JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J. - This revision arises out of the judgment dated, 11-3-78 passed by Sessions Judge, Bulandshahar dismissing the appeal that was filed by the present applicant against his conviction and sentence under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 2. On 17th of August, 1973, at about 9 a. m., a sample was collected by the Food Inspector, out of the milk in the possession of the applicant. One part of the sample was sent to the public analyst which was found to be adulterated. A complaint was, therefore, filed for the prosecution of the applicant. During his examination in the trial court, the applicant accepted the collection of sample from his possession. He, however, pleaded that the milk was pure and that the report of the public analyst was incorrect. The trial court held the applicant guilty and sentenced him to one years R. I. and to a fine of Rs. 2,000. Aggrieved against it, the applicant filed an appeal in the court of Sessions which resulted in dismissal and hen this revisions. 3. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant was that the charge in the instant case was defective in as much as it did not specify the extent to which the milk was adulterated nor did it disclose as to under which clause of Section 2 of the Act, did the alleged adulteration fall. Reliance for this argument was placed by the learned counsel on a decision of this court in case of Ajodhya Prasad v. State 1977 (II) FAC 26. 4. Having given my careful thought to the contention raised, I regret my inability to accept it. The case against the applicant was that he was found selling milk which was adulterated inasmuch as it did not conform with the prescribed standard of purity. The charge that was framed against the applicant explicitly stated the date, time and place of the collection of the sample as also the fact that the milk which the applicant was found selling was adulterated because it did not come up to the prescribed standard of purity. The charge that was framed against the applicant explicitly stated the date, time and place of the collection of the sample as also the fact that the milk which the applicant was found selling was adulterated because it did not come up to the prescribed standard of purity. I do not think it was necessary for the prosecution also to mention in the charge as to under which clause of Section 2 of the Act did the alleged adulteration fall nor was it necessary to mention the extent of the adulteration. As for the case cited by the learned counsel for the applicant, the adulteration in that case was by mixing linseed oil with mustard oil which was not mentioned in the charge. Further, the revision was not allowed merely for the defect in the charge. There was also an admission elicited in the cross-examination of one of the prosecution witness that he was not sure whether the sample purchased by the food inspector was that of mustard oil or Gawadah. It was in the totality of both these circumstances that the learned Single Judge allowed the revision and set aside the conviction and sentence. In criminal cases, it is well settled that every case is decided on its own facts. I do not think that the observation made in the case of Ajodhya Prasad v. State (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the applicant, can apply with equal force to the facts of the present case. 5. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant was that the prosecution did not examine any independent witness in the case. Learned counsel pointed out that the only witnesses examined in the case were the food Inspector and Safai Jamadar. Reference was made by learned counsel for the applicant to the case Shanti Prasad v. State, 1977 Cr. L.J. 564 (Allahabad) in support of this argument. I agree that in most of the cases, food inspectors content themselves by examining themselves and a sanitary supervisor, in almost every case they try to circumvent the provision contained in sub-section 7 of Section 10 of the Act by making a bald statement to the effect that those present at the place of occurrence were asked to sign the papers relating to the collection of sample but they refused to do so. It is not believable that the food inspector was not able to persuade an independent person to be a witness in the case. So far, however, as the present case is concerned, the argument appears to be of only an academic importance. A perusal of the record shows that the applicant admitted during his examination that the food inspector collected sample from the milk in his possession on the date, time and place alleged and that the food inspector had mixed formalin in the sample and the phials were sealed on the spot. He also admitted that the notice and the receipt prepared by the food inspector on the spot carry his signatures. In the face of this admission made by the applicant, during his examination in the trial court, the omission on the part of the food inspector in not picking an independent person to witness the collection of the sample can be of no consequence. 