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1979 DIGILAW 71 (CAL)

Tarapada Roy v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education

1979-02-23

BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK

body1979
Judgment : The judgment of the Court was as follows :- In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners are challenging an order of the Appeal Committee of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter referred to as the Appeal Committee) made on the 24th September, 1974. 2. This case has got a chequered career. I shall set out the facts which are material for the purpose of the disposal of this Writ petition. 3. At the relevant time the respondent No.7 was the Headmaster of Bolpur Siksha Niketan Ashram Vidyalaya (hereinafter referred to as the said School). On the 10th June, 1966 the respondent No. 7 was placed under suspension by the Managing Committee of the School. Thereafter an Administrator was appointed of the said School by the Board which was replaced later by an Ad hoc Committee. It appears that the respondent No.7 was arrested under the Preventive Detention Act but he was released on the 29th August, 1966. Thereafter certain charge-sheets were issued against the respondent No.7 by the School Authorities containing some allegations against the respondent No.7. It appears that the suspension order dated 10th July, 1966 was thereafter withdrawn. There was further charge-sheet and thereafter there were certain proceedings by the Ad hoc Committee and an order of dismissal was passed by the Ad hoc Committee. The respondent No.7 preferred an appeal before the Appeal Committee against this order of dismissal. By its order dated 25/26th June, 1969, the Appeal Committee partly allowed the appeal. It refused to grant reinstatement to the respondent No.7 but directed payment of a sum of Rs. 14,000/- to him. Against this order of the Appeal Committee the respondent No.7 filed a Writ petition in this Court. This Court by its order dated 10th June, 1974 disposed of the Writ petition. This Court held that the order gives no reason whatsoever why the Appeal Committee came to the finding dismissing the appeal. It was observed that a quasi-judicial Tribunal must give reasons for its finding but this was not so done in this case and accordingly the order must be quashed. The Rule was made absolute to the extent indicated therein and the following directions were given :- "I direct that the Appellate authority will rehear the appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law as soon as practicable. The Rule was made absolute to the extent indicated therein and the following directions were given :- "I direct that the Appellate authority will rehear the appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law as soon as practicable. All the points taken in the petition are left open to the parties to argue before the Appellate Tribunal." 4. After the matter was sent back, after some hearing, the Appeal Committee passed the following order, which was communicated by a letter by the Secretary to the Board to the Secretary of the said School :- "The appellant, Secretary to the School and Secretary of the previous Ad hoc Committee are present. Heard the parties. The case of the appellant is that certain charges were framed against him and fie was dismissed from the service. His allegation is that the false charges were brought against him for the purpose of removing him and that no proper enquiry was made. The case of the respondent is that the appellant was guilty of a number of charges. He was found guilty and was, therefore, removed from service. The Appeal Committee on the last occasion came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal was justified. The appellant moved the Hon'ble High Court. The Hon'ble High Court directed for re-hearing of the case. As directed by the Hon'ble High Court, the case has been heard afresh. Both the parties have filed a number of documents to prove their respective cases. It is a fact that a number of letters were sent to the appellant by the Managing Committee. In each of it a number of charges were mentioned. It is also a fact that the appellant replied to each and every charge contained in these letters. The charges were thereafter summarised in a letter dated 3.12.66 sent by the Mg. Committee to the appellant. The appellant replied. Thereafter, the Mg. Committee adopted a resolution on 7.2.67 and in that resolution they decided to dismiss the appellant and informed the appellant accordingly. A copy of that resolution has been filed. The resolution runs as follows :- "The charges against the Headmaster as enumerated in the chargesheet dated 3.12.66 are very serious involving interpolation in and manipulation of records, fictitious and fraudulent transaction, falsification of accounts to perpetrate fraud, defalcation of School money etc. A copy of that resolution has been filed. The resolution runs as follows :- "The charges against the Headmaster as enumerated in the chargesheet dated 3.12.66 are very serious involving interpolation in and manipulation of records, fictitious and fraudulent transaction, falsification of accounts to perpetrate fraud, defalcation of School money etc. As he has failed to produce any satisfactory explanation or evidence to disprove these charges or the majority thereof, the Committee after mature consideration of the case, holds him guilty and unfit to hold a position of trust and responsibility, particularly in an educational institution." The Mg. Committee then decided