JUDGMENT: This is a proceeding for contempt of Court. A preliminary contention has been raised by Mr. Biren Mitter the learned Public Prosecutor claiming the right of the State Government to intervene in a contempt proceeding pending before this Court and the right of the Public Prosecutor to appear in such proceeding without filing any vakalatnama or other authority in that behalf. 2. It. may be necessary to narrate a few facts giving rise to the instant contempt proceeding against Biswanath Nandy a Sub-Inspector of Police in the Enforcement Branch of the West Bengal Police Force. Certain quantities of mobil oil were seized by the Police Authorities belonging to the petitioner Gouri Shanker Shaw, and in connection therewith there were various proceedings both in this court and in the court of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate. Barrackpore (hereinafter referred to as S.D.J.M., Barrackpore). Ultimately an application under Ss. 397 and 401 read with S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 was made by the petitioner in this court which was heard by me on the 14th October 1978. Miss Uma Banerjee the learned Advocate fur the State appeared at the hearing. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties I issued a rule calling upon the State to show cause why the order complained of by the petitioner should not be set aside and I further directed that upon the petitioner executing a bond to the satisfaction of the S.D.J.M., Barrackpore the goods seized in connection with the Kharda P. S. Case No. 98(8) of 1977 be made over to the petitioner and the petitioner was directed not to sell, dispose of or Otherwise encumber the said goods until the disposal of the rule. The rule was made returnable one week after the long vacation. Subsequently on the prayer of the petitioner I directed that the petitioner be furnished with a plain copy of my said order counter-signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court. Thereafter un the application of the petitioner the S.D.J.M., Barrackpore made an order on the 19th October 1978 directing return of the seized goods to the petitioner on his executing a bond for Rs. 10,000/- and the petitioner in accordance with my order dated 14th October 1978 was again directed not to sell, dispose of or otherwise encumber the seized goods until the disposal of the said rule pending in this court. 10,000/- and the petitioner in accordance with my order dated 14th October 1978 was again directed not to sell, dispose of or otherwise encumber the seized goods until the disposal of the said rule pending in this court. It appears that on the 19th October 1978 the petitioner executed a bond for Rs. 10,000/- which was accepted by the S.D.J.M., Barrackpore, it further appears that in spite of my said order dated 14th October 1978 and the said order dated 19th October 1978 passed by the S.D.J.M. Barrackpore the alleged Condemner as an investigating officer in the said Kharda P.S. Case No. 98(8) of 1977 in whose custody the said seized goods were lying, did not return the said goods to the petitioner on the ground that he had not received the order of the S.D.J.M., Barrackpore. Thereafter the petitioner obtained a certified copy of the order dated 19th October 1978 passed by the S.D.J.M., Barrackpore and is said to have handed over the same to the alleged contemner, but the alleged contemner refused to deliver the said goods to the petitioner on the plea that the Number of the premises wherefrom the said goods were seized was not mentioned in my order dated 14th October 1978 and unless my said order was modified or clarified specifying the number of the said premises the said goods could not be delivered to the petitioner. On the 3rd November, 1978 the petitioner moved before me the instant application for contempt of court against the alleged contemner inter alia for violation of and disobedience to my said order dated 14th October 1978 when I issued a rule and directed the alleged contemner to deliver the seized goods to the petitioner on the bond furnished by the petitioner as directed by the S.D.J.M, Barrackpore by his order dated 19th October 1978, on the said terms and condition as contained in my said order dated 14th October 1978 and the alleged contemner was further directed to deliver the said goods to the petitioner from the premises wherefrom the same were seized and to act on a plain copy of my order counter-signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court. On the 17th November 1978 the present contempt application appeared before me when the petitioner was represented by Mr. Sekhar K. Basu Advocate and the alleged contemner was represented by Mr. On the 17th November 1978 the present contempt application appeared before me when the petitioner was represented by Mr. Sekhar K. Basu Advocate and the alleged contemner was represented by Mr. Biren Mitter the learned Public Prosecutor and Mr. N.A. Chowdhury, Advocate, and in the instance of the parties I gave directions for filling of affidavits. Thereafter on the 13th December 1978 the matter again appeared before me when Mr. Mitter claimed to intervene in the proceeding as the Public Prosecutor. Mr. Panja the learned counsel for the petitioner objected to the appearance of Mr. Mitter on the grounds that the State is not a party to the present proceeding and no power or vakalatnama has been filed by Mr. Mitter or on his behalf. Mr. Miller, however, contended that as the Public Prosecutor he was entitled to appear before all courts in all criminal proceedings and that also without filing any vakalatnama or power. Mr. Mitter urged that the State was interested in the present proceeding inasmuch as by reason of issue of the rule for contempt of court against the alleged contemner the investigation in the main criminal case was being hampered. In the main criminal case before this court out of which the present contempt proceeding arises was with regard to large quantities of oil which are sought to be taken a way by the petitioner and the State is a party of the said criminal proceeding and therefore the State should have been made a party by the petitioner in this contempt proceeding. The present contempt proceeding being an offshoot of the main criminal case and the petitioner by this contempt proceeding is trying to stifle the investigation and his prosecution in the said criminal case. The petitioner has no option but to make the State a party to this contempt proceeding which is of a quasi-criminal nature and in this particular case the contempt alleged by the petitioner is a criminal contempt and therefore the State has both the right to intervene and of audience Under S. 