ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under Section 21 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U. P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The property in dispute is house No. 107, Baika Bagh, Allahabad. The petitioner is the tenant and respondents Nos. 3 to 6 are the landlords of the premises in dispute. 2. The prescribed authority allowed the application and released the accommodation in favour of the respondents Nos. 3 to 6 by his order dated 9-1-1978. In appeal the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the prescribed authority but granted six months time to the petitioner to vacate the premises. This judgment was given on 12-4-1978. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate court the present petition has been filed in this Court. 3. Shri Ravi Kiran Jain appearing for the tenant petitioner has made only one submission that the finding of the prescribed authority as well as the appellate court to the effect that there will be greater hardship to the landlord in ease the application is rejected is founded purely on a consideration of the means of the petitioner and is vitiated in law as it is based on an irrelevant consideration. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and in my opinion the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has substance. The prescribed authority while comparing the hardship of the tenant with the landlord has only stated as follows : - "When the need of the applicant is to be found genuine and pressing. (). P. is drawing Rs. 800/- P. M. as salary as admitted Dy him and his one son is also an earning member. He can very well take another accommodation on rent ................" 5. The appellate court also while comparing the hardship has only Stated as follows : - "As regards the tenants position, it is not disputed that they are having more than a thousand rupees per month as income in their family. Therefore, the other observation of the authority below that the tenant can obtain a suitable accommodation for himself also seems to be correct, particularly because the landlords 6. Therefore, the other observation of the authority below that the tenant can obtain a suitable accommodation for himself also seems to be correct, particularly because the landlords 6. From the above, it is clear that both the authorities have merely relied upon the financial position of the petitioner and have considered no other circumstance along with it while comparing the comparative hardship. There is no finding to the effect that there is some other alternative accommodation available on rent in the city which the tenant can take on rent. 7. In Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. State of U. P. 1975 All LR 664, Hari Swarup, J. observed as follows : - "If it were possible to accept that the resources of the tenant and his richness arc valid grounds for granting permission for his ejectment then it may not be possible for the Government to resist any application for its ejectment from a private accommodation as the Government cannot be deemed to be not possessed with resources enough to construct a building. Such could not have been the intention of law." In Mahabir Prasad v. The District Judge 1977 (UP) RCC 581, M. P. Saxena, J. has held that the means of a tenant can be relevant only when houses are easily available at reasonable rent. 8. I agree with the propositions laid down in the above mentioned two authorities. The means of a tenant by itself cannot be a relevant circumstance while comparing the hardship of the tenant with that of the landlord. The means of a tenant will be relevant when there is a further finding that there is an alternative accommodation available which the tenant can in accordance with his means obtain on rent. It may be relevant when considered along with other circumstances. In the instant case both the prescribed authority as well as the appellate court have only considered the means bereft of the fact as to whether there is any other alternative accommodation available in the city which the tenant can acquire or along with any other circumstance. The finding based merely on the means of the tenant is vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside. The appellate court should have considered other circumstances available on record while comparing the hardship of the tenant with that of the landlord. 9. The finding based merely on the means of the tenant is vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside. The appellate court should have considered other circumstances available on record while comparing the hardship of the tenant with that of the landlord. 9. I may, however, make it clear that both the prescribed authority as well as the appellate court found the need of the landlord as being bona fide and genuine. 1 am not disturbing this finding arrived Case remand at by both the courts below and this finding shall be final. 10. In the result, I allow the petition, set aside the order of the 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad dated 12th April, 1978 and remand the case to the 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad with the direction that the appeal be readmitted to its original number and decided afresh at an early date in accordance with law. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.