to dismiss the appellant. It is evident from this resolution that the Mg. Committee did not record its decision on each item of charges brought against the appellant. On the other hand, they came to the conclusion without recording any reason that the appellant was guilty. The respondent cannot say what amount is actually due from the appellant though he was held guilty of defalcation of money. This decision, that the appellant was guilty was arrived at on rather subjective test. The Mg. Committee should prove the charges of the appellant and it is not for the appellant to disprove the charges. When the Mg. Committee decided to dismiss the appellant, they should have informed the appellant that he was guilty and the appellant should have been asked to make a representation against the punishment proposed. But the second opportunity was not given. It is thus clear that no proper enquiry was held. Reasons for coming to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty, have not been mentioned. Moreover, under the rules existing at the relevant time, the Mg. Committee should have sought the approval of the Board before dismissing the appellant. This approval means prior approval. It appears from the papers filed that on 9.2.67 i.e. 2 days after the dismissal, they decided to send a copy of the letter to the Board for necessary action. The approval of the Board was not obtained and as a matter of fact, the Mg. Committee did not ask for the approval of the Board which was required under the Rules. After hearing the parties and examining the records, the Appeal Committee holds that proper procedure was not followed before dismissing the appellant. In the circumstances, the dismissal does not appear to be proper. The appellant may, therefore, be reinstated. Committee did not ask for the approval of the Board which was required under the Rules. After hearing the parties and examining the records, the Appeal Committee holds that proper procedure was not followed before dismissing the appellant. In the circumstances, the dismissal does not appear to be proper. The appellant may, therefore, be reinstated. RESOLVED that the appeal be allowed. The appellant be reinstated in his post with effect from the date of his dismissal. The School shall pay the appellant his arrears of pay and allowances within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. The School may proceed against the appellant, if they so like according to the provisions of the existing Rules." 5. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioners, who along with the respondent No.8, are the members of the Managing Committee of the School, have preferred this application. 6. Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing in support of the Rule had raised various contentions before me. Firstly, he contended that the decision of the Appeal Committee is vitiated by bias. In this context he had drawn my attention to paragraphs 24 to 29 of the petition. In this connection Mr. Mukherjee has relied on the following decisions of the Supreme Court (1) Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Satyanarayan Transports, AIR (1965) S.C. 1303 (paragraph 9) and (2) A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India AIR 1970 S. C. 150 (Headnote (d). 7. The second submission of Mr. Mukherjee is that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of Rules 7 and 9 of the Appeal Regulations regarding the manner of hearing and deciding the Appeal by Appeal Committee (hereinafter referred to as Regulations). This is contained in the Notification dated 30th January, 1965. The relevant provisions of the Regulations 6 to 9 are set out hereunder. 6. (1) On receipt of a memorandum of appeal the Secretary to the Board shall forward a copy thereof by registered post with acknowledgement due to the Managing Committee concerned inviting its comments if any. (2) The Managing Committee shall forward its comments, in triplicate by registered post with acknowledgement due, to the Secretary to the Board within three weeks from the date of receipt of the said memorandum of appeal. (2) The Managing Committee shall forward its comments, in triplicate by registered post with acknowledgement due, to the Secretary to the Board within three weeks from the date of receipt of the said memorandum of appeal. (3) On receipt of such comments from the Managing Committee within the time mentioned in sub-regulation (2) the Secretary to the Board shall forward a copy thereof, by registered post with acknowledgement due, to the appellant who may within a fortnight from the date of receipt of such copy forward to the Secretary of the Board, by registered post with acknowledgement due, his explanation if any, on such comments. 7. (1) The Secretary to the Board shall— (a) within a fortnight from the date of expiry of the time mentioned in sub-regulation (2) of regulation 6 in the event of non-receipt of any comments from the Managing Committee, or (b) within a fortnight from the date of expiry of the period referred to in sub-regulation. (3) of regulation 6, place all records of the case with or without the comments of the Managing Committee and the explanation of the appellant as the case may be, before the Appeal Committee for a decision whether further enquiry into the case is necessary or not. The decision of the Appeal Committee in this respect shall be final. (2) If the Appeal Committee decides to have a further enquiry into the case, the Secretary to the Board shall, within one month from the date of such decision, forward such records of the case as were placed before the Appeal Committee to the Director of Public Instruction, Government of West Bengal, who shall as soon as possible after holding such enquiry as he considers necessary, send a report containing his view to the Appeal Committee. The Secretary to the Board shall then send a copy of such report to the appellant, by registered post with acknowledgement due, inviting his comments therein within a fortnight from the date of receipt thereof. (3) where the Appeal Committee decides under sub-regulation (1) that a further enquiry into the case is not necessary and also where the comment of the appellant referred to in Sub-regulation (2) is or is not received within the period mentioned therein, the Secretary to the Board shall place the case before the Appeal Committee for decision of the appeal. 