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Public Prosecutor is entitled to appear without being required to file any warrant or Vakalatnama. 3 In support of his contentions that the contempt alleged by the petitioner in the instant proceeding is a criminal contempt, Mr. Mitter referred to S. 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. 3 In support of his contentions that the contempt alleged by the petitioner in the instant proceeding is a criminal contempt, Mr. Mitter referred to S. 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. To appreciate the arguments of Mr. Mitter the relevant portions of S. 2 of the Act are set out below. 'Definitions-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, (a) "Contempt of Court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt. (b) "Civil Contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court" (c) "Criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise, or any mailer or the doing of any act whatsoever which - (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to Interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner." 4. Mr. Matter urged that the allegations against the alleged contemner here is that by words spoken or written or by visible representations the alleged contemner has scandalised or tended to scandalise or lowered or tended to lower the authority of this court or interfered or tended to interfere with due course of judicial proceeding" being the application made by the petitioner for release of the seized goods to him and further the alleged contemner by his acts and conduct interfered or tended to interfere with or obstructed or tended to obstruct the administration of justice by refusing delivery of the seized goods to the petitioner in compliance with the orders dated 14th October 1978 passed by this court and the order dated 19th October 1978 passed by the S.D.J.M., Barrack pore. As regards appearance of the Public Prosecutor in any criminal proceeding in any court without filing any warrant relevant portion of S. 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1978 relied on by Mr. Mitter may be set out below:- Section 301. As regards appearance of the Public Prosecutor in any criminal proceeding in any court without filing any warrant relevant portion of S. 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1978 relied on by Mr. Mitter may be set out below:- Section 301. Appearance by the Public Prosecutor - (1) The Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may plead with, out any written authority before any court in which that case is under enquiry, trial or appeal." 5. Mr. Panja contended that the contempt complained of by the petitioner is not at all a criminal contempt but a civil contempt. In a criminal contempt Mr. Panja submitted there must be publication by the contemner by wards spoken or written or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise of a matter which constitutes contempt and thus publication is the criterion for a criminal contempt. In the present proceeding there is no case against the alleged Contemner of any publication of any matter made by him. The Case of the petitioner against the alleged contemner is that the alleged contemner is guilty of wilful disobedience of the order dated 14th October 1978 and of the direction or delivery of the seized goods to the petitioner as contained in the said order Such disobedience might scandalise or lower the authority of the court or prejudice or interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding or interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice as in a criminal contempt but unless there is publication by the alleged contemner of any matter in tint behalf the acts, complained of would not constitute criminal contempt. 6. Mr. Panja in support of his submission, also referred to the rules framed by this court regulating the procedure in contempt of court matters, Rule 4 of the said rules provides inter alia that in the cause title of the petition the particulars of the nature of the contumacious conduct complained of are to be briefly stated. Mr. Panja submitted that the petitioner has clearly stated in the cause title of the petition, 'wilful disobedience and/or violation of the order dated 14th October 1978 as the contumacious conduct of the alleged contemner complained of. Mr. Panja submitted that the petitioner has clearly stated in the cause title of the petition, 'wilful disobedience and/or violation of the order dated 14th October 1978 as the contumacious conduct of the alleged contemner complained of. Rule 14 specifies that where the respondent is the Central Government or State Government the cause title should mention the person on whom the service is to be effected which clearly shows that proceedings for contempt may be taken against the Government as such the present proceeding is not against the Government at all but against a particular person who happens to be a Government employee. Rule 15 determines the jurisdiction of the Bench which will hear a civil contempt being a contempt grounded on wilful disobedience of a judgment, decree, direction or order or other process of court. Rule 26 provides for service of the Rule Nisi along with copy of the petition for contempt and where the Government or Government Department is a party respondent an additional copy of the petition is required to be filed for service upon the Legal Remembrance of the State if the State or any of its department is a party or on the solicitor of the Central Government if the Central Government or any of its department is a party. In the instant case Mr. Panja pointed out that neither the State Government nor any of its department is a party to the contempt proceeding and there are no allegations against them in the petition. Mr. Panja therefore urged that the State not being a party to the contempt proceeding nor there being any allegation against it the State has no right to appear or intervene in the present contempt proceeding. Mr. Panja contended that that the order dated 14th October 1978 out of which the present proceeding arises was passed in the presence of the State, the State being a party thereto was represented by Miss Uma Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the State and the said order was passed by this Court after hearing Miss Banerjee. If State was dissatisfied with the said order it could take appropriate proceeding for setting