two plots at Rs. 42,440/-. 5. Dealing with issue No. 2, which related to compensation in respect of the trees, the Tribunal, on a consideration of the evidence led before it held that the value of the fruit bearing, guava and mango trees was Rs. 7000/- and of the other fruit bearing and non-fruit bearing trees was Rs. 500/- the total being Rs. 7500/-. Likewise, it went into the evidence in regard to the value of the pakka well of the claimant and that of the kachcha construction and concluded that it was Rs. 2000/-and Rs. 100/- respectively. By these findings in regard to the pakka well and the kachcha house, the Tribunal disposed of issue Nos. 4 and 5. It proceeded to hold under issue No. 1 framed in the case that the claimant was entitled to compensation of Rs. 25/- for the Bora and Bhindi Crops which stood on the land at the time when possession was taken by the Collector. Adding a sum of Rs. 4 and 5. It proceeded to hold under issue No. 1 framed in the case that the claimant was entitled to compensation of Rs. 25/- for the Bora and Bhindi Crops which stood on the land at the time when possession was taken by the Collector. Adding a sum of Rs. 6366/- by way of 15% solatium on account of the compulsory nature of the acquisition of land, the Tribunal computed the total amount of compensation to which the claimant was entitled at Rs. 58,431/-. On the sum m excess of Rs. 11,196/- determined as compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer, the Tribunal directed payment of interest at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from August 10, 1955 when possession of the land was taken by the Collector till the date of payment of compensation. 6. In the present first appeal, the correctness of the findings recorded by the Tribunal was assailed on behalf of the Collector. Almost all the grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal assailed the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence on record made by the Tribunal. The difficulty with which the learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant was confronted at' the outset at the hearing of the appeal was about the scope of the grounds upon which the award of the Tribunal could be challenged by the appellant on account of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 381 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam (henceforth "Adhiniyam") which are in the following terms: "381. Appeals. (1) An appeal to the High Court' shall lie from a decision of the Tribunal, if (a) .................. (2) An appeal under sub-sec. (1) shall lie only on one or more of the following grounds, namely- (a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law. (c) a substantial error or defect which may have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case upon merits either on a point of fact or of law." 7. The scope of a provision akin to sub-section (2) aforesaid came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Debi Din v. Secretary of State for India (AIR 1942 All 186). The scope of a provision akin to sub-section (2) aforesaid came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Debi Din v. Secretary of State for India (AIR 1942 All 186). That was a case of an appeal under Section 3 (2) of Town Improvement (Appeals) Act (3 of 1920) which provided that: "An appeal under clause (b) of subsection (1) shall only lie on one or more of the following grounds, namely. (i) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (ii) The decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (iii) A substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the said Act which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits." The Bench took the view that in an appeal under Section 3, the only points which were open for consideration were points of law. 8. More recently another Division Bench, of which one of us (H. N. Seth, J.) was a member, observed in its judgment in Collector, Varanasi v. Suresh Prasad (First Appeal No. 27 of 1969 decided on 2-5-1979 : (reported in 1979 All LJ 956)) that "the grounds (on) which an appeal lies under Section 381 are more or less similar to those contained in S. 100 (1) Civil P. C. as it stood prior to its amendment (in) 1976 ..................... Even though there is some difference in the words of clause (c) of Section 381 (2) of the Adhiniyam and clause (c) of Section 100 (1) Civil P. C. but we feel that the scope of (sic) ambit of clause (c) in both the enactments is similar. In the context, the expression "substantial error or defect" mentioned in clause (c) of Section 38l (2) must refer to substantial error or defect in the procedure adopted by the Tribunal in arriving at a decision in the case. In the context, the expression "substantial error or defect" mentioned in clause (c) of Section 38l (2) must refer to substantial error or defect in the procedure adopted by the Tribunal in arriving at a decision in the case. Likewise, the scope of the expression may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case on merits" used in Sec 381 (1) (c) of the Adhiniyam is the same as that of the expression may have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case on merits either on a point of fact or law used in Section 100 (1) (c) Civil P. C. even though the words "either on a point or fact of law" have not been used in the former expression. We are accordingly of opinion that the appeals and cross objection under Section 381 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam have to be dealt with by the High Court precisely in the same manner in which second appeals under Section 100 Civil P. C. (prior to its amendment made in the year 1976) were being dealt with. It follows that in such appeals, the findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal cannot be interfered with on a ground which is not covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) or (c) and it is not the function of this court to re-appraise the evidence produced before the Tribunal." 9. It is true that the observations aforesaid were made in a case where the question which had come up for consideration before the Bench was as to whether the cross-objection filed by the claimant-respondents was maintainable or not, yet, in our opinion, the observations bring out the real nature of the scope of an appeal under Section 381 of the Adhiniyam and of the jurisdiction of this court in dealing with it. The various grounds, therefore, which the learned Chief Standing Counsel sought to raise against the award cannot legitimately be so raised by him. 10. The various grounds, therefore, which the learned Chief Standing Counsel sought to raise against the award cannot legitimately be so raised by him. 10. Faced with the situation aforesaid, the learned Chief Standing Counsel attempted to bring his case within the fore-corners of Sections 381 (2) by arguing that having once chosen to determine compensation for the acquired land not as agricultural land but as land appurtenant to the bungalow of the claimant in the city of Varanasi which was to be valued at the prevailing market rate, it was not open to the Tribunal to award compensation for the well, kachcha house, trees and the crop of Bora and Bhindi separately for, according to the learned Chief Standing Counsel, such method of evaluation was contrary to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the State of Kerala v. P. P. Hassan Koya ( AIR 1968 SC 1201 ). According to the learned Chief Standing Counsel, the Supreme Court had laid it down in that case as a principle of law that "in determining compensation payable in respect of the land with building, compensation cannot be determined by assessing the value of the land and the "break-up" of the building separately "for" the land and the building constitute one unit and the value of the entire unit must be determined with all its advantages and its potentialities. 11. The reliance in our opinion upon the decision aforesaid in the present case is misplaced. A perusal of the report of the case shows that the Band Acquisition Officer had calculated the compensation payable to the persons interested separately for the area of land and for the building standing thereon even though what had been acquired was the land with the building as an unit. On appeal, the subordinate Judge was of the view that the method adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer was unjust and improper and that the valuation had to be made of the acquired property as a composite property. He adopted the method of determining the market value by capitalising the net rent received from the unit and taking into consideration the return of from the gilt edged securities at a certain percentage awarded compensation for the unit in which the claimant was interested at 35 times the net annual rental. He adopted the method of determining the market value by capitalising the net rent received from the unit and taking into consideration the return of from the gilt edged securities at a certain percentage awarded compensation for the unit in which the claimant was interested at 35 times the net annual rental. The State of Kerala assailed the award of the Subordinate Judge before the High Court but unsuccessfully. The High Court upheld the mode of calculation of compensation though it reduced the multiple to 33 times of the net rent. The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid circumstances, made the observation upon which reliance has been placed by the learned Chief Standing Counsel. That decision, in our opinion, is not an authority for the proposition that whenever an area of land is acquired over which some structures or trees etc. stand, the compensation has to be calculated in respect of land alone and no compensation is payable for the structures or trees, etc. standing thereon. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our conclusion is that the learned Chief Standing Counsel has not been able to bring his submissions within the four corners of Section 381 (2) of the Adhiniyam nor does the judgment under appeal require any interference. The appeal, consequently, fails and is dismissed with costs.