8. 8. (1) The Appeal Committee may, at its discretion, hear the appellant or the Secretary to the Managing Committee or its representative personally and for that purpose may issue an order directing the appellant or the Secretary to the Managing Committee or its representative to appear before it with such papers and documents as the appeal Committee may require. (2) When an order in issued under sub-regulation (i) the party shall appear before the Appeal Committee on the date and time fixed in the said order. In case any of the parties or both the parties fail to appear, the Appeal Committee may proceed with the case without granting further time to the absentee party. 9. (1) The Appeal Committee may, on consideration of all the materials before it- (a) in an appeal against an order of reduction in rank or the withholding of salary or a portion thereof or the withholding of the increment in pay, or against any like order affecting the appellant, (i) allow the appeal and grant such relief as it considers appropriate, if it is of the opinion that the order appealed against is based on insufficient or unsatisfactory grounds, or (ii) dismiss the appeal, if it is of the opinion that there are no grounds for interference with the order appealed against; (b) in an appeal against an order of discharge or dismissal. (i) allow the appeal and make an order directing reinstatement of the appellant with or without such relief as may be found consequential to such reinstatement, if it is of the opinion that such reinstatement is' appropriate and proper, or (ii) allow the appeal and make an order directing payment of gratuity to the appellant calculated at the rate of one month's salary for each completed year of service subject to a maximum of twelve months salary if it is of the opinion that such payment of gratuity would be appropriate relief to the appellant instead of making an order of reinstatement, or, (iii) dismiss the appeal, if it is of the opinion that there are no good grounds for interference with the order appealed against, (2) The appeal Committee in all cases shall record reasons for its decision. 8. Mr. Mukherjee has made threefold submissions on this heading. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted firstly that the Regulation 7 provides a procedure to be followed before an appeal can be disposed of. 8. Mr. Mukherjee has made threefold submissions on this heading. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted firstly that the Regulation 7 provides a procedure to be followed before an appeal can be disposed of. After compliance with the provisions of Regulation 6, it is the duty of the Secretary to the Board, inter alia, to place all the records of the case with or without comments of the managing committee and the explanation of the appellant, as the case may be, before the Appeal Committee for a decision whether further enquiry into the case is necessary or not. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that before an appeal can be disposed of. Regulation 7 has to be complied with and the same is a condition precedent to the exercise of any power of disposal of appeal by the Appeal Committee under Reg, 9. Mr. Mukherjee has further submitted that this is not a mere idle formality. This provision requires an enquiry by the D.P. I. In this particular case if Reg. 7 was complied with and if there had been such an enquiry, in that event various facts would have been brought out to the notice of the Appeal Committee including the fact that the D.P.I. itself has, prior to the dismissal of the respondent No.7, made certain enquiries through Auditors and otherwise and that the D. P. I. itself has made certain observations from such enquiries regarding the conduct of the respondent No.7. This enquiry is also important on the question as to whether the power of the Appeal Committee to direct reinstatement should be used or not even if the order of dismissal is held to be bad. 9. The next branch of submission of Mr. Mukherjee on the question of non-compliance of the Regulations was that in this particular case there was non-compliance of the provisions of Regulation 9 (i) (b) (i). Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that under Regulation 9 (i) (b) there are three alternatives before the Appeal Committee in an appeal against an order of discharge or dismissal. However, even where sub-clause (i) applies, i.e. even if an order of dismissal is set aside and the appeal is allowed, the order of reinstatement would not follow automatically as has been done in the present case. However, even where sub-clause (i) applies, i.e. even if an order of dismissal is set aside and the appeal is allowed, the order of reinstatement would not follow automatically as has been done in the present case. The Appeal Committee has to exercise its mind independently because Regulation 9 itself provides that such an order of reinstatement is to be made by the Appeal Committee "if it is of the opinion that such reinstatement is appropriate and proper." 