aside or recalling of the said order which has not been done by the State. This clearly goes to establish that the State was not dissatisfied with the said order. If State was dissatisfied with the said order it could take appropriate proceeding for setting aside or recalling of the said order which has not been done by the State. This clearly goes to establish that the State was not dissatisfied with the said order. If the alleged contemner as an investigating officer was of the view that the said order dated 14th October 1978 would hamper of stifle his investigation and prosecution of the petitioner, he could complain to the appropriate authorities of the State Government who might take appropriate proceedings for setting aside or recalling of the said order but this also has not been done. The alleged contemner not having done so cannot take the law in his own hands and flout the order of court in the manner he has done. Mr. Panja submitted that the investigation of the case started in August 1977 and now up to middle of December 1978, although more than one year has elapsed the alleged investigation has not yet been completed by this efficient officer, the alleged contemner. The Code of Criminal Procedure Mr. Panja submitted dealt with the procedure in criminal cases in courts and not with contempt proceedings, be it for civil contempt or for criminal contempt in a High Court, jurisdiction in respect whereof is derived by the High Court under Article 315 of the Constitution. By any stretch of imagination a contempt proceeding cannot be described as a criminal case in a court of law to be regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers power on the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor to appear and plead in criminal cases in any court which are in their charge, without any written authority which is under enquiry, trial or appeal before a court. Mr. Panja therefore argued that for such appearance the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor must be in charge of such a criminal case. The Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor can not be said to be in charge of the present contempt proceeding. 7. Mr. Mr. Panja therefore argued that for such appearance the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor must be in charge of such a criminal case. The Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor can not be said to be in charge of the present contempt proceeding. 7. Mr. Panja therefore submitted that by virtue of S. 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the Public Prosecutor has neither any authority nor any locus standi, to appear or intervene on behalf of the State in a contempt proceeding in which the State is not a party and that also without any written authority. 8. In my opinion, the contentions or Mr. Mitter are wholly misconceived and without any substance. The proceedings for contempt be it for civil contempt or for criminal contempt, cannot be said to be a criminal case pending before the Court fur enquiry of trial or appeal. Any act constituting contempt must in every case in some way or other interfere or tend to interfere with due course of justice. The object of the discipline enforced by the court in the case of contempt on court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the judge but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. This is more intended for the protection of the public who should be vouchsafed the upholding and maintaining untarnished, the glory and reputation of the court as regarding its authority, fairness and impartiality. The extent anyone affects by his conduct the sancity and purity of justice deserves condemnation. The judge punishing the contemner only performs the duty of upholding the dignity and majesty of the seat of justice. A proceeding for contempt is a matter solely between the court and the alleged contemner, be it civil contempt or criminal contempt. It is neither a civil case nor a criminal case giving rise to litigation between the parties or prosecution of the accused. It is the power of the High Court under the Constitution to deal With persons who interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of justice or bring or tend to bring the dignity of the court into disrespect, be it by disobedience of an order of court or by publication by words spoken or written or by sings or by visible representations or otherwise. In the instant case, on the facts alleged in the petition the acts of contempt complained of against the alleged contemner, in my opinion, cannot be described as criminal contempt. It is wilful disobedience of the order dated 14th October 1978 which is clearly a civil contempt within the meaning of S. 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. There is no allegation or any publication by the alleged contemner which might constitute a criminal contempt. The State is not a party to the contempt proceedings and no allegations have been made against the State as such. Although the contempt proceedings arise out of a criminal case in which the State is a party, that in my opinion, does not give the State or the Public Prosecutor any right to intervene in the matter. A contempt proceeding is an independent proceeding and the court deals with it in an independent jurisdiction which has nothing to do with the original proceeding in which the order or decree was passed or direction was given, violation whereof is complained of in the contempt proceeding. If the argument of Mr. Mitter is to be accepted then in every case whenever any wilful violation of any judgment, decree, order or direction of the Court is complained of then all the parties to that proceeding in which such judgment, decree, order or direction was passed have to be arrayed as respondents although there may be no allegation of any contumacious act or conduct against any of those parties. This in my view is an absurd proposition. The contempt proceeding not being an ordinary criminal case, the procedure: thereof is not and can not be regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which has no application at all to contempt proceedings. Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 is therefore of no avail and the Public Prosecutor is not entitled to appear in a contempt proceeding without any written authority or vakalatnama. The State is also not entitled to intervene or appear in a contempt proceeding unless it is a party thereto. 9 The date of hearing of the Contempt rule would be fixed later. Preliminary contention disposed of.