6. Learned counsel next urged that the necessary amount of formalin was not mixed in the sample and thus the mandatory provision contained in Rule 20 of the rules framed under the Act was violated. I regret my unability to accept it. The food inspector in his statement on oath clearly stated that 18 drops of formalin were mixed in each phial. That is the quantity prescribed by the rules. Learned counsel, however, urged that it should further have been shown by the food inspector as to what was the strength of formalin mixed with the sample. Since the requisite amount of formalin is 18 drops to each 220 mls. and since this was complied with, the mere fact that the food inspector did not state as to what was the strength of the formalin that he mixed with the sample collected by him cannot be attached much importance. It may not be out of place to add here that the fact that preservative was mixed, was admitted even by the applicant during his examination in the trial court. The contention raised is accordingly rejected. 7. Learned counsel then urged that the prosecution in this case was launched with exorbitant delay with the result that the valuable right of the applicant under Section 13(2) of the Act to get the sample in his possession analysed by the Director, Central Food Laboratory, was frustrated. The contention raised is accordingly rejected. 7. Learned counsel then urged that the prosecution in this case was launched with exorbitant delay with the result that the valuable right of the applicant under Section 13(2) of the Act to get the sample in his possession analysed by the Director, Central Food Laboratory, was frustrated. Learned counsel stressed that the conviction recorded against the applicant cannot, therefore, be maintained in this case. I am once again unable to agree. The sample in this case was collected on 17th August, 1973, and the complaint was presented in court on 17-1-1974 that is, just after the expiry of a period of four months. Order was passed by the Magistrate for A issue of summons on 4th of June, 74 and, service of summons, it appears, was effected on the applicant some time in July, 74. In other words a period of about 11 months elapsed between the date of collection of sample and the date on which the service was effected on him. There are two reasons for which it cannot be held that this delay caused any prejudice to the applicant. According to Ex. Ka-8, the copy of the report of the public analyst was handed over to the applicant on 2nd of January, 1974. The applicant, therefore, had the notice on that date of the fact that the sample collected from his possession had been reported by the public analyst to be adulterated. Under the circumstances, if he at all wanted to avail of his right under Section 13 (2) of the Act, he could do so promptly thereafter. Even otherwise, an accused cannot claim any benefit on the basis of the delay in launching of prosecution unless he makes an application in court for the sample in his possession being sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory. It was so held by this court in case Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow v. Mushir Ahmed 1978 (I) FAC 165. In the instant case it is not shown that the applicant made an application at any stage during the trial of the case that the sample in his possession be sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is, accordingly, rejected. 8. In the instant case it is not shown that the applicant made an application at any stage during the trial of the case that the sample in his possession be sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is, accordingly, rejected. 8. Learned counsel next urged that Rule 9-J had not been complied with in as much as the report of the public analyst was not furnished to him. This argument too fails to bear any scrutiny I have already made a reference to the document Ex. Ka-8 which show that the report of the public analyst was furnished to the applicant on 2nd of January, 74. This fact was even admitted by the applicant when he was examined in the trial court. 9. Since the copy of the report was furnished to the applicant, there was substantial compliance of Rule 9-J. The contention is accordingly rejected. 10. Learned counsel lastly urged that a lenient view may be taken on the point of sentence. 11. The applicant is not a regular shop-keeper. The record does not show that he is a previous convict. The minimum sentence prescribed under Section 7 read with section 16 of the Act is six month's R. I. and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. The trial court has, however, sentenced the applicant to one years R. I. and to a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. That appears to be excessive. I think it would meet the ends of justice if the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the applicant is reduced to that already undergone and the sentence of fine of Rs. 2,000/- awarded to the applicant is reduced to a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. 12. This revision is accordingly allowed to this extent that, while the conviction recorded against the applicant under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Act is maintained, the sentence of one years R.I. and fine of Rs. 2,000/- awarded thereunder is reduced to the sentence of imprisonment already undergone together with fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of payment of fine, the applicant shall undergo six months R. I. The applicant is granted one months time from the date of the receipt of the record for depositing the fine. The applicant is on bail. He need not surrender. The bonds furnished by him are cancelled.