10. The other contention of Mr. Mukherjee regarding non-compliance of the Regulations is that the Board has to consider all materials before it. It acts as an appellate body and hears appeals which is by way of re-hearing of the charges. Merely because the Appeal Committee found some technical fault regarding the procedure followed by the Managing Committee, that should not have prevented the Appeal Committee from deciding the appeal on merits. It can also correct errors of facts and on such re-hearing of the matter it should have gone into the merits of the charges against the respondent No.7 and come to an independent conclusion. The Appeal Committee has failed to do so in this particular case. In support of his contentions on this point Mr. Mukherjee has relied on the following decisions (3) Radharaman Das v. Appeal Committee, 79 C. W. N. 31 and (4) Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narayan, AIR (1976) S. C. 888. 11. The third broad submission of Mr. Mukherjee is that the Appeal Committee proceeded on certain grounds which the School authorities as respondents to that appeal were not called upon to meet. In this connection he drew my attention to the form of appeal, one of the items of which refers to "grievances" of the appellant. In this particular case the respondent No. 7 as such appellant set out his "grievances" wherein the decision of the Managing Committee was not challenged on "merits but it only alleged malafide of the order of dismissal. The Appeal Committee went out of its way to set out various other grounds, not included in the said "grievances", in allowing the appeal. 12. The fourth broad submission of Mr. Mukherjee was that the Appeal Committee acted in error of law. In allowing the appeal it relied on certain reasons or grounds which were erroneous in law. The Appeal Committee went out of its way to set out various other grounds, not included in the said "grievances", in allowing the appeal. 12. The fourth broad submission of Mr. Mukherjee was that the Appeal Committee acted in error of law. In allowing the appeal it relied on certain reasons or grounds which were erroneous in law. Firstly, it has been stated in the Resolution that there is no specific finding on each of the charges. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted the Managing Committee was not required to do so. Secondly, Mr. Mukherjee has pointed out that in the resolution it has been stated that what was actually due has not been set out. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that there was no grievance by the petitioner on this heading and this should not have been relied on by the Appeal Committee. Mr. Mukherjee has further submitted that the Appeal Committee has acted in ignorance of law and in error of law in stating that there was no second show cause notice. This was one of the grounds why the Appeal Committee came to the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed. He had drawn my attention to the relevant rules to this effect as it was prevailing at the relevant time. He pointed out that only the new rules, which were not in force at the relevant time, provides for a second show cause notice and not the old Rules. 13. The fifth and last broad submission of Mr. Mukherjee was regarding the reference by the Appeal Committee regarding the approval of the Board. However, in view of a decision of this Court in the case of (5) Lilabati Kanjilal reported in 71 C. W. N. 221. Mr. Mukherjee did not press this point before me. He made it clear that he did not give up this point and he may be allowed to agitate this point in a proper proceeding. 14. Mr. Dutt appearing on behalf of the respondent No.7 has made the following submission:- Regarding the first contention of Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee i.e. bias, Mr. Dutt has drawn my attention to paragraphs 22 to 25 of the affidavit of his client and submitted that these allegations made in the petition are all denied and accordingly the Court should not come to any finding of bias. Regarding the second submission of Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee i.e. bias, Mr. Dutt has drawn my attention to paragraphs 22 to 25 of the affidavit of his client and submitted that these allegations made in the petition are all denied and accordingly the Court should not come to any finding of bias. Regarding the second submission of Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, so far as respondent No.7 is concerned. Mr. Dutt could not point out that there is any such compliance. However, he submitted that assuming there was such non-compliance, having regard to the facts of this case the petitioner cannot be allowed to agitate this point in this writ petition. He has submitted that the Appeal Committee originally passed an order on the appeal which was challenged by his client and the said writ petition was allowed and the Appeal Committee has been directed to re-hear the matter. At no point of time the petitioner took up this point regarding non-compliance of Regulation 7 and having regard to the order of this Court therein, directing such re-hearing, it was not open to the petitioner to agitate this point in this proceeding. So far as Regulation 9 (1) (b) is concerned, he has stated