JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. - This appeal arises out of consolidation proceeding The dispute relates to an area of 8,38 acres. The Respondents to this appeal have been litigating in respect of the plots in dispute ever since 1942 but have consistently failed in their three rounds of litigation in the revenue courts, and then they also failed before the consolidation authorities. They filed a writ petition which however, succeeded, leading to the present appeal. 2. Lakhmi Chandra and others were ejected at the suit of Gokaran Das, Lambardar of the mahal. Gokaran Das in execution took possession on 12th August, 1936. 3. The Respondents claimed that Gokaran Das executed a registered lease in their favour on 25th September, 1936, in respect of 5.97 acres of the land in dispute; The rest 2.41 acres area was given by him to Bankey Lal and others (the Respondents) under an oral lease, Gokaran Das died on 25th June, 1940. Nawab Singh was appointed lambardar in his place on 21st April, 1941. 4. Bankey Lal and others Respondents instituted a suit for declaration of title u/s 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act on 30th June, 1942, This suit was dismissed on the finding that the Plaintiffs had been ejected by some of the recorded cosharers on 1st July, 1939. They hence could not sue. for declaration. Appeal against this decree failed. The findings were affirmed. The Board of Revenue dismissed a second appeal on 5th December, 1946, 5. While the appeal was pending Bankey Lal and others filed another suit u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act for the ejectment of Nawab Singh and others on 3rd Jane, 1943. This suit was dismissed on 14th March, 1944, on the finding that the Plaintiff's had been ejected by recorded cosharers claiming to be land-holders, Bankey Lal and others filed an appeal. In the appeal they made an application that the file of the appeal be considered during pendency of the second appeal, filed by them before the Board of Revenue in the earlier declaratory suit. This prayer was accepted. 6. After the dismissal of their appeal by the Board of Revenue in the declaratory suit Bankey Lal and others did not apply for revival of the appeal against the dismissal of the suit u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. They filed a third suit on 25th November, 1947. This prayer was accepted. 6. After the dismissal of their appeal by the Board of Revenue in the declaratory suit Bankey Lal and others did not apply for revival of the appeal against the dismissal of the suit u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. They filed a third suit on 25th November, 1947. This was u/s 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. This suit was dismissed on 27th September, 1949, on the finding that to the previous litigation it had been finally held that the Plaintiffs had been dispossessed by Nawab Singh and others on 1st July, 1939, claiming as land-holders. That finding operates as res-judicata. The Plaintiffs case that they were dispossessed in 1942 was not correct, It was held that the suit was barred by limitation. 7. The Respondents Bankey Lal and others filed an appeal. The Additional Commissioner held that the suit was not barred by limitation because the cause of action for the suit u/s 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act accrued to the Plaintiff on 21st April, 1941, when Nawab Singh was appointed as the lambardar. The Plaintiffs will be deemed to have been dispossessed by the land-holders on or after 21st April, 1941. Since the other issues in the suit had not been decided the same was, remanded to the trial court, 8. Nawab Singh and others preferred a revision before the Board of Revenue against the remand order. The board of Revenue dismissed the revision on the finding, that the remand order was not a case decided and that the question of limitation could be agitated in appeal after the case had been finally decided. The preliminary objection succeeded and the revenue was dismissed . 9. While the suit u/s 183 was pending before the trial court after remand consolidation proceedings commenced, Bankey Lal and others filed objections because in the basic year the plots were recorded in the name of the other party. An observed earlier, they failed before all the consolidation authorities: The consolidation authorities found: (a) that the lease dated 25th September, 1936, was not proved in the present proceedings; (b) the case of oral lease was not believable; (c) the suit u/s 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was barred by time and bad also abated by reason of death of certain parties. 10. The learned single Judge reversed all the three findings and allowed the writ petition. 10. The learned single Judge reversed all the three findings and allowed the writ petition. He held that the lease of 1936 was a registered one. Its formal proof was dispensed with by Section 90(2) of the Evidence Act as added by the U.P. Legislature, and so a certified copy was admissible, it was also held that the decision of the Board of Revenue that the suit u/s 183 was within time was binding on the consolidation authorities. The plea that the suit had abated by reason of the death of certain parties was not accepted by the Board and that determination was equally binding. 11. We will take up the question of limitation first. 