JUDGMENT K. Bhaskaran, J. 1. The petitioner was first appointed on 11th March 1954 as a Sectional Officer, Electrical (Junior Engineer) in the Central Public Works Department by the Chief Engineer Central P.W.D., New Delhi. As from 13th October 1961 he was confirmed in the said post by order dated 23rd October 1962 of the Chief Engineer, Central P.W.D., New Delhi. By order dated 29th April 1967 the Chief Engineer, promoted him to officiate temporarily as Assistant Engineer (Electrical) in C.E.E.S. Class II with effect from 11thApril 1967. Though, by 1970, the petitioner had satisfactorily completed the period of probation, no order declaring his probation, or confirming him in the post of Assistant Engineer, was passed by the Chief Engineer, P.W.D. It is averred in the writ petition that in May 1976, while the petitioner was working as officiating Assistant Engineer at Trivandrum, Central Electrical Sub Division, under Coimbatore Electrical Division, he received an order from C.P.W.D., transferring him to New Delhi. The petitioner was relieved on 14th September 1976 from Central Electrical Sub Division, Trivandrum; he, however, instead of joining at New Delhi, applied for leave for 40 days. While matters stood like that, the petitioner received order No. 56/123/ 66-EC. III, dated 23rd September 1976 of the Government of India, Central Public Works Department, New Delhi, a true copy of which is Ext. P-1; and that reads as follows "Order. WHEREAS, the Engineer-in-Chief, Central P.W.D. New Delhi, is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so: NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (j) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, the Engineer-in-Chief, C.P.W.D, New Delhi, hereby retires Sri G. Jacob, Assistant Engineer (Electrical) attached to Central Electrical Sub Division, C.P.W.D., Pettah, Trivandrum with immediate effect, he having already attained the age of fifty years on 29th May 1976. Sri Jacob shall be paid a sum equivalent to the amount of his basic pay plus allowances, for a period of three months calculated at the same rate at which he was drawing them immediately before the retirement." Ext. P-2 is the copy of representation dated 27th November 1976 submitted by the petitioner to the Engineer-in-Chief (the first respondent) for reconsidering the case of the petitioner, both on merits and on compassionate grounds, and to reinstate him in service. Ext. P-2 (a) is an advance copy of Ext. P-2 is the copy of representation dated 27th November 1976 submitted by the petitioner to the Engineer-in-Chief (the first respondent) for reconsidering the case of the petitioner, both on merits and on compassionate grounds, and to reinstate him in service. Ext. P-2 (a) is an advance copy of Ext. P-2 forwarded by the petitioner to the Minister for Works and Housing. Ext. P-3 is a copy of the Official Memorandum of Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, dated 22nd March 1977, stating that the points raised by the petitioner in his representation had been considered by the competent authority, but it Was regretted that the decision already taken to retire him from service could not be reversed. Ext. P-4 is the copy of another representation dated 6th April 1977 submitted by the petitioner to the Prime Minister for reconsidering the matter and reinstating him in service. Ext. P-5 is the copy of the notice dated 18th July 1977 sent by the petitioner's advocate to the Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, New Delhi. 2. The writ petition is for quashing Exts. P-1 and P-3 orders passed by respondents 1 and 2 respectively, mainly on two grounds: (1) Ext. P-1 order had been passed with mala fides; and, (2) the provisions contained in subclause (i) of clause (j) of rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules for short the Rules, would not be applicable to the case of the petitioner inasmuch as, on the date of Ext. P-1 order, he was not holding the substantive post of a Class II Officer, (the Class II post held by him having been only an officiating one and he had not by then attained the age of 55 to make sub-clause (ii) of clause (j ) of rule 56 of the Rules applicable to him. 3. The Central Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable for the following reasons: (i) the mala fides urged to attack Exts. P-1 and P-3 orders have not been established; (ii) there is enormous delay in filing the writ petition even after the passing of Ext. P-3 order; (iii) the contention that the petitioner was not holding a substantive post in Class II service is not factually correct inasmuch as, even before the date of issue of Ext. P-1 and P-3 orders have not been established; (ii) there is enormous delay in filing the writ petition even after the passing of Ext. P-3 order; (iii) the contention that the petitioner was not holding a substantive post in Class II service is not factually correct inasmuch as, even before the date of issue of Ext. P-1 order, the petitioner had completed his probation of three years in the post of Assistant Engineer which was a Class II post; (iv) even if the officer was not confirmed in the Class II post, as he was discharging the functions of a Class II officer, he could be retired applying rule 56 (j) (i) of the Rules; and (v) the contention based on the interpretation of rule 56 (j) (i) of the Rules not having been raised in Ext. P-2 representation, the petitioner could not be allowed to urge it in proceedings under Article 226 of the constituion. 