that there has been compliance with this provision as the Appeal Committee has in compliance with this regulation passed the order of reinstatement. In this connection Mr. Dutt relied on a decision in the case of (6) Motilal v. Hargovind, 82 C.W. N. 1002. Regarding the third submission of Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, it was admitted by Mr. Dutt that the reasons on the basis of which the appeal has been allowed are not contained in the grievance of the petitioner which should be taken as the grounds of appeal. Mr. Dutt, however, submitted that the Appeal Committee was entitled to dispose of the appeal upon consideration of all the materials before it and it could rely on certain materials though the same was not the ground of objection of the appellant before the Committee. Regarding the fourth submission of Mr. Mukherjee Mr. Dutt has drawn my attention to the finding of the Managing Committee. Regarding the fifth submission of Mr. Mukherjee, Mr. Dutt had submitted that in any event in view of the said decision in the case of Lilubali Kanji/aJ (supra), the Appeal Committee's decision is valid. 15. Mr. Paritosh Mukherjee learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. Mukherjee Mr. Dutt has drawn my attention to the finding of the Managing Committee. Regarding the fifth submission of Mr. Mukherjee, Mr. Dutt had submitted that in any event in view of the said decision in the case of Lilubali Kanji/aJ (supra), the Appeal Committee's decision is valid. 15. Mr. Paritosh Mukherjee learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has mainly confined his submissions to the question of bias. He has referred to the affidavit affirmed by Satyendra Mohan Chatterjee in this connection, which affidavit has been affirmed by Satyendra Mohan Chatterjee on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. So far as the proceedings before the Appeal Committee is concerned Mr. Mukherjee has produced before me a file containing some papers and invited the Court may decide this case on the basis of the records as produced. I must point out that Mr. Mukheljee has specifically made it clear that these papers are the only records relating to the proceedings before the Appeal Committee regarding the appeal preferred by respondent No.7 and there is no other paper or material excepting these records which are produced before the Court. Regarding the other contentions of Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, Mr. Paritosh Mukherjee has relied on the submissions of Mr. Dutt. 16. I shall deal with the question of non-compliance of Regulations 7 and 9 first. I have already quoted these Regulations. In my opinion, before an appeal is heard on the merits, there must be a decision under Regulation 7. Regulation 7 makes clear that when Regulation 6 is complied with, after receipt of the Memorandum of Appeal, the matter must be placed before the Appeal Committee for a decision whether further enquiry into the case is necessary or not. This decision of the Appeal Committee is condition precedent to the disposal of an appeal under Rule 9. On the affidavits it has not been denied that Regulation 7 has not been complied with. I have also gone into the records produced by Mr. Paritosh Mukherjee. From such records it does not appear that Regulation 7 has been complied with in. the present case. Mr. Dutt has also not disputed before me that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of Reg. 7. According1y, I must hold that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of Reg. 7. 17. I am unable to accept the contentions of Mr. the present case. Mr. Dutt has also not disputed before me that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of Reg. 7. According1y, I must hold that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of Reg. 7. 17. I am unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Dutta that it is not open to the petitioner to agitate this point in this writ petition. The question of the petitioner's taking this objection earlier does not arise. The petitioner did not file any writ petition. It was on the writ petition of the Respondent No.7 that the first decision of the Appeal Committee was set aside. This is a question of jurisdiction. The exercise of power regarding an appeal is subject to other provisions contained in the Regulations including Regulation 7. Even if the petitioner had not taken any such point regarding jurisdiction before, the petitioner is not prevented from agitating the same now. So far as the order of Pradyut Kumar Banerjee J. in making the Rule absolute is concerned in my opinion there is nothing in the said order which can be said to have dispensed with the compliance of other procedural provisions contained in the Regulations including Regulation 7. By his order the learned Judge set aside the Appeal Committee's decision and directed rehearing of the appeal. I have already quoted the relevant portion of the order of the learned Judge. The learned Judge did not and could not have dispensed with any statutory provisions relating to hearing of appeal by the Appeal Committee. This would also be made clear from the fact that the learned Judge has specifically directed that the appeal be disposed of 'in accordance with law'. The 'law' would include Regulation 7. 18. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the exercise of power by the Appeal Committee in disposing of the appeal without compliance of Regulation 7 is without authority and jurisdiction. The 'law' would include Regulation 7. 18. