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Allahabad High Court · body

1979 DIGILAW 740 (ALL)

Sampat Devi v. Santosh Kumari

1979-07-18

S.D.AGARWAL

body1979
JUDGMENT : S.D. AGARWAL, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings u/s 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The property in dispute is house No. 129, Badshahi Mandi, Allahabad. The Petitioners are the landlords and Respondent No. 1 Smt. Santosh Kumari is the tenant. The application for release was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 6.12.1976. The Petitioners filed an appeal. The Additional District Judge, Allahabad, by his judgment dated 2.5.1977 dismissed the appeal. The Petitioner has challenged the orders dated 6.12.1976 and 2.5.1977 by means of the present petition. 3. Sri S.N. Verma, appearing on behalf of the Petitioners has urged that the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority have not at all considered the case of the Petitioners. The judgment is wholly arbitrary and it is not a judgment in the eye of law. Sri H.S. Nigam, appearing on behalf of the tenant Respondent, has urged that the application for release as well as the commissioner's report were before the Prescribed Authority. On that basis the Prescribed Authority had passed the order. The appellate order being an order of affirmance it was not necessary to consider in detail the relevant circumstances. In my opinion the contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has substance. 4. Section 21 of the Act enjoins upon the Prescribed Authority to record a finding to the effect that the building in question is bona-fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held. After having found the need of the landlord bona-fide the Prescribed Authority has under the IVth proviso to sub-section (1) to consider the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application of release as against the likely hardship to the landlord far from the refusal of application. The Prescribed Authority has to record findings in regard to both these matters. In case, however, it finds that the building is not bona-fide required by the landlord then it is not necessary to consider the second question as required by the proviso. 5. u/s 22 of the Act the order passed by the Prescribed Authority is appealable to the District Judge. In case, however, it finds that the building is not bona-fide required by the landlord then it is not necessary to consider the second question as required by the proviso. 5. u/s 22 of the Act the order passed by the Prescribed Authority is appealable to the District Judge. The appellate authority may confirm, vary or rescind the order or remand the case to the Prescribed Authority as it thinks fit. The intention of the Legislature in providing this right of appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority is with a view to enable the District Judge to judicially consider the facts on record and thereafter examine the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority. This is the only appeal provided under the Act and as such it is the duty of the District Judge while deciding the appeal to consider 111 the relevant facts and circumstances and then give his decision. It is not to be lightly treated because after this appeal there is no further right of appeal granted to any other court. 6. In the instant case the Additional District Judge, who decided the appeal, has dealt with the matter in a most cursory manner. He has not examined the relevant circumstances available on the record. He has only observed as follows: The Respondent has no house of his own, and the Appellant-landlord has apparently five rooms in possession. Therefore, the authority below seems to have taken the right view that the need of the landlord cannot be said to be greater than that of the tenant. 7. I have examined the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority has also not considered the facts at all and its finding is also based merely on surmises and conjectures. Such a finding could not have been affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge without considering the relevant facts on the record. The fact that Respondent has no house of his own is not at all relevant as also the fact that the Petitioner has five rooms in his possession is not sufficient. The Additional District Judge has to consider as to how many members of the family, the Petitioner has, whether they were married or not and what was their requirement. The fact that Respondent has no house of his own is not at all relevant as also the fact that the Petitioner has five rooms in his possession is not sufficient. The Additional District Judge has to consider as to how many members of the family, the Petitioner has, whether they were married or not and what was their requirement. In the application for release it has been categorically stated that amongst the members of the Petitioner's family there are three adult sons, two of them were married before the filing of the application and one was married after the application was filed. It has further been stated that there is a common latrine causing inconvenience. In the commissioner's report it has been further found that two of the five rooms are used as a shop. These were all factors which were to be considered by the learned District Judge. The Additional District Judge has however, without any valid reason refused to consider the documents filed by the Petitioner. These documents were in rebuttal and the Petitioner was justified in filing these documents. In the circumstances the judgment of the Additional District Judge is most arbitrary judgment and is no judgment in the eye of law. 8. In the result I allow the petition and quash the order of the Addl. District Judge dated 2nd May, 1977 and direct that the appeal be decided afresh in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law at an early date. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.