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1979 DIGILAW 725 (ALL)

Ashok Kumar Misra v. District Judge

1979-07-17

S.D.AGARWAL

body1979
JUDGMENT : S.D. Agarwal, J. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of the District Judge, Etawah dated 4-11-1978 rejecting the application of the Petitioner to be impleaded as a party to the revision. 2. The Petitioner is a prospective allottee. After the vacancy was notified the Petitioner applied for allotment but before the allotment could be made the landlady applied for release u/s 16 of the Act. The Petitioner contested the release application and it was after contest that the Prescribed Authority rejected the release application. The landlady filed a revision in the court of the Distt. Judge but did not implead the Petitioner as a party. The Petitioner was, therefore, compelled to move an application for being impleaded as a party. This application was rejected on 4-11-1978. Aggrieved the present petition has been filed. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has urged that the view taken by the District Judge that the Petitioner-prospective allottee has no right to be heard is manifestly erroneous in law. 4. Rule 13(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, was as follows: Every application u/s 16(1)(b) shall be a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord and the outgoing tenant or the prospective allottee, if any, shall have no right to file any objection against it. 5. The vires of this Rule was challenged before me in Raghunandan Lal and Another Vs. District Judge and Others, (1978) AWC 506. I held the Rule to be intra vires as in my opinion it was not against Section 16 of the Apt. I had further held in that case that once the tenant vacates the property then the property reverts to the landlord and thereafter the question as to whether the property should be released or not, is a question between the District Magistrate and the landlord. I further held that even if this clause was not there, then too, in my opinion the outgoing tenant or the prospective allottee, cannot have a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord. 6. Sub-clause (4) of Rule 13 was subsequently deleted. I further held that even if this clause was not there, then too, in my opinion the outgoing tenant or the prospective allottee, cannot have a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord. 6. Sub-clause (4) of Rule 13 was subsequently deleted. In view of this deletion, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has urged that since Sub-clause (4) has been deleted, it implies that now the prospective allottee has a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord. In my opinion this contention of the Learned Counsel is devoid of merit. Deletion of Sub-clause (4) does not confer any right on the prospective allottee. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the two cases of this Court in support of this submission. Smt. Indrani Mehrotra v. Addl. District Judge 1978 (UP) RCC 515 and Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (1979) AWC 255, both these cases are distinguishable on facts. The question as to whether a prospective allottee has a right to object to the release was not a question for consideration in either of the above cases. In the case of Smt. Indrani Mehrotra (supra), one Kedar Nath Mehrotra was the tenant of the premises. He died and thereafter applications were filed for allotment of the said premises. The Inspector reported that the said house was vacant. Smt. Indrani Mehrotra then filed an application for the allotment of the house being an heir of Kedar Nath Mehrotra who was in possession of the premises. A person who is in possession of the premises claiming through the erstwhile tenant definitely has a right to object to the release because the effect of it would be that the said person would be ejected from the premises. Similarly in the case of Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena, the Division Bench of this Court was reconsidering the case of Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena who was in occupation of the premises through the members of his family. The Division Bench held that Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena would come within the expression of aggrieved person as he was under the threat of dispossession. In case he was evicted, he would suffer substantial injury. It was in the light of the above facts that the Division Bench held that Dr. The Division Bench held that Dr. Gopi Mohan Saxena would come within the expression of aggrieved person as he was under the threat of dispossession. In case he was evicted, he would suffer substantial injury. It was in the light of the above facts that the Division Bench held that Dr. Saxena had a right to object to the release. 8. The mere making of an application for allotment does not confer any right on the applicant at all in the property sought to be released. There may be many applicants for allotment in respect of the said property. The prospective allottee may have a right to contest the question of allotment amongst the applicants for allotment, but he cannot possibly have a right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord as the question of release is directly a question between the District Magistrate and the landlord. In the circumstances, in my opinion, inspite of deletion of Sub-clause (4) of Rule 13 of the Rules, the prospective allottee has no right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlady. 9. In the instant case, however, the Petitioner objected before the prescribed authority and led evidence in support of his objection. The prescribed authority dismissed the release application after examining the evidence led on behalf of the Petitioner. No objection was raised by the landlady before the prescribed authority in regard to the maintainability of the objection of the Petitioner. The landlady filed a revision against the order of the prescribed authority without impleading the Petitioner as a party. Since the Petitioner was a party before the prescribed authority, it was mandatory for the landlady to have made the Petitioner a party in the revisional court as the revision arose from the very order (sic) the Petitioner was a party. In the circumstances, in the interest of justice, it is necessary that the Petitioner should have been made a party in the revision. In view of the above, I hold that a prospective allottee has no right to object to the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord. But due to the peculiar facts of this case, I am permitting the Petitioner to be impleaded as a party in the revision. The petition is accordingly allowed. The order of the District Judge dated 4-11-1978 is quashed. But due to the peculiar facts of this case, I am permitting the Petitioner to be impleaded as a party in the revision. The petition is accordingly allowed. The order of the District Judge dated 4-11-1978 is quashed. The District Judge is directed to implead the Petitioner as a party in the revision. The case is remanded to the District Judge, Etawah for decision afresh in accordance with law at an early date. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.