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the exercise of power by the Appeal Committee in disposing of the appeal without compliance of Regulation 7 is without authority and jurisdiction. Reference may be made in this connection to a decision of a single Judge of this Court in Radharaman Das Case (Supra) wherein, while interpreting the same Rules, the Learned Judge held as follows :- "It however, appears on an examination of the records of the Appeal Committee placed before this Court by the Board of Secondary Education that the Appeal Committee has executed its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity and this order has to be set aside. The appeal has to be decided in accordance with the procedure in the Regulations. The first stage is in Regulation 7(1)(b) which is that after the Managing Committee in an appeal by a teacher has made its comments and the appellant has given his explanation on such comments, the Secretary has to place all records of the case, with or without the comments of the Managing Committee and the explanation of the appellant as the case may be, before the Appeal Committee for a decision whether further inquiry into the case is necessary or not. If no further enquiry is directed then only the Secretary has to place the papers again before the Appeal Committee for a decision on the appeal itself as in Regulation 7(2) or (3). Order for inquiry may, be given under Regulation 7(2), referring it to the Director of Public Instruction Govt. of West Bengal, for the said enquiry and report to the Appeal Committee with its views. The Appeal Committee in the instant case did not follow the first stage of the disposal of appeal and had jumped it. When comments of the Managing Committee were received and explanation of the appellant on the comments were obtained, it proceeded to decide the case itself without passing through the stage in Regulation 7(1) (b). That has vitiated the whole proceeding. The Rule shall succeed on this score. This will mean that the Appeal Committee will now proceed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations as pointed out before." 19. So far as the question of Regulation 9(1)(b)(i) is concerned. I must accept the contention of Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee. That has vitiated the whole proceeding. The Rule shall succeed on this score. This will mean that the Appeal Committee will now proceed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations as pointed out before." 19. So far as the question of Regulation 9(1)(b)(i) is concerned. I must accept the contention of Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee. In my opinion, even if an appeal, is allowed, the Appeal Committee should not automatically reinstate the person concerned. This is made quite-dear from Regulation 9 itself. The Regulation 9(1)(b)(i) makes it clear that such order of reinstatement is to be made by the Appeal Committee "if it is of the opinion that such reinstatement is appropriate and proper". It is not merely an idle formality as rightly contended by Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee. Even if an appeal is allowed, the reinstatement should not automatically follow. After allowing the appeal, the Appeal Committee should then apply its mind independently to the question as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case reinstatement is justified or not. They should take into consideration all relevant facts in this connection, in coming to a decision. 20. Reference may be made in this connection to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College (Supra). That judgment was in the final appeal from a suit for injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with his duties as Principal of the College. Dealing with the question of the exception to the general rule that the contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable, the Supreme Court referred to various decisions of the Supreme Court. In this connection, it was observed by the majority of the Learned Judges as follows :- "The question remains whether even if there has been a violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute, should we in the exercise of our discretion grant a declaration or an injunction to the plaintiff/respondent in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case? It is well settled that a relief under the Specific Relief Act is purely discretionary and can be refused where the ends of justice do not require the relief to be granted. Mr. Ramamurthi learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent submitted that the question of discretion would arise only in case where the High Court or this Court is acting in a writ jurisdiction and not in a suit. Mr. Ramamurthi learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent submitted that the question of discretion would arise only in case where the High Court or this Court is acting in a writ jurisdiction and not in a suit. We are, however, unable to agree with this argument because the exercise of discretion is spelt out from the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and the common law and it applies as much to the writ jurisdiction as to other actions at law." 21. After consideration of the various authorities on this point was observed as follows :- "It seems to us that neither the First Additional Civil and Sessions Judge nor the High Court, while decreeing the plaintiff's suit, considered this aspect of the matter whether this was a fit case in which the discretion should have been exercised