4. Before entering into a discussion on the basic question as to whether rule 56(j) (i) of the Rules could be invoked in the instant case, the contention raised by the Central Government Pleader with respect to the delay and laches has to be disposed of. Ext. P-1 order was passed on 23rd September 1976, and Ext. P-3 order disposing of Ext. P-2 representation of the petitioner was passed by the second respondent on 22nd March 1977. The writ petition is seen to have been filed on 9th August 1977. In other words, the filing of the writ petition is within one year from the date of passing of the retirement order Ext. P-1, and within six months from the date of Ext. P-3 order. In this connection we have to bear in mind that the rule that belated and stale claims could not be gone into by courts is more a question of practice than a rule of law; a matter of discretion on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. A period of six months, or even one year, may be a reasonable time in one case; but in another case a period of three months could be considered to be a reasonable time to come to the court. A period of six months, or even one year, may be a reasonable time in one case; but in another case a period of three months could be considered to be a reasonable time to come to the court. The decision is to rest on various factors like the explanation for the delay offered, the seriousness of the consequences that would follow from the decision of the court, whether, it would tend to perpetuate injustice or would amount to failure to do justice, whether it would unsettle settled positions and would upset balance of convenience. The Supreme Court has in Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2271) on a consideration of the particular facts of the case, observed that the petitioner ought to have come to court at-least within six months or one year from the date of passing of the impugned order. Compulsory retirement is an exception to the general rule that by virtue of the provisions contained in rule 56 (a) of the Rules a Government Servant shall retire on the day he attains the age of 58 years. In a matter involving serious consequences and affecting civil rights the courts will ordinarily be reluctant to deny relief solely on the ground of delay and laches unless manifest injustice had already resulted from the callousness of the person invoking the writ jurisdiction. There could be no hard and fast rule prescribing the upper or lower limit within which an order has to be challenged under article 226 of the constitution. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner had made Ext. P-2 representation, and other circumstances and the seriousness of the consequences that follow from Ext. P-1 order, I am of the view that the petitioner should not be denied relief if he is entitled to succeed on merits, on the sole ground of delay and laches. The contention with respect to delay and laches raised by the Central Government Pleader appearing for the respondents is, therefore, rejected. 5. We will now proceed to consider the question as to whether the retirement order is valid and justified. Though mala fides also have been raised as a ground to attack Ext. P-1 order, there is hardly any material to substantiate that contention. I, therefore, reject that contention. 6. what survives for consideration is the question whether Ext. 5. We will now proceed to consider the question as to whether the retirement order is valid and justified. Though mala fides also have been raised as a ground to attack Ext. P-1 order, there is hardly any material to substantiate that contention. I, therefore, reject that contention. 6. what survives for consideration is the question whether Ext. P-1 order is bad for want of non compliance with the provisions contained in rule 56 (j) of the Rules. It is the admitted case that the petitioner had not attained the age of 55 when Ext. P-1 order was passed by the first respondent, and therefore rule 56 (j) (ii) has no application to the facts of the case. To put it otherwise, the validity of the impugned order, Ext. P-1, has to be tested in the light of the provisions contained in rule 56 (j) (i) of the rules. Rule 56 (j) (i) of the Rules reads as follows: " (j) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice; (i) if he is in class I or class II service or post and had entered Government service before attaining the age of thirty-five years, after he has attained the age of fifty years;" The contention of the petitioner is that on the date of passing of Ext. P-1 order he was not in Class I or Class II service or post, and, therefore, the first respondent could not have invoked rules 56 (j) (i) of the rules for compulsorily retiring him from service. The assertion of the counsel for the petitioner is that though the petitioner had been officiating temporarily as an Assistant Engineer (Electrical) with effect from 11th April 1967, no order either declaring his probation or confirming him