12. The revenue courts had found that Bankey Lal and others were dispossessed on 1st July, 1939, by some cosharers who claimed to be land-holders. This was a finding given in the declaratory suit as well as suit u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. In view of this finding Bankey Lal and others had to file a suit for possession u/s 99 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1926, within six months, i. e., till 31st December, 1939, before the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 came into force. They not having filed any such suit, their right became extinct and finished. That is the correct position in law as we (sic) 13. In the Suit filed u/s 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act the first appellate court held that Bankey Lal and others were ejected by some cosharers and not by the lambardar. Nawab Singh became the lambardar on 21-4-1941 and hence the Plaintiffs will be deemed to have been dispossessed by the land-holders on or after that date. This view is manifestly erroneous, Nawab Singh was one of the co-sharers who dispossessed Bankey Lal and others. The dispossession took place on 1st July, 1939. The finding in the suit u/s 180 was that they were claiming as land-holders. The dispossession of Bankey Lal and others, if at all by persons claiming to be land-holders took place on 1st July, 1939. Nawab Singh became lambardar on 21st April, 1941. Thereafter he did, not commit any act of trespass or of dispossession of Bankey Lal and others. The dispossession of Bankey Lal and others could not be referred to any act or omission on the part of Nawab Singh after he became the lambardar. Nawab Singh became lambardar on 21st April, 1941. Thereafter he did, not commit any act of trespass or of dispossession of Bankey Lal and others. The dispossession of Bankey Lal and others could not be referred to any act or omission on the part of Nawab Singh after he became the lambardar. It is entirely fallacious to say that the cause of action for the suit u/s 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act accrued to Bankey Lal and others only after Nawab Singh became the lambardar. Section 183 provides a remedy for wrongful dispossession by a land-holder "or any person claiming as landlord to have a right to eject" the tenant. A tenant can well sue such a person u/s 183. In view of the finding recorded in the suit u/s 180 that Nawab Singh and others dispossessed Bankey Lal and others claiming to be land-holders, the suit u/s 183 could be filed soon after 1st July, 1939. The cause of action for such a suit did not arise on 21st April, 1941, when Nawab Singh was appointed the lambardar, because after his appointment he did not commit any act of dispossession. As already observed, remedy against dispossession on 1-7-1939,' by persons claiming to be land-holders was u/s 99 of the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1926, which provided a period of limitation of only six months. That expired on 31st December, 1939. Thereafter Bankey Lal and others had no subsisting right to sue. 14. It was, however, submitted that the finding of the Addl. Commissioner on the question of limitation regarded in the suit under section183 having become final operated as res-judicata in consolidation proceeding 15. We are unable to agree the. Additional Commissioner after recording a finding that the suit u/s 183 was within limitation remanded it for retrial of other issues. The remand order was challenged before the Board of Revenue by way of a revision which dismissed it on the ground that the remand order did not constitute a case decided and hence the; revision was not maintainable. In the order there were certain observations concurring with the finding of the Additional Commissioner on the question of limitation, But this cannot be regarded as a finding, because the revision was held not maintainable. In the order there were certain observations concurring with the finding of the Additional Commissioner on the question of limitation, But this cannot be regarded as a finding, because the revision was held not maintainable. The finding of the Additional Commissioner could be challenged after the decision of the suit on remand and then in appeal against the final decree before the Board of Revenue. The finding of the Additional Commissioner cannot hence be held to have become final between the parties. It was open to scrutiny at a later stage. The suit was pending in the trial court after remand when consolidation proceedings commenced and the same was stayed, and then must have been abated. 16. When proceedings commenced before the consolidation authorities, there was no binding finding on the question of limitation so far as the suit u/s 183 is concerned. On the other hand the finding with respect to the date of dispossession and its consequences as recorded in the sun u/s 180 became-final between the parties, True that Bankey Lal and others filed an appeal against the dismissal of their suit u/s 180, but they themselves got it consigned to the record room and never got it revived. For all practical operate as res judicata in subsequent suit u/s 180 or in the declaratory suit Bankey Lal and others had thus so subsisting title left in the (sic) is dispute (sic) of the registered (sic) in their favour. The case of or (sic) was (sic) disbelieved by the consolidation authorities. the learned Single Judge had not upset that finding. The writ petition.. in so far as this part of the land in suit is concerned ought to have been dismissed. 17. The finding whether the lease of 1936 was properly proved or not as well as the, question whether the suit u/s 183 had abated by reason of the death of certain parties do not really arise in view of the finding given by us that the rights of Bankey Lal and others had extinguished long time back. 18. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside, and the writ petition is dismissed with costs.