in favour of the respondent. It is manifestly clear from the authorities discussed above that the relief of declaration and injunction under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act is purely discretionary and the plaintiff cannot claim it as of right. The relief has to be granted by the Court according to sound legal principles and ex debite justitiae. The Court has to administer justice between the parties and cannot convert itself into an instrument of injustice or an engine of oppression. In these circumstances, while exercising its discretionary powers the Court must keep in mind the well settled principles of justice and fair play and should exercise the discretion only if the ends of justice require it, for justice is not an object which can be administered in vacuum." After consideration of various facts the majority held that in view of the special and peculiar circumstances of the case, it will not be a proper exercise of discretion to grant a decree for declaration and injunction in favour of the plaintiff respondent. 22. In my opinion, similar consideration are involved while the Appeal Committee exercises its discretion in directing re-instatement in a particular case when the appeal is all owed. It should apply its mind objectively having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. 23. In my opinion, the Appeal Committee in this case has failed to do what it was required to do. The order makes it quite clear that after the appeal Committee decided to allow the appeal, the Appeal Committee automatically passed the order of reinstatement. 23. In my opinion, the Appeal Committee in this case has failed to do what it was required to do. The order makes it quite clear that after the appeal Committee decided to allow the appeal, the Appeal Committee automatically passed the order of reinstatement. There is no separate or independent application of mind on the question of reinstatement. The records are also silent in this connection. In my opinion, such application of mind is imbedded in Reg. 9(1)(b)(i). This is condition precedent to the exercise of the power of reinstatement. In my opinion, from the order itself it is apparent that Appeal Committee has failed to apply its mind to the question of reinstatement separately and independently from the question of allowing the appeal. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, this order is vitiated for this reason also. 24. For the aforesaid reasons alone this application should succeed and the Rule should be made absolute. However, as other contentions have been raised before me I think I should deal with the same shortly. 25. So far as the third contention of Mr. Mukherjee is concerned in my opinion even if the Regulations provide that the Appeal Committee should dispose of the Appeal on consideration of the materials before it that does not mean that the Appeal Committee can ignore the grounds on which an appeal has been preferred before it. If some one is aggrieved by an order of dismissal he may prefer an appeal and his "grievances" have to be set out as provided in the relevant form itself. In this particular case the admitted position is this, that the reasons given by the Appeal Committee in allowing the appeal preferred by the respondent No.7 are not to be found in the "grievances" of the petitioner in this case. The "grievances" filed by the petitioner make it clear that the appellant was not practically making any complaint regarding the merits of the charges against him but only that the order was passed malafide and with ulterior motive. Under these circumstances, the said appeal was to be considered on the basis of such 'grievances' alone which may be treated as grounds of appeal. In my opinion, the Appeal Committee should not have, on its own, disposed of the appeal on some grounds which were not raised by the appellant. Under these circumstances, the said appeal was to be considered on the basis of such 'grievances' alone which may be treated as grounds of appeal. In my opinion, the Appeal Committee should not have, on its own, disposed of the appeal on some grounds which were not raised by the appellant. However I make it clear that I am not suggesting that in no case the Appeal Committee can go beyond the grounds stated in the 'grievances' In a fit and proper case the Appeal Committee may allow the appellant to amend his 'grievances' by way of addition or alteration and/or allow the appellant to urge some new point. However in the facts of the present case, from the records produced before me, it does not appear that any such prayer was made by the appellant (respondent No.7) to that effect or that any such leave was given by the Appeal Committee. Accordingly, in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was not proper on the part of the Appeal Committee to go into all these questions which were not the subject matter of the 'grievances' of the appellant before it. The fact that according to Regulation 9, the Appeal Committee has to decide the appeal on consideration of materials before it, did not entitle the Appeal Committee to go beyond the petition of appeal in the facts and circumstances of this case. It merely means that in connection with such petition of appeal it should consider all the materials. These materials cannot be materials beyond the scope of the appeal itself. 