in that post, which is a Class II post, was passed by the authorities. The assertion of the counsel for the petitioner is that though the petitioner had been officiating temporarily as an Assistant Engineer (Electrical) with effect from 11th April 1967, no order either declaring his probation or confirming him in that post, which is a Class II post, was passed by the authorities. The emphasis laid by the counsel for the petitioner is that inspite of the petitioner having officiated from 11th April 1967 in the post of Assistant Engineer, which falls in Class II, for the purpose of rule 56 (j) (i) the petitioner ought to have been considered to hold only a Class III post which was the substantive post held by him as on the date of passing of Ext. P-1 order. The Central Government Pleader seeks to meet this argument by stating that even though no formal order of declaration of satisfactory completion of probation or confirmation in Class II post was passed by the appropriate authority, it should be deemed that on 11th April 1970, on completion of the three years period of probation, the petitioner had completed his probation and was also confirmed in the post of Assistant Engineer in Class II. His submission is that the position is so where there is no provision for extending the probation or there is no specific order for extending the period of probation. I find it difficult to agree with this reasoning of the Central Government Pleader. In the absence of a specific order confirming the petitioner in a Class II post, it is not possible to hold that the petitioner was holding a substantive post in Class II. It may be that, when the petitioner is threatened with reversion or adverse consequences, he might use as a shield for defence the fact that he had satisfactorily completed the period of probation, and in the absence of any rule for extention of the period of probation or a specific order extending probation, he should be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the probation. There is little justification for stretching the provisions contained in the service rules in order to justify an action taken by the authorities for compulsorily retiring a person from service, which could be reported to only very sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. 7. There is little justification for stretching the provisions contained in the service rules in order to justify an action taken by the authorities for compulsorily retiring a person from service, which could be reported to only very sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. 7. The Central Government Pleader then went on to argue that even assuming that the petitioner was not holding a substantive post in Class II, inasmuch as he was discharging the functions of a Class II Officer ever since 11th April 1967 till the date of passing of Ext. P-1 order, that should be considered to be sufficient for the application of rule 56 (j) (i) of the rules. His submission is that it has not been specifically stated in rule 56 (j) (i) that the rule has application only to the case of officers holding substantive posts in Class I or Class II service. In my view, it has to be looked at from a different angle, that is to say, in the absence of a specific mention that the rule would be applicable to officers holding posts in Class I or Class II service including those holding officiating or temporary posts in those Classes, the reasonable view of construing a provision would be that it has application only to case of officers holding substantive posts in Class I or Class II service. I, therefore, reject this contention also. 8. Lastly, the Central Government Pleader submitted that the contention based on the non applicability of rule 56 (j) (i) not having been specifically raised in Ext. P-2 representation, the petitioner is precluded from raising that contention in this writ petition. The retirement under rule 56 (j) could be ordered only when the conditions stated either in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) thereof are satisfied. These being mandatory provisions, I hold that the failure on the part of the petitioner to specifically raise the contention based on the non applicability of the rules to his case which goes to the very root of the matter, touching the jurisdiction of the first respondent to pass Ext- P-1 order, would not be a bar in raising that plea in the writ petition. This contention raised by the Central Government Pleader also is rejected. 9. For the foregoing reason I am satisfied that Ext. This contention raised by the Central Government Pleader also is rejected. 9. For the foregoing reason I am satisfied that Ext. P-1 order has been passed by the first respondent on a misconception of the applicability of rule 56 (j) (i) of the rules to a case where the officer concerned was not absorbed in a permanent post or was not holding a substantive post in Class I or Class II service. The result, therefore, is that the writ petition is allowed quashing Exts. P-1 and P-3 orders. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and treat him as having been in continuous service, ignoring Ext P-1 and P-3 orders. The writ petition is allowed as above. There will be no order as to costs.