26. Regarding the fourth contention of Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, it appears to me that the Appeal Committee has not applied its mind properly in disposing of the Appeal before it but it has acted in error of law. Admittedly there was no question of any second show cause notice at the relevant time when the new Rules were not in force. There was also no grievance of the appellant relating to the same. The learned Advocates for the respondents had also failed to bring to my attention any Rule or decision that in such cases there must be specific findings on the specific charges. In my opinion, this discloses non-application of mind on the part of the Appeal Committee. 27. Lastly, I take up the question of bias. The learned Advocates for the respondents had also failed to bring to my attention any Rule or decision that in such cases there must be specific findings on the specific charges. In my opinion, this discloses non-application of mind on the part of the Appeal Committee. 27. Lastly, I take up the question of bias. A very serious allegation has been made against Sri Satyendra Mohan Chatterjee the then President of the Board who was the Chairman of this Appeal Committee. This is contained in paragraphs 24 to 29 of this petition. On the one hand it has been alleged that no opportunity has been given to the petitioner to deal with the materials or documents submitted by the other sides. This has been specified in paragraph 25 of the petition. So far as the same is concerned, I tried to look into the records of this case as handed over to me by Mr. Paritosh Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the respondents nos. 1 and 2. Surprisingly enough, I find there is only a cyclostyled copy of document stated to be proceedings of the Appeal Committee held on 23rd and 24th September, 1974 and not the original of the same. There is no other record or minutes regarding this proceeding. There is no minutes to show how the Appeal Committee heard this matter. No document has been produced to show that the manner in which the appeal was dealt with and whether the statutory procedures regarding the disposal of the appeal has been followed. As I have already pointed out, Mr. Paritosh Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the respondents nos. 1 and 2 had stated that these are all the records and that there is no other record or paper relating to the disposal of this appeal. I am not satisfied about the manner in which the appeal has been heard. 28. The next ground regarding bias is based on the allegation that Mr. Chatterjee has taken one-sided attitude. In this connection it has been stated in paragraph 25 of the petition that the said Sri Satyendra Mohan Chatterjee happens to be a personal friend of the respondent no. 7. This has been denied by the respondent No.7, However, there is no specific denial by Mr. Chatterjee of the specific allegation made against him. Chatterjee has taken one-sided attitude. In this connection it has been stated in paragraph 25 of the petition that the said Sri Satyendra Mohan Chatterjee happens to be a personal friend of the respondent no. 7. This has been denied by the respondent No.7, However, there is no specific denial by Mr. Chatterjee of the specific allegation made against him. In particular it is not specifically denied by him that he was a personal friend of the respondent no. 7 as alleged by the petitioner. This is a very sorry state of affair. However, I need not say anything more about the same. 29. In view of my decision aforesaid, I must hold that the order of the Appeal Committee dated 23rd and 24th September, 1974 as communicated by the Secretary of the Board in its letter dated 6th of November, 1974 is illegal and without jurisdiction. Accordingly I pass the following order. 30. I allow this application and make the Rule absolute. Let a writ of certiorari do issue quashing the decision of the Appeal Committee (as Communicated by the letter dated 6th November, 1974) in the appeal the respondent no. 7 against the order of the Managing Committee of the School, There will also be a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the decision and direction contained in the letter of the Secretary of the Board dated 6th November, 1974. I make it clear that such appeal shall be deemed to be pending before the Appeal Committee and the Appeal Committee is directed to rehear the matter. I make it clear that such rehearing should be in accordance with the law which obviously includes all the relevant Regulations which have application in the present case. 31. Interim orders are vacated. There will be no order us to costs. This is the second time when an order by the Appeal Committee is being set aside by this Court It is expected that the Appeal Committee should expedite the matter. However, it is not necessary for me to specify any time because such appeal must be heard in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Regulations. However, it is desirable that the appeal is disposed of in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. The records produced in this connection by Mr. Paritosh Mukherjee are directed to be kept in this Court. However, it is desirable that the appeal is disposed of in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. The records produced in this connection by Mr. Paritosh Mukherjee are directed to be kept in this Court. If the respondent no. 7 wants to proceed with this appeal before the Appeal Committee in accordance with my judgment then leave is given to any of the parties to mention this matter for a direction for sending the records. Otherwise the records are to be kept on record because I have referred to and relied on the same in disposing of this writ petition.